Judgment :- K.A. Swami, C.J. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 19th September, 1996 passed by the learned single Judge, Dismissing W.P. No.13673 of 1996. Hence, the petitioner therein has come up in the appeal. 2. In the writ petition, the petitioner has sought for quashing the impugned order dated 19. 1996 hearing number 943/T.P.2/96 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, in exercise of his power under Sec.41(l) of the Madras City Police Act, 1888 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). 3. Learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition at the stage of preliminary hearing, on taking a view that the request for holding a public meeting on 22nd September, 1996 was also made by another group at the same time and same place, therefore the Commissioner of Police was justified in refusing the permission to held the meeting at Seerani Argangam on 29. 1996, in order to avoid conflict between the two groups and thereby resulting in disturbance of breach of peace. Regarding the route of the Vinayaga Procession the learned single Judge has taken a view that the Commissioner of Police was justified in regulating procession and modifying its route, in view of the fact that in the previous year, during such procession, there was a disturbance near Ice House Mosque causing damage to the public properties and disturbing peace. The learned single Judge is also of the view that for the purpose of achieving the object of immersing the Idols of Vinayaga in sea, the route by which the procession is taken, is not at all material, that the only requirement is that the procession should be allowed to reach the sea, where the idols are to be immersed, that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner by the impugned order. The learned single Judge is also of the view that in a matter like this, the principles of natural justice cannot be restricted to any particular strait jacket formula and the same have to be interpreted and adjusted according to the factual situation in each case, that the fundamental right of the petitioner has not been affected inasmuch as the procession has not been prohibited and it is only restricted to certain routes. 4. 4. The petitioner claims to be a registered public charitable trust known as Vinayaga Chathurthi Madhiya Kuzhu represented by its Trustee Ram Gopalan a founder trustee of the trust. The primary object of the Trust, as claimed in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is to serve the public and help, organise and conduct the Vinayaga Chathurthi festival in a proper and orderly manner, that it is doing so for the last 13 years in the City of Madras, that Vinayaga Chathurthi is celebrated by Hindus, not only as a personal affair in their respective houses but also as a public festival where idols are kept in public roads under decorated pandals and several social, cultural and religious programmes are arranged to evoke religious fervour and bring oneness in the public without distinction of caste or creed, that Vinayaga Chathurthi festival was made as public religious festival by Bala Gangadhar Tilak, to unite the Indians against the British and help realise Swaraj, that it is relevant, even to day, to bring about a sense of cohesion amongst the various sections of people and help realise “Rama Rajya”, an ideal society envisioned by Mahatma Gandhi, that in the City of Madras and other parts of Tamil Nadu, various such public processions are organised to celebrate Vinayaga Chathurthi at the end of the festival, public religious processions along the main thoroughfare of Madras City, Vinayaga idols would be taken to immerse in the see with a public meeting marking the occasion. It is the further case of the petitioner that in the last 12 years, public procession has been allowed to go through the thoroughfare including the Triplicane High Road, Ice House, where the Big Mosque is situated, that in several parts of India, including Hyderabad and Ahamedabad, similar processions and Rath Yatras take place every year and the locations of mosque on the way of the procession does not pose a threat to the peaceful conduct of the processions, that the celebration of Vinayaga Chathurthi is a public festival and taking Vinayaga idols in procession is a part of the Vinayaga Chathurthi religious festival, that Vinayaga idols are taken in procession after the 10th day for the purpose of immersing them in the sea and that the procession is taken every year, for the past 12 years, along the following routes. .(i) Starting from Thiruvateeswaram Pettai -Triplicane High Road - Dr.Beasant Road -Kamarajar Road - Reaching Marina Beach. .(ii) Starting from Nandanam Signal - Anna Salai -Dr.Radhakrishna Road - Kamarajar Road - Reaching Marina Beach. (iii) Starting from Nurses Colony - Muthusamy -Bridge - War Memorial - Kamarajar Road - Reaching Marina Beach. It is the further case of the petitioner that taking of Vinayaga Idols in possession is a part of the religious ceremony and as such, the members of the petitioner Trust have an inviolable fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19 (1 Kb), read with Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution, therefore, neither the State nor the Commissioner of Police has an authority or is entitled to interfere with the route of the procession; that any interference under the guise of regulation and maintaining public order would result in interfering with or denying the religious right to the members of the petitioner and all the devotees of Vinayaga, guaranteed under Arts.25 and 26 read with Art.l9(1)(b) of the Constitution, therefore, the action of the Commissioner of Police is unconstitutional, that such procession is being held every year for the last 13 years, though on certain occasions, there had been certain interference and the change in the route, but, the fact that there had been an interference and change in the route on one or two occasions, could not have any affect on the right of the members of the petitioner and other devotees of Vinayaga to take Vinayaga Idols in procession along the route as stated by them in the application dated 27. 1996 made to the Commissioner of Police, that at any rate, the procession being a religious one, it falls under Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.41 of the Act and as such, the members of the petitioner and other devotees of Vinayaga are free to take such a procession and it is the duty of the State and Police Authorities if they consider that there is going to be a disturbance of peace, to take necessary action in the matter, but, not to interfere with the procession, that the Commissioner of Police acted in violation of the provisions contained in Sec.41 (4) of the Act in not affording any opportunity to the petitioner or the applicant before rejecting the prayer as made in the application and modifying the route while granting the permission, that as per the provisions contained in Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.41, it was incumbent upon the Commissioner of Police to afford an opportunity of hearing before granting the prayer in the modified form, which resulted in rejecting certain part of the prayer made in the application, therefore, the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity of hearing that as no opportunity of hearing was given, the order is bad in law. 5. On the contrary, it is the case of the State that the past experience has made them wise, therefore it has become necessary to regulate such procession, hence the Commissioner on taking into consideration that past events, felt it necessary to regulate the procession. The past events have been stated in detail and we would refer to the same at the relevant point of time. It is also the case of the respondents that the fundamental rights enjoyed by the members of the petitioner and similar other persons under Arts. 19(1)(b), 25 and 26 of the Constitution are subject to public order, as it is evident from sub-Art.(3) of Art.19 and the opening words of Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution; that Art.25 specifically opens with the words, subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of Part III, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess practise and propagate religion. Similarly, Art.26 opens with the words, subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in accordance with law. therefore, it is the case of the respondents, that the petitioner cannot claim an absolute fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19(1)(b) and Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution and such a right is subject to reasonable restrictions and regulations, that in the light of the provisions contained in Sub-Art.(3) of Art.19, the provisions contained in Sec.41 of the Act are saved and continued; that the opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner, therefore the order does not suffer from any infirmity, inasmuch as the various leaders of different organisations as stated in paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit including the petitioner Rama Gopal, were invited for discussion; that during the meeting with Rama Gopal, the routes as well as the law and order incidents which had occurred in the years 1990, 1992 and 1995 were also discussed, therefore it is the case of the respondents that neither the Principles of natural justice nor Sub-sec.(4) of the Sec. 4 of the Act are violated. 6. In the light of the several contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration: .(i) Whether the members of the petitioner Trust and the other devotees in question, in the purported exercise of their fundamental right under Arts.l9(1)(b), 25 and 26 of the Constitution, can claim that they are entitled to take the Vinayaga Idols procession on the routes they have stated in the application without any deviation along the route/ routes. .(ii) Whether such right is an absolute right or is subject to regulations. (iii) Whether the order of the Commissioner of Police suffers from any legal infirmity. .(ii) Whether such right is an absolute right or is subject to regulations. (iii) Whether the order of the Commissioner of Police suffers from any legal infirmity. 7.Points (i) and (ii): Shri G.Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner/ appellant contended that religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities and to be religious one need not necessarily be a theist, that Vinayaga Chathurthi is a religious festival, that during the festival Vinayaga idols are worshipped by the devotees individually in their homes as well as in public places where the idols of Vinayaga are kept and worshipped and after certain days Vinayaga Idols are taken in procession to immerse them in sea, that the procession of Vinayaga Idols is a part of the religious practice and that such right is guaranteed under Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution, that holding of a public meeting on the beach at Seerani Arangam after the procession reaches, is also a part of the religious practice further the right to assemble peacefully and without arm is also a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, therefore, the State and the Commissioner of Police are not justified in refusing permission to hold a meeting at Seerani Arangam and to take Vinayaga Idols in procession on the route as stated in the application seeking permission. 8. On the contrary, it is the contention of the State-respondent that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19(1)(b), 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are subject to regulations, and the same may be regulated with appropriate conditions, and they are not absolute rights, reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of such rights in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, that the exercise of fundamental rights, viz., the right to freedom of religion and right to manage religious affair guaranteed under Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution are also subject to public order, morality and health and to other provisions of Part III of the Constitution of India, therefore the members of the petitioner Trust and the devotees of Vinayaga cannot claim the aforesaid fundamental rights as absolute. It is also contended by the learned Advocate General that Vinayaga Idol procession, in which the general public partake, as is revealed from the past experience cannot be considered to be purely religious. 9. It is also contended by the learned Advocate General that Vinayaga Idol procession, in which the general public partake, as is revealed from the past experience cannot be considered to be purely religious. 9. At the outset, it may be pointed out that the fundamental right pleaded and claimed by the members of the petitioner- Trust and the devotes of Vinayaga, to take the Vinayaga idol in procession for immersion, falls, under Arts.25 and 26(b) of the Constitution. As far as other matters dealt with in Art.26, such as to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and to administer such property in accordance with law, are concerned, these do not arise in the case on hand. Therefore, our decision will be confined to Arts.25 and 26 (b), read with 19(1)(b) and (3) of the Constitution. In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255, it has been held that "the matters of religion in Art.26(b) include even practices which are regarded by the community as part of its religion." This has been approved in the later decision in Tilkayat Shri.Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1638 and it has been observed thus: "Arts.25 and 26 constitute the fundamental rights to freedom of religion guaranteed to the citizens of this Country. Art.25(l) protects the citizen’s fundamental right to freedom of conscience and his right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. The protection given to this right is, however, not absolute. It is subject to public Order, morality and health as Art.25(1) itself denotes. It is also subject to the laws, existing or future which are specified in Art.25(2), Art.26 guarantees freedom of the denominations or sections thereof to manage their religious affairs and their properties. Art.26(b) provides that subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;... It would thus be clear that religious practice to which Art.25(l) refers and affairs ... matters of religion to which Art.26(b) refers, include practices which are an integral part of the religion itself and the protection guaranteed by Art.25(1) and Art.26 (b) extends to such practice." [Italics supplied]. 10. Religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities and to be religious one need not be a theist. matters of religion to which Art.26(b) refers, include practices which are an integral part of the religion itself and the protection guaranteed by Art.25(1) and Art.26 (b) extends to such practice." [Italics supplied]. 10. Religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities and to be religious one need not be a theist. No doubt, religious faith will have its own doctrines or dogmas which are prefessed and practised. In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Travancore - Cochin, (1954)1 M.L.J. 596: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282:1954 S.C.J. 335:1954 S.C.R. 1005, the question as to what may be considered as matters of religion came up for consideration. Relevant observations made therein are as follows: "What then are matters of religion? The word "religion" has not been defined in the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. In an American case- Vide Davis v. Beason, (1888) 133 U.S. 333 at P.342 (G), it has been said; that the term "religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relation to his creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His being and Character and of obedience to His will. It is often confounded with "cultus’ of form or worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter." We do not think that the above definition can be regarded as either precise or adequate. Arts.25 and 26 of our Constitution are based for the most part upon Art.44(2), Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt whether a definition of ‘religion’ as given above could have been in the minds of our Constitution makers when they framed the Constitution.." This was reiterated in Ratilal v. State of Bombay, (1954)1 M.L.J. 718: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388: 1954 S.C.J. 480:1954 S.C.R. 1055, while considering the question as to what are matters of religion and what are not was considered. In this connection, it was observed thus: "It may be noted that "religion; is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well-known religious in India like Buddism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. In this connection, it was observed thus: "It may be noted that "religion; is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well-known religious in India like Buddism and Jainism which do not believe in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conductive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and religious belief. A religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well." [Italics supplied]. In Shri Govindalalji v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1638, in deciding whether religious practice is an integral part of religion, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by community following the religion or not. ... ... ... This question will always have to be decided by the court and in doing so, the court may have to enquire whether as practice in question is religious in character and it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of lite community and the tenants of its religion. It is in the light of this possible, complication which may arise in some cases that this Court struck a note of auction in the case of Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 S.C.R. 388 at 411: A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1402 at 1415 and observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they must be regarded as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion area apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art.26...“ In the recent decision in Smt.Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani v. Union of India, J.T. (1995)4 S.C. 331, while dealing with Art.25 of the Constitution, it is observed thus: ”Art.25 is very widely worded. It guarantees all person, not only freedom of conscience but the right to profess, practice and propagate religion. What is religion? Any faith or belief? The court has expended religious liberty in its various phases guaranteed by the Constitution and extended it to practices and even external overt acts of the individual. Religion is more than mere matter of faith. The Constitution by guaranteeing freedom of conscience ensured inner aspects of religious belief. An external expression of it were protected by guaranteeing right to freely, practice and propagate religion. Reading and reciting hold scriptures., for instance, Ramayana or Quran or Bible or Gurur Granth Sahib is as much a part of religion as offering food to deity by a Hindu or bathing the idol or dressing him and going to a temple, mosque, church or gurudwara...