DIBYENDU BHUSAN DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE instant revisional application is directed against two orders, namely, order No. 207, dated 18-11-1992 and order No. 210, dated 1-12-1992 passed in Title Suit No. 101 of 1978 of the 3rd Court of Assistant District Judge, Howrah. ( 2 ) THE facts and circumstances leading to this revisional application may shortly be stated as follows : ( 3 ) THE suit was one for partition. In course of hearing of the suit the second witness of the plaintiff, viz. , P. W. 2 was examined on 2-11-1992. At that stage the plaintiff prayed for adjournment for adducing further evidence and the learned -Judge allowed that prayer and fixed 18-11-1992 for further evidence. On 11-11-1992 the plaintiff filed a petition praying for summoning four witnesses including two Government officials, namely, the Executive Engineer of Howrah irrigation Department and the Compensation Officer, Howrah for bringing into evidence certain documents, relating to some acquisition of properties forming part of the subject-matter of the suit and awarding of compensation in respect there of. Along with that petition the plaintiff also filed written up processes and the requisite fees for issuance of the summons through Court upon the said four witnesses. The Court allowed that prayer by its order No. 206, dated 11-111992 and issued summons fixing 18-11-1992, the date already fixed, for further evidence. On 18-11-1992, the plaintiff filed a petition for adjournment of the hearing on the grounds that the service return of the summons that was issued in terms of the order dated 11-111992 wad not received by the Court and that in the absence of the return it was not ascertainable whether summons was actually served or not and that concerned witnesses did not also appear for giving evidence. The defendants opposed the prayer for adjournment but also treated the plaintiffs' evidence as closed fixing 11-12-1992 as the date for dafence evidence. On 24-11-1992, the plaintiff filed a verified petition praying for issuance of fresh summons upon the said four witnesses for causing attendance of whom the Court issued the summons in terms of order No. 206, dated 11-11-1992, alleging that the summons were not issued from the Court's Najarat even though the Court ordered their issuance and that they have filed further summons and the requisite fees for issuing the summons afresh upon the self-same witnesses. This petition for fresh summons was moved on 1-12-1992 in presence of the defendants and the learned Judge by order No. 12, dated 1-12-1992 rejected the petition only on the ground that the order dated 18-111992 by which the plaintiffs' evidence was already treated as closed by the Court was neither set aside nor modified. In such view of the matter, he rejected the plaintiffs' prayer for fresh summons. Being aggrieved by both the orders dated 18-11-1992 and 1-12-1992, the plaintiffs' have come up in the instant revision. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the defendant-opposite parties, maintainability of the present revision case was challenged on the ground that none of the two impugned orders could constitute a "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115, C. P. C. Reliance was placed in support of this contention in three Supreme Court cases, namely, S. S. Khanna 0 v. Brig. F. J. Dhillon, reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 ; Baldevdas Shival v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. , reported in AIR 1970 SC 406 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 : On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that none of the Supreme Court decisions cited on behalf of the opposite parties is applicable to the present case and the case of Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhara, reported in AIR 1978 Cal 264 , was cited on behalf of the petitioners in support of the contention that the impugned orders do constitute "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115, C. P. C. In the first two Supreme Court cases referred to above viz. the cases of S. S. Khanna and Baldevdas Shivlal (supra), decisions were pronounced at a time when the expression "case decided" as it was then appearing in Section 115 was not defined. The Supreme Court in the said two cases laid down the test for determining when an order amounted to a "case decided". According to the said test, a particular order would come within the expression "case decided" if thereby the Court adjudicates for the purpose of the suit some rights or obligations of the parties in controversy. Subsequently, Section 115 had undergone amendments by the C. P. C. Amendment Act of 1976 which came into force on 1-2-1977. The old Section 115 is now renumbered as subsection (1) of Section 115. Subsequently, Section 115 had undergone amendments by the C. P. C. Amendment Act of 1976 which came into force on 1-2-1977. The old Section 115 is now renumbered as subsection (1) of Section 115. A proviso to subsection (1) and a new sub-section (2) has been added by the said Amendment Act. Even an explanation has been incorporated in subsection (2) giving an inclusive definition of the expression "case decided". According to this explanation, any order made in the course of a suit or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or proceeding will come within the ambit of the expression "case decided". If the Legislature intended that only such orders by which the issue is decided could come within the mischief of expression "case decided", then there was no necessity of separately using the expression" any order made" and it is a settled principle of law that Legislature does not use redundant word in a statute. The case of Food Corporation of India (supra) after taking into consideration the effect of the explanation which has been inserted in Section 115 of the Code has virtually laid down that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Baldevdas reiterating the "case decided" theory propounded by the Supreme Court in its earlier case of S. S. Khanna's case does not hold the field. According to the learned Advocate appearing for the opposite parties, the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court cannot be considered to be good law in view of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Madhu Limaye's case. But on a perusal of the Supreme Court decision in Madhu Limaye's case I find that this case has no application for determining the Meaning of the expression "case