Honble JAIN, J. – By this order, I propose to dispose of the objection raised by the office that this revision petition is barred by time by 88 days. The litigation relating to this revision petition has got a chequered history but presently it is not necessary to advert to the same. Suffice it to say that in civil original suit No. 112/94 pending before the learned Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Jodhpur, an application of petitioners- defendants u/O. 7 R. 11 CPC was filed. The learned trial Court dismissed the above application on 6.6.1994. The petitioner has filed this revision to challenge the above order. Respondent No. 5 was added as party in the said suit by the order of this Court dated 19.1.1995. This Court issued a notice of the revisional application but the same was recalled. It further appears that this Court passed an interim direction to the effect that the opposite party to this petition would be restrained from preventing the applicants in the revisional application from taking possession of the disputed property if such possession had been taken in accordance with law. This order was challenged before the Honble Supreme Court and the SLP No. 12085/95 was decided in October, 1995. It was observed :– ``It appears to us that in the revisional application the delay not having been condoned, consideration of revision application on merits was premature. That apart, the interim order passed in favour of the opposite parties to the said revisional application by the trial Court was not the subject matter of challenge in the revisional application but the revisional application was directed against the order of rejection to the said application u/O. 7 R 11 of the CPC. In that view of the matter, in our view, the impugned interim order passed by the High Court was not warranted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order granting the said interim injunction. Revisional application, however, should be considered by the learned Judge after taking into consideration the question of condonation of delay as expeditiously as possible. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. It is in compliance of the above order that I am disposing of this petition regarding limitation. (2). I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the non-petitioner No.2. (3). Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order was passed on 6.6.1994. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. It is in compliance of the above order that I am disposing of this petition regarding limitation. (2). I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the non-petitioner No.2. (3). Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order was passed on 6.6.1994. Application for obtaining a certified copy was moved on 7.6.1994. The copy was issued on 15.6.1994 and it reached the Mining Engineer, Mines & Geology (writs) Deptt., Jodhpur on the same day. Thereafter, opinion of the learned Public Prosecutor was obtained and the file was submitted to the Secre- tary to the Govt. with the proposal for seeking order whether to file a revision or not against the above order. Before the file is disposed of at the level of the Secretary to the Govt., it has to pass various levels and various departments. Since time was being taken and the period of limitation was arriving near and the sanction was not received, a letter followed by two reminders was sent. Shri R.L. Jangid was appoin- ted as penal lawyer of the department who was entrusted to file this revision petition. When he was contacted, he expressed his inability to file revision on the ground that he had been counsel for the opposite party in a writ petition filed before the High Court. In view of the development, the department had to submit file again to the State Government apprising it of the above facts and a request was made to appoint a new counsel. Again the file had to route through various levels and officers and eventually the sanction was accorded on 3.10.1994. It was received in Jodhpur on 17.10.1994. However, alongwith the sanction letter, the certified copy of the impugned order was not received. The Govt. had to be contracted for this. Information was received that the same had been despatched by post. It was, how- ever, received on 9.11.1994. Thereafter, one more hurdle was faced by the department. Five Government offices were shifted to another buildings. The file relating to this case was also shifted from one office to another and it took some more time to trace out the same. When the file was ultimately retrieved, the revision petition was filed. It was, how- ever, received on 9.11.1994. Thereafter, one more hurdle was faced by the department. Five Government offices were shifted to another buildings. The file relating to this case was also shifted from one office to another and it took some more time to trace out the same. When the file was ultimately retrieved, the revision petition was filed. Learned counsel has very earnestly submitted despite best efforts, delay in obtaining the relevant sanction for filing a revision or appeal was not received within time. On account of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology the above object is seldom achieved. This necessarily results in delay. Appreciating the above difficulties, the Honble Supreme Court did not rigidly apply the doctrine of equality before the law and made some allowance for the above impediments and hurdles faced by the Govt. Deptt. in obtaining sanction in a particular case. Learned counsel has referred to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Chandramani & Ors. (1). In this case, the Honble Supreme Court reviewed the old case law and also appreciated the practical and unavoidable de- lays faced by the Govt. Deptt. in obtaining the final sanction for preferring a revision or appeal against a particular order. He submitted that a delay of 109 days in that case was condoned. The principles laid down in State of Haryanas case fully applied to the present case. He, therefore, submitted that the delay may be condoned and the decision on merits be delivered. (4). Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 very vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners. He submitted that the proof of explanation for sufficient cause (s) is a sine quo non for condoning delay on an application submitted u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 5 does not recognise any distinction between the State and private individual or an institution when the need to establish ``sufficient cause is judicially appreciated. Hence, discriminatory approach is not called for. Regarding the facts narrated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he submitted that the petitioners cannot be credited with the explanation of sufficient cause by making a statement that the Mining Deptt. submitted the file through the Secretary of the Govt. Hence, discriminatory approach is not called for. Regarding the facts narrated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he submitted that the petitioners cannot be credited with the explanation of sufficient cause by making a statement that the Mining Deptt. submitted the file through the Secretary of the Govt. and there it took a lot of time because according to official procedure, various stages and various departments are consulted before a final decision is taken. He further submitted that when the sanction was accorded, the period of limitation had expired. The explanation submitted by the petitioner that when Shri Jangid declined to accept it took a very long time even to find out a new advocate to represent the petitioner. Further more, by taking a lenient view and recognising the bureaucratic indifference to the realisation of early disposal of such file, premium will be paid to such erring officers. He expressed surprise why no action is taken against the erring officers. When a file reaches a particular stage or officers, it can conveniently be marked ``URGENT or by some other mode it can be indicated that the disposal was urgen- tly required. If such delays are condoned, merely on the omnibous explanation furnished by the petitioner, as in the present case, the bar of limitation will lose all its sanctity