ORDER 1. The defendant in O. S. No. 39 of 1988 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Parappanangadi is the appellant. The respondents are the plaintiffs. They filed the above suit claiming maintenance from the appellant. The Munsiff's Court decreed the suit awarding a sum of Rs. 3,600 as past maintenance. As against the said judgment and decree the appellant filed an appeal before the Sub Court, Tirur as A. S. No. 6 of 1991. In that appeal the decree for past maintenance was confirmed. It is against the said judgment and decree, this Second Appeal has been filed. 2. The 1st respondent is the wife of the appellant and the 2nd respondent is the child born to them in their lawful wedlock. The marriage was solemnized about 4 years prior to the filing of the suit. The case of the respondents is that the appellant had neglected them and refused to maintain. On the other hand, the case of the appellant is that the 1st respondent was forcibly taken away from his residence by her father when the appellant was away from the house. His further case is that the 1st respondent had refused to live with him and therefore she is not entitled to the maintenance. 3. The trial court, after the enquiry found that the respondents are entitled to claim maintenance in as much as the appellant failed to look after them. It is further found that the respondents were residing separately for sufficient reasonable cause. These findings are concurred by the lower appellate court. 4. The first and foremost question which is required to be decided is whether there was any reasonable cause for the separate residence by the respondents in this case. While the respondents were residing with the appellant, he first took away 8 sovereigns belonging to the 1st respondent. Subsequently, he demanded the balance gold ornaments from the 1st respondent which was refused by her. He therefore became angry and forcibly took away the 1st respondent to her father's residence. She was not allowed to carry the second respondent minor child with her. For the custody of the minor child, the 1st respondent was therefore forced to move the Magistrate's Court. It is because of the above happenings, respondents were residing away from the appellant. He therefore became angry and forcibly took away the 1st respondent to her father's residence. She was not allowed to carry the second respondent minor child with her. For the custody of the minor child, the 1st respondent was therefore forced to move the Magistrate's Court. It is because of the above happenings, respondents were residing away from the appellant. These circumstances would sufficiently justify the separate residence by the respondents and it was for reasonable and sufficient cause. 5. The question which remains to be considered is whether the respondents are entitled to a decree for past maintenance. S.278 of the Mahomedan Law (Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law) prescribes the filing of a suit for maintenance by the wife in case the husband neglects or refuses to maintain bis wife without any lawful cause. However, it further provides that wife is not entitled to a decree for past maintenance unless the claim is based on a specific agreement. According , to the Shafi School, the wife is entitled to past maintenance though there may be no agreement in respect thereof. In Minhaj-ut-Talabin of Nawabi, a high authority on the Shafi Law (as translated by Messrs. Van Len Beg and Howard) it is stated: "During his stay in Egypt, Shafi adopted the doctrine that a wife's maintenance is obligatory only if she puts herself at her husband's disposition and not in virtue of the contract of marriage. ......... Consequently a husband owes his wife no maintenance so long as she refuses to come to him, but owes it from the moment he hears she is willing to put herself at his disposition." It is further laid down: "When a husband during his marriage becomes so insolvent that he can no longer give the minimum maintenance prescribed but his wife in spite of this continues to live with him, the maintenance becomes a debt due to her from him and exigible at any momeny. Placing reliance on this high authority the Division Bench of the Madras High Court (Abdur Rahim and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ.) held in Mohamed Haji v. Kalimabi AIR 1918 Madras 722 "According to the Shafi school arrears of maintenance can be recovered by the wife counting from the date when her husband wrongfully refused or neglected to maintain her." Thus according to Shafi theory of Sunni system maintenance to a wife is a debt and not in the nature of a gratuity and the wife is entitled to recover arrears of maintenance though it may not be due under a decree of court or a mutual agreement. This court in Abdulla v. Katheesa 1983 KLT 672 followed the above decision of the Madras High court and held that a Shafi wife is entitled to recover arrears of maintenance from her husband. Learned Judge (Balakrishna Menon, J.) also placed reliance on 'Mohammedali Law' by Tyabji. Charles Hamilton in 'The Hedaya' while discussing about decreed maintenance drop points out the view of Shafi rule thus: "Shafi says that the maintenance is in all circumstances to be considered as a debt upon the husband, in conformity with his tenet, that it is not a gratuity but a return.'' 