Judgement This Misc. Application has been filed by the appellant under Order XXXIII, Rule 1 read with Sec. 151 of the C.P.C. 2. The petitioner as appellant filed First Appeal No. 126/94 under O. XLI, R. 1, C.P.C. read with Sec. 96, C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 3-5-94 passed by the learned Asstt. District Judge, West Tripura in Title Suit No. 101 (Mort) of 1988. 3. Petitioner No. 2 herein is the proprietor of the firm/factory, namely, Agartala Nail Industries (petitioner No. 1). 4. Petitioners case in the suit is that the petitioner took loan amounting to Rs. 1,01,165/- from the plaintiff-Union Bank of India, a Nationalised Bank, as term loan for plant and machinery, shed etc. and Rs. 38,000/- under cash credit loan for accommodation as working capital in the name of the firm. As the defendant (appellant/petitioner) failed to repay the loan amount the suit was filed for recovery of dues outstanding in cash credit loan account and term loan account secured by guarantee, hypothecation and equitable mortgage claiming recovery of Rupees 4,22,847.46/-. The suit was decreed and being aggrieved the defendant filed the above appeal for setting aside the impugned judgment and decree. 5. The appeal was filed beyond time with insufficient Court-fee, that is, the appellant paid Rs. 6/- only out of actual Court-fee of Rupees 4920.75/-. On 19-11-94 the Registry directed to deposit the remaining amount within 15 days. Subsequently the appellant deposited Rs. 200/- on 2-12-94 and Rs. 300/- on 12-2-95. On 28-2-95 the matter came before the Court and one month time was extended to pay the amount with the further direction that for non-compliance of the order the appeal would be dismissed. On 30-3-95 Rs. 500/- was deposited with an application praying for two months time to deposit the remaining Court-fee. On 30-5-95 again the matter came before the Court and on the prayer of the counsel for the appellant Court allowed further seven days time to deposit the Court-fee. Though the matter was to be listed on expiry of the seven days period it did not come before the Court. As per the order dated 30-5-95 the appellant ought to have deposited the remaining amount within the extended period but no application praying for time was filed by the appellant which he was required to do under the provisions of law. As per the order dated 30-5-95 the appellant ought to have deposited the remaining amount within the extended period but no application praying for time was filed by the appellant which he was required to do under the provisions of law. Interestingly on 7-6-95 an application under O. XXXIII, R. 1, C.P.C. was filed by the appellant praying for exemption from paying the balance Court-fee of Rs. 3,920.75/- treating the appellant as an indigent person which has been numbered as Civil Misc. Case No. 503/95. Further another application being Civil Misc. Case No. 502/95 had also been filed for condonation of delay by swearing an affidavit on 25-10-94. Though this Misc. Case was registered as Misc. Case No. 502/95 office did not mention on which date it was filed or was registered. But from the registration number of the Misc. Case it is apparent that both the petitions were filed and registered on the same date. There is no explanation whatsoever for this anomaly in the office. 6. In view of the above backdrops we are required to examine the petition under O. XXXIII, R. 1, C.P.C. From the above discussion, it is seen that plaintiff-Bank filed the suit TS (Mort) 101/88 which was decreed on 3-5-94. Appeal was filed beyond time on 25-10-94 with deficit Court-fee and condonation petition and on instalment till 30-3-95 only Rs. 1000/- was deposited out of the total Court-fee of Rs. 4920.75/-. This Court gave ultimate time to deposit the outstanding Court-fee which was required to be deposited by 6-6-95 positively. Neither any application nor any oral prayer was made before the Court for extension of time to pay the deficit Court-fee. As per Courts direction deficit Court-fee was not paid by 6-6-95. Instead, as aforesaid, an application was filed on 7-6-95, which was not put up before the Court to pass necessary order immediately after its filing. In our view these lapses on the part of the office and the dilatory tactics of the appellant has a legal effect both in procedure and in the right of the decree-holder wherein public interest is also involved. 7. In our view these lapses on the part of the office and the dilatory tactics of the appellant has a legal effect both in procedure and in the right of the decree-holder wherein public interest is also involved. 7. In a catena of judicial pronouncements the established position of law is that under Sections 4 and 6 of the Court-fees Act, before a document is filed in the High Court or in other Courts and in public offices it must bear the Court-fee chargeable within the first schedule/second schedule of the Court-fees Act; that memorandum of appeal should be properly stamped as required u/S. 4 of the Court-fees Act and that in such cases High Court has full power to refuse to accept the memo of appeal which is insufficiently stamped. Provision of Sec. 4 being a taxing statute, it is to be interpreted strictly. Ratio of judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court is that equity has no place in taxing statutes. However, Sec. 149, C.P.C. mitigated the rigour of Sec. 4 of the Court-fees Act. Therefore, in a given case it is for the Court to harmonise the provisions of both the Court-fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure by reading Sec. 149, C.P.C. as proviso to Sec. 4 of the Court-fees Act and allow the deficit to be made good within a period of time fixed by it ( AIR 1971 SC 1374 Mannan Lal v. Mst. Chhotka Bibi, on her death by her legal representatives). Under Sec. 149, C.P.C. the Court can extend time to pay deficit Court-fee at any stage of suit/appeal. But Court has to see the effect of such extention as when the deficit Court-fee is paid after the date fixed for payment, it should be treated as fresh suit and, therefore, question of limitation in the appeal is also required to be taken into consideration. In that view of the matter payment of deficit Court-fee required to be accompanied by an application with prayer for condonation of delay. 8. As Sec. 149 is a discretionary provision given to the Court, this discretionary power has to be exercised keeping in view the right of the respondent/decree-holder and public interest, in a given case, like the interest of the plaintiff-Union Bank. In the instant case inordinate delay with a view to evade the claim of the plaintiff-Bank is apparent. 