and purpose. (5). I have considered the rival contentions. In State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howarah Municipality (2), it was emphasised that no distinction bet- ween the State and private individual or an institution can be made while interpreting the words ``sufficient cause in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act only because the party in default is the Govt. Consideration that would be shown to a private party u/s. 5 should also be available to the State. (6). In the latest decision in State of Haryana vs. Chandramani & Ors. (supra), Apex Court dealt with the cases decided by it previously and observed : ``It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 percent of the cases filed in this Court be it by private party or the State are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methoddogy imbued with the note-making, filed-pushing and passing- on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that de- cisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeal brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ``sufficient cause should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizent to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopele- ssly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standard cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjust- ment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. It was also observed that what constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Shanti (3), it was held that discretion given by Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act should not be defined or crystalised as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. Hence, the expression ``sufficient cause should receive a liberal consideration. In State of Kerala vs. E.K. Kuriyipe & Ors. (4), it was held that condonation of delay on the basis of sufficient cause is a matter of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In O.P. Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh & Ors. (5), a Bench of Honble three Judges of the Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (6), it was observed :– ``The expression `sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression ``every days delay must explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression ``every days delay must explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner. When substantial justi- ce and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. In Smt. Prabha vs. Ramprakash Kalra (7), the Apex Court held that the Court should not adopt an injustice oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. (7). From the above it is clear that the underlying principles which can be deduced from the above decisions of the Supreme Court are that a pragmatic view of functioning of the Govt. must be adopted while considering as to whether the delay should be condoned or not. Since the decisions of the Govt. are collective and institutional and are proverbially slow and encumbered by a considerable degree of procedural delay in the process of their making, certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. The reason is that if appeals approached by Govt. are lost on account of such fault, the interest of the justice will be jeopar- dised. However, it may be emphasized that the Apex Court emphatically stressed the need to adopt a pragmatic view while considering the question on merits whether the defaulting party has been able to show sufficient cause or not. In the case of Govt. some latitude has been found admissible on account of, ``impersonal machinery and ``inherent bureaucratic methodology, imbued with the note - ma- king, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck-ethos. It was further laid down that on account of limitation, the Govt. should not suffer grave miscarriage of justice. In other words, if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, that may constitute a valid ground to condone the delay. The expression ``sufficient cause must be applied in a meaningful manner which can subserve the justice. However, it may be noted in the above decision the Apex Court has not dispensed with the requirement of the defaulting party to offer explanation or sufficient cause for condoning the delay. It does not mean that since the defaulting party is Govt. The expression ``sufficient cause must be applied in a meaningful manner which can subserve the justice. However, it may be noted in the above decision the Apex Court has not dispensed with the requirement of the defaulting party to offer explanation or sufficient cause for condoning the delay. It does not mean that since the defaulting party is Govt. and the decision making process of the Govt. is lethargic and time consuming and suffers from bureaucratic methodology, a presumption that delay was caused for sufficient reason cannot be presumed. The merits of the case must also be kept in mind while approaching the question of condonation of delay u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act. (8). Now coming to the merits of the present case, there is no dispute that the delay caused is of 88 days. The impugned order was passed on 6. 6. 1994 and the petitioner moved an application for obtaining the certified copy on 7.6.1994 and the same reached the Mining Engineer on 15.6.1994. Thus, limitation for filing the revision against the impugned order expired on 13.9.1994. The revision was actually filed on 13.12.1994. It is very important to take a note of the fact that sanction for filing the revision was accorded by the competent authority on 7.10.1994 e.g. after the expiry of the period of limitation. It may be noted that by the impugned order, an application u/O. 7 R. 11 r/w Sec. 151 CPC was decided . The explanation offered by the petitioner in his application u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act is that after obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order, the file was sent to the Secretary to the Govt. of Rajasthan. Thereafter, the file went through various levels and various age- ncies. When the sanction was not received, the reminders dated 18.6.1994, 12.7.1994 and 4.8.1994 were sent. It is interesting to note that after according sanction on 17.10.1994, the filation of the revision took almost two months and the reason for this delay was that the penal lawyer Shri R.L. Jangid could not handle the case as he had appeared for the opposite party. Thereafter, time was taken in second appointment of the lawyer. (9). From the above, it is only apparent that the certified copy was submitted to the Govt. What happened thereafter is not known or indicated in the application. Thereafter, time was taken in second appointment of the lawyer. (9). From the above, it is only apparent that the certified copy was submitted to the Govt. What happened thereafter is not known or indicated in the application. At what level the delay was caused and the file was held-up must have been exp- lained by the petitioner. Sometimes erring officers escape their accountability on the ground that the Courts tend to approach the application for condoning the delay with a very liberal view and does not call for the details of such delay. Certainly the Govt. must not protect such erring officers who must be well aware of their duty to clear the file with utmost priority and did not perform their duties properly. If the Govt. is pressurised for submitting the details of the delay, such officers or agencies can be exposed and they may be amenable to disciplinary action. It is ironical that on the one hand the Govt. pleads for liberal attitude for deciding the matter whether to file an appeal or revision or not, and, on the other hand, indirectly protects such officers. In the instant case, the Govt. has not explained why two months were taken for filing this revision petition when sanction was accorded. If Shri Jangid could not handle the case, by resorting to urgent communication, some other advocate could have been appointed in a weeks time. (10). In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to condone the delay. I, therefore, hold that the petition filed by the petitioner is hopelessly time barred and is hereby dismissed for this reason.