Judgment Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. 1. The most accepted methodology of a Governmental working is fairness and in the event of there being any departure from the concept of fairness, there ought not to be any hesitation in so far as the Law Courts are concerned to strike down such an action as not being fair and to do so is a plain exercise of judicial power. Law Courts exist to redress the grievances of the people in the event of there being any administrative ipsi dixit since arbitrariness is anti-thesis of law and Law Courts cannot possibly give indulgence to such an arbitrary action or allow the executive ipsi dixit to be perpetrated on to an innocent citizen. Law Courts have a duty towards the society and in the event the Law Courts do not rise upto the occasion to deal with the matter in accordance with law. Law Courts possibly will cease to exist thereby rendering the wishes of framers of our Constitution into peril. Fairness is the cardinal principle of a governmental action and it is on this background that this appeal shall have to be dealt with by this Court and to assess the situation itself whether in fact there was fairness of a governmental• action being the legitimate expectation of a citizen of this country. 2. Turning attention on to the factual score of the matter under consideration at this juncture, it appears that the petitioner is a registered small scale industrial unit dealing in coal and other allied products. In the normal course of business, the petitioner's unit is a manufacturer of Special Smokeless Fuel (SSF) and as such, has been recognised as a SSF Unit by the Government of India. The unit was established with a view to augment supply of domestic fuel to the public at large and was set up with definite encouragements from the Ministry of Coal, Coal India Ltd. and with technical collaboration of Central Mining Planning And Designs Institute Ltd. (CMPDIL), a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd. Be it noted here that the entire technical know-how for establishment of the unit was provided by CMPDIL and on the basis of specific assurance of the Government of India that regular supplies of raw materials of suitable grade would be effected and thus to allow this particular SSF Unit to function effectively as per expectation. 3. 3. The factual score depicts that the initial linkage was provided to the petitioner from Rajrappa Washery of Central Coalfields Ltd. by the appropriate recommendatory agency of Coal India Ltd. at its 55th meeting held at Calcutta. The records further depict that the raw materials from Rajrappa Washery were, however, not of the suitable grade and complaints were lodged in regard thereto. In the letter of complaint it has been specifically stated that the Middlings of Rajrappa Washery as a matter of fact contains mixtures with bond, stone and other rejects and as a matter of fact there was no facility available for even screening at the Rajrappa Washery. Subsequently, the records depict that the Coal Controller in terms of the provisions of the Colliery Control Order, 1945 did make an allotment of 5,000 M. Tonnes of coal per month from Hazaribagh area to the petitioner which is nearest to the petitioner's unit. For convenience's sake, the relevant extracts of the order of linkage dated 19th April, 1993 as appears from the records is reproduced hereinbelow ; "Under these circumstances 5,000 M.Tons of coal per month from Hazaribagh area available in excess of requirement of Steel Industry and Coke Ovens are allotted to M/s. S.J. Coke Industries (P) Ltd. till further advice. They may be given the same facility for lifting from Collieries as given for the Coke Oven owner of the area. However, if you have any genuine problem the matter may be discussed with the consumer and may be intimated so that allocation could be modified." 4. It is to be noted here in this context that after the issuance of the linkage order, the same was duly sanctioned and/or approved by the Coal India Ltd. at its 70th meeting held at Calcutta on 11th and 12th October, 1993. It is to be noted that the confirmatory letter of sanction from the Coal India Ltd. itself records that- . "before raw coal from Hazaribagh area is issued to this SSF unit, it is requested that the unit be got inspected to ensure that a suitable crusher is installed in the coal handling units as suggested by CMPDIL in their letter dated 5.8.93........." "The petitioner in fact in terms of this intimation did in fact install such a crusher -and as a matter of fact the petitioner, it has been contended, has spent a total sum of Rs. 18,55,000/- inclusive of all necessary expenditure required for the purpose of the crusher plant. Be it recorded that in terms of the order of linkage and as confirmed by the Coal India Limited at its 70th meeting, as noted above, the petitioner was allowed to lift from the Hazaribagh area and supplies were effected regularly without any hindrance." 