Judgment : An important question of law, that too, of general importance is raised in these revisions. The question is this: When the trial court is approached under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, requesting the said court to file the complaint against a person under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, can the court dismiss the same, without conducting a preliminary enquiry as required under Sec.340, Crl.P.C? 2. The petitioner Muralidhar was an accused in C.C. No.1883 of 1986, on the file of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, in the case filed by the police for the offences under Secs.406 and 420, I.P.C., on the complaint of the 1st respondent Kishore Kumar P.Jain. After trial, the petitioner was acquitted on 3. 1989. Then he filed petitions in Crl.M.P. Nos. 184 to 186 of 1990, on 12. 1990, under Sec.340, Crl.P.C., requesting the court to exercise its powers under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, to present a complaint in writing to anyone of the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, in Madras, for taking cognizance of the offences under Sec.211 read with 120-B, I.P.C, against the respondents alleging that the 1st respondent Kishore Kumar P. Jain, in pursuance of the conspiracy hatched with the other respondents gave a complaint, with the false charge of offence made with intent to injure the petitioner before the trial court in C.C. No.1883 of 1986, which ended in acquittal. 3. These applications were dismissed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed appeals before the Sessions Court, Madras in C.A. Nos.82, 86 and 87 of 1990. The appellate court also dismissed these appeals on 28. 1990, confirming the view taken by the lower court. 4. The grounds of dismissal as narrated both by the lower court and the appellate court, could be stated as follows: .(a) The petitions filed under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, and the original Judgment in C.C. No.1883 of 1986, which ended in acquittal do not show that the complaint made by Kishore Kumar P.Jain, the 1st respondent, was a false one, and the same was made with intent to cause injury to the petitioner. .(b) The acquittal was on the basis that the charge was not proved beyond doubt. The trial court did not give any finding that the petitioner instituted the said complaint with the false charge of offence with intent to injure the petitioner. .(b) The acquittal was on the basis that the charge was not proved beyond doubt. The trial court did not give any finding that the petitioner instituted the said complaint with the false charge of offence with intent to injure the petitioner. .(c) Since the ingredients of Sec.211, I.P.C, are not attracted on the averments made in the petitions filed under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, the court cannot take action under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. 5. Aggrieved over the verdict of both the trial court and the appellate court, the petitioner approached this Court, by filing these revisions. 6. The above referred question of law, is being raised on different angles by Mr.G. Krishnan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in the following manner: .(a) When an application under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, requesting the court to take action under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, is made the court shall entertain, conduct a preliminary enquiry, and then give a finding, whether it is expedient to prefer a complaint for the offence under Sec. 211, I.P.C. or not without such a preliminary enquiry, the Magistrate, cannot straight away dismiss the petition. .(b) To invoke Sec. 340, Crl.P.C, there need not be any finding in the original case by the trial court, with reference to the false evidence having been let in. It is all the more necessary for the lower court, in the absence of such finding in its judgment, to conduct a preliminary enquiry by giving opportunity to the petitioner to establish that a false case was instituted before the trial court, This alone would enable the lower court to consider the expediency to file the complaint under Sec. 195, Crl.P.C. .(c) The Magistrate of course can take into consideration, the observation in the original Judgment, with reference to the finding about the false charge, in addition to the materials produced by the petitioner, only during the time, of the preliminary enquiry under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. and not before that. .(d) The Magistrate cannot dismiss straight away, merely on the ground that the said finding was not given in the original Judgment. .(e) Before the enquiry, the Magistrate can look into the petitioner alone, which was filed under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, In other words, he cannot look not any other documents, including the earlier Judgment. .(d) The Magistrate cannot dismiss straight away, merely on the ground that the said finding was not given in the original Judgment. .(e) Before the enquiry, the Magistrate can look into the petitioner alone, which was filed under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, In other words, he cannot look not any other documents, including the earlier Judgment. .(f) Even assuming, for the argument sake, that the original Judgment can be looked into along with the petition under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, before such preliminary enquiry, in the instant case, there is also an observation found in the said Judgment, that the evidence relating to the document Ex.P-5 was a false one. This has not been taken into account by the lower court. .7.Per contra, Mr. Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents, in reply, contended various points, which are given below: .(a) The Prayer as found in the petitions presented by the petitioner under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, would show that the petitioner only wanted the court to take on file the complaint under Sec.211 read with 120-B, I.P.C., There is no prayer requesting the court to conduct preliminary enquiry under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. .(b) Under Sec. 340, Crl.P.C., even before conducting preliminary enquiry, the court should form an opinion that it is expedient, in the interests of justice, that a preliminary enquiry is to be made into any offence referred to in Sec.195, Crl.P.C, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court. If he does not form such an opinion, and if he concluded that preliminary enquiry is not necessary, in the interests of justice, he could straightaway dismiss the application. In other words, only when the court finds prima facie materials for entertaining the said petition under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, he can hold a preliminary enquiry. Only in such an enquiry, the Magistrate has to find out, whether it is necessary to file a complaint. If it is so, he should record a finding, and then present a complaint under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. before any other court. So, the process of forming an opinion to conduct preliminary enquiry, is at the first phase. Even at that stage, when the Magistrate comes to the conclusion, that no enquiry is necessary, the question of conducting preliminary enquiry does not arise. So, the process of forming an opinion to conduct preliminary enquiry, is at the first phase. Even at that stage, when the Magistrate comes to the conclusion, that no enquiry is necessary, the question of conducting preliminary enquiry does not arise. In this case, the petition under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, and the Judgment in the original case as referred to in the petitions have been thoroughly gone into and only thereafter a decision was arrived at by the lower court, holding that this is not a fit case for proceeding further under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the verdict given by the lower court, which was confirmed by the appellate court. 8. So, the rival contentions urged by the respective counsel have given rise to the above referred question of law. But, before deciding this issue, this Court is called upon to consider the question of maintainability of these revisions, as pointed out by Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents. So, at the outset, this preliminary question has got to be answered. 9. The nature of the question raised as a preliminary objection by Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents would be summarised thus: “Whenever an application is filed under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, before the court to take action against the person concerned under Sec.195, Crl.P.C., for having given a false complaint, the court has to pass an order. Under Sec.341, Crl.P.C, when the court refused to make a complaint under Sec. 340(1), Crl.P.C, the applicant may appeal to the appellate court. Sec.341(2), Crl.P.C. provides, that the appellate order under Sec.341, Crl.P.C, shall be final and shall not be subject to revision. As such, these revisions against the orders on appeals are not maintainable.” 10. In reply to this, Mr.G. Krishnan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that though these revisions are not maintainable under Sec. 341 (2), Crl.P.C. this Court has got powers under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C, to treat these revisions, as the petitions under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. and invoke its inherent powers to secure the ends of Justice, in order to correct the illegality committed in the orders of the lower Court. 11. 11. Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents strenuously contended that these revisions are not only maintainable, but also the same cannot be treated as applications under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. In support of his submission, he read out the scope and object of the bar contained under Sec.341 (2), Crl.P.C. The relevant portions contained in the objects and reasons relating to Sec.341, Crl.P.C, are given below. The Law Commission in its 41st report observed: “Orders under Secs.476, 476-A and 476-B are at present, regarded as subject to revision. In our view, the right of appeal conferred by Sec.476 is enough, and there should be no further proceeding by way of revision against such orders. An order under Sec.476 or under Sec.476-A should be final subject to the appeal provided for by Sec.476-B; and an order under Sec.476-B should be final, being itself an order passed on appeal. It is also necessary to set at rest the controversy as to whether the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure or of the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply where the order of a civil court passed under Sec.476 is challenged in revision.” 12. On the basis of this, Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondent contended that only on this reason, the amendment of Sec.341(2), Crl.P.C. has been brought, making the order under Sec.341(1)(476-B old section) to be final. The plain and conjoint reading of the other Secs.476, 476-A and 476-B and the present Secs.340, 341(1) and 341(2), Crl.P.C. coupled with the objects and reasons as contained in 41st report of Law Commission, would reflect the intention of the legislature, asking the court to adopt the literal construction for the bar contained in Sec.341(2), Crl.P.C. Learned counsel for respondent also cited the following decisions, in order to substantiate his contentions that both revisions as well as petitions under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. are not maintainable. (a) Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and another v. D. V.A. Dikshitulu and another, A.I.R. 1979S.C. 193. .