“ Examining in the background of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid various decisions, Vinayaga Festival and Vinayaga Idols procession are part of the religious practice, in which after worshipping Vinayaga for a certain period from Vinayaga Chathurthi Vinayaga Idols are taken in procession for immersion either in the sea or in the river or in the tank or in the well as the case may be. Establishing of Vinayaga Idols arc taken in procession for immersion either in the sea or in the river or in the tank or in the well as the case may be. Establishing of Vinayaga Idols arc taken in procession for immersion either in the sea or in the river or in the tank or in the well as the case may be. Establishing of Vinayaga Idols on Vinayaga Chadrurthi day and worshipping for a certain period, thereafter taking the Vinayaga Idols in procession to the place of immersion can be held to be an integral part of the religious practice. The petitioner claims that the members of the petitioner Trust and the devotees of Vinayaga have an inviolable and absolute fundamental right guaranteed under Arts. 25, 26(b) read with Art.19(1)(b) to take the Vinayaga Idols in procession through the particular route only and such a right cannot be interfered with under the guise of maintaining the Public order. There is no evidence placed before us. nor there is any authentic literature produced, the show that the procession of Vinayaga Idols should be through the particular route only. It is not pleaded or proved that. The route in question is a customary route being used from time immeorial. The route of the procession cannot be considered to be an essential or integral part of the religious practice of taking Vinayaga Idols in procession for immersion. What is essential and integral part of religious, faith and religious practice of followed in Vinayaga festival is as already pointed out above, to worship Vinayaga Idol, taken the Idol in procession to the place of immersion and immerse the idol in water. There is no particular place of worship. Similarly, there is no particular place having religious significance for immersion of Vinayaga Idol inasmuch as Vinayaga can be kept and worshipped and immersed in water at any place. It hardly matters from what route the procession is taken unless there is any religious importance attached to the route connected with the Vinayaga Idol procession. No such plea of special importance is putforth. We cannot also lose sight of the historical fact, and even now it is so, that Ganesh festival or as it is called in Tamil Nadu Vinayaga Festival was used as a political instrument to create awareness in the freedom struggle and even now it is used as such at certain times and places to achieve political ends. But that does not take away the religious character of the procession. 11. But that does not take away the religious character of the procession. 11. In this connection, the observations made in M.Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, A.I.R 1995 S.C. 605 are very relevant to be noticed: ”The protection under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of practice of that religion. While offer or prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof. Places of worship of any religion having particular significance for that religion to make it an essential or integral part of the religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated differently and more reverentially." 12. After the Constitution, the law relating to right to freedom of religion, freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion and the freedom to manage religious affairs are governed by the provisions contained in Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution. Therefore, the decisions rendered prior to the Constitution, regarding the right to religious practice cannot be of such help to decide the issues involved in the instant case. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to deal in detail with the following decisions rendered prior to the Constitution relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner/ appellant. 1.Sundram Chetti v. The Queen, I.L.R. 6 Mad 203. 2.Sadagopachariar and others v. A.Rama Rao and others. (1903) I.L.R. 26 Mad. 376. 3.K.Kandaswami Moodali and others v. K.Subbaroya Mudali and others, (1909)19 M.L.J.617. 4.The Hindus of Kanammapalayam v. Kaikkolar Christians, (1911)21 M.L.J. 486 . 5.In re. Gurusamy Nadar and others, (1912)22 M.L.J. 251 . 6.Andi Moopan and others v. Muthuveera Reddy and another, (1915)19 M.L.J. 91. 7.Valan Pakkiri Taragan and others v. Subbayan Samban and others, (1919)36 M.L.J. 79 . 8.Manzur Hasan v. Mohd Zaman and others, (1925)48 M.L.J. 23 (P.C.). 9.Venkata Subbayya v. Mohd Falauddin Khaji, (1927)52 M.L.J. 298 . 10.Subbayya v. Khaji, (1927)52 M.L.J. 552. 13. 6.Andi Moopan and others v. Muthuveera Reddy and another, (1915)19 M.L.J. 91. 7.Valan Pakkiri Taragan and others v. Subbayan Samban and others, (1919)36 M.L.J. 79 . 8.Manzur Hasan v. Mohd Zaman and others, (1925)48 M.L.J. 23 (P.C.). 9.Venkata Subbayya v. Mohd Falauddin Khaji, (1927)52 M.L.J. 298 . 10.Subbayya v. Khaji, (1927)52 M.L.J. 552. 13. The next question for consideration is as to whether such a right is an absolute right or is subject to any reasonable restriction or limitations or is open to be regulated by the State authority. We have, earlier pointed out that Art.25 opens with the words, subject to public order, morality and health and to other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Similarly, Sub-Art.(3) are Art.19 in relation to the right guaranteed under Art.19(1)(b) viz., the right to assemble peacefully and without arms, specifically provides that nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause, shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. In fact, this right has been the subject of many pronouncements of the Supreme Court, in which it has been specifically held that the Tight is subject to regulations. 14. In the decision in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C.620, at paragraphs 7 and 8, this aspect has been specifically considered and it has been held as follows: "(7) After this Court decided the cases of Ramesh Thappar and Brij Bushan, Cl.(2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution was amended. Clause (2), as amended, protects, a law insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Sub-cl.(a) of Clause (1) of Art.19 in the interest of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, Public order, decency or normality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.“The question for our consideration is whether the impugned order can be properly said to be a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in the interest of public order. It will be noticed that the language employed in the amended Clause is "in the interests of and not “for the maintenance of." As one of us pointed out in Dehi Soren v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1954 Pat. 254, the expression "in the interest of makes the ambit of protection very wide. A law may not have been designed to directly maintain public order and yet it may have been enacted in the interest of public order. (8) It is pointed out that Sec.295-A has been included in Chap.15, Penal Code which deals with offence relating to religion and not in Chap.8 which deals with offences against the public tranquility and from this circumstance, it is faintly sought to be urged, therefore, that offences relating to religion have no bearing on the maintenance of public order or tranquility and consequently a law creating an offence relating to religion and imposing restrictions of the right to freedom of speech and expression cannot claim the protection of Cl.(2) of Art.19. A reference to Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to freedom of religion, will show’ that the argument is utterly untenable. The right to freedom of religion assured by those Articles is expressly made subject to public order, morality and health. Therefore, it cannot be predicated that freedom of religion can have no bearing whatever on the maintenance of Public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion cannot under any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order. These two articles in terms contemplate that restrictions may be imposed on the rights guaranteed by them in the interests of Public order." With reference to Sub-Art.(2) of Art.19, in the same decision, in which also the words’ public order, occur, it has been held." "In the first place, Clause (2) of Art.19. protects a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech "in the interests of public order" which is much wider than "for maintenance of" public order. If therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder a law penalising such activities, as an offence cannot so held to be a law imposing reasonable restriction "in the interests of public order" although in some cases those activities may not actually lead to a breach of public order. If therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder a law penalising such activities, as an offence cannot so held to be a law imposing reasonable restriction "in the interests of public order" although in some cases those activities may not actually lead to a breach of public order. In the next place, Sec.295-A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. In suits, to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feeling of that class, do not come within the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious in tension of outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated pendency of this aggrieved form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order and the section, which penalises such activities, is well within the protection of Clause (2) of Art.19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a) Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created by the Sec.295-A, there cannot be any possibility of this law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution. In other words, the language employed in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a) and consequently the question of severability does not arise." 15. In other words, the language employed in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.19(1)(a) and consequently the question of severability does not arise." 15. Again, in Virendra v. The State of Punjab and another, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 896, it has been held that: "There is and can be no dispute that the right to freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right to propagate and circulate one’s views and opinions subject to reasonable restrictions and that the several rights of freedom guaranteed to the citizen by Art. 19(1) are exercisable by them throughout and in all parts of the territory of India The restrictions so far as they extend, may be certainly complete but whether they amount to a total prohibition of the exercise of the fundamental rights must be judged by reference to the ambit of the rights." 16. Again in Ishtiaq Hussain Farooqui v. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C.93, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2198 with reference to the right guaranteed under Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution, regarding exercise of power by Executive Magistrate under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it has been held as follows: "We fail to appreciate the occasion for filing such a petition. The maintenance of law and order is a function of the District Magistrate and we have every reason to believe that the District Magistrate of Lucknow with a view to avoid any possible breach of peace would take the necessary steps well in advance for the purpose of maintaining public order which would be in the larger interests of the society. The exercise of fundamental rights under Arts.25 and 26 of the Constitution is not an absolute right but must yield or give way to maintenance of public order as laid down by this Court in Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982)1 SCR. 1077 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2198. The principles, are well settled and it is but for the District Magistrate to exercise his powers in consonance with the provisions of Sec.144 of the Criminal P.C. 1973. This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution appears to be wholly misconceived." 17. 1077 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2198. The principles, are well settled and it is but for the District Magistrate to exercise his powers in consonance with the provisions of Sec.144 of the Criminal P.C. 1973. This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution appears to be wholly misconceived." 17. However, Shri Subramaniam, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision in The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh and another v. Rama Manohar Lohia, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633. We may point out that in the said decision also, the public order occurring in Sub-Art.(2) of Art.19 is considered with reference to the right guaranteed under Art.19(1)(a). In the said decision, the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 620 and Virendra v. The State of Punjab and another, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 896 referred to by us earlier, have been considered and the observations made therein have been approved. It has been held with reference to the observations contained in these decisions relating to the interpretation of the words in the interest of "and for the maintenance of public order thus: "We do not understand the observations of the Chief Justice to mean that any remote or fanciful connection between he impugned act and the public order would be sufficient to sustain its validity. The learned Chief Justice was only making a distinction between an Act which expressly and directly purported to maintain public order and one which did not expressly state the said purpose but left it to be implied therefrom and between an Act that directly maintained public order and that indirectly brought about the same result. The distinction does not ignore the necessity for intimate connection between the Act and the Public order sought to be maintained by the Act respondent on 18. 1996. During the meeting with Thiru Rama Gopalan the routes as well as the law and order incidents which had occurred in 1990, 1992 and 1995 and the police firing in 1990 and the lathi charge in the subsequent years were specifically discussed. Thiru Rama Gopalan insisted that he had his fundamental right of taking out procession in front of the Mosque in the particular route and also demanded that during the course of the procession, if prayer has commenced in the Mosques enroute, it should be stopped. Thiru Rama Gopalan insisted that he had his fundamental right of taking out procession in front of the Mosque in the particular route and also demanded that during the course of the procession, if prayer has commenced in the Mosques enroute, it should be stopped. Besides, Thiru Rama Gopalan claimed that the police has got an authority to stop the processions. In the light of the issue raised by Thiru Rama Gopalan, a suggestion was made about an alternate route via. Pillaivar Koil Street, T.H.Road, B.V.Naicken Street, P.V. Koil Street, Dr. Besant Road and Kamarajar Salai. However, Thiru Rama Gopalan insisted on the route taken by them in the previous year (1995). He claimed it to be his birth right to take out the procession in front of the Mosque. In the light of what had happened in the past years and the deliberate choosing of time and route for taking out processions and deliberate delaying of progress of the procession, Thiru Rama Gopalan was politely informed that the Police was duty bound to regulate the routes of the procession under Sec.41 of City Police Act taking into account the requests of the organisers, the prevailing situations and past incidents. The representatives of other groups Tvl.S.V. Sridharan, Hindu Makkal Katchi, S. Somasundaram, Hindu Makkal Katchi, Sermadurai, Hindu Makkal Katchi also met this respondent. They were also told about the decision of the police to regulate the routes with a view to maintain peace and law and order. The members who participated in the meeting representing the Hindus and the Muslims (Somasundaram, Jayakrishnan, P.Sermadurai, Baskar, Yousuff, A.K. Tajudeen, Nasullah) where also informed about the alternative routes. Then the representatives of the Hindu Munnani led by Tr.Rama Gopalan insisted that the route which was taken by them last year must be permitted this year also, the other groups like Ganesh Mandal, Hindu Makkal Katchi accepted the suggestions made by the Police. It was also pointed out to the Hindu Munnani Group led by Thiru Rama Gopalan about the manner in which the procession was taken out by mem leading to riotous and violent behaviour of the processionists and the action taken by the Police. It was pointed out to the organisers that they could not effectively control the processionists in 1995. It was also pointed out to the Hindu Munnani Group led by Thiru Rama Gopalan about the manner in which the procession was taken out by mem leading to riotous and violent behaviour of the processionists and the action taken by the Police. It was pointed out to the organisers that they could not effectively control the processionists in 1995. One of the participants, Thiru Karthikeyan, President, Hindu Munnani, Madras District admitted and accepted their inability to control and contain the processionists during the procession in the year 1995. It was also pointed out to him that Thiru. Rama Gopalan who was present in front of the Ice House Mosque in the company of the then Director-General of Police and Commissioner of Police suddenly disappeared just a few minutes prior to the starting of the trouble. This can be seen from the Video taken during the last year’s procession. All the other groups and individuals including the Muslim leaders who participated were requested to extent their full co-operation and they conveyed their total acceptance." Again, in paragraph 11, it has been further stated that all particulars were given to the applicant in the discussion held with the respondent and also the leaders of the other groups, the details of which have already been stated in paragraph No.9 of the counter-affidavit which has been extracted above. In addition to that, in paragraph 17, it has been further stated that the application dated 27. 1996 was signed by the President, Mr.D. Shankar, that the subsequent letter received on 19. 1996 was signed by one Mr.Veerabahu, that Thiru.Rama Gopalan the petitioner herein was heard by the respondent on 18. 1996, that subsequently, the meeting held on 9. 1996, Thiru. G.Karthikayan took part on behalf of Hindu Munnani, that the letter received on 19. 1996 sent on behalf the petitioner would show that they had also taken part in the discussions on 9. 1996, though they objected to the presence of others. On the, basis of all these facts, it was contended, that the petitioner’s group was heard by the respondent. 18. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner, the details given in the counter-affidavit with regard to paragraph 9, are controverted thus: "The allegations in para. 9 are totally untenable. The explanations and the narration about the various discussions and acceptance are not at all relevant. 18. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner, the details given in the counter-affidavit with regard to paragraph 9, are controverted thus: "The allegations in para. 9 are totally untenable. The explanations and the narration about the various discussions and acceptance are not at all relevant. I beg to submit that the allegation that I disappeared suddenly before the trouble started, during last year is totally untenable. Simultaneously, at that time, the meeting at Seerani Arangam was started and Shri Ashok Singhal had come to address the gathering. Therefore, I had to attend the meeting by giving instructions to the processionists and also delegated Shri Veerabhagu and Shri Karthikeyan to take charge of the remaining parts of the procession. As already explained the tail group was a plated group and only in order to give trouble to the previous Government they deliberately delayed the procession resulting in trouble. This fact was stated by Shri Karthikeyan during the Peace Committee meeting. The respondents cannot take this statement in part and try to project that we have no control over the procession." This goes to show that Mr.Rama Gopal did attend the meeting and also delegated Shri Veerabhagu and Shri Karthikeyan. If that be so, there is no reason to disbelieve what is stated by the commissioner regarding the mode of hearing afforded to the petitioner. We are of the view that the hearing contemplated under Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.41 of the Madras City Police Act is not of the type as is done in a court of Law or in any proceedings. It is to afford an opportunity to the applicant regarding the action proposed to be taken or the order proposed to be passed on the application filed for permission under Sec.41(1) of the Act. The form, type and the nature of the hearing would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no violation of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.41 of the Act. 19. We may also point out that in the impugned order, the Commissioner has referred to the above events, though not in detail and has also stated as to what happened in the Peace Committee and the necessity of maintaining public order. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no violation of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.41 of the Act. 19. We may also point out that in the impugned order, the Commissioner has referred to the above events, though not in detail and has also stated as to what happened in the Peace Committee and the necessity of maintaining public order. On taking into consideration all these aspects, he has stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 thus: "If permission is granted to take out procession in the result sought by you, there is a possibility of communal clash this time also. Therefore damages to public properties may be caused and also public peace will be damaged. This is my strong opinion. Hence, to preserve public peace and to avoid damages to public properties and keeping this in mind the petitioner is permitted to go on procession on 29. 