5. Subsequently however, as appears from the record, by a letter dated 6/11th October, 1 994 the General Manager (Sales), informed the petitioner that arrangement for making available 30 mm. middling at Rajrappa are being made and the requirement of the petitioner would be met from the said source soon. 6. It is on this letter that the petitioner felt aggrieved and moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge while entertaining the writ application was however, pleased not to grant any interim order. The petitioner, as appears and as has been contended by Mr. Pal appearing in support of the appeal, however also did not take any further steps since there was no denial or refusal to supply from the Hazaribagh area and as a matter of fact supplies continued upto March, 1995 without any interruption and it is only from April, 1995 that the supplies were stopped without any rhyme or reason, obviously on the basis of the intimation as recorded above in the letter dated 6th/11th October, 1994. The petitioner however, immediately thereafter moved another interlocutory application for injunction before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge was pleased to reject the application summarily on the plea that the same is not maintainable by reason of the applicability of the doctrine of constructive res judicata. It is against this order of rejection that this Court was approached by the petitioner by way of an appeal against the order of the learned Judge. The records depict that various applications and counter-applications have been moved in the appeal. Without, however, going into the details of it, the parties agreed that the appeal ought to be disposed of along with the applications. 7. Today, however, when the matter was taken up for hearing, Mr. Pal drew the attention of this Court in regard to a document issued by the Ministry of Coal, Government of India, dated 9th November, 1995 and also to an affidavit filed by one Ramesh Kamra affirmed on 5th January, 1996. 7. Today, however, when the matter was taken up for hearing, Mr. Pal drew the attention of this Court in regard to a document issued by the Ministry of Coal, Government of India, dated 9th November, 1995 and also to an affidavit filed by one Ramesh Kamra affirmed on 5th January, 1996. In paragraph 19 of the affidavit, the deponent on behalf of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 stated as follows ; "19. As regards the letter dated 9th November, 1995 being Annexure 0' to the petition, I say that the Government direction dated 5th January, 1995 has been clarified that supply to other linked consumers may be given from those collieries earmarked for supply to private cokeries. Such supply shall naturally be subject to availability and if there is any excess after meeting the demands of private cokeries and steel industries as per the letter dated 19th April, 1993. By the said letter of 9th November, 1995 the SSF plants have not been given any priority over the cokery units or steel industries." 8. It would also be convenient at this juncture to note the relevant extracts of the letter dated 9th November, 1995 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Coal, New Delhi. In paragraph 2 of the letter it has been categorically stated : "2. It has been brought to the notice of this Ministry that from those earmarked collieries CCL is supplying coal to private cokeries only and have stopped supplies to other linked consumers like SSF Units, etc. It is clarified that there is no bar from supplying coal to consumers other than private cokeries from the collieries which were to be earmarked for supplies to private cokeries. It is accordingly clarified that the coal companies may also supply coal to other linked consumers from such collieries earmarked for supply to private cokeries." 9. It is on the basis of this subsequent event, Mr. It is accordingly clarified that the coal companies may also supply coal to other linked consumers from such collieries earmarked for supply to private cokeries." 9. It is on the basis of this subsequent event, Mr. Pal contended that his client is prepared to accept such a situation by reason of a specific direction from the Central Government to the effect that in the event of there being any excess quantum of coal being made available after supplying to the private cokeries and other steel industries, the SSF Units can be supplied therewith, but the same, however, did not find favour with the learned Advocates appearing for the Central Coalfields Ltd. The affidavit affirmed by Central Coalfields Ltd. has been stated to be rather unfortunate and has been couched in a language which cannot but be termed to be ambiguous and the same needs to be explained. We, however, cannot lend our concurrence to such a submission by reason of the express language used therein. As a matter of fact, the affidavit cannot possibly be said to be in contradiction with the contents of the letter dated 9th November, 1995, but rather is in conformity therewith. We are at a loss to find this particular attitude on the part of the Central Coalfields Ltd. As noted above, fairness is the most cardinal principle of any governmental action. Is it fair to deprive a SSF Unit coal from a colliery which is suitable to the SSF Unit in the event of there being any excess available after supplying to the private cokeries and steel plants? The answer, however, cannot but be in the negative. There is as a matter of fact a vehement objection in regard to the supplies of coal to this particular SSF Unit from Hazaribagh area. The reasons, we are not interested in going into, but the fact remains that there is a definite refusal on the part of the Central Coalfields Ltd. to permit such a supply being effected from the Hazaribagh area. 10. Turning attention on to the impugned letter dated 6th/11th October, 1994, it appears that admittedly there was existing a linkage order to Hazaribagh area as issued by the Coal Controller and subsequently approved and ratified by Coal India Ltd. at its 70th meeting at Calcutta. 