Raghunath Singh v. (Minor) Vikram Sharma — 1995 DIGILAW 997 (RAJ)

Honble KAPUR, J. – As far as the dispute between the parties in this particular case is concerned it has been settled out of the court and no adjudication in favour of either of the parties is to be made. However, the point which has been referred to this larger Bench requires an answer to set at rest the controversy as to which view taken by the different Benches is correct as it arises quite often before the appellate courts. The point to be decided is whether the provisions of section 13(3) ,13(4) and 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) apply to the appeals as well or they are applicable only to the suits pending before the trial court. (2). Section 13(i) of the Act enumerates all the grounds on which the landlord would be entitled to evict a tenant and the circumstances under which the court can pass a decree for eviction. If the tenant is ready and willing to pay the rent to the full extent allowable by the Act, no decree for eviction would be passed. But the ground of default would be available to the landlord if the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due to him for six months. Further protection is available to the tenant when the suit is on the ground of default in payment of rent. This further protection contained in section 13(3) onwards of the Act reads as under : "13(3) in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section the court shall on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six percent per annum from the date when such amount was payable up to the date of determina- tion: Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section the court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of filing of the suit. (4) The tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord , month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period up to which determination has been made by the fif- teenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3). (5) if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub- section(4) on the date or within time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. (6) if a tenant makes deposit or payment as required sub- section(4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the court against him: Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section , if having obtained such benefits or benefit under 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of the accommodation for six months. (7) if in any suit referred to in sub-section (3), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the court shall decide the dispute finally at the time of decision of the suit and may, at that time pass such orders regarding costs or interest,as having regard to the circumstances of the case if deems fit. (8) in case at the time of decision of the suit-(a) the court finds that the amount of rent provisionally determined by it under sub-section (3) and deposited in court or paid to the landlord under sub- section (4) is less than the amount of rent finally decided as payable by the tenant the Court shall pass a decree for the balance amout against the tenant, (b) the court finds that the amount determined and deposited or paid as aforesaid in excess of the amount of rent finally decided as payable by the tenant the court shall, in the event of passing a decree for eviction against the tenant on ground other than that set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1), also pass a decree in favour of the tenant for such excess amount deposited or paid by him and in the event of dismissing the suit for eviction it shall direct in the decree that such excess amount will be adjusted by the landlord against future rent payable by the tenant. 13(A)-Special provisions relating to pending and other matters. 13(A)-Special provisions relating to pending and other matters. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the amending Ordinance or in any other law :– (a) no court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in court, within such time such aggregate of the amount of rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit , as may be directed by the court and in accordance with that clause; (b) in every such proceeding, the court shall on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commence- ment of the Amending Ordinance notwithstanding any order to the contrary determine the amount of rent in arrears up to the date of the order as also the amount of the interest thereon at six percent per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the land lord; and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed as aforesaid the proceeding shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default; (c) the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or application for revisions, preferred or made, after commencement of the Amending Ordinance, against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variations that in clause (b), for the expression "from the date of the commencement of the Amending Act", the expression "from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision" shall be substituted; (d) no court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the Amending Ordinance, pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction solely on the ground that due to the death of the tenant as defined in clause (vii) of section 3 as it stood before the commencement of the amending Ordinance, his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of section 3 were not entitled to the protection against under this Act as it stood before the commencement of the amending Ordinance; (e) no decree for eviction passed by any court