1996 in the Forenoon at 1.31 noon to 5 p.m. in the following routes: Routes: Procession shall start from Thiruvateeswaran Pettai and reach Marina Beach Routes: Pillaiyar Koil St- Dr.Besant Road -Kamarajar Salai. .(2) Starting from Nandanam Signal to Marina Beach - Annal Salai - Ranna Rotary Cathedral Road - Music Academy Dr.Radhakrishna Road -Kamarajar Salai. .(3) Starting from Nurses Colony to Marina Beach Route; Muthusamy Bridge- Kodimara Salai - War Memorial - Kamarajar Salai - Procession starting from North Madras regions like Pullianthope, Vyasarbadi, Sharma Nagar, Basin Bridge, Perambur, Nataraja Theatre, Salt Quarters, Elephant Gate, Bridge, Waltax Road, E.Ve.Ra.Road - Nurses Colony must join with other North Madras Idols and proceed through Muthusamy Bridge, Kodimara Salai, War Memorial Kamaraj Salai. (b) Similarly idols from Central Madras Komaleeswaran Pettai, Chinthathripet, Pudupet shall proceed from Blakers Road, Anna Road, Wallaja Road, Ezhilagam, reach Marina Beach. REGULATION:(1) The participants of the procession shall not carry wooden bars, weapons, metal rods, weapons capable of inducing violence. .(2) Loud speakers shall not be used. .(3) Traffic regulations should be observed. .(4) Traffic should not be obstructed. .(5) Normal activities of common man should not be conducted. .(6) Objectionable slogans and illegal slogans or provocative slogans affecting others’ sentiments shall not be expressed or voiced. .(7) Processionists shall proceed in two persons row and shall keep one side of the road by keeping other side for transport. .(8) The processionists shall observe and follow instructions given by the police personnel from time to time. .(6) Objectionable slogans and illegal slogans or provocative slogans affecting others’ sentiments shall not be expressed or voiced. .(7) Processionists shall proceed in two persons row and shall keep one side of the road by keeping other side for transport. .(8) The processionists shall observe and follow instructions given by the police personnel from time to time. .(9) When the procession crosses mosque during the prayer period, they shall observe silence and the petitioner shall advise accordingly. .(10) Crackers are prohibited. .(11) They should not spray colour powders. .(12) The petitioner should inform their supporters that they should not throw any article towards mosque. If any person throws any article, suitable action will be taken against them by the police. The instructions of police officers and other regulations should be followed.“ All the requirements of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.41 are satisfied by the impugned order of the Commissioner. In other words, the impugned order is in accordance with Sec.41(1) to (4) of the Act. Though in the impugned order past events have not been stated in detail, nevertheless, they are referred to, but, in the counter-affidavit, the same are stated in greater detail. 20. In Himat Lal K.Shah v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 87, while considering the validity of Sec.33(1) of the Bombay Police Act with reference to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art.l9(1) of the Constitution, the Apex Court has held thus: ”It seems to us that it follows from the above discussion that in India a citizen had, before the Constitution, a right to hold meetings on public streets, subject to the control of the appropriate authority regarding the time and place of the meeting and subject to considerations of public order. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the impugned rules are ultra vires Sec.33(1) of the Bombay Police Act insofar as they require prior permission for holding meetings.“ Sec. 33(1) (n), (o) and (6) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is, in substance, similar to Sec.41(1) of the Madras City Police Act. It reads as follows: "Bombay Police Act, 1951: 33(1) The Commissioner and the District Magistrate, in areas under their respective charges or any part thereof, may make, alter or rescind rules or orders not in-consistent with this Act for... It reads as follows: "Bombay Police Act, 1951: 33(1) The Commissioner and the District Magistrate, in areas under their respective charges or any part thereof, may make, alter or rescind rules or orders not in-consistent with this Act for... .(n) Licensing, controlling or, in order to prevent the obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger or damage of the residents or passengers in the vicinity, prohibiting the playing of music, the beating of drums, tom-toms or other instruments and blowing or sounding of horns or other noisy instruments in or near streets or public places: .(o) regulating the conduct of and behaviour or action of persons constituting assemblies and processions on or along the streets and prescribing in the case of processions, the routes by which, the order in which and the times at which the same may pass; .(p) prescribing the procedure in accordance with which any licence or permission sought to be obtained or required under this Act should be applied for and fixing the fees to be charged for any such licence or permission.“ 21. We may point out here that the order passed by the Commissioner is not a judicial order nor is it a quasi-judicial order. It is an executive order intended for the purpose of maintaining public order and tranquility. In fact, the order of the nature came up for consideration before the Supreme Court as to whether such an order can be considered to be a judicial or quasi-judicial order in Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2198. it has been held that it is an executive order passed in performance of an executive function. In para.23 of the judgment it is held as follows: "Under the new Code the designation of District Magistrate of Sub-Divisional Magistrate has been statutorily used in relation to officers performing executive functions only in recognition of the concept of separating Executive Magistrates from Judicial Magistrates. In para.23 of the judgment it is held as follows: "Under the new Code the designation of District Magistrate of Sub-Divisional Magistrate has been statutorily used in relation to officers performing executive functions only in recognition of the concept of separating Executive Magistrates from Judicial Magistrates. It is true that before passing the order the District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Executive Magistrate gives a hearing to parties except in cases of emergency when ex parte order can be make under Sec.144(2) by him without notice to the person or persons against whom it is directed but in which cases on an application made by any aggrieved person he has to give hearing to such persons under Sec. 144(5) and thereupon he may rescind or alter his earlier order. It is also true that such an order made by the Executive Magistrate is registrable under Sec.397 of the Code because under the Explanation to that section, all Magistrates whether executive or judicial or whether exercising appellate or original jurisdiction, are deemed to be inferior Courts for purposes of the revisional power of the High Court or Court of Sessions. But, the fact that the parties and particularly the aggrieved party are heard before Apart from that, it has also been further held in that decision that, “Restrictions must have reasonable relation to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and must not go in excess of that object. The restriction made in the interests of public must also have reasonable relation to the object to be achieved, i.e., the public order. If the restriction has no proximate relationship to the achievement of public order, it cannot be said that the restriction is a reasonable restriction within the meaning of the said clause.” In Tilkayat Shri Govindalji Maharaj’s case, A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 1638, referred to above the question arose as to whether certain provisions contained in the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959, contravened the fundamental right guaranteed under Arts.25(1) and 26 (b) of the Constitution to practice the religion freely and to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion. It has been held that Arts.25 and 26 constitute the fundamental rights to freedom of religion guaranteed to the citizens of this country; Art.25(1) protects the freedom of right to conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. It has been held that Arts.25 and 26 constitute the fundamental rights to freedom of religion guaranteed to the citizens of this country; Art.25(1) protects the freedom of right to conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. The protection given to this right is, however, not absolute. It is subject to public order, morality and health as Art.25(1) itself denotes. It is also subject to the laws existing or future which are specified in Art.25(2). 