10. Turning attention on to the impugned letter dated 6th/11th October, 1994, it appears that admittedly there was existing a linkage order to Hazaribagh area as issued by the Coal Controller and subsequently approved and ratified by Coal India Ltd. at its 70th meeting at Calcutta. There is existing no fresh linkage order; on the contrary an intimation of the nature as appears from the letter has been sent to the appellant herein. Thl' question arises as to whether this particular document can be termed to be a linkage order when on the face of the record it appears that the petitioner was informed that arrangements for making available +30 mm middling at Rajrappa are being made and the petitioner's requirement would be met from the said source soon. What would be the quantum of such linkage, if any, is totally absent in the said letter. It does not have any reference in regard to the cancellation of the earlier linkage of 5,000 M. Tons. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that no fresh linkage is existing in regard to the appellant's requirement. The letter under reference thus cannot but be termed to be a mere intimation to the appellant that the supplies would be effected soon from Rajrappa and it is this particular intimation which is under challenge by Mr. Pal, inter alia, on the ground that there exists no fresh linkage and the document cannot in any event be termed to be a fresh linkage. Incidentally be it recorded that in order to avoid such an executive ipsi dixit, the Central Government has itself issued the circular letter to the Central Coalfieids dated 9th November, 1995 which expressly records that the coal companies may also supply coal to other linked consumers from such collieries earmarked for supply to private cokeries. This clarification ordinarily and in the normal course of events was not required, but by reason of the conduct of the respondent Central Coalfields, the Central Government had no other alternative but to issue such a directive as and by way of a clarification. Surprisingly, however, that in spite of such a letter being sent to the Managing Director of Central Coalfields, the Central Coalfields continued with their obstinacy for reasons not disclosed to this Court to the detriment of the SSF Units. Surprisingly, however, that in spite of such a letter being sent to the Managing Director of Central Coalfields, the Central Coalfields continued with their obstinacy for reasons not disclosed to this Court to the detriment of the SSF Units. Incidentally it is to be noted that the Coal Controller in his letter of linkage addressed to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Central Coalfields dated 19th April, 1993 has recorded the following : "You may be aware that SSF Units had been launched with a lot of fan-fair and publicity, on a technology development by Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. Due to indifferent treatment meted out to these units, most of them are on verge of being declared sick. The very purpose of supplying cheap domestic fuel and to serve as an alternative to soft coke, seems to be getting defeated. In the instant case the entrepreneur is running from pillar to post for getting proper quality of coal. They are situated near Hazaribagh which is closest to Charhi Area but instead of giving coal from this Area they are offered middling mixed with respects of Rajrappa Area. It is paradoxical that Central Coalfields Ltd. has been obtaining release of Coking Coal of Charhi Area for sale to non-metallurgical consumers, besides under ISS and free marketing policy also substantial coal of this area is being offered but I fail to understand why Central Coalfields Ltd. cannot offer the coal to this SSF Unit who have not been able to get coal of right choice in spite of being recommended by. D.I.C., Government of Bihar". 