Judgment :- The prayer in the writ petition is to issue a writ ofcertiorarified mandamusor any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ calling for the records of the proceedings of the first respondent dated 28-8-1996 confirming the findings of the second respondent dated 31-1-1996, quash the same and direct the second respondent to keep the petitioner's appeal alive and dispose of the same in accordance with the law. 2.The petitioner M/s. The Metal Powder Company Ltd., is a Public Limited Company. The Secretary of the Company in his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition states that the petitioner company availed exemption in terms of Notification 184/88, dated 13-5-1988. The Second respondent issued show cause notice on 8-12-1992 that the petitioner company was not entitled for the exemption under the aforesaid notification. The petitioner sent a reply on 11-3-1995. After giving an opportunity to the petitioner company, the second respondent passed the Order-in-Original No. 18/96, dated 31-1-1996, rejecting the contentions of the petitioner company. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the first respondent, the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Trichy and filed an application under Section 35F to get the benefit of proviso of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. By the impugned telegram dated 28-8-1996 the first respondent rejected the contentions of the petitioner and directed the petitioner company to deposit the due demanded in four weeks and report the compliance. Aggrieved by the said impugned order, the petitioner has approached this Court for reliefs as prayed for. 3.Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order is unsustainable in law. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the impugned order is not a speaking order and the first respondent has not applied the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in matter of granting interim relief. The learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of this Court to Section 35A(4) of the Act, which says that the order of Collector (Appeals) disposing of the appeal shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. In this connection Mr. The learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of this Court to Section 35A(4) of the Act, which says that the order of Collector (Appeals) disposing of the appeal shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. In this connection Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel referred to ruling of the Supreme Court reported inAssistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagarv.Dunlop India Ltd.- 1985 (19) ELT 22 , 1985 AIR(SC) 330, 1985 (58) CC 145, 1985 (1) CCC 622, 1985 ECR 4, 1985 (154) ITR 172, 1984 (2) Scale 819 , 1985 (1) SCC 260 , 1985 (2) SCR 190 , 1985 UJ 368 , 1984 (2) SCALE 819 , 1985 (4) ECC 103, 1985 AIR(SCage) 330, 1985 SCC(Tax) 75 (SC) with reference to grant of interim orders which is as follows :- "There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of aprima faciecase. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of the public interest. There are many such factors worthy of consideration" * . He contended that the impugned order is not sustainable in law. The learned Senior Counsel referred to Section 35A(4) and (5) of the Act and pointed out that the order of the Collector (Appeals) disposing of the appeal must be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision and the same has to be communicated to the concerned party to be a valid order. 4.There is force in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel. On the perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that it is not a speaking order and no reasons have been stated as to why the petitioner-company is not entitled to the benefit of proviso to Section 35F of the Act. In the absence of the reasons, it is not possible to note whether the discretion given to the appellate authority under proviso to Section 35F of the Act has been exercised judiciously and in accordance with law. In the absence of the reasons, it is not possible to note whether the discretion given to the appellate authority under proviso to Section 35F of the Act has been exercised judiciously and in accordance with law. The ruling of the Supreme Court inAssistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagarv.Dunlop India Ltd.- 1985 (19) ELT 22 , 1985 AIR(SC) 330, 1985 (58) CC 145, 1985 (1) CCC 622, 1985 ECR 4, 1985 (154) ITR 172, 1984 (2) Scale 819 , 1985 (1) SCC 260 , 1985 (2) SCR 190 , 1985 UJ 368 , 1984 (2) SCALE 819 , 1985 (4) ECC 103, 1985 AIR(SCage) 330, 1985 SCC(Tax) 75 (SC) cited by Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel relates to grant of interim orders by Courts. In this connection, the Supreme Court has observed as follows :- "There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of aprima faciecase. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of the public interest. There are many such factors worthy of consideration." * The above decision is not with reference to the exercise of discretion under proviso to Section 35F of the Act. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that all the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in grant of interim orders will also apply for the exercise of discretion under proviso to Section 35F of the Act. As observed by the Supreme Court, there can be and there are no hard and fast rules, but prudence, discretion and circumspection are called for. I am of the view that under proviso to Section 35F of the Act, apart from the existence ofprima faciecase and hardship to the assessee, the interest of revenue has to be considered. 5.Further in the instant case, the impugned order has been communicated to the petitioner by means of a telegram. The original order signed by the first respondent has not been communicated to the petitioner. It is not in accordance with law and procedure laid down under Section 11(1)(a) of the Act. Section 37C prescribes the mode of service of decisions, orders, summons, etc., under the Act. The original order signed by the first respondent has not been communicated to the petitioner. It is not in accordance with law and procedure laid down under Section 11(1)(a) of the Act. Section 37C prescribes the mode of service of decisions, orders, summons, etc., under the Act. In this connection, Section 37C(1)(a) reads as follows :- " 37C.Service of decisions, orders, summons, etc.: (1) Any decision or order passed or any summons or notices issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be served, - (a) by tendering the decision, order, summons of notice, or sending it by registered post with acknowledgement due, to the person for whom it is intended or his authorised agent, if any; In the instant case, the procedure given for service of the appellate order has not been complied with as the first respondent has only communicated the order by telegram and has not sent the original order signed by him by registered post with acknowledgement due.6.In view of the above, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. The first respondent shall give a notice of personal hearing to the petitioner and dispose of the petition filed by the petitioner-company under Section 35F of the Act, in accordance with law within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. This writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. Consequently, no orders are necessary in W.M.P. Nos. 18750 and 18751 of 1996.