22. The decision in Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486, has been relied upon by both sides, in which it has been held with reference to Art.19(2), (3) and (4) and the expression ‘public order’ occurring in those provisions and the scope of the said expression and also the scope of the expression ‘in the interest of public order’ thus: “A person playing loud music in his own house in the middle of the night may disturb public tranquility, but he is not causing public disorder. Public order no doubt, also requires absence of disturbance of a state of serenity in society but it goes further. It means what the French designate order publique, defined as an absence of insurrection, riot, turbulence or crimes of violence. The expression public order’ includes absence of all acts which are danger to the security of the State and also acts which are comprehensed by the expression order public’ explained above, but not acts which disturb only the serenity of others.” Therefore, it is clear that the rights guaranteed under Arts.l9(1)(b) and 25 and 26 cannot be claimed as absolute rights. In fact, any right claimed as absolute right will not be exercisable, as there will be no orderliness in exercising such a right band as a result thereof, it would affect the rights of the other persons, who also enjoy similar rights. Consequently, it will lead to chaos, and there will be no peace resulting, in a fight between the individuals and communities. As a result thereof, no one would be able to exercise his right. Hence, it is necessary that the right guaranteed under Arts. 19, 25 and 26 should be regulated. Consequently, it will lead to chaos, and there will be no peace resulting, in a fight between the individuals and communities. As a result thereof, no one would be able to exercise his right. Hence, it is necessary that the right guaranteed under Arts. 19, 25 and 26 should be regulated. It is because of this, the Constitution makers have specifically subjected these rights to the existing law and the future law imposing such restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions in the exercise of the rights conferred therein. As already pointed out, Arts.19(1)(b) and 25 and 26 open with the words, subject to public order, morality and health. Temporary Orders for prohibition of meeting or procession to prevent imminent breach of peace are held to be reasonable restrictions, upon the freedom under Clause (b) of Art. 19(1) of the Constitution. Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C.884: (1961)3 S.C.R. 423 and Kishan v. State of M.P., (1964)1 S.C.R. 765 . 23. In the decision in Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486, which has been referred to earlier, it has been held that public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. Similar is the view stated in The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh and another v. Ram Manohar Lohia, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633. We may also point out that it is absolutely necessary for a citizen to carry on his normal avocation to maintain public order. Absence of public order is an aggravated form of disturbance of public peace. It affects the general current of public life and any act, which merely affects the security of others may not constitute a breach of public order. See. Bhupal Chandra Ghosh v. Arif Ali and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 256 and Madhu Limaye v. S.D.M. Monghyr, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2486. 24. List II of the Seventh Schedule enumerates the matters on which the Legislature of the State can make laws. Entry I therein relates to “Public order (but not including the use of any naval, military or air force or any other armed force of the Union or of any other force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof) in aid of the civil power”. Entry I therein relates to “Public order (but not including the use of any naval, military or air force or any other armed force of the Union or of any other force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof) in aid of the civil power”. The expansion “public order” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh and another v. Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633, that public order is a most comprehensive term and the State Legislative on all matters, which relate to what are necessary for maintenance of public order. In fact, in the pre-constitution period, the Federal Court in Laki Narayan v. Province of Bihar, (1950) 5 D.L.R. 17, held that the public order implies absence of violations and an orderly state of affairs, in which the citizens can peacefully pursue their normal avocation of life. Thus, we are of the view that there is no doubt that the right to conduct religious procession is a fundamental right, but it is subject to public order. Art.19(3) saves the existing law, viz. the Act which specifically provides for exercise of such power by the State Authority, viz., the Police Commissioner to regulate assemblies, meetings and processions in public places etc. 25. Under Sec.41(1) of the Madias City Police Act, the Commissioner or subject to his order, any police officer above the rank of Head Constable from time to time, as the occasion may require, direct the conduct of all assemblies, meetings and processions in public places and prescribe the routes by which and the times at which such processions may pass etc. The power conferred under Sec.41 of the Act includes the one which could be exercised for regulating the Vinayaga Idol procession also, wherein the general public participate. 26. It has not been brought to our notice by citing any religious scriptures, authorities, texts or literatures that the route by which the Vinayaga Idol procession should pass through also forms an integral part of the religious practice of taking Vinayaga Idol in procession for immersion. The object of such religious practice of taking Vinayaga Idols in procession is for immersion of the Vinayaga Idols in water. The object of such religious practice of taking Vinayaga Idols in procession is for immersion of the Vinayaga Idols in water. If that be so, it is not possible to appreciate how a route of the procession can be considered to be an integral part of the religious practice so as to insist that the Vinayaga Idol procession should be allowed to be taken along the particular route as claimed by the petitioner. It has already been pointed out that the fundamental right guaranteed under Arts.25, 26 and 19(1)(b) are not absolute and they are subject to regulation. Of course, the exercise of such a power of regulation would depend upon the factual position prevailing at the relevant point of time and also of the events that they have taken place in the past connected with such procession. The absolute right claimed by the petitioner is opposed to the very provisions of the Constitution contained in Arts. 19(1)(b) and (3), 25(1) and (2) and 26. We cannot imagine the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and under any other law, without maintenance of public order. The Constitution makers, after due deliberations have subjected the rights to public order. Normal activities of a citizen, development of his personality and pursuit of his avocation in the growth of the society cannot be ensured unless there is public order and harmony among the members of the society and the communities. That can be ensured only by maintaining public order. Therefore, it is not possible to agree with the contention of the petitioner that the members of the petitioner Trust and the devotees of Vinayaga enjoy absolute right to take the procession on the route they chalk out and the same cannot be regulated, modified or interfered with by the State and its authorities. Therefore, we are of the view that though the right to take Vinayaga idol in procession for immersion forms part of religious practice of Vinayaga festival, such right cannot be claimed as absolute. It is subject to regulation and imposition of reasonable restrictions as contemplated in Art. 19(1) (b) and (3), 25(1) and (2) and 26 of the Constitution and exercise of such right can be regulated and controlled as per the provisions contained in Sec.41 of the Madras City Police Act. Accordingly, point Nos.1 and 2 are answered as follows. 27. It is subject to regulation and imposition of reasonable restrictions as contemplated in Art. 19(1) (b) and (3), 25(1) and (2) and 26 of the Constitution and exercise of such right can be regulated and controlled as per the provisions contained in Sec.41 of the Madras City Police Act. Accordingly, point Nos.1 and 2 are answered as follows. 27. Though the right to take Vinayaga Idol in procession for immersion is a part of the religious practice, such a right is not an absolute right so as to enable the processionists or the members of the petitioner Trust or the devotees of Vinayaga to insist that they are entitled to take the procession along the particular route on the particular date, time and hour. The exercise of such right is not absolute and it is subject to regulation in accordance with the provisions contained under Sec.41 of the Madras City Police Act as the occasion may require depending upon the conditions and circumstances prevailing in the city or locality as the case may be for maintaining public order, morality and health and ensure safety and security of the public and the property. 28. Point No.(iii): At the outset we may point out that a Division Bench of this Court in In Re. Anna Durai, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 63, has upheld the Constitutionality of Sec.41 of the Act. The relevant portion is as follows: "Then, Mr.Raman urged that the powers given to the Commissioner under Sec.41 of the City Police Act were arbitrary and uncontrolled and far more extensive than the powers given to a District Superintendent of Police under Sec.30(2) of the Indian Police Act, or even under Sec.164, Crl.P.C, to Magistrate and that therefore, Sec.41 need not be struck down. The learned Advocate General replied that actually Sec.41 of the City Police Act has laid down certain conditions to be observed by the Commissioner before passing an order under that section prohibiting public meetings and that one of conditions is that he should consider such prohibition to be necessary for the preservation of the public peace or public safety. The learned Advocate General replied that actually Sec.41 of the City Police Act has laid down certain conditions to be observed by the Commissioner before passing an order under that section prohibiting public meetings and that one of conditions is that he should consider such prohibition to be necessary for the preservation of the public peace or public safety. He urged that the Commissioner of Police of Madras and the other two presidency towns was not a mere police official, like the District Superintendent of Police in the mofussil acting under Sec.30(2) of the Indian Police, Act, but was also a Magistrate in some respect and entitled to remand people and also a justice of the peace and that the presidency police administration ever since 1727 had been considered to be different from the district police administration and so there was a reasonable classification and no discrimination. Mr.Raman urged that the difference between the presidency towns and mofussil emphasized by the learned Advocate General was not real, and was illusory and that