Judgment R.R. Yadav, J.-In the instant writ petition petitioner questions impugned order dated 29-6-96. Annexure 2, passed by the Chancellor nominating Dr. S. L, Verma, Retired Professor (Department of Political Science) of University of Rajasthan, as his nominee in the syndicate of Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur thereinafter referred as respondent University) w.e.f 28-6-96 for a period, three years in supersession of his earlier order dated 15-9-95 a communication whereof is filed and marked as Annexure I. .2. The genesis of challenge of the validity of the impugned order terminating petitioner stunure as nominated member of Syndicate of the respondent University before expiry of the period of three years is based on grounds inter-alia that power of the Chancellor to nominate a member of Syndicate under clause (iv) .of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of Jai Narain Vyas University Jodhpur Act, 1962 thereinafter referred as Act No. 17 of 1962) stands exhausted with nomination of the petitioner. 3. It is averred in the writ petition that under Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act the elected members and members nominated under clauses (iv), (vi) and (viii) of Sub-section (1) of the said section shall hold office for a period of three years and members nominated under clause (ii) and (iii) for a period of one year from the date of election or nomination as the case may be. It is alleged that order impugned has been passed against the principle of natural justice. It is perse arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner also pleaded to get the benefit of doctrine of legitimate expectation and principle of promissory estoppel. .4. After service of notice, a return has been filed on behalf of Chancellor denying the averments made in the writ petition in present form. It is stated that a Division Bench of this Court in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 530/96 (Dr. Irfan Mehar vs. State of Rajasthan). DB Civil Writ Petition No. 777/96 (Miss Shruti Goyal vs. State of Rajasthan), DB Civil Writ Petition No. 647/96 (Ramesh Joshi vs. State of Rajasthan), DB Civil Writ Petition No. 82 1/96 (Dr. Smt. Anina B. Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan) and DB Civil Writ Petition No. 866/96 (Dr. Irfan Mehar vs. State of Rajasthan). DB Civil Writ Petition No. 777/96 (Miss Shruti Goyal vs. State of Rajasthan), DB Civil Writ Petition No. 647/96 (Ramesh Joshi vs. State of Rajasthan), DB Civil Writ Petition No. 82 1/96 (Dr. Smt. Anina B. Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan) and DB Civil Writ Petition No. 866/96 (Dr. Anupma Gaur vs. State of Rajasthan) issued the following directions amongst others to the respondent University which reads thus:-- .“In the result, we issue the following directions: (1) the prevailing system of adhocism in appointments stand deprecated and we mandate upon the University to make regular appointments in respect of the sanctioned posts by August 31, 1996 positively. The selection process may be commenced within a fortnight hereof” 5. It is further stated in return filed by the Chancellor that in faithful compliance of the mandate issued by the Division Bench of this Court the respondent University commenced the process of selection for making regular appointments in respect of sanctioned post of teachers. The selection committees held selections in the month of June, 1996 in compliance of the above direction of the Division Bench of this Court and the Vice-Chancellor convened a meeting of Syndicate as envisaged under Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of Act No. 17 of 1962 on 25-6-96 for approval of the recommendations sent to him by various selection committees in sealed covers. The Vice-Chancel for of the respondent University apart from sending formal communications to all the members of the Syndicate including the petitioner requested him on telephone several times and obtained his confirmation on 24-6-96 for attending the said meeting of Syndicate. 6. It is further stated in reply that in spite of giving solemn affirmation on 24-6-96 to the Vice-Chancellor to attend the meeting of Syndicate on 25-6-96, the petitioner deliberately abstained from attending the said meeting and as such the meeting was frustrated due to lack of requisite quorum making the faithful compliance of the mandate of the Division Bench of this Court impossible for respondent University. The Chancellor after coming to know about deliberate abstention of the petitioner from attending the meeting of Syndicate passed the impugned order of supersession Annexure 2 to save the meeting of the Syndicate from being frustrated in future in order to ensure faithful compliance of order passed by Division Bench of this Court. 7. The Chancellor after coming to know about deliberate abstention of the petitioner from attending the meeting of Syndicate passed the impugned order of supersession Annexure 2 to save the meeting of the Syndicate from being frustrated in future in order to ensure faithful compliance of order passed by Division Bench of this Court. 