ORDER J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Shri S. S. Garg with Ku. Rekha Shrivastava and Shri C. S. Ujjainia for the petitioner. Shri S. H. Sen, Dy. Govt. Advocate with Shri A. Salim, Panel Lawyer for the prosecution. The petitioner is hereby assailing the order passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone dated 20-12-1995 by which he has dismissed the revision petition filed by the present petitioner challenging the charge which has been framed against him for offences punishable under provisions of Sections 34-A and 49-C of Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 (hereinafter referred to as the M.P. Excise Act for short). 2. The prosecution case in brief can be stated as hereunder. On 27-2-1994 at about 8.40 p.m. the hut belonging to accused Molkia was raided by the police and they found 2 drums of illicit liquor in the said hut when wife of Molkia was present in the said hut. The said drums were seized by police under Panchanama in presence of Panch witnesses. Molkia was arrested by the police six months thereafter. When Molkia was arrested, he made a statement while in custody of police that those two drums which were seized from the said hut were belonging to present petitioner Madanlal. Molkia showed his willingness to point out petitioner Madanlal. The police went along with accused Molkia to Madanlal and accused Molkia pointed out Madanlal. Police made present petitioner Madanlal as co-accused in said case and thereafter challan was filed against present petitioner. 3. A prayer was made to the trial Court by the present petitioner to discharge him which was rejected by the trial Court holding that the statement given to police by Molkia while in the custody in view of provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereafter referred to as Evidence Act for short) was sufficient to make out aprimafacie case against him. A revision petition was preferred against that order by the present petitioner which was decided by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone who confirmed the view taken by the trial Magistrate. 4. Shri S.S. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Magistrate and learned Additional Sessions Judge committed the error of law in interpreting the provisions of Section 27 of Evidence Act qua the alleged statement made by accused Molkia while in custody of police. 4. Shri S.S. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Magistrate and learned Additional Sessions Judge committed the error of law in interpreting the provisions of Section 27 of Evidence Act qua the alleged statement made by accused Molkia while in custody of police. He placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter Of Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Omprakash, AIR 1972 SC 975 and the judgment of Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67. 5. Shri Sen learned Dy. Govt. Advocate tried to justify the said order by pointing out that the said drums of liquor were belonging to the present petitioner and, therefore, rightly the learned trial Court has rejected the prayer of the petitioner which view has been confirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Shri Sen submitted that besides that the prosecution is in possession of the statement of wife of accused Molkia and witness Rajendra Goswami. 6. In the matter of Pulukuri Kottaya (supra) the Privy Council has held that the fact discovered is not equivalent to object produced. It has been held that information as to the past user or the past history of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to a discovery of knife'; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. In the said judgment the Privy Council held that Section 27 of Evidence Act will have to be considered in context with Sections 25 and 26 of Evidence Act as Section 27 which is not artistically worded provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence, but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. The Privy Council further pointed out that normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as dead body, a weapon, or ornaments said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. While rejecting the submission made by the prosecution in the said matter that the evidence in respect of such information becomes admissible if that information relates to the object produced, the Privy Council held that "if this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if at all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect." The Privy Council further held the proviso to section 26, added by Section 27 should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. The Privy Council further held that "it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within this section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact." 7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Omprakash (supra) held that "a fact discovered within the meaning of Section 27 must refer to a material fact to which the information directly relates. That information which does not distinctly connect with the fact discovered or that portion of the information which merely explains the material thing discovered is not admissible Under Section 27 and cannot be proved. Where an accused gives information to the Investigating Officer that he purchased the murder weapon from a particular dealer and takes the investigating officer and the Panchas to the places of the dealer and points him out, the information is inadmissible Under Section 27. However, the evidence of the investigating officer and the Panchas that the accused had taken them to the dealer and pointed him out and as corroborated by the dealer himself is admissible under section 8 as conduct of the accused." 8. The provisions of Section 27 of Evidence Act are being misused by some of the investigating officers for the purpose of creating evidence against the accused when the prosecution does not have it in the course of investigation done earlier. Generally, attempts are made by some of the investigating officers to connect co-accused with the alleged crime by use of a statement made by former accused in view of provisions of Section 27 of Evidence Act, the past user and past history is generally grabbed as source of strength in this attempt. The memoranda of such informations do contain such inadmissible material which consumes significant time of the trial Court in discarding it. Time has come now to caution such investigating officers to be careful in that context and to see that the record is not burdened at the cost of important time of the Court which is needed for expeditious disposal of the trials. 9. In the present case the two drums containing liquor were already seized from the said hut in which, according to prosecution case, the wife of accused Molkia was present. 9. In the present case the two drums containing liquor were already seized from the said hut in which, according to prosecution case, the wife of accused Molkia was present. If at all the police wanted to connect those drums with the present petitioner, the wife of Molkia should have been interrogated in respect of ownership of those drums. The statement of wife of Molkia is silent on this point. The statement of Rajendra Goswami is also nothing but collection of hearsay evidence. It is pertinent to note that when the investigating agency found that the material with it was not sufficient to connect the present petitioner with the crime, an attempt seems to have been made by recording the statement of Molkia which would be pointing out present petitioner. Such statement is there and Molkia has pointed out the present petitioner. What the statement of Molkia shows is the past history of the said drums and that past history has been used for the purpose of connecting the present petitioner so far as the ownership of the said drums is concerned. It is nothing but bypassing the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act shrewdly by taking the shelter of Section 27 of the Act. Such cannot be permitted and by such use of provisions of Section 27 of Evidence Act, a person cannot be put to troublesome ordeal of facing a trial which requires attendance in Court on number of dates and expenditure by way of engaging a lawyer. 10. The learned trial Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge has failed to interpret provisions of Section 27 of Evidence Act so far as facts of the present case are concerned. They have not taken into consideration that those drums were discovered six months prior to the statement of accused Molkia and were well within the knowledge of the police investigating into the crime. The Courts below have failed to note that it was nothing but addenda to investigation done earlier motivated for connecting the present petitioner with the alleged crime for which accused Molkia or his wife was to face the prosecution. 11. The Courts below have failed to note that it was nothing but addenda to investigation done earlier motivated for connecting the present petitioner with the alleged crime for which accused Molkia or his wife was to face the prosecution. 11. Thus, in view of the discussion above this is a fit case in which the High Court should invoke its inherent powers in view of provisions of Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the charge which has been framed against the petitioner. 12. The petition is, therefore, allowed. The charge which has been framed against the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 46 of 1995 stands quashed.