Sec.41 of the City Police Act, with its wide terms, cannot be defended, on the ground of "reasonable classification" as against the narrower provisions of Sec.30(2) of the Indian Police Act. The learned Advocate General stated that in presidency towns there would be large concentrations of population and large hooligan elements which might suddenly cause a disturbance and that the commissioner of Police has to keep his pulse on the tempo of the hooligan population and its activities and act swiftly in emergencies. Mr.Raman urged that, from a reading of the police administration report of 19S6, he found as many as 1537 riots in the mofussil and none in Madras City. From this he concluded that the Madras city was, if anything, having a more orderly population than the mofussil. We cannot agree, possibly, the presence of Sec.41 and the action taken under it may itself be responsible for the absence or rioting in Madras City compared with the mofussil. Anyway from the time of Ceaser and Antony, city mobs have been noted for their excitability and sudden acts of mobs violence, including incendiarism. As regards the exception referred to by Mr.Raman, as amounting to discrimination under Art.14, they are, in our opinion, reasonable restrictions. Thus, marriages, funerals and religious assemblies are not likely to be participated in by hooligans. Anyway from the time of Ceaser and Antony, city mobs have been noted for their excitability and sudden acts of mobs violence, including incendiarism. As regards the exception referred to by Mr.Raman, as amounting to discrimination under Art.14, they are, in our opinion, reasonable restrictions. Thus, marriages, funerals and religious assemblies are not likely to be participated in by hooligans. They are also least likely to break the law, normally, in their own interest and were rightly exempted from licences. Statutory meetings or meetings under express legal authority are also not likely to cause disturbance or to be participated in by hooligans. Meetings sanctioned by a special licence by the Commissioner or the assistant Commissioner of Police will also not cause disturbance, because the police will see to it that there is proper bandobust. Then there remain only assemblies and procession in which the Governor of Madras of any Minister of the Union Government or the State Government participates. This too is not a favour conferred on his political bosses to carry their favour. Surely, in meetings in which they participate, the police will be making the necessary bandobust and so, there will be no chance of disturbance. We may add here that it has been held by a Bench of this Court to which on of us was a party in Globe Theatres Limited v. State of Madras, (1954) 2 M.L.J. 110 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 690 and in Naina Mohammed v. Tirukulacheri Panchayat Board, 68 L.W.908: A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 289, that there is ample power to suitable cases, to grant such exemptions based on reasonable classification, and that this has been recognised from the most ancient times and will not amount to discrimination. So Mr.Raman cannot attack the order of the Commissioner dated 312. 1957 as void on the ground of discrimination." Rightly, the validity of the said section is not challenged before us. 29. Before we consider the validity of the order passed by the Commissioner, we must advert to the contention raised by Shri Subramaniam, leader senior counsel that in the light of Sub-sec. (8)of Sec.41 of the Act, no such permission is necessary, as it is a religious procession, therefore Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.41 enables the petitioner and others to take the procession about the route, as specified in the application. 30. (8)of Sec.41 of the Act, no such permission is necessary, as it is a religious procession, therefore Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.41 enables the petitioner and others to take the procession about the route, as specified in the application. 30. Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.41 reads thus: "(8) Nothing in this section shall apply to any assembly or meeting of a purely religious character held in a recognised place of worship, any assembly or meeting gathered together purely for the purpose of taking part in sports, any procession on the occasion of any wedding, funeral or similar domestic occurrence, or of any religious ceremony or to any public meeting held under any statutory or other express legal authority or to public meetings convened by the sheriff or to any public meetings or class of public meetings exempted for that purpose by the State Government by general or special order." A careful analysis of the aforesaid Sub-sec.(8) of Sec.41 of the Act would reveal that the procession of the nature in question is not covered by it Firstly, it says that "Nothing in the section shall apply to any assembly or meeting of a purely religious character held in a recognised place of worship." Vinayaga Idol procession cannot be considered to be an assembly. Further, there is no place known as a recognised place of worship of Vinayaga. However, Shri G.Subramanian, learned Senior Counsel, contended that procession is nothing but an assembly of persons in motion. We may point out that the word, assembly has got a definite connotation and definite meaning. It means a group of persons fathered together especially as a deliberative body. Procession cannot be considered as a deliberative body. It cannot also be considered to be a meeting of a purely religious character in a recognised place of worship, because it is a procession in which general public participate. Sometimes, it will have political overtones also as sometimes in the past it had been made use of for achieving political ends. It is stated in the last portion of para 2 of the affidavit of the petitioner to which we have referred to while summerising the case of the petitioner, it cannot also be considered to be a meeting gathered together purely for the purpose of taking part in sports. It is stated in the last portion of para 2 of the affidavit of the petitioner to which we have referred to while summerising the case of the petitioner, it cannot also be considered to be a meeting gathered together purely for the purpose of taking part in sports. So also, it cannot be considered to be a procession on the occasion of any wedding, funeral or similar domestic occurrence, or of any religious ceremony. The words or of any religious ceremony’ in the context they appear following the words ‘similar domestic occurrence’ are to be construed not as a public religious ceremony but a religious ceremony relating to a family. Therefore, the religious ceremony referred to in Sub-sec.(8) is the ceremony relating to a family. The public procession like the Vinayaga Procession cannot be considered to be a family ceremony or any domestic occurrence. Similarly, it cannot be considered to be a public meeting held under any statutory or other express legal authority or a public meeting covered by the sheriff or any public meeting or class of public meetings exempted for that purpose by the State Government by general or special order. Therefore, though the Vinayaga procession is a part of religious practice it cannot be considered to be the one falling under Sec.41 (8) of the Act as it partakes the character of a public procession. Looked at from any point of view, the procession of the nature in question cannot be held to fall under Sub-sec.(8) of the Sec.41 of the Act. 31. Under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.41, the Commissioner has got a power to regulate assemblies, meetings and processions in public places, etc. It specifically provides that he is entitled to prescribe the routes by which and the times at which such processions may pass, in order to keep the public places and prevent obstructions on the occasion of such assemblies, meetings and processions and in the neighbourhood of places of worship during the time of public worship and in any case, when public places may be thronged or liable to be obstructed and may license and regulate or prohibit the use of music or of sound amplifiers in any area. Therefore, there can-not be any doubt that’ the impugned order passed lies well within the power of the Commissioner of Police of the City of Madras. 32. Therefore, there can-not be any doubt that’ the impugned order passed lies well within the power of the Commissioner of Police of the City of Madras. 32. We now come to the contention that no opportunity of hearing as required by Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.41 of the Act was afforded to the applicant. In this regard, in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, except asserting that no opportunity was given, other particulars are not found. However, in the counter-affidavit filed by the Commissioner of Police, it has been stated in specific terms in paragraph 9 thus: "The various leaders of the different organisations namely Tvl.Rama Gopalan (State Organiser, Hindu Munnani), S.V.Sridharan (President, Hindu Makkal Katchi), Ila Ganesan (State General Secretary, B.J.P.) R.B.V.S. Manian (State Organiser, Vishwa Hindu Parishad) were invited for discussion. Thiru Rama Gopalan was also contacted and he met this such an order is made merely ensures fair play and observance of such alteram partem rule which are regarded as essential in the performance of any executive or administrative function and the further fact that a revision lies against the order of the executive magistrate either to the Sessions Court or to the High Court removes the vice of arbitrariness, if any pertaining to the section. In fact, in the three decisions of this Court which were relied upon by counsel for respondents 5 and 6 namely Baby Parate’s case, A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 884, K. K. Mishra’s case, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1667 and Madhu Limaye’s, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2486, where the constitutional-ity of Sec. 144 of the old Code was challenged on the ground that it amounted to unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a citizen under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution, the challenge was repelled by relying upon these aspects to be found in the provision. In our view, however, these aspects cannot make the order a judicial or quasi-judicial order and such an order issued under Sec.144 of the present Code will have to be regarded as an executive order passed in performance of an executive function where no lis as to any rights between rival parties is adjudicated but merely an order for preserving public peace is made and as such it will be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art.32 of the Constitution." Therefore, it would be open to the respondent to plead and to produce all necessary records to show under what circumstances the order came to be passed when challenged in the court. In the counter-affidavit, the respondent has stated in great detail about the past events that led to communal clash and disturbance of public peace and tranquillity. In paragraph 4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the counter-affidavit, it has been stated in great detail as follows: "While considering the application of the petitioner as well as various other organisations who had also requested for similar permission for the procession to be conducted on the same date, the police had to necessarily bear in mind the past experience which are summarised below: .