11. The Coal Controller's letter indicates the purpose for which these SSF Units were established and the assurance to provide good quality of coal for the benefit of the public at large. The anguish of deprivation in so for as this particular SSF Unit is concerned has been clearly exhibited in the letter of the Coal Controller and this letter, as appears from the records, has its due corroboration from the Coal India Ltd. by reason of its approval as and by way of ratification and as a matter of fact, the same also finds favour with the Central Government, as is evidenced in the letter dated 9th November, 1995, otherwise such a clarification would not have been issued. Be it further noted that in the letter dated 19th April, 1993, the Coal Controller has expressly recorded that the linkage of 5,000 M. Tons per month from Hazaribagh area could continue till further advice. As a matter of fact, during the course of hearing on a pointed question by this Court, no further advice could be produced neither could be taken recourse to. Admittedly, the General Manager (Sales) has no authority as such to issue the linkage order. This is more so by reason of the fact that on a pointed question as to the authority of the General Manager (Sales), Mr. Mullick appearing for the Central Coalfields has not been able to satisfy the Court in regard to such an authority as would be available with the General Manager (Sales) of the Central Coalfields. In fact, the question of having any authority in so far as the General Manager (Sales) of Central Coalfields in regard to the issuance of a linkage order does not and cannot arise. It is a policy decision which can only be effected by the parent company at Calcutta and by none others and Central Coalfields, being a subsidiary of the parent company, is bound to carry out the requirements as is specified by the parent company. There cannot possibly be any independent option of its own so far as the Central Coalfields is concerned, but they are to follow the directives of the Coal India Ltd. 12. Be it recorded here that strong comment has been made in regard to the authority of the Coal Controller in the matter of issuance of the linkage order. The Colliery Control Order itself, however, in particular clause 12A read with clause 15 unmistakably depict the authority to issue the allotments so far as the Coal Controller is concerned, and it is on the basis of this authority that the allotment has been made and the linkage is effected by the Coal India Ltd. and in the facts and circumstances of the matter in issue as a matter of fact Coal India has issued necessary linkage on the basis of the allotment of 5,000 M. Tonnes per month from Razaribagh area. As such, we do not find any justification to lend our concurrence to the submissions as advanced by the respondents in regard to the authority of the Coal Controller in regard to the issuance of the allotment. 13. Mr. Mitra appearing for the Central Coalfields Ltd. however contended that as a matter of fact, diverse matters are pending before the Supreme Court in regard to this particular issue, viz., the authority of the Coal Controller. We are not really concerned in the event of there being an internal conflict between the Coal Controller and the Central Coalfields Ltd. or any other subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., neither the name had any corelation with the matter in issue before us. 14. Be it placed on record however that this Court has not been informed of any particular finding or any observation even in any judgment in regard thereto and as such, we are not expressing any opinion on this score. 15. As appears from the provisions of the Colliery Control Order, the Coal Controller is a creature of the Statute and since the Coal Controller has exercised such a power as vested on to him under control order and issued the order of allotment in favour the petitioner and which stand ratified by Coal India Ltd., being the parent company by reason of the issuance of a linkage order as detailed above, we do not find any colourable exercise of such power; neither the use of that power can be attributed to be arbitrary or can be termed to Coal Controller's ipsi dixit. 16. Incidentally, be it noted here that there is no whisper from Coal India, as against exercise of such a power in so far as the Coal Controller is concerned. Coal India is a party to this proceeding and at no stage Coal India has ever raised any objection in regard thereto. We are at a loss to find that the objection to effect supplies from Razaribagh area is being taken by Central Coalfields and not by the parent company or the Coal C0ntroller or even the Central Government. Can this particular stand of the Central Coalfields be said to be fair or reasonable in the contextual facts: The answer cannot possibly be but in be the negative. Can this particular stand of the Central Coalfields be said to be fair or reasonable in the contextual facts: The answer cannot possibly be but in be the negative. Central Coalfields are to carry out the directions of Coal India but, in the facts of the matter under consideration there is a deliberate attempt on the part of the Central Coalfields to thrust the order and directive of the parent company-a situation wholly unwarranted and an action wholly unauthorised and unknown to law. 17. Be it recorded that at the initial stage of hearing Mr. Pal submitted before this Court that on the wake of the letter dated 9th November, 1995 and on the basis of the averments, as made in paragraph 19 of the affidavit of Shri Ramesh Kamra, affirmed on 5th January, 1996, the appellant is prepared to withdraw the appeal, in the event the Central Coalfields Ltd. do proceed on the basis of its statement in the above-noted paragraph. It is placed on record that immediately on such submission being made, this Court asked the learned Senior Advocates appearing in the matter, as to whether the Central Coalfields is prepared to accept such a suggestion, so that the appeal may be withdrawn by Mr. Pal on the basis of the statement as recorded in paragraph 19 of the affidavit and as more fully detailed above, but the answer, however, is in the negative. 