7. It is also averred in the reply filed on behalf of Chancellor that power conferred upon him is unfettered and can be exercised from time to time as occasion requires in the interest of the University. 8. The respondent University has filed a separate preliminary reply to the writ petition taking a plea that power to withdraw any nomination made by the Chancellor under clause (iv) of Sub-section (l) of Section 16 of Act No. 17 of 1962 inheres in him to remove such nominated member of Syndicate by virtue of the provisions contained under Section 18 of Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred as Act No. 8 of 1955). 9. After service of copies of aforesaid two replies the petitioner has filed a circumlocutory rejoinder stating therein that the petitioner was constantly emphasizing the desirability of holding selections to fill in more 22 posts of Professors and 32 posts of Readers (not covered by the decision of Division Bench of this Court) and pointed out that if selections were not held for these posts, it would necessitate ad hoc/temporary appointments of lecturers against the higher posts in order to meet the demands of work load of respondent University. 10. It is also stated in the rejoinder that when his attempt to get information from Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor failed he thought it proper to avoid situation that might precipitate discord and confrontation between the Vice-Chancellor & Ors. members of the Syndicate especially as meeting of Syndicate was convened after the Vice-Chancellor was requested not to hold a meeting during this period. 11. In order to maintain brevity suffice it to say that the petitioner made new allegations about the hostile discrimination alleging in his rejoinder that before nomination of the petitioner by the Chancellor Mr. VS. S. Vyas and Mr. M. VS. Mathur were also nominated as members of Syndicate by him in the past but they did not attend the meetings of Syndicate yet they were not removed. 10.12. VS. S. Vyas and Mr. M. VS. Mathur were also nominated as members of Syndicate by him in the past but they did not attend the meetings of Syndicate yet they were not removed. 10.12. With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties the present writ petition is being disposed of at admission stage. 113. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival gravitative contentious legal points raised at the Bar and examined the materials available on record critically. 114. Before itemising the posers springing from the competing submissions so that contentions raised at the Bar may be concretised, I would like to observe at the outset that the petitioner was nominated by the Chancellor of respondent University as his nominee in the Syndicate of Jai Narain Vyas University w.e.f 15-9-95 for a period of three years purely on pious and altruistic mission with a solemn expectations by all that he would render his free services to the aforesaid University. The petitioner has not alleged that the order impugned superseding his nomination from the membership of Syndicate has been passed capriciously having a tinge of laissez faire. It is also not alleged that the order impugned is based on non-existent ground. A mere look at the impugned order throws a flood of light that it is an innocuous order and not stigmatic. With the aforesaid circumspection now I propose to deal with the arguments raised at the Bar. 115. It is contended at the first instance by Senior Counsel Shri M. Mridul on behalf of petitioner that Statute 26(1) of the respondent University framed under Act No. 17 of 1962 is a self-contained code for removal of members of Syndicate and as such Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 cannot be pressed into service. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Manik Chand Sutaiaa vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1993 (2) WLC (Raj) 49. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Manik Chand Sutaiaa vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1993 (2) WLC (Raj) 49. Opposing the aforesaid argument it is urged by Shri L. R. Mehta, learned Counsel for respondent University and Shri L. S. Udawat, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of Chancellor that the provisions of Statute 26(1) are applicable only to officer members of Syndicate and these provisions have no application with other two categories of numbers of Syndicate i.e. elected and nominated members. Learned Counsel for contesting respondents strenuously urged that power to appoint includes power to remove within the meaning of Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955. According to them the Chancellor possessed unfettered power to remove a nominated member of Syndicate under Section 18 of the said Act. It is to be noticed that the provisions of Statute 26( 1) of the respondent University framed by Senate in exercise of its power under Section 22 of the Act No. 17 of 1962 leads towards an irresistible conclusion that any member of the Senate, the Syndicate or the Academic Council may be removed by a resolution of the Senate, the Syndicate or the Academic Council as the case may be, passed by a majority of not less than two thirds of its members on either of the grounds enumerated under the said Statute. 