ORDER : G.N. Ray, J. 1. This appeal under the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 read with Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the judgment and order dated 19-10-1992/23-10-1992 passed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 818 of 1983. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, set aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of the appellant in Sessions Case No. 3 of 1983 by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar on 27-4-1983. 2. The appellant faced the trial on a charge under Section 302 Indian Penal Code for committing the murder of Kamlesh. It is the prosecution case that on 27-10-1982, between 9 and 10 a.m., the deceased Kamlesh was dragged by force into the house of the appellant and the appellant thereafter poured kerosene on the body of the deceased and set her on fire. In the said case, five dying declarations were placed for consideration of the Court, out of which, three were written dying declarations and two were oral. Out of the three written dying declarations, one of the declarations was recorded by an Executive Magistrate who has also deposed in the case. 3. The learned Sessions Judge, inter alia, came to the finding that the dying declarations were inconsistent and there were attempts of improvement and embellishment. Moreover, the possibility of the deceased being tutored by mother could not be ruled out. Accordingly, the trial court did not place any reliance on the dying declarations. The trial court was of the view that the prosecution case could not be established beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt was given to the appellant and the order of acquittal was passed in his favour. On appeal being preferred by the State of Gujarat, the High Court by the impugned judgment has set aside the said order of acquittal and convicted the accused under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment. 4. Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that it appears that the reprehensible conduct of the appellant-accused weighed more in basing the decision of the High Court than considering the intrinsic evidence adduced in the case dispassionately. 4. Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that it appears that the reprehensible conduct of the appellant-accused weighed more in basing the decision of the High Court than considering the intrinsic evidence adduced in the case dispassionately. It was noted in the impugned judgment of the High Court that the accused, after setting the deceased on fire, had left the place and such conduct was held to be indicative of his complicity in the crime. But from the evidence of PW 4 Jilu who was first to arrive at the place of the incident, it is quite clear that the accused was present in the house and it was at his instance that Jilu opened the door of the house of the accused which was bolted from outside. She has deposed that it was the accused who told Jilu that the deceased was burning. Hence the High Court misconceived the facts of the case. Mr Sushil Kumar has further submitted that one of the dying declarations was recorded by PW 8 Balwant Singh who was a police constable. Such a dying declaration has been disbelieved both by the High Court and also by the trial court for cogent reasons. But, unfortunately, even in the said dying declaration, which was a piece of fabrication and forgery, the mother did not hesitate to put her thumb impression. Mr Sushil Kumar has submitted that the trial court has indicated cogent reasons as to why the dying declaration should not be accepted. He has also submitted that it is only when the mother reached the place of the incident, all the dying declarations came into existence in quick succession and the mother was also present when the Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration. There is evidence that she was present even before the arrival of the Magistrate in the hospital. In the aforesaid circumstances, the chance of tutoring by the mother cannot be ruled out and the trial court was justified in holding such a view. 5. Mr. Sushil Kumar has submitted that it was extremely unnatural that the victim did not shout for help when she was set on fire. In the aforesaid circumstances, the chance of tutoring by the mother cannot be ruled out and the trial court was justified in holding such a view. 5. Mr. Sushil Kumar has submitted that it was extremely unnatural that the victim did not shout for help when she was set on fire. PW 4 Jilu has specifically deposed that the accused requested Jilu to come to the house by opening the door bolted from outside and when she came by opening the door, she was told by the accused that the victim was burning. According to PW 4 Jilu, even then she did not hear any screaming by the victim and the victim then came out from a room in the house and sat on the "wada" (open space) and quietly requested Jilu to bring some curd to apply on her body. Such fact runs counter to the prosecution case of the victim being set on fire by force. Mr Sushil Kumar has submitted that in the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, the victim has stated that she had shouted for help but such assertion in the dying declaration runs counter to the deposition of Jilu, an independent witness. There is no reason to hold that Jilu has not deposed correctly. As a matter of fact, the prosecution has relied on the deposition of Jilu. 6. Mr. Sushil Kumar has submitted that a note stated to be written by the deceased which apparently appears to be a note for committing suicide was also placed before the Court. Unfortunately, the same was not considered in the proper perspective. In the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant has specifically stated that the deceased requested him to marry but she (sic he) had refused to marry as he was already married. She entered his house when he was asleep after night duty and committed suicide. From the conduct of the victim and other facts revealed in the evidence as indicated hereinbefore, the defence case of suicide committed by the deceased appears to be quite plausible. In the aforesaid facts, the trial court was fully justified that the prosecution case had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the aforesaid facts, the trial court was fully justified that the prosecution case had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt. It cannot be contended that such a finding was a perverse finding being wholly against the weight of evidence for which interference by the court of appeal was called for. Mr Sushil Kumar has submitted that the law is well settled that if on the basis of the evidence adduced in a case, the view taken by the trial court in passing the order of acquittal appears to be one of the reasonable views which can be taken, no interference by the court of appeal is called for by re-appreciating the evidence and substituting another view which may also be one of the possible views. He has therefore submitted that the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of acquittal and convicting the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal should be allowed by setting aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. 