(b) Lt.Col.Prithi Pal Singh Debi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1413: (1981) 2 S.C.C. 140. .(c) Mohideen v. M.K. Chandra Kant, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 343. .(d) S. Mrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 327. .(e) Rajkumar Machananda v. State of Karnataka, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 537. .(f) Nelson Motis v. Union of India and another, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1981. .(c) Mohideen v. M.K. Chandra Kant, 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 343. .(d) S. Mrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 327. .(e) Rajkumar Machananda v. State of Karnataka, 1990 S.C.C. (Crl.) 537. .(f) Nelson Motis v. Union of India and another, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1981. .(g) Dharampal and others v. Ramshri and others, 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 333. .(h) Deepti alias Arati Raj v. Akhil Raj and others, (1995) 3 Crimes. 818. 13. The proposition of law with reference to the exercise of the inherent powers under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C., especially when there is a bar to revision has been elaborately discussed in the above decisions. The gist of dictum found above could be stated as follows: .(a) When the revision before the High Court is not maintainable, the inherent power cannot be utilised for exercising the power, which is expressly barred by the Code. The inherent power of the High Court under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C, is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice. Such powers are as much controlled by principle and precedents as are its express powers by statute. It cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the grab of inherent jurisdiction. .(b) Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Sec. 397(3), Crl.P.C, could be labelled as one under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C. .(c) The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the court should adopt literal construction, if it does not lead to an absurdity. If there is no ambiguity in the language, it would mean the language used, speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, it would mean the language used, speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning. .(d) It is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reasonably susceptible only one meaning, it must construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences, .(e) The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed “according to the intent of they (author) that made it”. Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But, however, in Mohideen, In re., 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 343, this Court, while dealing with the civil revision petition, held that the said petition was not maintainable, since the appeal under Sec.340(1), Crl.P.C, was final. Being a civil revision petition, the inherent powers under Sec.482, Crl.P.C, has not been discussed there. So, this decision cited by Mr.Packiaraj, is not applicable to decide about the present issue. 14. Mr.G. Krishnan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner cited several decisions contrary to the principles laid down in the decisions referred to by Mr.Packiaraj. They are as follows: .(i) (a) Kunhammed Haji v. Amino, (1996)1 Crimes 176. (b) Vanka Rajulu v. Singupalli Somunaidu and others, (1996) 2 Crimes 110. It is held in the these decisions, that the provisions contained in Sec.397(3) of the Code, will not be a total bar for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. and the Court can exercise the powers under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. to pass such order as are necessary to prevent the abuse of process of Court or to secure the ends of Justice. This Court’s jurisdiction under Secs.397 and 482, Crl.P.C. do not over-lap each other. Therefore, a reading of all these decisions cited by both the sides would show that both these propositions have been propounded by this Court and the Apex Court, .(ii) learned counsel also cited the decision in Lalit Mohan Mondal and others v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 785. Therefore, a reading of all these decisions cited by both the sides would show that both these propositions have been propounded by this Court and the Apex Court, .(ii) learned counsel also cited the decision in Lalit Mohan Mondal and others v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 785. The relevant observation of the Apex Court is as follows: “We agree with the High Court, that against an order passed in appeal under Sec.341 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the order would not be re-visable by the High Court Sec.397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, but there can be no doubt that the Court is entitled to examine the matter under Sec.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which expressly overrules the bar contained in Sec. 341 of the Code. In the instant case, the High Court has merely indicated that this is not a fit case for invoking the inherent power without at all applying its mind whether or not in the circumstances, it was a fit case for filing a complaint, particularly when the matter rested merely on oath against oath.” .