116. Aconjoined reading of Sections 9 and 16 of the Act No. 17 of 1962 cast light that the body of Syndicate consists of officer members of Syndicate, nominated members of Syndicate and elected members of Syndicate. It is further evident that under. Statute 26(1) of the respondent University only officer numbers of Syndicate can be removed under said Statute on specified grounds enumerated (herein. According to the definition of the officers given under Section 9 of Act No. 17 of 1962 only Vice-Chancellor is an officer member of Syndicate under clause (i) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 and by necessary implication the Director of College Education Rajasthan can said to be the officer member of Syndicate under clause (v) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act. Rest of the members of the Syndicate under Section 16 of Act No. 17 of 1962 are either nominated members or elected members who do not fall within the ambit of Statute 26(1) of the respondent University. 117. Learned Counsel for the petitioner frankly admitted during the course of his argument that Statute 26(1) of the respondent University is not happily worded, therefore, after taking recourse of construction the other two categories of members of Syndicate i.e. nominated and elected members may also be treated to be within its scope. I am not able to pursuade myself to agree with the aforesaid submission of Shri Mridul for the reasons stated hereinbelow. 118. In my humble opinion whenever and wherever an expression is defined in an enactment of Legislature and the same expression in such enactment is subsequently used by it then the Courts of law are under legal obligation to assign same meaning to such expression as given by Legislature. To my mind what Legislature has not written in an enactment a Court of law may writ after taking recourse of construction while contrary to it is not true. In such cases if recourse of construction on the specious plea of ambiguity is adopted it would tantamount naked usurpation of Legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation which is impermissible. 119. An identical question came up for consideration before me in the case of Bheru Dan vs. Firm Sohanlal Shiv Narain in SB Civil First Petition No. 3 of 1978, decided on 21-4-94. Wherein in paragraph 29 it was held which reads thus:-- “Where Statutes or Rules are not ambiguous or capable of two interpretations, it is hardly necessary to have recourse to rule of construction. In such cases, what a Court has to do, is to see of those words and give effect to them regardless of the consequences that may ensue. If language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to proviso of Rule 175 of the said Rules may lead to some inconvenience to the subordinate Courts and Officer-in-charge of the Record Room in Rajasthan to know about the pendency of the Civil Appeal or Revision in the higher Courts, is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting the said Rules. The Rule making authorities in this case may be unconsciously are without sufficient fore-sight may have framed these Rules, but if so, it must be left to the Rule making authorities to correct its error.” 20. I see no reason in the present case to differ from the principle enunciated by me in the case of Bheru Dan (supra), therefore, it is hereby reiterated. 21. In the present case this Court is also called upon to determine the question about applicability of Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955. The question about applicability of General Clauses Act came up for consideration before Apex Court in case of Bool Chand vs. Kurukshetra University reported in AIR 1968 SC 292 : (1968 Lab IC 232) where it was Held that the power to appoint implies the power to determine the employment. Referring to Section 14 of Punjab General Clauses Act 1898 which is pari-materia to Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 the Supreme Court propounded the well settled rule of interpretation holding that the power of appointment includes the power to determine the employment. 22. In caseof Manik Chand Surana (supra) it was held that Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 will have no application if a person holds an office under the provision of a Statute which fixed certain modes and methods for appointment, dismissal or removal. It was found by the learned single Judge in case of Manik Chand Surana (supra) that Chairman appointed under Rajasthan Khadi and Village Industries Act, 1955 became a non-official member of Board, therefore, provisions contained under Sections 7,11,12,13 and 17 of the said Act which relate to tenure and condition of service of non-official members equally apply to him. Thus the facts of the case of Manik Chand Surana (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the-present case as there were provisions regulating removal of Chairman under Rajasthan Khadi and Village Industries Act, 1955 under which he was appointed whereas in the case on hand there are no provisions either under Act No. 17 of 1962 under which the petitioner was nominated as member of Syndicate or under Statute 26(1) framed thereunder regulating his removal. 