7. Mr. Shashank Adhyeru, the learned counsel appearing for the State has however submitted that no suggestion was given on behalf of the accused that the mother had tutored the deceased in giving her dying declaration. Even if no reliance may be placed on the oral and the other written dying declarations, there is no occasion to discard the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate. In the absence of any suggestion that such a dying declaration was a product of tutoring the deceased, the same deserves to be accepted and the High Court has rightly placed reliance on the said dying declaration and no exception should be taken in placing such reliance on the dying declaration recorded by the learned Magistrate. Mr Adhyeru has also submitted that even from the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is quite apparent that when the accused came to know that the deceased was burning in his house, he did not shout or raise any note of alarm but just called Jilu, PW 4 when she happened to pass by his house and when she came inside the house, she was quietly told that the deceased was burning. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the State that such conduct of the accused is highly unnatural and against normal human behaviour. Accordingly, the case sought to be made out by the accused in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be discarded. Mr Adhyeru has therefore submitted that the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate not being liable to be discarded, the conviction passed against the appellant by the High Court by placing reliance on such a dying declaration must be held to be legal and valid. He has therefore submitted that no interference is called for in this appeal and the same should be dismissed. 8. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that there are some disturbing features in this case which require to be carefully considered. It is the specific case of the prosecution, as disclosed in the dying declaration recorded by the learned Magistrate, that she was dragged by the accused inside the house and thereafter threatening to kill her, kerosene was poured on her body and she was set on fire. It has however transpired from the evidence of PW 4 Jilu that there were a number of persons collecting water almost in front of the house of the accused. If the deceased, an able-bodied person was attempted to be forcibly dragged inside the house, it was quite natural that she should shout and raise a voice of protest, more so, when she was taken inside the house and the door was bolted and she was threatened to be killed. There is no evidence that anybody had heard any shout for help. Even when she was set on fire, nobody heard her screams or any appeal for help. When PW 4 being requested by the accused entered the house and was told by the accused that the deceased was burning, even then she did not hear any scream or shout for help. 9. According to the evidence of PW 4, the deceased silently came out from the room and after sitting in the "wada", she only requested Jilu to bring curd for being applied on her body. 9. According to the evidence of PW 4, the deceased silently came out from the room and after sitting in the "wada", she only requested Jilu to bring curd for being applied on her body. Such conduct appears to be quite unusual and does not conform to the case of being forcibly dragged into the house and thereafter being set on fire by pouring kerosene. On the contrary, such a case reasonably justifies a case of committing suicide as contended by the accused. We may also note here that the doctor who held an autopsy has also stated that such burning was also possible if somebody would commit suicide. It may be indicated here that Mr Sushil Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that both the palms of the deceased were not burnt. Such a fact indicates that she had committed suicide because in that event, the palms were not likely to be affected. In a case of homicidal burning by pouring kerosene on the body by another person, the palms along with the other parts of the body will get burnt. We may also indicate here that the dying declaration of the victim as recorded by the Magistrate runs counter to the deposition of PW 4. Though in her dying declaration, the deceased stated specifically that she shouted for help, Jilu (PW 4) deposed that she did not hear any such shout for help. It also appears to us that the mother of the deceased, shortly after the incident, reached the place of the occurrence and when Banraj had left the place, she was there. It is not unlikely that at that point of time, barring the accused, no other person was present along with the deceased. There is evidence that the mother had remained with the deceased all the time and when the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate, the mother was also present and she also put a thumb impression on the dying declaration. Her conduct in being a party to a fabricated piece of dying declaration recorded by the police constable which was rightly discarded by the courts below cannot be overlooked. In the aforesaid circumstances, in our view, there is justification for the trial court to proceed on the footing that reliance should not be placed on the dying declaration. Her conduct in being a party to a fabricated piece of dying declaration recorded by the police constable which was rightly discarded by the courts below cannot be overlooked. In the aforesaid circumstances, in our view, there is justification for the trial court to proceed on the footing that reliance should not be placed on the dying declaration. In the aforesaid facts, the view taken by the trial court for giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the appellant cannot be held to be absolutely without any basis and against the weight of evidence adduced in the case. Hence, in our view, there was no occasion to interfere with the order of acquittal passed in favour of the appellant. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. The appellant is in jail. He should be released forthwith, if he is not wanted in connection with any other criminal case.