18. This Court, however, is at a loss to find such an answer, since the statement in the affidavit cannot he whittled down in any way whatsoever. In this context the observations of P.D. Dossi, the then learned Chief Justice, in the case of Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Staff Association and Another vs. Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. and Others AIR 1990 Cal 442 seemed to be very apposite. The learned Chief Justice, in paragraph 23 of the report, observed as follows : "Of course, the Counsel has a choice whether or not to exercise such authority and the Court cannot compel him to do so. The learned Chief Justice, in paragraph 23 of the report, observed as follows : "Of course, the Counsel has a choice whether or not to exercise such authority and the Court cannot compel him to do so. It should not be a futile entertainment of hope, however, to expect after the law has been clarified as aforesaid that an advocate not expressly injuncted by his client, would not hegitate to exercise the implied authority, if a reasonable suggestion is made by the Court, which, as a minister of justice equally with the Judge, his conscience finds acceptable in the best interests of his clients. He will thereby be performing a public service also in that an avoidable litigation in the overflowing dockets of the Court would come to a final and expeditious end without consuming the Court's precious time in adjudicating the Cause." 19. In the facts of the matter under consideration, has the suggestion been accepted this appeal could have been disposed of at a much earlier point of time, rather than consuming a major part of the Court's business for the day. 20. Lastly however, the issue of jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition was raised by the Respondent Central Coalfields. Be it recorded that before the learned Trial Judge, the issue of jurisdiction was not raised, though, however, Mr. Mullick submitted that the issue of jurisdiction was raised before Sinha J., when the matter was moved at first. It. appears from records that inspite of such a plea of lack of jurisdiction of this Court, Sinha, J, on 8th December, 1994 passed the following order: "Let this matter appear in the list two weeks hence as 'For orders'. Affidavit-in-opposition to be filed within 10 days from date; affidavit-in-reply to be filed within three days thereafter. However, allotment in favour of the petitioner would not lapse because of the pendency of this writ application................................. " 21. Be that as it may, it appears that under Art. 226(1) of the Constitution, High Court would be otherwise authorised to exercise jurisdiction, if the seat of the Authority against whom the relief is claimed, is within the State of West Bengal. In the facts of the matter under consideration, the relief has been claimed against the Coal India Ltd. and the Coal Controller. Both these two authorities have their seats admittedly in Calcutta. In the facts of the matter under consideration, the relief has been claimed against the Coal India Ltd. and the Coal Controller. Both these two authorities have their seats admittedly in Calcutta. In this Context reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Pottery Mazdoor Panchayet vs. Union of India 1989 (1) CHN 369 wherein P.D. Desai C.J. speaking for, the Bench observed: "3. The Order (Annexure 'A') issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Industry (Bureau of Public Enterprises), states, inter alia, that the Government had decided to authorise the Managements of Public Sector Enterprises on Industrial D.A. to sanction interim relief to employees with effect from January 1, 1986 in Enterprises where the period of validity of wage settlements had expired or was to expire shortly. The rates at which the interim relief was payable were also specified in the order. The Circular, Annexure 'B' is substantially in terms similar to the Order. Annexure 'A' and it was specifically adressed, inter alia, to the third respondent (the Managing Director of the Second Respondent Company). Be it stated at this stage that the second respondent is a wholly owned Government Company operating in the Public Sector and that it has its Registered Office as well as the Head Office in Calcutta. 