23. 23. From the facts stated above I have no hesitation to hold that Statute 26(1) of the respondent University is not a self-contained code regulating the procedure for removal of either nominated or elected members of Syndicate, therefore; general provisions envisaged under Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 can be made applicable for removal of the petitioner from membership of Syndicate. In fact power of removal is a necessary concomitant of power to appoint within the meaning of Section 18 of the aforesaid Act provided, such removal order is passed reasonably and not arbitrarily. 24. It is next contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri M. Mridul that pleasure doctrine is not importable under Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 while with equal vehemence it is urged on behalf of respondent University by Shri L. R. Mehta and learned Additional Advocate,General Shri L. S. Udawat appearing on behalf of the Chancellor that doctrine of pleasure is applicable to the aforesaid section and Chancellor possessed unfettered power to remove a nominated member of Syndicate at will and such removal order is not justiciable. In support of his argument, learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance on an unreported decision rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 229 of 1993 between Suresh Bhardwaj vs. H. P. University decided on 30-11-93 by Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court. 25. Beforedwelling upon aforesaid rival contentions advanced before me by the learned, Counsel for the parties, I consider it proper to discuss some of the land mark Judgment s of the Supreme Court dealing with pleasure doctrine. Way back in 1961 the Apex Court in the case of State of U. P. vs. Babu Ram Upadhyay reported in MR 1961 SC 751 : (1961 (l)Cri U 773) held that power of Governor to dismiss at pleasure subject to the provisions of Article 311 is not an executive power under Article 154 but a constitutional power and is not capable of being delegated to officers subordinate to him. In the case of Babu Ram Upadhyay (supra) the majority view laid down seven propositions at page No. 761. In the case of Babu Ram Upadhyay (supra) the majority view laid down seven propositions at page No. 761. All those seven propositions were reviewed by the majority opinion of the Apex Court in the case of Moti Ram Deka vs. General Manager, N.E.F. Railway, Malegaon reported in AIR 1964 SC 600 and the Apex Court restated that the proposition No. 2 must be read along with subsequent propositions specified as propositions No. 3,4, 5 and 6. According to review in case of Moti Ram Deka (supra) the pleasure of the President or the Governor to dismiss can, therefore, not only be delegated but is also made subject to Article 311. Thus the majority view in Babu Ram Upadhyay’s case (supra) is no longer good law after the decision in Moti Ram Deka’s case (supra). 26. Theaforesaid question of pleasure doctrine again came up for consideration before Hon’ble seven the then Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 : (1974 Lab IC 1380) and in this case the Apex Court reiterated the majority view taken in the case of Moti Ram Deka (supra). 27. The pleasure doctrine again came up for consideration before a constitutional bench of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 (1985 Lab IC 1393) by that time Article 311(2) was drastically amended by, 42nd Amendment Act, 1.976. After taking into account all the previous decisions on the question of pleasure doctrine the majority view (the then Hon’ble Thakkar, J. contra) ruled that doctrine of pleasure need not be exercised by the President or the Governor personally it can be delegated to other authorities under the Rules of Business of the Government. It is also held that the pleasure doctrine is exception to Article 311(1) and (2) but not Article 309 hence Rules framed under Article 309 or Act referable to it cannot imping upon pleasure of President or Governor. 28. In caseof Dr. It is also held that the pleasure doctrine is exception to Article 311(1) and (2) but not Article 309 hence Rules framed under Article 309 or Act referable to it cannot imping upon pleasure of President or Governor. 28. In caseof Dr. D. C. Saxena vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 1463 : (1987 Lab IC 1018) a question based on pleasure doctrine came up for consideration before Supreme Court where State Legislature has expressly provided under Section 4-A of Haryana Board of School Education Act that the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members to hold office during pleasure of State Government. 29. Similarly in case of Om Narain Agrawal vs. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur reported in 1993 (2) SCC 242 : ( AIR 1993 SC 1440 ) the Supreme Court while dealing with the removal of two women members before expiry of the period of their tenure by appointing new two women members on their places under pleasure theory held that nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. In case of an elected member, the Legislature has provided the grounds under Section 40 of U. P. Municipalities Act under which the elected members could be removed. But so fan as the nominated members are concerned, Legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the government. It is apparent from perusal of amended 4th proviso to Section 9 of U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 that doctrine of pleasure was expressly provided by State Legislature irrespective of Section 16 of U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 which is parimateriato Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955. 30. From aforesaid discussion it is easily deducible that although founding fathers of the Constitution were cognizant of the fact that provisions of Section 15 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which are pan materia to Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 are applicable under Article 367(1) of the Constitution yet specific provisions for applicability of pleasure doctrine are made in the Constitution. Similarly although U. P. Legislature was cognizant of the fact that there are provisions under Section 16 of the General Clauses Act which are pan materia with Section 18 of Act No. 8 of 1955 yet in U. P. Municipalities Act 4th proviso was added to Section 9 expressly conferring power of removal of nominated members at the pleasure of State Government. Like manner under Section 4-A of Haryana Board of School Education Act it is expressly provided that Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members to hold office during the pleasure of State Government. I have examined the provisions of Sections 15 and 20 of Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act, which are pan materia to Sections 18 and 23 respectively of Act No. 8 of 1955. 4.31. In my considered opinion the pleasure doctrine cannot be imported to Sections 18 and 23 of Act No. 8 of 1955 unless State Legislature makes specific provision to this effect. In case of Suresh Bhardwaj (supra) even in absence of any specific provision made by State Legislature doctrine of pleasure has been extended to Sections 15 and 20 of Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act. I have the misfortune to be unable to agree with the erudite opinion of learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court in case of Swesh Bhardwaj (supra). In my humble opinion the ratio of decision rendered by apex Court in the case of Dr. D. C. Saxena (supra) and Om Narain Agrawal (supra) based on pleasure doctrine are not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in those two cases after change of State Governments in furtherance of its policy decisions the Chairman, Vice-Ghairman and members of Haryana Board Education as well as two women nominated members of Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur were removed on political considerations whereas in the present case neither the petitioner was nominated on political consideration nor he is being removed by the Chancellor on any political reasons to carry forward policy decision. The petitioner was nominated under clause (iv) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of Act No. 17 of 1962 as an educationist and he is being removed by impugned order to make body of Syndicate functional in the interest of public in general and respondent University in particular and also to ensure faithful compliance of decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court. 5.32. 5.32. For deeper understanding of the controversy involved, I would like to recapitulate the distinctive features of pleasure doctrine and theory based on subjective satisfaction in following paragraphs. 6.33. Theexpression discretionary power in administrative law is in process of evolution. At one hand constitutional functionaries, statutory functionaries & Ors. executive officers are asserting unfettered discretion in the garb of either pleasure doctrine or under theory based on subjective satisfaction while on the other hand the Courts of law are making constant efforts to curb and control such unfettered discretion by evolving principles of fairness akin to principles of natural justice to ensure that such wide discretions may not be abused but properly exercised. 34. In fact discretionary power can be divided into two main categories i.e. based on objective satisfaction and based on subjective satisfaction. The question of objective satisfaction is not involved in the present case, therefore, it is left open to be considered in an appropirate case. I would like to confine the discussion only with respect to doctrine of pleasure and theory based on subjective satisfaction. 1.35. In my opinion ‘pleasure doctrine’ is genus while theory based on subjective satisfaction is its specy. Thus it is obvious that theory of subjective satisfaction is a taxonomic group of lower rank of pleasure doctrine and as such former is not comparable with the later although element of subjective satisfaction remains intact in both the form of discretionary power. It is true that genus includes specy but specy does not include genus. 