(iii) The next decision referred to by learned counsel is reported in Major K. Mathews v. J. Raja Kalifulla, (1994) 1 L.W. (Crl.) 74 wherein this Court observed as follows: “The High Court, while sitting in revision under Secs.397 and 401 of the Code, when it is able to identify the impropriety or illegality committed by a subordinate Judge who passed the impugned judgment or order, which causes miscarriage of justice or denial of justice, then, the accepted position is, that irrespective of the bar provided under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.341 of the Code, can intervene, by virtue of the inherent power made available under Sec.482 of the Code and it is the wells settled principle of law in this regard.” (iv) In Francis Xavier v. Neelamegam, (1995)1 L. W. (Crl.) 237, this Court observed as follows: “In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extra-ordinary situation excites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.... The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.... At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the the Court in the face”, .(v) In order to substantiate his submission, that the se revisions could be treated as petitions under Sec.482, Crl.P.C, in order to secure the ends of justice, learned counsel cited the decision in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978S.C.47, in which the Supreme Court held as follows: “The bar under Sec.397(2) will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the end of justice. The label of the petition filed by aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers.” 15. At this juncture I must point out that none of the decisions cited by Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents, would refer to the scope of Sec.482, Crl.P.C., with reference to the bar contained in Sec.341(2), Crl.P.C, whereas out of the decisions cited by Mr.G. Krishnan, learned senior counsel, the two decisions by Apex Court and this Court viz., in (1) Lalit Mohan Mondal, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 785 and (2) Major K.Mathews, (1994)1 L.W. (Crl.) 74, would exactly answer this point, holding that if it is a fit case, where there illegality has been identified, the inherent powers under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. can be invoked, even in the revisions filed under Secs.397 and 401, Crl.P.C, despite the bar contained in Sec.341(2), Crl.P.C, Accordingly, I am constrained to reject the preliminary objection raised by Mr.Packiaraj, with references to the maintainability of these petitions, since I am of the view, that the High Court can treat these revisions as petitions under Sec. 482, Crl.P.C. as the label of the petitions is immaterial, as the Apex Court pointed out. 16. The next question that arises for consideration is whether it is appropriate for this Court, to invoke the inherent powers, in order to correct the illegality, if any committed by the lower court, for the purpose of securing the lends of Justice, or in other words, whether any such serious illegality is committed by the lower court, warranting the interference of this Court. To decide this point, this court has to necessarily go to main question of law raised in this case, mentioned in the preamble portion of this order. 17. To decide this point, this court has to necessarily go to main question of law raised in this case, mentioned in the preamble portion of this order. 17. The petitioner was acquitted in the police case, on the complaint filed by the 1st respondent, in respect of the offence under Secs.406 and 420, I.P.C, in C.C. No.1883 of 1986, on the file of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, by Judgment dated 3. 1989. On 2. 1990, he filed petitions under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, requesting the court to present a complaint against the respondents for the offence under Secs.211 read with 120-B, I.P.C, Such petitions were dismissed on 12. 1990. 18. The prayer in the abovesaid petitions as pointed out by Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents is as follows: "Under the aforesaid circumstances, it is prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to present a complaint in writing to any Court of Metropolitan Magistrate at Madras, for taking cognizance of offences punishable under Secs.21 read with 120-B, I.P.C, against respondents 2 to 6, and pass such further or other orders as deem fit and thus render justice." Admittedly, no enquiry was sought for by the petitioner, stating that he has got the materials, necessitating the said enquiry. The contents of the petition discloses that the petitioner wanted a complaint to be filed by the court, since the earlier case filed by the court, since the earlier case filed against him was acquitted on 3. 1989, and nothing more. Along with this petition, the main judgment copy in C.C. No.1883 of 1986 was also enclosed. This petition also was presented only eleven months subsequent to the acquittal i.e., 3. 1989. 19. In the light of the said situation, the lower court considered both the petitions and the judgment and passed an order, dismissing the petition, holding that the trial court acquitted, not on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, land that the case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is also observed in the order that on the available materials, it could not be said that the complaint was filed by the 1st respondent, with the intention to cause injury to the petitioner. The appellate court would as well, as referred to above, concurred with the view taken by the lower court. 