4. Against the aforesaid background, it is difficult to uphold the view taken by the learned Single Judge that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The First Appellant writ petitioner is a registered Trade Union of the employees of the Second respondent Company who were employed at the material time in one of its Refractories situate in Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh. It is not in dispute that the question as to the grant of interim relief on the basis of the Order/Circular, Annexure 'A' and Annexure 'B', is required to be dealt with and decided at the Head Office. Under these circumstances, the relief in the writ petition was rightly sought, inter alia, against the Second Respondent Company whose Head Office as earlier stated, is situate in Calcutta. By virtue of the provisions contatins in clause (1) of Art. 226 of the Constitution therefore, this Court was competent to entertain and decide the writ petition. Under these circumstances, the relief in the writ petition was rightly sought, inter alia, against the Second Respondent Company whose Head Office as earlier stated, is situate in Calcutta. By virtue of the provisions contatins in clause (1) of Art. 226 of the Constitution therefore, this Court was competent to entertain and decide the writ petition. The question with respect to the cause of action, wholly or in part, arising within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court was not directly relevant, since clause (1) of Art. 226 of the Constitution is attracted in the present case in view of the fact that the Head Office/ Registered Office of the Second Respondent Company, which is an authority with in the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, is situate in Calcutta. In our opinion, therefore, it was an error to reject the writ petition without entering into the merits of the case on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction." 22. In any event it appears from the petition, that the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of Art. 226(2) of the Constitution as well, where notwithstanding the situs of the authority, High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction a part of the cause of action arises will have jurisdiction to issue appropriate writ or direction. The legal import of the expression 'part of the cause of action' is too well established to merit any further discussion. Suffice it to note however the observations of the Supreme Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu 1994(4) SCC 711 which is as follows :" 5. Clause (1) of Art. 226 begins with a non obstante clause notwithstanding anything in Art. 32-and provides that every High Court shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Art. 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Under clause (2) of Art. 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Art. 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression cause of action means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh Lord Watson said: 'the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.' Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court." 23. In the petition it has been pleaded that the original linkage to Rajrappa Washery was granted by the Coal India Ltd. at the NCLC meeting held at Calcutta, In the petition, it has been stated that on a representation being made, the Coal Controller made an allotment of 5,000 M. Tonnes of raw coal from Hazaribagh area from his office at Calcutta. On the basis of the Coal Controller's allotment, the Coal India Ltd. at its meeting held at Calcutta approved the change of linkage to the Hazaribagh area. As a matter of fact, Coal India Ltd. by its letter dated 16th November, 1993 issued from Calcutta engrafted a condition that suitable crusher is to be installed at the writ petitioner's unit for implementation of the change of linkage from Rajrappa to Hazaribagh. As a matter of fact the allotment order expressly stipulates that the same was subject to the provisions of the Colliery Control Order, 1945 against linkage or the recommendation. The subsequent letter of the Coal Controller dated 11th July, 1994 regarding the maintenance of supply was also issued from Calcutta on a representation made by the petitioner and addressed to him at his Calcutta Office as appears from the letter dated 7th July, 1994. The entire claim of the petitioner is based on its right to obtain 5,000 M. Tonnes from Hazaribagh area by reason of the changed linkage as approved by the Coal India Ltd. at Calcutta and the allotment order made by the Coal Controller. The entire claim of the petitioner is based on its right to obtain 5,000 M. Tonnes from Hazaribagh area by reason of the changed linkage as approved by the Coal India Ltd. at Calcutta and the allotment order made by the Coal Controller. under the Colliery Control Order and it is by reason of non-observance of the directives of the confirmatory order of the Coal India Ltd. in terms of the allotment order issued by the Coal Controller and it is on these factual elements, which comprised the foundation on which the writ petitioner claims the relief. Its grievance in fact and in substance is that the linkage and allotment is being nullified by the impugned action of Central Coalfields. It is the media of the changed linkage to Hazaribagh and the allotment of the Coal Controller both of which were admittedly made and alteration of the position by installing a crusher as required by Coal India's letter