2.36. Now a days in democratic set up pleasure doctrine is not based on prerogative of crown representing a relic of feudalera but it is based on public policy having nexus with policy decision with a tinge of political considerations whereas theory of subjective satisfaction is ordinarily made applicable in individual cases bereft of policy decision and also far away from political considerations. 3.37. Pleasure doctrine is invariably exercisable either by constitutional functionaries or its dclegatees under the Rules of Business of a Government and it always finds its origin in constitutional provisions or specific statutory provisions with expression ‘pleasure’ whereas theory based on subjective satisfaction is exercisable by any executive authority under an enactment, under statutory Rules or even without framing of Rules or an enactment. In case of doctrine of pleasure only some of the decisions taken by constitutional functionaries such as declaration of war and peace or entering into treaty with foreign countries or in the interest of the security of the State etc. are not justiciable whereas in case of decisions taken on the basis of theory based on subjective satisfaction either after making the law or without making the law are invariably subject to judicial review. At the time of judicial review the presumption to act fairly in case of pleasure doctrine is higher than in a case where decision has been taken by an executive in exercise of his subjective satisfaction. 4.38. Thus, the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents to the effect that the order impugned has been passed on pleasure doctrine and as such the petitioner’s nomination as member of Syndicate can be superseded at will of the Chancellor and it is not justiciable, has been raised merely to be rejected hence it is hereby rejected. It is well to remember that judicial review has been declared as basic feature of the Constitution by the Apex Court with an avowed object to ensure that High Courts and Supreme Court are to act as bulwark for the protection of rights of citizens and it would check on the vagaries, negligence and mistakes of the executive or highhandedness of the party before it against another on the anvil of rationality and reasonableness and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable. It is held that although pleasure doctrine is not importable under Sections 18 and 23 of Act No. 8 of 1955 but impunged order superseding the petitioner from the membership of Syndicate will be treated to have been passed on subjective satisfaction of the Chancellor. 5.39. It is next contended by Shri M. Mridul on behalf of the petitioner that in the past the Chancellor of the respondent University has nominated Shri M. VS. Mathur as well as Shri VS. S. Vyas as members of Syndicate and both of them had not attended any meeting of the Syndicate but they were not superseded while the petitioner has been singled-out by superseding his nomination from the membership of Syndicate for single absence. Mathur as well as Shri VS. S. Vyas as members of Syndicate and both of them had not attended any meeting of the Syndicate but they were not superseded while the petitioner has been singled-out by superseding his nomination from the membership of Syndicate for single absence. Suffice it to say that for attracting the mandatory provisions enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution the fact of hostile discrimination must exist in presenti not in the past. More over in the present case no proper foundation has been led alleging that Shri N. VS. Mathur and Shri VS. S. Vyas were similarly circumstance with the petitioner. No where it is alleged that aforesaid two members nominated in the past as members of Syndicate had deliberately avoided to attend the meeting of Syndicate in order to frustrate implementation of any decision taken by a Court of law. No where it is alleged that the aforesaid both members of Syndicate, nominated by the Chancellor under clause (i v) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of Act No. 17 of 1962, after giving solemn undertaking to attend the meeting of Syndicate to the Vice-Chancellor, deliberately abstained from attending such meeting. 6.40. The next limb of argument of Shri Mridul about violation of Article 14 of the Constitution is that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive and administrative action because any action arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of an equality. In such matters one need not to confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons similarly circumstanced to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. According to Shri Mridual an action per se arbitirary itself amounts denial of equal protection of the laws. In support of his aforesaid submission the learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision rendered by apex Court in the case of A. L. Kaira vs. The Project and Equipment Corporation India Ltd. reported in AIR 1984 SC 1361 : (1984 Lab IC 961). 7.41. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner but such nature of discriminatory treatment has to be tested on the anvil of action being per se arbitrary. The learned Additional Advocate General Shri L. S. Udawat has produced the original file containing the information and material available on record on basis of which impugned orde