B. K. SHARMA, J. Madan Chauhan petitioner has filed this writ petition for issue of a writ of habeas corpus to quash the order of his detention dated 16-11 -1995 passed by the District Magistrate, District Mau, Respondent No. 2 under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980. The detention order is Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition. The detention order has been challenged before us on the sole ground that in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority did not inform the petitioner that he had a right to make representation on the ground of detention to the Central Government and thus he was denied the constitutional right to make the representation to the Government of India. The plea has been taken in para-19 of the Writ Petition. In reply to this para, it has been stated in the Counter Affidavit of Sri Om Prakash, District Magistrate, Mau in para-17 that the petitioner had a right to make representation before the appropriate Government regarding which he was informed and as such, there is strict compliance of the Act as well as Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 2. The learned A. G. A. has supported the plea of the District Magistrate by pointing out that Section 8 (1) of the National Security Act obliges the detaining authority to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made and to afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. He has also pointed out to the definition of appropriate Government as has been given in Section 2 (a) of the National Security Act. In that definition, the appropriate Government means as respects the detention order made by an officer subordinate to the State Government. His contention, therefore, is that this requirement has been met by the District Magistrate in the grounds of detention in respect of the detenu and as such, there is neither violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India or Section 8 (1) of the National Security Act. His contention, therefore, is that this requirement has been met by the District Magistrate in the grounds of detention in respect of the detenu and as such, there is neither violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India or Section 8 (1) of the National Security Act. Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India provides as below: "when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earlier opportunity of making a representation against the order. " The Article does not specify by designation the authority to whom representation is to be made. 3. Before we proceed further a reference may be made to Section 14 of the National Security Act. The section provides that detention order made at any time be revoked or modified : (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or by the Central Government. ; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the Central Government. 4. The contention of the learned A. G. A. is that even while Section 14 of the National Security Act vests the Central Government with the power to revoke the detention order made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act, there is no constitutional obligation of the detaining authority to inform the detenu that he has a right to make a representation to the Central Government. He has placed reliance on the authority AIR 1984, SC 1095 State of U. P. v. Javad Zama Khan, which was an authority rendered by three judges of the Apex Court. In this authority it was said: "at one time it was thought that Section 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 which was in pari materia with Section 14 of the Act did not confer any right or privilege on the detenu but there is a definite shift in the judicial attitude, for which there appears to be no discernible basis. Then after refering to various authorities, the Apex Court held that: "the principle that emerges from all these decisions is that the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under Sec. 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under sub-section (5) of Section 3 or from the detenu in the form of a petition for representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whether or not it should revoke the order of detention in a particular case. In the present case, the detenu was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Article 22 (5) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Government under Art. 22 (5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Central Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith. " 5. In that case the principal question was whether it was obligatory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under Section 14 of the National Security Act and this point was replied in the negative. 6. The learned A. G. A. has relied on the authority Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1994 SCC (Crl) 482, rendered by two judges of the Apex Court, In para-17 it was observed by the Apex Court : "it may be noted that Article 22 (5) casts an obligation on the detaining authority to communicate to the detenu the grounds and to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making the representation. The article does not say to whom such representation is to be made but the right to make a representation against the detention order undoubtedly flows from the constitutional guarantee enshrined therein. The next question as to whom such representation should be made, depends on the authority who has power to approve, rescind or revoke the decision. To know who has such power, we have to necessarily look to the provisions of the Act. " 7. The next question as to whom such representation should be made, depends on the authority who has power to approve, rescind or revoke the decision. To know who has such power, we have to necessarily look to the provisions of the Act. " 7. The learned A. G. A. relies on the following sentences in the same para : "therefore, the representation to be made by detenu after the earliest opportunity was afforded to him, can be only to the Government which has the power to approve or to revoke. That being the reason the question of detenu being informed specifically in the grounds that he had also a right to make a representation to the detaining authority itself besides the State Government does not arise. " 8. If has been argued by the learned A. G. A. that last sentences indicated that the right to make representation was limited to the State Government. A reference has also been made to para 19 of the same authority where it was said that of the appropriate government has considered the representation of the detenu, it cannot be said that there is contravention of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. However, in para-20 it was said that in the context of Article 22 (5), the scheme of the particular Act has to be examined to find out the authority to whom representation can be made. Reliance was also placed by the learned A. G. A. on the authority Amin Mohammad Qureshi v. Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, 1994 SCC (Crl.) 498. This authority related to the question whether the detenu was to be told by the detaining authority that he has a right to make a representation to it (the detaining authority) also. This judgment was rendered by two judges Bench of the Apex Court. 9. There was a subsequent authority of the Apex Court B. Alamelu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 SC 539 a decision rendered by the three judges Bench of the Apex Court. This judgment was rendered by two judges Bench of the Apex Court. 9. There was a subsequent authority of the Apex Court B. Alamelu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1995 SC 539 a decision rendered by the three judges Bench of the Apex Court. In this authority, the detenu was told in the grounds of detention that he had a right to make representation to the State Government and also to the Government of India against the order of detention and the representation made by him was forwarded to the Central Government by the jail authorities after a delay of about 48 days and the Apex court held that the constitutional right of the detenu under Article 22 (5) has got violated on account of non- sending of the copy of his representation by the jailor to the Central Government expeditiously. This implied that the right to make representation to the Central Government followed from Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. 