before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance shall, unless the same already stands executed before such commencement, be exe- cuted against the surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of Section 3 if such decree was passed solely on the ground as is referred to in clause (d) and such decree shall be deemed to be a nullity as against them; and (f) the provisions of clause (d) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals, or applications for revisions preferred or made, after the commencement of the Amending Ordinance; Explanation : For the purposes of the section, (a) "Amending Ordinance " means the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment ) Ordinance, 1950; and (b) "proceeding" means suit, appeal or application for revision." (3). The substance of these provisions is that in a civil suit after filing of the written statement and before framing of issues the court has to provisionally determine the amount of rent to be paid by the tenant along with interest and in case the tenant pays the provisional amount determined by the court and further pays or deposits the rent, month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding 15 days as may be extended by the court, then no decree for eviction on the ground of default shall be passed by the court. However, if the tenant fails to deposit the provisional rent determined or fails to pay the monthly rent by the due date, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. The further provision is that if the tenant has once obtained the benefit of the provision of section 13(5) of the Act in respect of any accommodation and he again makes a default in payment of rent of that acco- mmodation for six months, then he would not be entitled to this protection. If there is any dispute about the amount of rent payable the same shall be decided at the time of final decision of the suit and if less amount has been paid then decree for balance shall be passed and if the excess amount has been paid then the excess amount shall be adjusted against the future rent. (4). The question to be decided is whether the tenant has to deposit the monthly rent as provided in section 13(4) of the Act month by month subsequent to the period for which the determination has been made only during the pendency of the suit or during the pendency of the appeal also and in case he fails to deposit this amount during the pendency of appeal can his defence against eviction be struck out. The existing decisions of this court on this subject may be looked into before coming to the decisions of the other High Courts and the Supreme Court. (5). Kamruddin vs. Wahid Ali (1), decided by justice S.N. Bhargava (as he then was ) is the direct authority on this subject . The existing decisions of this court on this subject may be looked into before coming to the decisions of the other High Courts and the Supreme Court. (5). Kamruddin vs. Wahid Ali (1), decided by justice S.N. Bhargava (as he then was ) is the direct authority on this subject . It has been held the section 13 of the Act when read as a whole clearly applies to suits and the tenant is not under an obligation to deposit the rent month by month after the decision of the suit. It has been further held that an appeal cannot be held to be a continua- tion of the suit for purposes of the second part of section 13(4) of the Act. While arriving at this conclusion Kedar Nath Gupta vs. Bishan Das (2), Kewal vs. Sesmal (3) and S.B.Civil Revision Petition No. 267 of 1976 decided on 11.7.1979 were relied upon and Mrinalini B. Shah and another vs. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (4) was distinguished. In Kamruddins case the trial court decreed the suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity but as far as the default in payment of rent was concerned, it held that the tenant had obtained protection by depositing the rent. In appeal the District Judge struck out the defence of the tenant on the ground that he had failed to deposit the rent regularly during the pendency of the appeal. The matter came up before this court in second appeal and after considering various decisions, the view of this court in the earlier case mentioned above was followed. (6). In Kedar Nath Guptas case (Supra) which was a suit for ejectment on the ground of default as well as for reasonable and bonafide necessity, the tenant took protection of section 13A of the Act by depositing the rent and ulti- mately the suit was dismissed. The landlord preferred an appeal and it was during the pendency of the appeal that the landlord made an application under section 13(5) of the Act stating that the tenant had not deposited the rent month by month by 15th day of succeeding month and his defence against eviction should be struck out. This application was dismissed by the Addl. The landlord preferred an appeal and it was during the pendency of the appeal that the landlord made an application under section 13(5) of the Act stating that the tenant had not deposited the rent month by month by 15th day of succeeding month and his defence against eviction should be struck out. This application was dismissed by the Addl. District Judge and the appeal by the landlord before the High Court was also dismissed by a detailed order observing that when he was not liable to deposit the rent month by month in the suit itself such a liability could not arise during the pendency of the appeal. (7). In Kewal vs. Sesmal (supra) the suit for eviction was on the ground of default and personal necessity. The rent was determined under section 13(3) of the Act and the rent was deposited within time. The suit for ejectment was ultimately dismissed. During the pendency of the appeal preferred by the landlord