Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff in O.S. No. 219 of 78 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli, is the appellant in the above Second Appeal. He filed the said suit for declaration that the order of termination of the agency passed by the first defendant on 18.11.1976 against the plaintiff is illegal, ultra vires and not binding on the plaintiff and for injunction restraining the defendants from any manner giving effect to or to implement the said order. 2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows: The plaintiff has been appointed as agent of Life Insurance Corporation from 1969 onwards and he has been doing business to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/- per year. He has also taken a policy to the tune of Rs. 1,70,000/- for which he is paying the premium regularly. The plaintiff was also getting commission to the tune of Rs. 8,000/- per annum. On 22.5.1976 the plaintiff received a notice from the first defendant to show cause why his agency should not be terminated under Regulations 16(1) (a) and (b) of the (Agents) Regulations, 1972 on the ground that the plaintiff failed to bring to the notice of the Corporation about certain information regarding the policy taken in the name of the plaintiffs wife Lakshmi Bai bearing policy No. 42755090 in respect of which the plaintiff sent a suitable reply. The defendants by a letter dated 3.8.1976 informed the plaintiff that the claim for the policy taken in the name of his wife has been repudiated and the premium paid thereunder has been forfeited. A sum of Rs. 696-75 paid towards the commission to the plaintiff for the suit policy has been recovered from the bill in the month of June, July, 1976. The action of the defendants in repudiating the claim as well as the forfeiture of the premium and deduction of commission due to the plaintiff are illegal and ultra vires. The wife of the plaintiff died on 8.3.1974 at Tiruchirappalli Headquarters Hospital in spite of best medical treatment for a month. The cause of death is not due to any ailment, but due to accidental consumption of Phenobarbitone tables prescribed by the plaintiffs son. With these averments, he prayed for a decree. 3. The defendants filed a written statement wherein it is contended that the plaintiff was appointed as Agent of Life Insurance Corporation on 23.12.1969. The cause of death is not due to any ailment, but due to accidental consumption of Phenobarbitone tables prescribed by the plaintiffs son. With these averments, he prayed for a decree. 3. The defendants filed a written statement wherein it is contended that the plaintiff was appointed as Agent of Life Insurance Corporation on 23.12.1969. The conditions provided in the termination of the agency forthwith by written notice to him, if in the opinion of the L.I.C., his conduct became such as to render him unfit to act as its agent or if in its opinion, the plaintiff acted in a manner prejeducial to the interests of the Corporation. Clause 16 of the Agents Regulations provides that the competent authority may be order determine the appointment of an agent inter alia (a) if he has failed to discharge his functions as set out in regulation 8 to the satisfaction of the competent authority: (b) If he acts in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the policy holder. (c) If evidence comes to its knowledge to show that he has been allowing or offering to allow rebate of the whole or any part of the commission payable to him. (d) If it is found that any averment contained in his agency application or in any report furnished by him as an agent in respect of any proposal is not true, provided that the agent shall be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such termination. 4. It is further averred that the plaintiff wrote to the defendant that the life assured under Policy No. 42755090 who was incidentally the plaintiffs wife died on 8.3.1974 due to consumption of “Phenobarabitone”. During the investigation made by the L.I.C., regarding the early claim relating to Life Insurance Policy on the life of the plaintiffs wife, it was found that about 2 years before she proposed for the policy of life insurance, the life assured had suffered from “ Urge incontinence of Urine ” for which she has taken medical treatment. But the plaintiff as the agent of the Corporation had failed to disclose the information about such illness. But the plaintiff as the agent of the Corporation had failed to disclose the information about such illness. The defendant wrote to the plaintiff on 30.3.1976 asking for his observation in the matter and the same elicited a reply from the plaintiff in which he has stated that the life assured did not suffer from such ailment, but she had poor weight and the cause of death was due to consumption of phenobarbitone tablets and not due to any ailment. Further, the wife of the plaintiff had consulted a doctor and undergone treatment during the period from 25.12.1970 to 17.3.1971 and she failed to disclose the same in her personal statement and the plaintiff also has not mentioned the same in his confidential report. This, the plaintiff had failed to discharge the function as an agent by acting in violation of the regulation 8 (2) (b) of (Agents) Regulations, 1972. So the action of the plaintiff is prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation, and as such his agency has been terminated under regulation 16(1) (a) and (b) of the (Agents) Regulations, 1972. With regard to the personal enquiry the defendant decided that in as much as reasonable opportunity has already been given, no more enquiry was necessary. Then only the plaintiffs agency was duly terminated by letter dated 18.11.1976 after complying with the essential procedural requirements contained in the regulations. It is further averred that civil court cannot go into the decision of the defendant in terminating the agency of the plaintiff when once it is shown that the defendants have acted strictly as per the Agents Regulations 1972. Hence the plaintiff cannot get any relief and the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs. 5. Plaintiff himself was examined as P.W. 1 and he also marked Ex. A-1 to A-17 in support of his case. On the other hand, no one was examined on the defendants side. Exs. B-1 to B-3 alone were marked on their side. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge, after framing necessary issues and in the light of the oral and documentary evidence, by a common judgment (the other two suits, namely, O.S. No. 424 of 77 and S.C. No. 215 of 76 - not concerned for the present case), decreed the suit as prayed for with costs. 6. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge, after framing necessary issues and in the light of the oral and documentary evidence, by a common judgment (the other two suits, namely, O.S. No. 424 of 77 and S.C. No. 215 of 76 - not concerned for the present case), decreed the suit as prayed for with costs. 6. Aggrieved by the decree of the trial court, the defendants filed appeal in A.S. No. 238 of 80 before the District Court, Tiruchirappalli. The lower appellate court after framing necessary points, by a common judgment (we are not concerned with the other appeal, namely, A.S. No. 293 of 79), allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 7. The unsuccessful plaintiff has filed the present appeal against the dismissal of his suit by the lower appellate court. While entertaining the appeal, this Court has framed the following substantial question of law for consideration:— “The main question that arises in this Second Appeal is as to whether the plaintiff can seek a relief as against the termination of his services as agent of the Life Insurance Corporation of India without exhausting the remedies provided in the Service Regulations”. 8. In the light of the substantial question of law framed earlier, Mr. M.V. Krishnan, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the lower appellate court committed an error in dismissing the suit when there is no rebuttal evidence from the side of the defendants against the plaintiffs evidence. He also submits that the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff has not disclosed the ailment of his wife (policy-holder) in the policy as well as to the Life Insurance Corporation cannot be put against him in the light of the certificate issued under Ex. B-3 by Dr. Gnanasoundar, one of the Medical Examiners of the defendants Corporation saying’ that “the life of the plaintiffs wife as first class life”. With these submissions he prays for interference in this appeal. 9. On the other hand, Mr. M.S. Umapathy, learned counsel for the respondents, after taking me to the (Agents) Regulations, 1972 and the conclusion reached by the lower appellate court, submits that there is no warrant to interfere in the decision arrived at by the lower appellate court and prays for dismissal of the appeal. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 10. M.S. Umapathy, learned counsel for the respondents, after taking me to the (Agents) Regulations, 1972 and the conclusion reached by the lower appellate court, submits that there is no warrant to interfere in the decision arrived at by the lower appellate court and prays for dismissal of the appeal. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 10. Though the plaintiff has filed three suits claiming various reliefs, we are concerned with only the relief prayed for in O.S. No. 219 of 78. It is a suit for declaration that the order passed by the first defendant on 18.11.76 terminating the plaintiffs agency is null and void, and ultra-vires and not binding on the plaintiff and for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendants from giving effect to or to implement the said order. The plaintiff was admittedly appointed as agent of the Life Insurance Corporation on 23.12.69 and he served till the agency was terminated by the defendants on 18.11.76. It is the contention of the plaintiff that his service as agent was terminated by the defendants Corporation only on flimsy grounds without giving reasonable opportunity to be heard and so, the order passed by the defendants terminating his srervice as agent is held to be null and void and ultra vires. In support of his contention, he was examined as P.W. 1., and he has marked Exs. A-1 to A-17. Exs. B-1 to B-3 were also marked through him. Ex. A-12 is the order passed by the first defendant dated 18.11.76 terminating the service of the plaintiffs agency. It is seen from Ex. A-12 that the plaintiff has sent a proposal on the life of his wife, who underwent medical treatment under various Medical Examiners before the proposal for insurance and the same must have been known to the plaintiff. It is the contention of the defendants that the same was not brought to the notice of the defendants Corporation by the plaintiff and so the plaintiff was held to be guilty of withholding material information from the Life Insurance Corporation. It also reveals that the plaintiff had acted in violation of Regulation 8(2) (b) of (Agents) Regulations, 1972 and he acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation and also interests of the policy holders. Hence the plaintiffs agency was terminated under Regulations 16 (1) (a) and (b) of (Agents) Regulations, 1972. It also reveals that the plaintiff had acted in violation of Regulation 8(2) (b) of (Agents) Regulations, 1972 and he acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation and also interests of the policy holders. Hence the plaintiffs agency was terminated under Regulations 16 (1) (a) and (b) of (Agents) Regulations, 1972. A persual of Ex. A-12 further reveals that the reasons for terminating the plaintiffs agency are that the plaintiffs wife was taking treatment under various doctors before she proposed for insurance, but the plaintiff being the husband of the life assured, has not brought the same to the notice of the Life Insurance Corporation and so he is guilty of suppression of the material facts to the L.I.C., and as such his action is held to be prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation. For the said reasons, his service as agent of the Corporation has been terminated. (Agents) Regulations, 1972 has been marked as Ex. B-1. Regulation 8(2) (b) would reveal that, “the agents should make all reasonable inquiries in regard to the lives to be insured before recommending proposals for acceptance, and bring to the notice of the Corporation any circumstances which may adversely affect the risk to be undertaken”. Similarly it appears from regulation 16 (1) (a) that the competent authority may, by order, determine the appointment of an agent if he has failed to discharge his functions, as set out in regulation 8, to the satisfaction of the competent authority. Sub Clause (b) provides that if he acts in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation or to the interests of its policy holders. Thus it is clear from Regulation 16 (1) (a) and (b) that the competent authority can terminate the appointment of an agent if the latter fails to discharge his function as set out in regulation 8 and also if he acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation or its policy holders. As provided in Regulation 8(2) (b), the agents should make all reasonable enquiries in regard to the lives to be insured before recommending proposals for acceptance and bring to the notice of the Corporation any circumstances which may adversely affect the risk to be undertaken. As provided in Regulation 8(2) (b), the agents should make all reasonable enquiries in regard to the lives to be insured before recommending proposals for acceptance and bring to the notice of the Corporation any circumstances which may adversely affect the risk to be undertaken. But in the present case before me the contention raised by the defendants in the various communications sent by them to the plaintiff and also in the averments made in the written statements filed by them is that Lakshmi Bai, the wife of the plaintiff was suffering from “ urge incontinence of Urine ” and for the same she was taking treatment under various doctors even before the proposal was sent to the defendant. But the same was not brought to the notice of the defendants Corporation either by the plaintiff or by his wife. 11. Ex. B-3 is a proposal sent by Lakshmi Bai, the wife of the plaintiff to the defendant. In the proposal, for the specific question, namely, “have you consulted a medical practioner within last five years,” the answer is “no”. The above said answer shows that she has not consulted any medical practitioner within five years prior to the proposal was sent. However, Ex. A-17 reveals that Lakshmi Bai was examined by a leading Neorologist Thiru. Ramamoorthy at Madras on 17-3-71 and a prescription was given on 20-3-71. Hence, it is the contention o f the defendants that in the light of Ex. A-17 oven though the person assured had some ailment and consulted the leading Nerologist, the same has not been disclosed in the proposal form. The said Lakshmi Bai, wife of P.W. 1 died in the Government Headquarters Hospital, Tiruchirappalli on 8-3-1974. The reason for the death, according to P.W. 1 is due to consumption of sleeping tablets. However, it is the definite case of the defendants that Lakshmi Bai died due to urinary infection. It is true that the defendants have not taken steps to summon the hospital records where the said Lakshmi Bai died. However, the fact remains that P.W. 1 as the husband of the deceased Lakshmi Bai as well as Lakshmi Bai herself failed to mention the ailment and treatment with Dr. Ramamoorthy for two years and the same has been suppressed in the proposal form. However, the fact remains that P.W. 1 as the husband of the deceased Lakshmi Bai as well as Lakshmi Bai herself failed to mention the ailment and treatment with Dr. Ramamoorthy for two years and the same has been suppressed in the proposal form. No doubt, it is true that the plaintiffs wife was taken by two officers of the Life Insurance Corporation to Dr. Gnanasundari one of the Medical Examiners for the LIC., at Tiruchirapalli and found in Ex. A-3 that the proposer i.e., the Plaintiffs wife was a first class life. With this evidence P.W. 1 deposed that there is no warrant to cancel his agency. However the fact remains that the plaintiff and his wife suppressed the material fact in the proposal Form. 12. Now we have to consider whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature. The appointment and termination of the plaintiff is governed by Life Insurance Corporation of India (Agents) Regulations, 1972. The said Regulations have been framed in exercise of the powers vested under Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act 31 of 1956). Regulation 4 deals with appointment of agents. Regulation 8 deals with functions and Regulation 10 deals with payment of commission to agents. Regulation 13 deals with termination of agents. Regulation 15 deals with termination of agency on account of certain disqualifications. Regulation 16 deals with termination of agency for certain lapses. Regulation 20 enables every agent a right of appeal to the appellate authority set out in Schedule VII against an order terminating the appointment which has been passed under Regulation 15 or regulation 16 or sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 17 or Regulation 18. Even after rejection of appeal by the appellate authority, the aggrieved agent may file a memorial to the Chairman of the Corporation under Regulation 24. The scheme of the said Regulation shows that if any agent is terminated or discontinued, it is open to him to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority and thereafter memorial to the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. There is no specific exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in respect of such matters or prohibition of granting orders with regard to the said Regulations. There is no specific exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in respect of such matters or prohibition of granting orders with regard to the said Regulations. In such situation, it is useful to refer a decision of the Apex Court reported in Raja Ram Kumar v. Union of India ( AIR 1988 SC 752 ). With reference to Section 9 Civil Procedure Code, namely, exclusion of Civil Courts jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations for determining whether Civil Court jurisdiction is excluded are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the Civil Courts jurisdiction, then both the common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence.” In the very same judgment, the Supreme Court has further observed, “The broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common-law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the Civil Courts jurisdiction, then both the common-law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence”. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and in the absence of any specific exclusion in the said regulation referred above, it is open to the aggrieved person either to approach the Civil Court or go before the appellate and revisional authorities as per the statute. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and in the absence of any specific exclusion in the said regulation referred above, it is open to the aggrieved person either to approach the Civil Court or go before the appellate and revisional authorities as per the statute. Hence, the filing of the present suit by the plaintiff cannot said to be either improper or illegal. Hence, I hold that the Civil Court is competent to dispose of the suit of this nature and the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable. 13. The next point to be decided is whether the suit as framed is maintainable. In such a situation, the decision, namely, Usha Das v. Arati Kar (AIR 1982 Calcutta 174) referred to by Mr. M.S. Umapathy is relevant for consideration. With reference Sections 14 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act, namely, contract of personal service, the Calcutta High Court has observed thus:— “A contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. Where specific obligations are incorporated under a statute equitable considerations can hardly arise. The Managing Committee of a school constituted in accordance with the rules framed under the West Bengal Secondary Education Act 1950 is neither a body corporate nor a statutory body. An employee of such a private school does not acquire a statutory status. Again, on removal, the remedy of such an employee is in damages and not by way of declaration”. The other decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent is VaishDegree Collegev. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 888). Almost in a similar circumstance the Apex Court has concluded thus: “This brings us to the next point for consideration as to whether or not the plaintiff/respondents case fall within the exceptions laid down by this court to the general rule that the contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable. Lakshmi Narain (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 888). Almost in a similar circumstance the Apex Court has concluded thus: “This brings us to the next point for consideration as to whether or not the plaintiff/respondents case fall within the exceptions laid down by this court to the general rule that the contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable. In this connection, as early as 1964, in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, (1964) 3 SCR 55 at P. 59 = ( AIR 1964 SC 1680 at P. 1682) this court observed as follows:— Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions. It is open to the courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by so doing the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Sim ilarly under the industrial law, jurisdiction of the labour and industrial tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker, whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The courts are also invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute, even if by making the declaration the body is compelled to do something which it does not desire to do. “To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, (1970) 2 SCR 250 at P. 265 = ( AIR 1970 SC 1244 at page 1253) where it was observed as follows: “From the two decisions of this Court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are. To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) A public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Art. 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are. To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) A public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Art. 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute.” 14. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court referred above and in view of the factual findings as arrived at by the lower appellate court, namely, the plaintiff has contravaned the above mentioned regulations, I am in entire agreement with the conclusion reached by it. Even though, the defendant has not let in oral evidence, more particularly with regard to the condition of the Policy holder (wife of the plaintiff), in as much as both the policy holder and the plaintiff suppressed the material facts in the proposal form, namely, serious urinary ailment, I am unable to accept the explanation offered by the plaintiff in this regard. The lower appellate court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, accepted the case of the defendants, more particularly with regard to the questionnaire in the proposal form with reference to various regulations. In these circumstances, I am not pursuaded to take a different conclusion than that of the lower appellate court. 15. In view of the law laid down by the decision referred to above and of the factual finding of the lowser appellate court, I do not find any good reason to accept any of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant, consequently, the second appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.