Judgment :- Thomas, J. The sole question which survives now, after the lapse of nearly a decade since the landlord and the tenant have forked each other with the rent control proceedings, is whether the tenant can be allowed to seek protection envisaged in the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the act). 2. For the purpose of this revision there is no need to recite the entire facts or the history of this litigation. So we are mentioning only those facts barely necessary for the purpose of deciding the question. Eviction was applied for on the ground that landlord's eldest son Jayarajan was in need of starting a business in the building. Initially the tenant succeeded as the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority have concurrently held that the landlord failed to make out the need. This was on the premise that the landlord did not state the exact nature of the business his son had in contemplation. But, in a previous revision this court, following the decision of a Division Bench in Narayani v. District Judge (1991(1) KLT 646) remanded the case to the Appellate Authority for deciding the appeal afresh. Appellate Authority found after remand that the landlord's need to accommodate his eldest son Jayarajan' s proposed grocery business is bona fide. 3. But during the pendency of the rent control proceedings a development took place. Landlord got vacant possession of another building which is situated adjacent to the petition schedule building. On its basis the tenant advanced a contention in the appeal, after remand, that he is entitled to protection from eviction as envisaged in the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. The landlord admitted that he got vacant possession of that oilier building (which is the next door room in the same edifice). However, he contended that the said room is set apart for his second son to start a flour mill and that the building is not useful as a grocery shop. 4. Appellate Authority accepted the stand of the landlord and hence passed order of eviction which is now impugned in this revision. Learned counsel for the tenant contended that no landlord can wriggle out from the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act by pleading excuses for not using the building in his possession. 5. 4. Appellate Authority accepted the stand of the landlord and hence passed order of eviction which is now impugned in this revision. Learned counsel for the tenant contended that no landlord can wriggle out from the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act by pleading excuses for not using the building in his possession. 5. The first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act reads thus: "Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so". Section 11(3) recognises the principle that in spite of the restrictions imposed against eviction of the tenant the genuine need of the landlord must supercede even the tenant's need. But through the three provisos to the sub-section the legislature provided certain inbuilt safeguards for tenants against unbridled use of the ground by their landlords. The second proviso is embodied to keep even the genuine need of the landlord (to have vacant possession of the building ) at bay vis-a-vis the tenant's need, if the source of livelihood of the tenant would be at peril as a consequence of eviction. The second proviso warrants consideration only after the landlord succeeds in establishing that his need is bona fide. Otherwise, court is not required to proceed to the second proviso at all. But the first proviso is different. Tt embodies a wholesome principle having a perceptible bearing on the core of the ground itself as it also helps the court to decide whether the need expressed by the landlord is bona fide. The idea is simple. When a landlord has one building in his possession, how can he seek the help of the court to evict his tenant of another building on the ground of his own need? The answer is that unless there are special reasons the landlord cannot be helped by the court to evict the tenant. In the absence of special reasons the fact of landlord having possession of another building of his own-in the same town or village may in some-cases tell upon the genuine ss of his need. The legislature, therefore, insists on special reasons. In the absence of special reasons the fact of landlord having possession of another building of his own-in the same town or village may in some-cases tell upon the genuine ss of his need. The legislature, therefore, insists on special reasons. The special reasons should be such as would satisfy the court that, in spite of landlord having possession of another building of his own, it would be just and proper to evict the tenant. The first proviso, is, in fact, so embedded in the main body of the sub-section that it is really an integral part of it. S.11(3) of the Act would have been incomplete without the first proviso. Even if such a proviso was not specifically set forth in the sub-section, the principle involved therein could have been read into the sub-section. The utility in relegating the principle in the form of a proviso was perhaps to cast the onus of proof at different stages of consideration. 6. In Sundaram Filial v.Pattab Iranian (AIR 1985 SC 582) Supreme Court after referring to the English decisions regarding the use of provisos in a section such as Rhodda Urban District Council v. T. V. Railway Co. (1909 - A.C. 253) and Jennings v. Kdly (1940 A.C. 206) has observed thus: "Generally speaking a proviso is intended to limit the enacted provision so as to except something which would have otherwise been within it or in some measure to modify the enacting clause. Some time a proviso may be embedded in the main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a substantive provision itself (emphasis supplied) The primary burden, to show that landlord has a building of his own in possession, is-of course on the tenant unless it is an admitted fact. When once it is shown that the landlord is in possession of another building of his own in the same town or village the burden swings over to the landlord to establish special reasons. This burden can be discharged either by his own evidence or through the answers elicited from the witnesses of the tenant or through other modes. 7. What may be the special reasons which could possibly be shown under the first proviso. It is not possible to catalogue such special reasons. This burden can be discharged either by his own evidence or through the answers elicited from the witnesses of the tenant or through other modes. 7. What may be the special reasons which could possibly be shown under the first proviso. It is not possible to catalogue such special reasons. There can be a variety of such special reasons and some may fit in with the facts of one case and others may apply to the facts of another case. If the landlord shows that the need is to start his own trade, then the mere fact that the other building in his possession is only a residential one would prima facie be a special reason. Similarly, when he establishes that the building in which he resides or carries on business is insufficient for his requirement it can be another special reason. Another example is, when his son or daughter, after marriage, wants to have a separate independent establishment, it could also be a special reason in certain circumstances. The above are only illustrative and not exhaustive (vide New Woodlands Hotel v. Varkey -1974 KLT 867). 8. Considering the first proviso in the above angle, we have to see whether there is any special reason to support the landlord's claim in spile of his having possession of another building. He set up two reasons. First is that the building in his possession does not have any roof ceiling. We are of the opinion that this draw back can easily be remedied by the landlord as the cost of providing such a roof ceiling may not be substantial when he proposes to make a good investment for starting a new grocery shop. Second is that the already vacated room is intended to be used by the second son for starting a flour mill. In the circumstances of the case the said reason cannot be regarded as a special reason because it was his eldest son's need which arose first and priority must normally be given to it. We do not know whether second son wants to start a flour mill at all and the landlord did not adduce any evidence in that line. 9. Learned counsel for the landlord lastly made a plea for granting an opportunity to adduce evidence to establish special reasons. We do not know whether second son wants to start a flour mill at all and the landlord did not adduce any evidence in that line. 9. Learned counsel for the landlord lastly made a plea for granting an opportunity to adduce evidence to establish special reasons. Why he did not avail himself of the opportunity when the matter was earlier remanded to the Appellate Authority? S.18(3) of the Act provides such an opportunity by using the words "after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court". It was open to the landlord to apply for additional evidence to be collected at the appellate stage if he wanted to establish special reasons. We are not inclined to re-open this old litigation since the landlord has the right to start a fresh litigation on the cause of action based on the need of the second son if it is bona fide. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Appellate Authority. Revision is disposed of accordingly.