(a) On 9. 1990 when the Vinayagar Idol procession was passing in front of Ice House Mosque shouting inflammatory slogans, Chappals were thrown on the processionists which resulted in members of Muslim and Hindu Communities pelting stones at each other. The warring groups were separated by the Police. A Police van was set fire to, while several Police Officials sustained injury. Since bursting of tear gas shells and lathi charge proved futile, firing was resorted to bring the situation under control. One person died and 12 others sustained injuries. .(b) On 9. 1992, when the procession was passing through Triplicane High Road, the processionists deliberately delayed the movement which resulted in delaying of the evening prayer at the mosque. They also burst crackers in front of the Mosque. Police with great difficulty controlled the situation. On the same day, when the processionists demanded the closure of shops at Komaleeswaranpet, trouble erupted culminating in the serious rioting between Hindus and Muslims and in the registration of cases in counter of rioting on the complaints of both sects. (c) On 9. They also burst crackers in front of the Mosque. Police with great difficulty controlled the situation. On the same day, when the processionists demanded the closure of shops at Komaleeswaranpet, trouble erupted culminating in the serious rioting between Hindus and Muslims and in the registration of cases in counter of rioting on the complaints of both sects. (c) On 9. 1992, when the Meelad Nabi procession passed through the Triplicane area, trouble erupted culminating in the clash between the processionists and the miscreants at Triplicane High Road, Dr.Besant Road and Kamarajar Salai. 3 Muslims were killed and totally 114 cases were registered in which 141 persons including 106 Hindus and 35 Muslims were arrested. Properties worth Rs.22 lakhs were damaged while several vehicles were also damaged. Following this during 1993 Meelad Committee gave up the proposal to take Meelad-un-Nabi procession. Since Triplicane High Road, housing Big Mosque and Ice House Mosque surrounded by other small mosque has become communally a very sensitive spot, during the year 1993, permission was given in three different routes, to ultimately converge at Seerani Arangam and the same practice was followed for subsequent years. .(d) the procession conducted during 1995 resulted in a graver situation resulting in widespread disorder and extensive damage to public and private property and threat to the life of Police Personnel and Members of Public. On 9. 1995, when the Vinayaga Idols Procession from Thiruvatteeswaranpet Temple deliberately moved very slowly in spite of the repeated requests of the police officers on duty that they should pass the junction of Triplicane High Road and Dr.Besant Road where the Ice House Mosque is situated before the evening prayers starting at 4.45 p.m. as per the conditions granted in the licence, 8 carts including 2 big Vinayagar Idols remained stationary near the junction of Pycrofts Road and Triplicance High Road with the processionists shouting objectionable and inflammatory anti-Muslim and anti-Police slogans. When the Police requested them again to move, the processionists attacked the Police with stones and brick-bat. The unruly mob also set fire to a police vehicle at Namasivayam Street and damaged another Police van. Hence, after due warning 20 tear gas shells were burst and then lathi charge was resorted to disperse them. When the Police requested them again to move, the processionists attacked the Police with stones and brick-bat. The unruly mob also set fire to a police vehicle at Namasivayam Street and damaged another Police van. Hence, after due warning 20 tear gas shells were burst and then lathi charge was resorted to disperse them. Further when another procession was passing through Cathedral Road, some among them broke the glass case outside St.George Cathedral, damaged the statute of Jesus Christ and the Bible display Board, Picket party at the junction of Dr.Besant Road and Kamarajar Salai was also attacked and 9 Police personnel were injured. Following this, there were stray violent incidents in the city in which 4 P.T.C. buses and 6 D.A.T.C. buses, 1 M.G.R. Transport Bus, 1 tempo, one maruthi van, 2 jeeps and 1 Contessa Car, 3 Police Jeeps were damaged while another M.G.R. Transport bus was set fire to. Cases were registered in this regard." Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned order in question cannot be held to be an arbitrary act on the part of the Police Commissioner, nor can it be held that he was actuated by ulterior motives to curb the right of the members of the petitioner Trust and other devotees of Vinayaga. A topography of the route has been placed before us and both sides have accepted it as correct. A look at the topography would show that the route as prayed for by the petitioner has been permitted except in one place marked as "5" wherein the Ice House Mosque is situate and it was at this place, in the past during such procession disturbance had occurred. The deviation is of a very minor nature. Except the deviation at point 5, the entire route as sought for by the petitioner has been permitted. Even otherwise, as already pointed out, the Commissioner is entitled to regulate the procession also. 33. Sensing the situation the Commissioner of Police on 19. 1996 had issued the Prohibitory Order No.1177/Sec.3.II/96 for a period of 15 days commencing from 9 a.m. on 19. 1996 ending with 9 a.m. on 10. 1996 both days inclusive. That order was also sent to all the press as per the paper attached to such order, the prohibitory order is also placed before us, which gives the reason as to why such prohibitory order was issued. 1996 ending with 9 a.m. on 10. 1996 both days inclusive. That order was also sent to all the press as per the paper attached to such order, the prohibitory order is also placed before us, which gives the reason as to why such prohibitory order was issued. It enumerates about 8 reasons for passing such a prohibitory order. We have mentioned this, because it was contended at a certain stage that there was no prohibitory order issued, therefore, there was no permission necessary to be sought. 34. We may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in V.M.Turkunde and another v. Union of India and others, (1989)2 Scale 937. In that case, the religious procession carrying the consecrated shilas (bricks) to be carried on for the purpose of laying the foundation stone of the Ram Janam Bheemi Mandir near the Babiri Masjid area were prohibited on the ground that the same would cause communal disharmony of a serious nature and as such taking of processions by the members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in that connection should be prohibited. The Supreme Court taking into consideration of the situation that would emerge if the consecrated shilas were to be taken for the purpose of laying the foundation stone of the Ram Janam Boomi Mandir near the Babri Masjid area, directed the Union Government as sell as the concerned State Government concerned to take appropriate steps as well as to take severe action against all these who indulged in communal disturbances and spreading communal disharmony amongst the citizens of the respective States. It was also further held that such an action would also be opposed to the order passed by the 3 Judge Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, that the status quo shall be maintained and there shall not be any change in the nature of property in question. Hence, it was directed that such a procession should be prohibited. Though the right of a member of every religion, community and freedom to profess was claimed, but, nevertheless, it was held that in the interest of maintaining public order and tranquility, it would be necessary to step the same. In the instant case, there is no such prohibition, There is only regulation of the route and the petitioner is not prevented to take Vinayaga Idols in procession as per the route mentioned in the impugned order. In the instant case, there is no such prohibition, There is only regulation of the route and the petitioner is not prevented to take Vinayaga Idols in procession as per the route mentioned in the impugned order. Hence, we are of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 35. Point (iii) is answered accordingly. 36. For the reasons stated above, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed. We make it clear that our decision upholding the impinged order of the Commissioner of Police is on the facts and circumstances stated in the petition and the counter-affidavit and also the impugned order. As every year, such a procession is to take place, the Commissioner of Police has to independently examine the situation obtaining at the relevant point of time, whenever such permission is sought and not to dispose of such request arbitrarily. Every such order of the Commissioner of the authorised officer is liable to judicial review under Art.226 of the Constitution. The regulation would depend upon the factual situation prevailing at the relevant point of time. The C.M.P. is also dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.