an application under Section 13(5) of the Act was filed by the landlord stating that the tenant had not paid rent during the pendency of the suit as well as in the appellate court hence his defence should be struck out. The tenants plea that it was not necessary for him to deposit the rent month by month after the dismissal of the Suit for ejectment, was not accepted by, the first appellate court and his defence against eviction was struck out. However, he preferred an appeal before this court in which it was held that the tenant was under no obligation to deposit the rent month by month after the suit was dismissed. (8). In Prahalad Singh vs. Mohan Das (5), the suit for eviction was dismissed in default. It was held that section 13(4) of the Act applies only when the suit is pending and if the suit is not pending then the tenant has no right to deposit the amount of rent in court and there is no question of striking out the defence for non-payment of rent. It was further held that after restoration there should be fresh determination of dues. Relying on Kamruddins case (Supra) it was again held in Rajendra Kumar and others vs. Kanhaiyalal (6), that section 13(4) applies in pending suits only and appeal is not continuation of suit. (9). It was further held that after restoration there should be fresh determination of dues. Relying on Kamruddins case (Supra) it was again held in Rajendra Kumar and others vs. Kanhaiyalal (6), that section 13(4) applies in pending suits only and appeal is not continuation of suit. (9). Honble Justice Kochar has also taken the same view in S.B.Civil Misc. Petition No. 43 of 1990 Dharambir Bhatia vs. Ghanshyam L.Ahuja decided on March 7, 1991 that there could be no order striking out the defence if the rent is not deposited during the pendency of the appeal. (10). But a contrary view has been taken by this court in Durgalal Jadiya vs. Smt. Sarju Devi, S.B.Civil Second Appeal No.55 of 1981 , decided on 11th Sept. 1990 by the then Honble Chief Justice Shri K.C.Agrawal. In this case the suit was brought by the landlord on the grounds of arrears of rent and personal necessity. The tenant contested the suit alleging that he had offered the rent but the landlord did not accept. On 23.10.1975 the tenant moved an application offering to pay rent as well as interest . The trial court determined the rent along with interest and directed to deposit it within two months. The suit was decreed and the tenant preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court, namely, the Additional District Judge, Jaipur who dismissed the appeal. The contention before the lower appellate court was whether the defendant tenant moved the application dated 23.10.1975 under section 13 A of the Act and if he deposited the amount determined by the court then merely because the appellant failed to deposit monthly rent by the 15th of subsequent month his defence against eviction could be struck out ? Going into the requirements of section 13 A of the Act it was held that the application under section 13 A of the Act but was under section 13(3) of the Act and as the rent was not deposited after 23.10.1975 regularly month by month the rights against eviction could be struck out by the appellate court. This court in second appeal observed that the appeal is a continuation of the suit therefore the provision of section 13(3), 13(4) and (5) of the Act would apply to the appeal also. This court in second appeal observed that the appeal is a continuation of the suit therefore the provision of section 13(3), 13(4) and (5) of the Act would apply to the appeal also. In this case the non-compliance of section 13(4) of the Act was during the pendency of the suit as well as appeal but it has been specially held that the above provisions apply to the appeal also. It was held if the non-compliance was during the pendency of the suit then the appellate court could have struck out the defence even though the trial court had not done so while deciding the appeal the earlier decisions of this court have not been referred and taken note of . (11). In M/s. Bahirumal Basdev vs. Lalit Kishore (7), it has been observed: "Both the parties are in agreement that so far as the precedents are concerned, judicial properly requires that if a Bench of a High Court is unable to agree with the decision already rendered by other co-ordinate Bench, or the same Bench of the same High Court , the question should be referred to a larger Bench. Otherwise the decisions of the High Court will not only lose respect in the eyes of the public, but will also make the task of subordinate courts difficult. It was laid in Tribhovandas Purshottam das Tha- kkar vs. Ratilal Motilal Patel ( AIR 1968 SC 372 ):- "Precedents which enunciate rules of law from the foundation of administration of justice under our system. It has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgments of courts and co- ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the full Benches of this court and of this court (sic). The reason of the rule which makes a precedent binding lies in the desire to secure uniformity and certainly in the law." (12). The point which has to be answered by this Full Bench was published in the cause list and several advocates appeared to assist this court for which we are thankful to them. (13). Mr. Chadda appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that sections 13(3) (4) and (5) of the Act cannot be said to be applicable to appeals. The point which has to be answered by this Full Bench was published in the cause list and several advocates appeared to assist this court for which we are thankful to them. (13). Mr. Chadda appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that sections 13(3) (4) and (5) of the