JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order dated 1.8.1996 passed by Shri G.S. Saraf, the Learned District Judge, Merta in Civil Appeal (decree) No. 15 of 1996 whereby the Learned District Judge has dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant-petitioner in the Court of the Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nawan Sahar for ejectment and arrears of rent on the ground of default in payment of rent and that the defendant-petitioner was not residing in the rented premises without any reasonable explanation for the last more than six months from the date of the institution of the suit. The suit was contested by the defendant-petitioner. The learned trial Court decreed the suit on the groun I s contained in Section 13(1)(j) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act'). The defendant-petitioner preferred an appeal before the Learned District Judge, Merta but the same was dismissed by the learned first appellate Court, on the ground that the appeal filed by the defen,dant-petitioner was barred by time. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has very vehemently contended that the learned first appellate Court did not at all consider the application moved by the petitioner for condoning the delay. According to the learned counsel, the suit was decreed on 22.11.1995. The counsel engaged by the petitioner did not inform the latter of the decision. The petitioner did not enquire because his counsel had assured him that the latter would be calling the former as and when it was found necessary. It was, therefore, squarely a mistake on the part of his counsel not to inform him about the decision in the above suit. The petitioner came to know about the said judgment and decree on 9.7.1996 and on the next very day, he obtained copies of the judgment and decree and rushed to Jodhpur to prefer an appeal which was filed on 22.7.1996. 5. The learned appellate Court held that the petitioner did not explain the delay. The petitioner came to know about the said judgment and decree on 9.7.1996 and on the next very day, he obtained copies of the judgment and decree and rushed to Jodhpur to prefer an appeal which was filed on 22.7.1996. 5. The learned appellate Court held that the petitioner did not explain the delay. The copy was received by petitioner on 10.7.1996 and the appeal was filed on 22.7.1996 but no explanation whatsoever has been offered by the petitioner for this delay even after obtaining the copy. 6. The learned counsel has cited Refiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 S.C. 1400 , wherein their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed : "Where an appeal filed by the appellant was disposed of in absence of his counsel, so also his application for recall of order of dismissal was rejected by the High Court, the Supreme Court in appeal set aside both the orders of dismissal on ground that party who, as per the present adversary legal system, has selected his advocate, briefed him and paid his fee can remain supremely confident that his lawyer will look after his interest and such a innocent party who has done everything in his power and expected of him, should not suffer for the inaction deliberate omission or misdemeanour of his counsel." 7. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. 8. The latest case on the question of limitation is State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors., 1996 (3) J.T. (S.C.) 371 . In this case, the Apex Court reviewed the earlier law and laid down the guidelines for the subordinate Courts. However, in that case, the consideration of 'sufficient case' was with respect to the appeal filed by the State and in that context it was observed : "If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffer, is public interest. The Expression 'sufficient cause' should therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to detezmine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the evont of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the Officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay." 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that if the merits of the judgment of the trial Court is examined, it would be evident that the case has been decreed without any evidence. The statements of the witnesses examined in the case were not made available to one. 10. I have gone through the statements. I do not find any force in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In my opinion, the learned trial Court has not committed any jurisdictional error or any illegality or material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction. Even if the impugned order of the learned appellate Court is erroneous, no interference is warranted in revision under section 115 CPC. 11. For the above reasons, I find no force in this revision petition and it is hereby dismissed summarily.Petition Dismissed. *******