8. As Sec. 149 is a discretionary provision given to the Court, this discretionary power has to be exercised keeping in view the right of the respondent/decree-holder and public interest, in a given case, like the interest of the plaintiff-Union Bank. In the instant case inordinate delay with a view to evade the claim of the plaintiff-Bank is apparent. The legal right of the decree-holder has been held up by the lengthy process in the appellate Court. In this case it is seen that no step was taken by the appellant/petitioner either by depositing the deficit Court-fee as directed by the Court or by application for extension of time to deposit the same. 9. As discussed above, in the facts and circumstances of the case we should proceed to examine whether the application of the appellant under O. XXXIII, R. 1 can be accepted. 10. As it is seen this application was filed on 7-6-95 and no application for further extension of time to deposit deficit Court-fee was filed. The ground for exemption from paying the remaining Court-fee of Rs. 3920.75/- was that the petitioner/appellant could not collect money to pay the required Court-fee due to his ailments, but somehow paid Rs. 1000/- towards deficit Court-fee making outstanding the substantive amount. That on 5-7-95 at night a theft was committed in the factory of the petitioner, namely, Agartala Nail Industries, and valuable articles, such as, motor, dices, raw materials etc. were taken away, valuation of which is more or less Rs. 3.5/- lacks leaving the petitioner/appellant financially handicapped. A copy of the first information report, which was filed before the Officer in charge, Amtali Police Station, Agartala (Amtali PS FIR No. 32/95) with much delay, has been annexed with this petition (Annexure-I). It is further contended that save and except the premises of the factory hypothecated to the plaintiff-Bank and Tripura Industrial Development Corporation, he owns only wearing apparels which has been described in the schedule. His further contention in the petition is that the theft of the properties of the factory totally turned him financially handicapped and hoped that "he will be able to recover his position in near future if his said factory survives and the respondent-Bank does not further destroy him by not providing him (appellant/petitioner) financial assistance as required, as the respondent-Bank did earlier." 11. Lastly the petitioner/appellant contends that he has no sufficient means to pay the balance Court-fee. 12. The conduct of the appellant/petitioner has to be examined from the sequence of the circumstances as transpires from the above discussion. 13. Petitioner/appellant took more than one year to deposit the Court-fee on instalments and in two of his petitioners for extension of time, he gave the reason of his inability to pay due to different ailments at different time at his convenience. Interestingly the theft took place on 7-5-95, i.e., after direction of this Court dated 28-2-95 with clear terms to pay the deficit Court-fee within one month failing which appeal be dismissed. In that case the matter ought to have been listed on or before 28-3-95 for dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance of Courts order but it did not come before the Court. The matter was listed on 30-5-95 on which date on the prayer of the counsel seven days time was extended which expired on 6-6-95 and as stated above on that date or even on subsequent dates the matter was not listed before the Court to pass necessary order and no application was filed for further extension. In that view of the matter we are constrained to hold that as no deficit Court-fee was deposited on the date fixed, the petitioner/appellant is not entitled to get the benefit as provided u/S. 149, C.P.C. Established position of law by a catena of judicial pronouncements is that practice of filing of appeal immediately before the expiry of limitation with insufficient Court-fee merits severe condemnation and cannot be tolerated, AIR 1939 Mad 1. (SB). 14. When the extension and exemption of deposit of Court-fee is a discretionary power of the Court, bona fide of the ground should be established beyond all reasonable doubt. 15. From another point, O. XLIV deals with appeals by indigent persons and it contemplates that appeals by indigent persons shall be dealt with in the same manner as institution of original proceedings by such persons. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XLIV prescribes ". . . . . .all matters, including the presentation of such application, to the provisions relating to suits by indigent persons, in so far as the provisions are applicable" are to be followed. Order XXXIII deals with the procedure relating to suits by indigent persons. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XLIV prescribes ". . . . . .all matters, including the presentation of such application, to the provisions relating to suits by indigent persons, in so far as the provisions are applicable" are to be followed. Order XXXIII deals with the procedure relating to suits by indigent persons. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of Order XXXIII mandates that the application shall be presented by the applicant in person, unless he is exempted from appearing in Court. Sections 132 and 133 of the C.P.C. give the list of persons who are exempted from personal appearance in the Court. Order XXXIII, Rule 3 prescribes that provision contained in this Rule (R. 3 of O. XXXIII) overrides any other provisions contained in the Rules. Thus, the legislature intended that the person applying to the Court seeking leave to sue or to prosecute an appeal should present the application by himself. In our present case at hand, the concerned application dated 7-6-95 was presented by the advocate. For the purpose of O. XXXIII and O. XLIV of the C.P.C. the learned counsel for the party cannot be treated or taken as an authorised agent. Again, Rule 5 of O. XXXIII mandates that the Court shall reject the application if the application is not presented in the manner prescribed by Rule 3. The relevant provision is extracted below : "O. XXXIII, R. 5- Rejection of application - The Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as an indigent person- (a) where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rules 2 and 3, or (b) ... ... ... (c) ... ... ..." Thus, by mandate of law it has to be held that the present application seeking leave to file the appeal as an indigent person is to be rejected. 16. We also find it not necessary to make enquiry as provided under O. XXXIII, R. 1A as the materials before us as transpired from the memo of appeal, judgment and decree and from the contention of the petitions are sufficient to satisfy us to examine his prayer under O. XXXIII, R. 1 of the C.P.C. 17. In the result this Misc. Case is dismissed. The appellant/petitioner is directed to deposit the balance Court-fee of Rs. 3920.75/- within one month from today failing which the appeal shall be dismissed. Petition dismissed.