JUDGMENT : 1. The appeal impugns the judgment and order dated 16th April, 1971 of the High Court of Madras. It arises out of a suit filed before the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, for partition of the estate of Koneri Gounder who died on 8th July, 1926. 2. Succinctly stated, these are the relevant facts. On 5th July, 1956 Koneri Gounder executed a will. He divided his estate in two equal parts. With one moiety, bequeathed to the plaintiff, we are not here concerned. The other moiety, under the terms of the will, was to go to three persons, one of whom was the defendant. These persons, the will stated, would enjoy the said moiety with absolute right and freedom after the lifetime of the testator and his wife, Sowbagiammal. The will directed the plaintiff (whose legal representatives are the respondents) to maintain the family of the testator by obeying his wife, paying and discharging his debts and collecting outstanding dues. The will closed with the statement, "The entire terms of this will shall come into effect only after the lifetime of myself and my wife, Sowbagiammal." 3. Sowbagiammal died on 4th December, 1962. The suit was instituted after her death. The only question for determination in this appeal is whether, under the terms of the will, a limited estate was conferred upon Sowbagiammal in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance and whether, therefore, the terms of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applied and the limited estate conferred upon her had enlarged so that she had become the full owner thereof. 4. The High Court took the view that the testator had intended to give a bare life estate to his widow, not a Hindu widow's estate, and that Section 14(2) of the Act applied so that Sowbagiammal had not become absolute owner of the property. 5. Much water has flowed since the High Court delivered its judgment in 1971. This court has delivered a string of judgments dealing with Section 14 of the Act. All these judgments have been summarised in the concurring judgments of two learned Judges in Thota Seeharathamma and another v. Thota Manikyamma (dead) by L.Rs. and others, (1991) 4 SCC 312 . Much water has flowed since the High Court delivered its judgment in 1971. This court has delivered a string of judgments dealing with Section 14 of the Act. All these judgments have been summarised in the concurring judgments of two learned Judges in Thota Seeharathamma and another v. Thota Manikyamma (dead) by L.Rs. and others, (1991) 4 SCC 312 . Put concisely, it has been held that Section 14(2) of the ACt is in the nature of a proviso or an exception and it comes into operation only if acquisition by any of the methods set out in the Explanation to Section 14(1) is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the Hindu woman. If her case fell under the provisions of Section 14(1), the Hindu woman became the full owner of the property. The concept of a Hindu widow's estate was not relevant. It was enough if the Hindu woman had even a vestige of title to the property and she had acquired it by virtue of a pre-existing right. That the limited right had been conferred upon her by a document did not attract the provisions of Section 14(1) if the Hindu woman had a pre-existing right to maintenance. The document only recognised and gave effect to the pre-existing right to maintenance. The document did not have to state that the limited estate was being conferred upon her in lieu of her pre-existing right. 6. The terms of the will leave us in no doubt that a life interest in the property of the deceased was created in Sowbagiammal's favour and that it was in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance. The life interest commenced upon the death of the testator on 8th July, 1926. Sowbagiammal died on 4th December, 1962. By that time the Act had come into operation and, by reason of Section 14(1), Sowbagiammal's limited interest in the property had blossomed into full ownership thereof. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in Gumpha (Smt) and others v. Jaibai, (1994) 2 SCC 511 , and, on the strength of this judgment, submitted that when a Hindu woman had acquired a limited interest in property under the terms of a will the provisions of Section 14(1) were not attracted. Learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to the judgment of this Court in Gumpha (Smt) and others v. Jaibai, (1994) 2 SCC 511 , and, on the strength of this judgment, submitted that when a Hindu woman had acquired a limited interest in property under the terms of a will the provisions of Section 14(1) were not attracted. Smt. Gumpha's was a case in which the testator had died in 1958, i.e., after the coming into force of the Act. The Court considered the scope of Section 14 and Section 30 of the Act. The latter empowered a Hindu to dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property, which was capable of being so disposed of by him, in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other law for the time being in force which was applicable to Hindus. The Explanation to Section 30 stated that the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenery property was, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or any other law for the time in force, deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by a Hindu within the meaning of Section 30. The Court, having regard to the use of the expansive language in Section 30 made wider by the Explanation, was left in no doubt that the legislature intended that any property disposed of by will by a Hindu who was capable of disposing of such property "shall be subject to restrictions and conditions imposed by the testator himself in the will". It was held that if a Hindu woman acquired-'possession of property after the coming into force of the Act and that possession was traceable to a will or other instrument described in Section 14 then she would not get a higher right than that stipulated in the will or document. The purpose and the legislative intention which surfaced from a combined reading of the two sub-sections was that Section 14 attempted to remove the disability which was imposed by the customary Hindu law on the acquisition of rights by a Hindu female but it did not enlarge or enhance the right which she got under a will giving her a limited estate under Section 30 of the Act. 8. 8. Now, Sowbagiammal did not acquire the life interest in the property of the testator under a will under Section 30 of the Act. The will spoke from the date on which the testator died, namely, 8th July, 1926, which is when Sowbagiammal's limited interest in the property came into existence. She died after the coming into force of the Act. Under the terms of Section 14 of the Act, her limited interest was enlarged into an absolute right to the property. The decision in Smt. Gumpha case is, therefore, not germane. 9. Learned counsel also drew attention to the judgment in Bhura and others v. Kashi Ram, (1994) 2 SCC 111 . This was not a case under Section 14 of the Act and has no bearing upon the issue involved in this appeal. 10. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside to the extent that it holds that Sowbagiammal had not become the full owner of the property in suit subsequent to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 11. There shall be no order as to costs.