JUDGEMENT - G.R. MAJITHIA, J. :---The petitioner, Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha, has sought a mandate against the International Airport Authority of India and the Union of India to enforce Notification No. S.O. 779(E) dated 9th December, 1976, issued by the Central Government prohibiting employment of contract labour on and from March 1, 1977, for sweeping, cleaning, dusting and watching of buildings owned or occupied by establishments in respect of which the appropriate Government under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short "the Regulation Act") is the Central Government and to reinstate the 71 workmen fully detailed and described in Ex. 'A' to the petition, as regular employees, with full backwages and continuity of service, in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner is a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. It represents a large number of employees employed in various industries. Respondent No. 1, International Airport Authority of India (for short "the Airport Authority") is a statutory Corporation created under the International Airport Authority of India Act. The Airport Authority engages employees through contractors for the maintenance of the airport and for allied purposes. Seventy-one workmen were employed by the contractor to carry out the work of sweeping, cleaning, dusting, loading, unloading, etc. The contractor terminated the services of the 71 workmen on December 19 and 21, 1983. These workmen filed a complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (for short "the MRTU PULP Act") and also obtained ad-interim order from the Industrial Court restraining the contractor and the Airport Authority from terminating their services. The order could not be served on them. The work which was being done by these 71 workmen in now being carried on by the workmen who have been engaged by another contractor. The services of the 71 workmen were terminated without complying with the provisions of section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3. The Airport Authority denied that the notification dated December 9, 1976 is applicable to it. It further submitted that the petitioner union is espousing the cause of 71 workmen who had filed a complaint under the provisions of the MRTU PULP Act against it; that on an objection raised by it that the MRTU PULP Act is inapplicable to it, its name was deleted from the array of parties. It further submitted that the petitioner union is espousing the cause of 71 workmen who had filed a complaint under the provisions of the MRTU PULP Act against it; that on an objection raised by it that the MRTU PULP Act is inapplicable to it, its name was deleted from the array of parties. It further stated that there is no privity of contract between the Airport Authority and the 71 workmen. 4. This Writ Petition was filed on February 12, 1987. It came up for admission on March 9, 1987 and the following order was passed:- "Rule, returnable on 7-8-87. Resp. 1 waives service. To be heard along with W.P. 1213/85. Expedited." This writ petition is tagged with a bunch of other writ petitions. In this bunch of writ petitions, a prayer is made that the Government Notification dated December 9, 1976, under which the Central Government has prohibited employment of contract labour in the establishments in respect of which appropriate Government under the Regulation Act is the Central Government, be applied to the Airport Authority of India, Air-India and Indian Air Lines and the workmen engaged by the respective contracts in the said establishments be absorbed as their employees. The matter was argued at length in this bunch contracts in writ petitions when it was brought to our notice that the services of the workmen. whose cause is being espoused by the petitioner, were terminated in December, 1983 and thereafter as alleged in the petition, new contractor was engaged and the contractor had engaged workmen to carry out the same work which was carried out by these 71 workmen. The contractor who replaced the earlier contractor has employed his workmen to carry out the work hereinbefore performed by those 71 workmen whose services were allegedly terminated by the employer-contractor. These workmen had also filed writ petition bearing No. 1494/1989 claiming the same relief which has been claimed in this petition. This petition was accordingly segregated from the bunch. 5. The petitioner is espousing the cause of those workmen whose services were terminated in December, 1983. Those workmen have already availed of the remedy available to them under the MRTU PULP Act. The counsel for the petitioner could not bring to our notice as to what was the result of the complaint which was filed under the MRTU PULP Act. The petitioner is espousing the cause of those workmen whose services were terminated in December, 1983. Those workmen have already availed of the remedy available to them under the MRTU PULP Act. The counsel for the petitioner could not bring to our notice as to what was the result of the complaint which was filed under the MRTU PULP Act. It is indisputable that the Airport Authority is not a party to the complaint. It was initially made a party but the complainant subsequently deleted it from the array of parties. The order of termination was passed on December 19, 21, 1983. The limitation to challenge that order is 3 years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act and the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. Reliance can usefully placed on (State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh)1, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 111. The respondent in the appeal before the Apex Court was appointed as an ad hoc Sub-Inspector in the District Food and Supply Department of Punjab State. He absented himself from duty with effect from September 29, 1975. His services were terminated from January 27, 1977. On April 18, 1984, he instituted the suit for a declaration that the termination order was bad at law and he continues to be in service. The suit was resisted by the State and it was, inter alia, pleaded that the services were terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the ad hoc appointment and the suit was barred by time. The trial Judge accepted the plea on limitation and dismissed the suit being barred by time. On first appeal, the judgment and decree of the trial Judge was set aside and the suit was decreed. On the plea of limitation the First Appellate Court held that no limitation is prescribed for challenging an illegal order. The decision of the First Appellate Court was challenged in Regular Second Appeal in the High Court. The appeal was dismissed in limine. The order was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court, reversing he decision of the High Court, held that a suit for declaration in which challenge to an order of dismissal or termination from service being wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is made, is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The order was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court, reversing he decision of the High Court, held that a suit for declaration in which challenge to an order of dismissal or termination from service being wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is made, is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Reversing some other judgments of the Punjab Haryana High Court, the Apex Court observed thus:- "4. First of all, to say that the suit is not governed by the law of limitation runs afoul of our Limitation Act. The statute of limitation was intended to provide a time limit for all suits conceivable. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit, appeal or application instituted after the prescribed 'period of limitation' must subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 24 be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 2(j) defines the expression 'period of limitation' to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or application. Section 2(j) also defines, 'prescribed period' to mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court's function on the presentation of plaint is simply to examine whether, on the assumed facts, the plaintiff is within time. The Court has to find out when the 'right to sue' accured to the plaintiff. If a suit is not covered by any of the specific articles prescribing a period of limitation, it must fall within the residuary article. The purpose of the residuary article is to provide for cases which could not be covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not otherwise provided for. Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act, 1908) is a residuary Article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under Article 120 it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article 113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words 'right to sue' ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Under Article 120 it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article 113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words 'right to sue' ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted [See: (i) (Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan)2, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 270 and (ii) (Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1433]. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 5. ..... ..... If an Act is void or ultra vires it is enough for the Court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. It need not be set aside. The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and not binding upon him. A declaration merely declared the existing state of affairs and does not 'quash' so as to produce a new state of affairs. 6. But nonetheless the impugned dismissal order has at least a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by a competent body or Court. ..... ...... ..... 7. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX 8. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief or declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for". 6. This writ petition was filed on February 12, 1987, after the expiry of 3 years. The remedy of these workmen under the ordinary law, of filing a civil suit is barred by time in view of the decision in the State of Punjab's case (supra). The petitioner cannot legitimately be allowed to rake up the claim of those workmen which is barred by limitation in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This writ petition otherwise also suffers from the vices of laches and delay. The petitioner cannot legitimately be allowed to rake up the claim of those workmen which is barred by limitation in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This writ petition otherwise also suffers from the vices of laches and delay. Additionally, the petitioner claims that the 71 workmen were engaged by the contractor and their services were illegally terminated by him. The contractor is not a party to this writ petition. The relief, if any, can only be granted after hearing the contractor. The necessary party is not before this Court and as such no relief can be granted against the contractor. The petitioner had filed a complaint under the MRTU PULP Act against the contractor and it is not brought to our notice as to what was the result of that complaint. If the order has gone adverse to the workmen, that order attains finality till it is set aside in accordance with law. We have been kept in the dark about the exact factual position with regard to the outcome of the complaint. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon (Sankar Mukherjee v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 532, in support of his contention that the denial of benefit of absorption in service of 1st respondent is discriminatory, In the said judgment, the validity of the notification issued by the Government of West Bengal was challenged. The West Bengal; Government, by notification dated February 9, 1980, prohibited employment of contract labour in 16 departments covering 65 jobs in the establishments of M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. One of the jobs given in the schedule attached to the notification related to the Brick Department and it was on the following terms:- "Cleaning and stacking and other allied jobs except loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks." The validity of this notification to the extent it excluded loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks was challenged in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Apex Court. The Apex Court, after taking note of the rival contentions observed thus:- "7. It is not denied that the bricks handled by the Brick Department are used in furnaces of the company as refractory. Therefore the work done by the Brick Department including loading and unloading of bricks is incidental to the industry carried on by the company. The Apex Court, after taking note of the rival contentions observed thus:- "7. It is not denied that the bricks handled by the Brick Department are used in furnaces of the company as refractory. Therefore the work done by the Brick Department including loading and unloading of bricks is incidental to the industry carried on by the company. It is also not denied that the petitioners are employed as contract labour by the company for the last 15/20 years. Then where is the justification to treat the petitioners differently and deny them the right of regular appointment? After so holding, the Apex Court directed that the petitioners and other workers doing the job of loading and unloading bricks from wagons and trucks in the Brick Department be treated at par with effect from the date of notification with those who are doing the job of cleaning and stacking in the said department. This decision has no application to the facts of the instant case. 8. The petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought for. The benefit, if any, under the notification dated December, 9, 1976 can only be given to the workmen engaged by the contractor and who are continuing in service. It is not disputed that the old contractor who was the employer of these 71 workmen was replaced by a fresh contractor and that contractor has employed workmen who are carrying on the work as on today. This writ petition has no merit. 9. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000/-. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.