20. Sec. 195, Crl.P.C, provides as follows: "195(1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a)....... The appellate court would as well, as referred to above, concurred with the view taken by the lower court. 20. Sec. 195, Crl.P.C, provides as follows: "195(1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a)....... (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, Secs.193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199,200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive), and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, (ii)........ (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit, or the abatement of any offence specified in Sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii). except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate" Under this section, the person aggrieved of the offence under Sec.211 read with 120-B, I.P.C, has to necessarily approach the court, in which alleged false complaint was given, to request the court to file a complaint in the appropriate court, to take action against the person concerned for the offence under Sec.211 read with 120-B, I.P.C. The said aggrieved person, in order to achieve this object, has to make out an application under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. before the said court. 21. Sec.340, Crl.P.C. contemplates thus: "Procedure in cases mentioned in Sec.195: When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any as it thinks necessary, .(a) record a finding to that effect; .(b) make a complaint thereof in writing; .(c) send it to a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction;" Under this section, the court which the arrived person approached with the application has to necessarily form an opinion that in the interests of justice, an enquiry should be conducted, in order to find out whether any offence covered under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, is committed, and only then, the court can conduct the said enquiry, and record a finding. Only after such finding recorded in the order, he could present a complaint, before the appropriate court. 22. The main grievance for the petitioner is that the Magistrate dismissed the petition straight away, without conducting the preliminary enquiry contemplated under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, merely on the ground that there is no finding with regard to the institution of the false complaint in the original Judgment, which he cannot look into before such an enquiry, (i) On the strength of a decision in K.Karunakaran v. T.V.Eachara Warrier and another, A.I.R. 1978S.C. 290, Mr.G. Krishnan, learned senior counsel contended, that the petitioner may choosed to place all materials before the court, at the time of enquiry. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "In a proceeding under Sec.340(1), Crl.P.C, the reasons recorded in the principal case, in which a false statement has been made, have a great bearing and indeed action is taken having regard to the over all opinion formed by the court in the earlier proceedings. At such an enquiry irrespective of the result of the main case, the only question is whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offence and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take such action. The party may choose to place all its materials before the court at that stage, but if it does not it will not be estopped from doing so letter in the trial, in case prosecution is sanctioned by the court." This is not the authority to hold that the petitioner may choose to place all the materials during the preliminary enquiry. The above observation is to the effect the party may choose to place all materials before the court only at the time of trial, after the complaint was lodged by the court. So, this decision may not be helpful to the prosecution submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner. 23. Regarding the question as to when necessity for preliminary enquiry would arose, Mr.Packiaraj, cited the following authorities: (i) In K. Venkataratnam v. Chairman, A.P. Housing Board and others, (1993)2 Crimes. 624, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, held that the court is to consider, whether at all a preliminary enquiry is necessary under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, on the strength of the decision in Gani v. Harcourt, A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 624, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, held that the court is to consider, whether at all a preliminary enquiry is necessary under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, on the strength of the decision in Gani v. Harcourt, A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 436, wherein it was held as follows: "Where a person is alleged to have given false evidence before arbitrator, an application under Sec.476, Crl.P.C, (present -Sec. 340, Crl.P.C.) is necessary. But the question whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case." .(ii) In Vittappan v. State, 1987 Crl.L.J. 1994, the High Court of Kerala, observed as follows: "The enquiry contemplated in Sec.340 is an enquiry by the prosecuting court itself and it is regarding the offence which appear to have been committed in or in relation to the proceeding in that court. It is in such an enquiry that the Court has to enter a finding regarding the offence which appears to have been committed. Such an enquiry itself need be conducted only if the court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so. That means in all case when it appears to the court that an offence is committed it need no conduct an enquiry for the purpose of taking decision whether or not a complaint has to be filed. Even if an offence appears to have been committed the enquiry the consequent finding land the complaint need be only in cases where lit is expedient to do do in the interest of justice". 