Act cannot be said to be applicable to appeals. His first submission is that appeal is a continuation of suit only for certain purposes and not for all purposes. In this connection he has placed reliance on Dayawati and another vs. Inderjit and others (8). In this case there was an amendment in the Debt Laws giving relief in respect of excessive interest to be applicable to pending suits. This question arose whether this relief could be granted in appeal or not. It was observed: "The only difference between a suit and an appeal is this that an appeal only reviews and corrects the proceedings in a cause already constituted but does not create the cause".As it is intended to interfere in the cause by its means, it is a part of it, and in connec- tion with some matters and some statutes it is said that an appeal is a continuation of a suit. In the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act (7 of 1934) , the intention is to give relief in respect of excessive interest in a suit which is pending. A preliminary decree in a suit for foreclosure does not terminate the suit. The appeal is a part of the cause because the preliminary decree which emerges from appeal will be the decree, which can become a final decree." (14).Reliance has been placed on a 7 Judges Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sharadchand vs. Vishnupant (9) . Referring to the provisions of MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961, it was held that in a suit for eviction of tenant where the trial court ordered the tenant to deposit rent month by month, but ultimately the suit was dismissed then it was not necessary for the tenant to continue to deposit the rent in court on the presumption that the landlord would file an appeal. It was also held that appeal is not a continuation of suit for all purposes but it has to be examined in the context of statutes. Whether the appeal can be said to be continuation of the suit. It was also held that appeal is not a continuation of suit for all purposes but it has to be examined in the context of statutes. Whether the appeal can be said to be continuation of the suit. There was an earlier decision of the Full Bench consisting of five Judges holding the same view but the matter was referred to the Full Bench of seven Judges because it was contended that the same was no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in Radha Kishan Rao V. Gopal Modi and ors (10). This Supreme Court decision arose out of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and the differences between M.P. and Bihar Act were pointed out and it was observed that in the Bihar Act the landlord could make an application under section 11 A not only in the trial court but also in appellate court because of the words `at any stage of the suit it could be said that an appeal is stage of the suit. This was not so in the MP Act. (15). Mr. Chadda has referred to the words and phrase `hearing of the suit in section 13(5) of the Act in order to contend that it is only during the pendency of the suit that section 13(4) is applicable and if the defence is struck out then immediately their could be a hearing in the suit and such a procedure is not available in an appeal where the only procedure is hearing and not calling upon to file any written statement , framing of issues and recording of evidence etc. (16). Mr.R.K.Agrawal has supported the contention of Mr.Chadda with the additional ground that life of an order under section 13(3) of the Act is only till the end of the suit because according to section 13(8) of the Act the provisional rent determined under sub-section (3) of section 13 and deposited under sub-section (4) of section 13 is to be adjusted. If less amount is paid to the land- lord then the decree is to be passed in favour of the landlord and if excess rent had been paid then it is to be adjusted against future rent. Thus the proceedings under sections 13(3) and 13(4) are provisional which come to an end with the conclusion of the suit . If less amount is paid to the land- lord then the decree is to be passed in favour of the landlord and if excess rent had been paid then it is to be adjusted against future rent. Thus the proceedings under sections 13(3) and 13(4) are provisional which come to an end with the conclusion of the suit . Under section 13(3) only the provisional rent determined has to be deposited . After conclusion of the suit there is no order determining the provisional rent which has to be complied with during the pendency of the appeal. (17). In Kundan Lal vs. Angan Lal (11) the matter arose out of Delhi Rent Control Act and it was held that the stage of striking out the defence is before the case is taken up for hearing and therefore it cannot be referable to the result in the case which remains unknown at that stage. The fact that the ground of default ultimately failed was wholly immaterial. The order striking out the defence was not revocable. The provision for striking out defence is limited to non-payment of provisional rent determined by the court and not for failure to pay the final rent. (18). Mr.M.M.Ranjan, Mr.P.N.Agrawal, Mr. P.C.Jain have all supported that sections 13(3),(4) and (5) of the Act are not applicable to appeals unless there are specific directions by the appellate court. (19). The words quoted in all the sub-sections of section 13 have to be given the same meaning and this shall be clear mainly by the duty assigned to the trial court under section 13(3) of the Act. (20). Mr. A.K. Bhandari alone has submitted that the contrary view is correct and has contended that when the Act has been enacted to control rent and eviction, the rights of the landlord are also to be safeguarded. A tenant who commits one default on one