of 16th November, 1993 at Calcutta which are the foundation of the writ petitioner's grievance. The writ petitioner is claiming relief as has been sought for in this writ application by way of issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the Coal Controller as well as the Coal India Ltd. to ensure that the allotment and linkage already issued be implemented. The direction sought for from this Court in so far as Central Coalfields is concerned is a consequential order which the petitioner has sought for. It is not a case against the Delhi Electric Suppl.): Corporation where the only publication was had in the city of Calcutta though the contract was entered into at Delhi and the work was to be carried out at Delhi. We cannot lend our concurrence to the submission that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. As a matter of fact, a major portion of the cause of action by reason of the grievance as ventilated in the petition has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, if not in its entirety. The prayer for setting aside of the letter dated 6/11th October, 1994, as noted above, is a mere consequential one since the same is not in accordance with the linkage order issued by the Coal India Ltd. The right to move this Court rests on the right as conferred in terms of the linkage order. The prayer for setting aside of the letter dated 6/11th October, 1994, as noted above, is a mere consequential one since the same is not in accordance with the linkage order issued by the Coal India Ltd. The right to move this Court rests on the right as conferred in terms of the linkage order. Had there been no linkage order, then the issue would have been completely different, but by reason of the existence of such a linkage order and allotment order as issued by the Coal Controller, in our view, the question of this Court having no jurisdiction does not and cannot arise. 24. In paragraph 61, the petitioner has relied on the allotment order of the Coal Controller, and a change of the linkage made at Calcutta, amongst others, as constituting part of its cause of action and has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court on that basis. In paragraph 44 of the affidavit in-opposition, while dealing with paragraph 61 of the writ petition, it has been stated by the Central Coalfields that the collieries are outside the jurisdiction and their allotments are also made from Ranchi and that in the matter of issue of allotment order, nothing takes place at West Bengal. It has also been stated that the Coal Controller or the Coal India Ltd., after issue of their respective directives and linkages, has nothing further to do. This stand of the respondents with regard to jurisdiction emphasises on a non-issue. The petitioner's grievance is not in relation to the mere issuance of an allotment order without anything more. The petitioner's basic complaint is that its right based on the linkage and allotment is being nullified and in order to establish this, it has to prove that it had such a linkage and such an allotment. These two are the important factors which have taken place at Calcutta and as such it cannot but be noted that the petitioner at least has been able to show that part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission's case (supra). 25. In that view of the matter, we are unable to record our concurrence with the contention of Mr. Mittra that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain, try or determine this writ application. 25. In that view of the matter, we are unable to record our concurrence with the contention of Mr. Mittra that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain, try or determine this writ application. The contention in regard thereto therefore fails. 26. In the premises, the pending appeal, all applications and the writ petition shall stand disposes of in the line of the statement as made by Sri Ramesh Kamra as contained in the affidavit affirmed on 5th January, 1996, in particular paragraph 19 thereof and as such it is ordered that supply to the petitioner's SSF Unit be given from those collieries earmarked for supply to private cokeries. Such supply shall however be subject to the availability and if there is any excess after meeting the demands of private cokeries and Steel Industries as per the letter dated 19th April, 1993. In the event of there being any excess found after affecting supplies to the private cokeries and other steel industries, the supplies to be effected to the SSF Units shall have to be strictly in accordance with the priority as maintained by Central Coalfields Ltd., viz., the date of allotment and the linkage. The Central Coalfields, however, are directed to take expeditious steps in the matter of supplies of coal in the normal course of events. 27. All interim orders are vacated. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 28. Mr. Mullick, appearing for the Central Coalfields Ltd. prays for stay of operation of this order. Mr. Pal, appearing for the appellant, opposes such a prayer. Considering the submissions, however such a prayer of Mr. Mullick is rejected. Appeal disposed of.