24. Mr.Packiaraj, learned counsel for the respondents cited some more decisions to show that the prosecution under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, should be resorted to only when there is a deliberate perjury and the conviction is reasonable provable. .(a) In Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1367: 1971 Crl.L.J. 1096, the court held as follows: ."The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonable probable or likely ....Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some in accuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance land the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. In the present case we do not think the material brought to our notice was sufficiently adequate to justify the conclusion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint... Lastly, there is also the question of long lapse of time of more than ten years since the filing of the affidavit which is the subject matter of the charge. This factor is also not wholly irrelevant for considering the question of expediency of initiating prosecution for the alleged perjury. In view of the nature of the alleged perjury in this case this long delay also militates against expediency of prosecution. And then by reason of the pendency of these proceedings since 1962 and earlier similar proceeding before the District Magistrate also the appellant must have suffered both mentally and financially. In view of all these circumstances we are constrained to allow the appeal land set aside the order directing complain to be filed." .(b) In K. Narayanaswami Reddiar v. T. Kolandaivelu Chettiar, A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 267: 1970 Crl.L.J. 980, this Court has held as follows: ."Even otherwise this is not a case where a complaint should be filed in the interests of justice. The matter relates to the execution of a promissory note. The executant says that he executed it believing certain representations. The appellant avers that he had nothing to do with the promissory note. It is said that suits were instituted on the promissory note and that they are pending. To say that the complainant has not proved his case under Sec.420, I.P.C., is not always the same as saying that it has been proved that the complaint given by him was false. "The bare fact that subsequently it was noticed that false evidence was given in a proceeding, by itself, will not be sufficient for concluding the expediency of prosecution. Before launcing prosecution, one has to bear in mind that hundreds of actions are tried yearly in which the Court finds the evidence irreconcilable conflicting and therein one or the other side must have wilfully and deliberately perjured. The courts do not often pronounce on the falsity of evidence when coming to findings. Before launcing prosecution, one has to bear in mind that hundreds of actions are tried yearly in which the Court finds the evidence irreconcilable conflicting and therein one or the other side must have wilfully and deliberately perjured. The courts do not often pronounce on the falsity of evidence when coming to findings. If prosecution has to be launched in every case, and particularly at the instance of the opposite party, then there will be no limit to litigation between the parties. This aspect of the matter must make the court pause and consider the expediency of prosecution in a particular case with reference to its facts and not launch prosecution at the instance of parties in every case where perjury is discovered. The learned Magistrate has correctly dismissed the petition stating that there was not sufficient ground for taking any action against the respondents. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed." .(c) In Santokh Singh, In re., 1973 S.C.C. (Crl.) 828, the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, observed as follows: "Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the court should direct prosecution. The High Court seems to have misunderstood the appellant’s evidence and has also failed to apply its mind to the question of expediency." 25. In the light of the principle laid down in the above Sec.340, Crl.P.C, could be again gone through: A plain reading of Sec.340, Crl.P.C, discloses that there are two phases. The High Court seems to have misunderstood the appellant’s evidence and has also failed to apply its mind to the question of expediency." 25. In the light of the principle laid down in the above Sec.340, Crl.P.C, could be again gone through: A plain reading of Sec.340, Crl.P.C, discloses that there are two phases. (1) The court should form an opinion on the basis of the materials found available in the petition presented to the court that it is expedient, the interests of justice, a preliminary enquiry is necessary, (2) If on such a preliminary enquiry, if the court comes to the conclusion that the offence covered under clause (b) of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.195, Crl.P.C, has been committed, then he should record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing. In other words, if the court does not form an opinion that the preliminary enquiry is necessary in the expediency and in the interests of justice, then he cannot enter into the second phase and so he could straightaway dismiss the petition. In other words, when he finds prima facie materials for maintaining the petition under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. then alone he shall conduct a preliminary enquiry. As such, the process of forming an opinion to conduct a preliminary enquiry, is one thing. In the process of preliminary enquiry, taking a decision and recording a finding to that effect and making a complaint to an appropriate court is another thing. As such when the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that no such enquiry is necessary in view of lack of prima facie case, he cannot be compelled to conduct an enquiry even though he formed an opinion that no such enquiry is necessary. 