occasion can be given safeguard but if the tenant commits defaults again and again he should not be given the same protection. Thus, if the tenant commits defaults in the payment of rent during the pendency of the appeal then the landlord should not be asked to file a second suit but should be given a relief in the appeal itself. (21). Thus, if the tenant commits defaults in the payment of rent during the pendency of the appeal then the landlord should not be asked to file a second suit but should be given a relief in the appeal itself. (21). It is argued that in appeal it is not necessary to pass a fresh order in accordance with section 13(3) of the Act because such an order is automatically revived as soon as the appeal is filed. He has placed reliance on the cases reported in AIR 1977 SC 1217 (supra) , AIR 1980 SC 954 (supra), AIR 1992 SC 1097 (12), 1979 RLW 458 (supra),1981 RLW 77 (supra) and AIR 1966 SC 1423 (supra). (22). We have given our thoughtful considerations to be question which has been referred to this larger Bench and in our opinion the law as laid down in Kamruddin vs. Wahid Ali [1987 (1) RLR 290] is the correct law. The decision in Durgalal Jadiya vs. Smt. Sarju Devi, if at all it can be said to be taking a contrary view, cannot be said to be laying down the correct proposition. Our reason are as under : The scope of appeal is to see whether the findings given by the trial court are correct. There cannot be a fresh cause before the appellate court. With this background the appeal cannot be said to be a continuation of suit for all purposes. We have to examine the provisions of section 13(3) of the Act in order to see whether the appeal can be said to be a continuation of suit for purposes of complying with the provisions of section 13(5). (23). Section 13(3) of the Act refers to stages of the suit for purposes of passing an order determining the provisional rent. The court is required to determine the provisional rent after filing of the written statement and before framing of the issues. Such determination can be made in the trial court only as the stages referred to in this sub-section are stages of the suit only and not of appeal. (24). Section 13(4) of the Act provides that the tenant shall deposit the rent as determined under sub-section(3) of Section 13 within 15 days of the determination of the rent. He shall further continue to deposit the monthly rent within 15 days of next succeeding month. (24). Section 13(4) of the Act provides that the tenant shall deposit the rent as determined under sub-section(3) of Section 13 within 15 days of the determination of the rent. He shall further continue to deposit the monthly rent within 15 days of next succeeding month. Sub-section(5) of section 13 provides that in case the tenant fails to deposit the rent as provided under sub- section (4) of section 13, the Court shall strike out his defence and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. All the aforesaid provisions are interlinked and go to show that the determination of provisional rent is in the suit and not in the appeal. Hence defence of tenant can not be struck down in case he does not deposit monthly rent in appeal. (25). Sub-section(7) of section 13 of the Act provides that in any suit referred to in sub-section (3), if there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the court shall decide the dispute finally at the time of decision of the suit. The final determination of rent has been provided in sub-section (7) of section 13. Thus the relevance of order passed in sub- section (3) of section 13 determining the provisional rent comes to end when the rent is decided finally at the time of decision of the suit under sub-section(7) of section 13. (26). Sub-section (4) of section 13 provides that the tenant shall deposit the rent as determined under sub-section (3) of section 13 and not the rent as finally determined under sub- section (7) of section 13. This goes to show that the intention of the Legislature was that it was not obligatory for a tenant to deposit the monthly rent in appeal. There is no provision in the Act that the tenant shall also continue to deposit the rent as determined finally under sub-section 7 of section 13 of the Act during the pendency of appeal . There is also no provision in the Act that in case the tenant fails to deposit rent in appeal, his defence has to be struck out. (27). The argument can be considered from another angle. There is also no provision in the Act that in case the tenant fails to deposit rent in appeal, his defence has to be struck out. (27). The argument can be considered from another angle. In case a suit for eviction on the ground of default is dismissed by a Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) or (Senior Division), the landlord can file an appeal within 30 days plus the days taken in obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree. In case the suit is dismissed by A.D.J. or D.J. the landlord can file first appeal before this Court within a period of 90 days plus the days taken in obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree. Sometimes the appeals remain pending in defects. Even after the passing of the order by the court for issuing notice, the notices are not served on the respondent-tenant for a long time. The tenant cannot be expected to search in the appellate court during this period as to whether the plaintiff landlord has filed an appeal or not. In such circumstances, he cannot wait and has to pay the rent directly to the landlord, and in case he does not accept the same to deposit the same in accordance with law to avoid another suit for eviction on the ground of default. (28). In case the suit filed by the plaintiff is decreed and the tenant