6. The courts below proceeded on the basis that the parties in this case are Muslims governed by Shafi School of Law. There is no dispute on this question between the parties. The Madras District Gazetteers (Malabar) Vol. I gives the following description about Muslims in Malabar area: "The Mappillas belong to the Shafi School of the Sunni sect of Muhammadans, that is they acknowledge besides the Koran, the authority of the Sunneh, or customary law of Arab theology, as interpreted by Shafi. In South Malabar they arc divided into two divisions, preferring allegiance to the Valiya Jaratingal Tangal of Ponnani and the Kundotti Tangal respectively. The followers of the latter are said by those of the former to be Shiahs, but they themselves claim to be Sunnis. The differences between the two parties sometimes become acute and load to disturbances, but intermarriage between them is not prohibited and persons often forsake one sect for the other to suit the convenience or caprice of the moment. The division between the two is born in fact of party spirit rather than based on any essential doctrinal difference. The differences between the two parties sometimes become acute and load to disturbances, but intermarriage between them is not prohibited and persons often forsake one sect for the other to suit the convenience or caprice of the moment. The division between the two is born in fact of party spirit rather than based on any essential doctrinal difference. The Mappilas acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the Sultan of Constantinople. The Tangals are their religious leaders; they are regarded with a high decree of reverence..........." Mulla in his Principles of Mohammedan Law states (para 28): "The Sunnis are divided into four sub-sects, namely, the Hanafis, the Malikis, the Shafeis and the Hanbalis." Further added; "Considerable groups of Mahommedans in the South of India, such as Kerala and Malabar, are Shafois." The Madras High Court while dealing with validity of a wakf observed in Kutti Umma v. Nedungadi Bank Limited AIR 1937 Madras 731 thus: "This is perhaps because it is Egypt which is the stronghold of the doctrines associated with the name of Shafi which also find acceptance among the Mappilas of South Malabar generally. It will thus be seen, apart from the fact that the executant of the wakf in the present case is governed by the Shafei School of Law and therefore the doctrine of Shafei must apply without question to the present case.........." 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has brought to my notice a Division Bench decision of this court in Amina v. Hassan Koya 1985 KLT 596 . In para 52 of the said judgment it is observed as below: "We hold that the courts can safely presume that the Muslims of our State are following the Hanafi, Law, and where departure therefrom ia resorted to be proved, it must be pleaded and proved as a fact." While holding so, the Division Bench has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kathesssa v. .Narayanath Kunhamu AIR 1964 SC 275 . What the Division Bench said is this: " AIR 1964 SC 275 was a case from North Malabar. It is seen that the parties are treated as Hanafis." In the judgment of the Supreme Court, there was no discussion about the sub-section, of the parties whether they belong to Hanafi or Shafi. It appears to me that the Supreme Court has treated the parties to the litigation as Hanafis. It is seen that the parties are treated as Hanafis." In the judgment of the Supreme Court, there was no discussion about the sub-section, of the parties whether they belong to Hanafi or Shafi. It appears to me that the Supreme Court has treated the parties to the litigation as Hanafis. The Division Bench has also considered the following decisions on this point. (1) Marakkar v. Kandakutty ( AIR 1967 Ker. 78 ) (2) Abdulla Beary v. Alikunhi Beary ( 1957 KLJ 731 ) (3) Seethi v. Mariyakutty ( 1954 KLT 249 ) and (4) Akbarally v. Mohmeddly (AIR 1932 Bombay 356). In view of the above authorities, with great respect, I would say that this court cannot have a different view from what has been laid down by the Division Bench in Amma's case 1985 KLT 595 supra, 8. What has been laid down by the Division Bench in Amina's case 1985 KLT 595 is that the Muslims of the State are presumed to be following the Hanafi Law. When the parties went to the court as Shafi's and the court also proceeded with the case on the basis that the parties are Shafts, then there is no question of invoking the rule of presumption. The presumption will apply when the Court has no material before it either way for taking a decision. Presumption is a legal inference to the existence or truth of a fact, not certainly known, drawn from the known or proved existence of some other fact. Presumptions are artificial rules which stand in the place of proof until the contrary be shown. It is only in this sense that the well known maxim "Stabitur presumption donee probetur in contrarium" (Presumption will be stood by of upheld until proof be made to the contrary) is used. The contrary can be proved by admission of parties to the litigation on the basis of existence of certain true facts. 9. Varma says in his Mohammedan Law in India and Pakistan: "........(The generality of Mappillas in South Malabar are Shafeis; but, it cannot be said that every Mappilla in South Malabar is a Shafei. ......... In those days when migration from a district to another in a State is so easy and common, it cannot be assumed conclusively that all Muslims in South Malabar are of a particular sect. ......... In those days when migration from a district to another in a State is so easy and common, it cannot be assumed conclusively that all Muslims in South Malabar are of a particular sect. In Mohamed Haji's case AIR 1918 Madras 722 supra the Madras High Court observed: "The Hedaya is devoted to the exposition of the Hanafi Law, but the erudition and accuracy of its learned author was so great that whatever, according to the practice that prevailed in those days, he states on any point to be the contrary doctrine of the Shafi of any other branch of the Sunni system, that statement may generally be safely accepted as correct." Therefore when both parties to a litigation admit before the court that they are Shafis, the above presumption shall be treated to have been rebutted. In such cases further pleading and proof arc found to be inessential. 10. In view of what I have said herein above, I do not see any reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. The Second Appeal is dismissed.