decided" as it appears in Section 115, C. P. C. after its amendment in the year 1976. In Madhu Limaye's case, the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the expression "interlocutory order" as envisaged under Section 397 (2) of the Cr. In Madhu Limaye's case, the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the expression "interlocutory order" as envisaged under Section 397 (2) of the Cr. P. C. A question arose in that case as to whether the order taking cognizance is an interlocutory order or not and in that light their Lordships considered various decisions of the Supreme Court as also the decision of the Federal Court and Privy Council in relation to final order within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution on and in that context the case of Baldevdas was also taken into consideration and it was held that the order taking cognizance is not an interlocutory order. The Supreme Court had really no occasion in Madhu Limaye's case to consider the effect of amendment that was made in Section 115 by the C. P. C. Amendment Act, 1976. Therefore, it cannot be said that the law laid down in the case of Baldevdas has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye. In view, the meaning of the expression "case decided" has been widened to a large extent by reason of the amendment. Now, any order made in the course of a suit or other proceeding will come within the ambit of the expression "case decided" and interference with such an order under Section 115, C. P. C. will be called for only if that order also comes within any of the three clauses of sub-section (1) and also within any of the two clauses, namely, clauses (a), (b) of the proviso to subsection (1) and the condition imposed by subsection (2) 1 is fulfilled. This view of mine appears to be fully fortified by the Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Awadh Kishore Singh v. Brij Bihari Singh, reported in AIR 1993 Patna 122. Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhara, reported in AIR 1978 Cal 264 , s. S. Khanna 0 v. Brig. This view of mine appears to be fully fortified by the Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Awadh Kishore Singh v. Brij Bihari Singh, reported in AIR 1993 Patna 122. Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhara, reported in AIR 1978 Cal 264 , s. S. Khanna 0 v. Brig. F. J. Dhillon, reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 ; Baldevdas Shival v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. , reported in AIR 1970 SC 406 and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 the Patna High Court considered the Calcutta High Court case of Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhara ( AIR 1978 Cal 264 ) (supra) and the decisions of the Delhi High Court and Orissa High Court reported in AIR 1986 Delhi 286 and AIR 1978 Orissa 179 and the Andhra Pradesh case reported in AIR 1992 Andh Pra 300. It has categorically been laid down in this Patna decision that the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 and AIR 1970 SC 406 are no longer good law in view of amendment of Section 115, C. P. C ( 5 ) HAVING regard to the nature and of the amendment and relying on decisions reported in AIR 1978 Cal 264 and AIR 1993 Patna 122, I have no hesitation to hold that in order to be a "case decided" an order passed in course of a suit or other proceeding need not be an order whereby some right or obligation of the parties in controversy has to be decided for the purpose of the suit or that proceeding. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it can at once be held that the impugned orders if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice and also cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. Then again, the fact remains that the Court had once allowed the plaintiffs' prayer for issuance of summons upon certain -witnesses and the plaintiff did whatever he could in the matter of issuance of summons and effecting service thereof through Court. It also transpires that the summons in question were not actually issued by the Court's Najrat and that was why the summons could not be served upon the witnesses concerned resulting in their non-appearance on 18-11-92, the date fixed for their evidence. It also transpires that the summons in question were not actually issued by the Court's Najrat and that was why the summons could not be served upon the witnesses concerned resulting in their non-appearance on 18-11-92, the date fixed for their evidence. It cannot, therefore, be said that the plaintiff was to blame for his failure to produce the said witnesses on 18-1192. The Court below did not assign any reason as to why it rejected the plaintiffs' prayer for adjournment on 18-11-92. No reason has also been assigned in the order dated 18-11-92 whereby the Court not only rejected the prayer for adjournment but also straight way closed the plaintiffs' evidence. It is thus apparent that the Court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in refusing to grant adjournment and closing the plaintiffs' evidence on 18-11-92. Subsequently, by the verified petition dated 24-11-92 the plaintiffs specifically pointed out to the Court below that because of inaction on the part of the Court's Najarat the summons that were ordered to be issued by the Court below on the prayer of the plaintiff's on 11-11-92 were not actually issued for service resulting in the plaintiffs' failure to produce the evidence on 18-11-92 ( 6 ) IN the circumstances, the impugned orders can be said to have manifestly occasioned the failure of justice and caused irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. The Court below proceeded to decide the case after depriving the plaintiffs of reasonable opportunity to produce evidence in support of their case. As such, the order dated 18-11-92 whereby the Court closed the plaintiffs' evidence and fixed the date for defence evidence was certainly without jurisdiction inasmuch as Order 17, Rule 3, C. P. C. cannot be said to have been attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case ( 7 ) IN view of my findings recorded above, it would necessarily follow that the impugned orders cannot be allowed to stand and must, accordingly, be set aside forthwith. The revisional application is thus allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. The trial Court shall allow the plaintiffs opportunity of adducing further evidence and proceed to decide the suit expeditiously in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.