files an appeal, normally execution of the decree is stayed on the condition that the tenant will deposit all the arrears of rent, if any, and also continue to pay the rent within the time fixed by the court. In such circumstances the rights of the landlord are safeguarded and payment rent is ensured. There is no provision in the Act that the tenant shall continue to pay/deposit rent for payment to the landlord every month in appeal and further that in case the tenant fails to pay or deposit the monthly rent in appeal, his defence would be struck out. (29). There is no provision in the Act that the tenant shall continue to pay/deposit rent for payment to the landlord every month in appeal and further that in case the tenant fails to pay or deposit the monthly rent in appeal, his defence would be struck out. (29). Sub-section (6) of section 13 provides that in case the tenant makes payment or deposits the amount as required under sub -section (4) of section 13, no decree on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section(1) of section 13 shall be passed against the tenant meaning thereby that the ground of default comes to an end on payment of rent by the tenant as required by sub-section (4) of section 13. (30). In view of this, We are of the opinion that the provisions of sub-sections(3), (4) and (5) of section 13 do not apply in appeal. We answer the questions referred to us accordingly. (31). Honble MISRA, J.– Although, I agree with the view taken by my learned colleagues Honble Mohini Kapoor J. and Honble R.S.Kejriwal J. that a tenant is not required to deposit the provisional rent as envisaged under Sec. 13(3) and (4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short,the Act) during the pendency of the appeal, as the provisional rent is required to be deposited by the tenant by way of provisional arrangement only during the pendency of the suit and also since the life of an order under sub sec.(4) of the Act is only till the suit is finally decided, yet I consider it proper to record that the judgment of this Full Bench may not be misconstrued so as to infer that a tenant is not required to pay even the rent which is finally determined vide sub-section (7) of Section 13 of the Act during the pendency of the appeal. The tenant, therefore, is absolved only of the liability to pay the provisional rent during the pendency of the appeal and in my humble opinion, it would be going a little too far to infer from Section 13 of the Act if read as a whole that a tenant is under no obligation to deposit even the rent which is finally determined during the stage of the appeal. (32). (32). It is no doubt true that if a suit for eviction of the tenant is dismissed his liability to pay month to month rent automatically does not survive and he is under no obligation to pay even the finally determined rent during the pendency of the appeal since the decree of eviction has already been passed against him and, he would be required to deposit the rent during the pendency of the appeal only if there is an order of the appellate Court to that effect in case of grant of stay of eviction. But , in the event, the suit for eviction is dismissed and, it is ultimately held by the trial Court that the tenant has a right to remain in occupation of the suit premises, then, in my opinion, the tenant is certainly required to pay the rent which has been finally determined under sub-section(7) of Sec. 13 of the Act directly to the landlord and in case he refuses to accept the same then by way of money order or in the appellate court after obtaining permission for the same, since an intention to that effect can surely be gathered from sub-section (8)(b) of Section 13 of the Act itself wherein it has been laid down that "in the event of dismissing the suit for eviction it shall direct in the decree that such excess amount will be adjusted by the landlord against future rent payable by the tenant, "from which, it can clearly be inferred that the tenant is certainly required to deposit future rent to the landlord as long as he remains in occupation of the suit premises including the stage of the appeal. In my view, Section 13 of the Act, if read as a composite section, certainly makes it obligatory for a tenant to deposit the monthly rent finally determined under sub-section (7) of Sec.13 of the Act even during the pendency of the appeal especially when the appeal is pending against the dismissal of the suit for eviction. (33). In my view, Section 13 of the Act, if read as a composite section, certainly makes it obligatory for a tenant to deposit the monthly rent finally determined under sub-section (7) of Sec.13 of the Act even during the pendency of the appeal especially when the appeal is pending against the dismissal of the suit for eviction. (33). In my opinion, Sec.13(3),(4) and (5) of the Act simply means that in spite of default committed by the tenant in payment of rent to the landlord prior to the filing of the suit , or during the pendency of the suit , as pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaint, the Court will not assist the landlord plaintiff and no decree for eviction will be passed under Clause (a) of Section 13 if the tenant complies with the order made under sub-section (3) and also regularly pays or deposits rent in future every month under sub-section (4). Therefore, the default of the tenant, if any, prior to passing of the order under Sec. 13(3) of the Act is condo- ned by this section. But this may not be misunderstood so as to infer that the tenant is under no obligation to pay even the rent which is finally determined under Sec. 13(7) of the Act, for it is quite obvious that where the status of tenant and landlord is admitted, there can be no dispute regarding