26. In this context, let me see whether any prima facie case was made out to make the lower court to form an opinion, as to whether any preliminary enquiry was worthwhile. It is relevant to point out at this stage, that the petitioner on these very same allegations filed a private complaint before the very same court straightway. The respondents correctly filed a petition for quashing the proceedings of the said complaint, on the ground that the said complaint was not filed by the Court under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, This Court on entertaining the said petition quashed those proceedings. The respondents correctly filed a petition for quashing the proceedings of the said complaint, on the ground that the said complaint was not filed by the Court under Sec.195, Crl.P.C, This Court on entertaining the said petition quashed those proceedings. Thereafter, the present petition in Crl.M.P.Nos.184 to 186 of 1990 were filed, and orders were passed dismissing the same, which resulted in the filling of the appeals, and then the present revisions. 27. The records of the original case in C.C. No.1883 of 1986, would disclose that the offence had been committed in the year 1983. The main case ended in acquittal on 3. 1989. As mentioned earlier, the acquittal was not on the ground that a false complaint was filed. These petitions under Sec.340, Crl.P.C, were filed only after 11 months. In the petition, there was only reference about the acquittal judgment. There is no other new material mentioned in the petition. In such a situation, the lower Court had to consider both the petitions and the judgment in the main as, to come to the conclusion whether it is a fit case for enquiry under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. 28. Further more, the lower Court which tried the main case, had all the materials before it, when it rendered the judgment of acquittal. Obviously, the lower court did not consider it necessary or expedient to launch proceedings against the respondents for preferring any false complaint or for perjury. No new material was placed subsequently, by the petitioner to show that the complaint, which was filed previously by the 1st respondent, was false, or the evidence which was given amounted to perjury. To say that the complaint (1st Respondent) has not proved his case under Secs.420 and 406, I.P.C., is not always the same, as saying that it has been proved that the complaint given by him was false. The bare fact that false evidence was given in a proceedings by itself will not be sufficient for concluding the expediency of the prosecution. 29. If prosecution has to be launched in every case and particularly at the instance of the opposite party, then there will be no limit for litigation between the parties. The bare fact that false evidence was given in a proceedings by itself will not be sufficient for concluding the expediency of the prosecution. 29. If prosecution has to be launched in every case and particularly at the instance of the opposite party, then there will be no limit for litigation between the parties. This aspect of the matter must make the court to consider the expediency of prosecution in a particular case with reference to its fact and not launch prosecution at the instance of parties in every case, where perjury is discovered. 30. Expediency in the interests of justice should be the criterion. Otherwise there could be almost as may prosecution as the number of witnesses examined, because in the evidence of each and every witness, an element of untruth could be found out. As the Apex Court held, the prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts, only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious. To start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material will defeat its very purpose. 31. Perjury is concomitant of a Court of Law, the question always being one of degree. Even though every act of perjury is strictly an offence, it need not necessarily follow that on that account every perjurer should be charged. Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent oh the court to order prosecution. 32. So, the question that has been raised in this case is answered as follows: .(1) The provisions of Sec.340, Crl.P.C, are more or less procedural, before directing a complaint to be lodged, the court must form an opinion on being satisfied and coming to the conclusion on such satisfaction that the person charged has intentionally given false evidence and that for the eradication of the evils of perjury and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that he should be prosecuted, .(ii) Taking into consideration these principles, if the court forms an opinion, on the basis of the materials found available in the petition presented into court, that it is not expedient in the interests of justice, to conduct preliminary enquiry, the court could dismiss the same, even before such an enquiry. 33. 33. In view of the above answer, this Court feels that these petitions have no merits, as no infirmity or illegality could be identified in the orders passed by the trial court, which was confirmed by the appellate court, and that no interference is called for even under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. 34. In the result, these petitions are dismissed.