the liability of the tenant to pay rent even in future. On reading Sec. 13 and 13(A) of the Act as a whole, it can safely be interpreted to mean that while he is not required to deposit provisional rent during the pendency of the appeal he is certainly required to deposit the rent which is finally determined even during the pendency of the appeal and the Legislature in its wisdom has, therefore, incorporated a proviso to sub- section (6) of Section 13 of the Act that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief if he has obtained the benefit of making up for the default on one occasion, then on the second occasion, he will not be entitled to such protection. Besides this, sub- section (8) (a) and (b) of sec. 13 also envisages payment of future rent to the landlord by the tenant. (34). Besides this, sub- section (8) (a) and (b) of sec. 13 also envisages payment of future rent to the landlord by the tenant. (34). In this context, it would be worthwhile to take note of the settled prin- ciple of the rules of interpretation which is that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to the other provisions in the same Act so as to make it a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid "head on clash" (as explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 202 ) (13) between two sections of the same Act and as far as possible to construe provision to avoid conflict so that they harmonise. Similarly, the provision of one section of a statute cannot be to defeat those of another "unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation bet- ween them " as held by the Privy Council in the case of Mohammad Sher Khan vs. Raja Seth Swami Dayal (14) and Sanjeevayya D.V. Election Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh (15) at page 1213) (para 4). This Rule applies similarly in regard to sub-section of a section and in the words of Gajendragadkar J.vide Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya V. Shree Chhangdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. (16), "the sub-section must be read as part of an integral whole and as being interdependent : an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, and to avoid repugnancy." Thus , a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a dead letter is not a harmonious construction. (35). (35). Viewed in the light of the aforesaid well settled principles of rules of interpretation of statutes, if Section 13 of the Act is read in its entirety, it clearly transpires that while on the one hand, the object of this section is to protect the tenants from illegal eviction and afford them a chance to be punctual for future in making payment of rent, it has also incorporated the expression " so long as" the tenant is ready an willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act in Sec. 13(1) which expression clearly denotes the span of time to which the tenant regularly makes payment of rent to his landlord.The tenant , therefore, is entitled to occupy the premises till he is ready and willing to pay the rent regularly and any default in payment of rent on his part disentitle him to continue with the possession of the premises as a tenant. (36). Therefore, it would be reasonable to infer from Section 13 of the Act that although the defence of the tenant cannot be struck off for non-payment of provisional rent during the pendency of the appeal because the stage would have already passed at the stage of appeal, it cannot be held that the tenant is under no obligation to pay even the monthly rent which is finally determined at the time of decision of he suit as envisaged in sub-section (7) of Section 13 of the Act because payment of rent by the tenant is a condition precedent to protect him from eviction as envisaged in the expression "so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent " used in sub-section (1) of Sec. 13 of the Act and in case he commits default in payment of rent to the landlord during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court can certainly take notice of the proviso to sub- section (6) of Section 13 which does not grant any protection to a tenant from eviction if he commits default for the second time in payment of rent for more than six months. In such an eventuality, it would be an empty formality and would certainly lead to multiplicity of proceedings if the landlord is required to file a fresh suit of eviction for the second default which can be taken care of by the appellate court. In such an eventuality, it would be an empty formality and would certainly lead to multiplicity of proceedings if the landlord is required to file a fresh suit of eviction for the second default which can be taken care of by the appellate court. Such an interpretation , in my opinion, cannot be made of section 13 of the Act if read as a whole. (37). I, therefore, although concur with the majority view, that the tenant is not required to deposit the provisional rent as determined under Sec. 13(3) of the Act at the stage of the appeal and non-payment of such rent would also not entail the consequence of striking out the defence of the tenant, I am further of the opinion that the tenant is under an obligation to pay the rent finally determined under Sec.13(7) which is clearly payable as envisaged in section 13(1) and 8(a) (b) of the Act if the suit for eviction is dismissed and non-payment of such rent would certainly attract the consequences laid down in the proviso to Sub-section (6) of Sec. 13 of the Act which can be taken note of even by the appellate court. Such a construction, in my opinion, only results in a harmonious construction of Sec. 13 of the Act of which sub-sections (3),(4) and (5) is also a part. The reference is accordingly answered.