10. There is an authority of the Apex Court rendered by a constitution Bench of five judges Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and others, JT 1995 (3) SC 639. In this authority, it was held that the provisions of Article 2,2 (5) of the Constitution has the same force and sanctity as in other provisions relating to fundamental rights. The Apex Court has stated in para-6 of this judgment : "article 22 (5) imposes a dual obligation on the authority making the order of preventive detention : (1) to communicate to the person detained as soon as may be the grounds on which the order of detention has been made ; and (ii) to afford the person detained the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. Article 22 (5) thus proceeds on the basis that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention and the aforementioned and objections are imposed on the authority making the order of detention with a view to ensure that right of the person detained to make a representation is a real right and he is able to take steps for redress of a wrong which he is able to take steps for redress of a wrong which he thinks has been committed Article 22 (5) does not, however, indicate the authority to whom the representation is to be made. Since the object and purpose of the representation that is to be made by the person detained is to enable him to obtain relied at the earliest opportunity, the said representation has to be made to the authority which can grant such relief, i. e. the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him at liberty. . . . . . . . " It can, therefore, be said that Articles 22 (5) postulates that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention to the authority making the order. In addition, such a representation can be made to any other authority who is empowered by law to revoke the order of detention. " "article 22 (5) must, therefore, be construed to mean that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention which can be made not only to the Advisory Board but also to the detaining authority, i. e. the authority that has made the order of detention or the order for continuance of such detention, who is competent to give immediate relief by revoking the said order as well as to any other authority which is competent under a law to revoke the order for detention and thereby give relief to the person detained. The right to make a representation carries within it is corresponding obligation on the authority making the order of detention to inform the person detained of his right to make a representation against the order of detention to the authorities who are required to consider such a representation. " 11. We have already placed on record the provisions of Section 14 of the National Security Act, 1980 under which the Central Government also has got the power to revoke or modify a detention order passed by the District Magistrate. 12. There is then the latest authority of the Apex Court Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh v. District Magistrate Ahmedabad & others, JT 1996 (2) SC 532. In this authority after referring to the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, Section 8 (1) of the National Security Act which provides for affording opportunity to the detenu of making a representation to the appropriate Govt. and the definition of appropriate Government" in Section 2 (a) of the National Security Act, his Lordships observed as follows : "13. and the definition of appropriate Government" in Section 2 (a) of the National Security Act, his Lordships observed as follows : "13. Apart from the above, Section 14 of the Act provides that order of detention may be revoked either by the State Government or by the Central Government. The Central Government can revoke even those orders which have been made by the State Government. The Act also provides that within seven days of the making also the grounds on which the order was passed shall be sent to the Central Government. "14. From the above, it will be seen that the right to make representation against the order of detention is not only a constitutional right but a statutory right as well. Since the Constitution as also the Act specifically provide that the detenu shall be given the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, it is implicit that there is a corresponding duty on the authorities to whom the representation at the earliest or else the constitutional and the statutory obligation to provide the earliest opportunity of making a representation would lose both its purpose and meaning. "15. We may, at this stage, notice a frivolous contention, raised on behalf of the respondents that since the authorities to whom the representation can be made have not been specified in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, the right of the detenu of making a representation to the appropriate government cannot be treated to be a constitutional right. Respondents, for this purpose, have placed reliance upon the decision of this court in. John Martin v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 775 . "16. It will be seen that right to represent has been given not only by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution but also by Section 8 of the Act. The right provided under the Act, has, therefore, to be treated as an extension of the Constitutional right already available to a detenu under Article 22 (5 ). The legislature has, in fact, given effect to the constitutional right by providing in Section 8 of the Act that the detenu shall have the right of making a representation to the appropriate Government. The legislature has, in fact, given effect to the constitutional right by providing in Section 8 of the Act that the detenu shall have the right of making a representation to the appropriate Government. In Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana & others (1991) 4 SCC 39 , this Court while considering the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 observed as under: "this clause casts a dual obligation on the Detaining Authority, namely (i) to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the detention order has been made, and (ii) to afford to the detenu the earlier opportunity of making a representation against the detention order. Consequently the failure to communicate the grounds promptly or to afford the detenu an opportunity of making a representation against the order would clearly violate the constitutional guarantee afforded to the detenu by clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. It is by virtue of this right conferred on the detenu that the Detaining Authority considers it a duty to inform appellant-detenu of his right to make a representation to the State Government, the Central Government and the Advisory Board. The right to make a representation against the detention order thus flows from the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 22 (5) which casts an obligation on the authority to ensure that the detenu is afforded an earliest opportunity to exercise that right, if he so desires. " This decision was considered in Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, JT 1994 (1) SC 350. (1994) 2 SCC 337 and it was laid down as under : "the right to make representation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . power to approve or to revoke. " (gist already produced above in this judgment) "these decisions are enough to reject the contention of the respondents. " 13. The above three latest authorities of the Apex Court conclude the matter. I would only make a passing reference to the three Division Bench authorities of this Court on the same point which supports the claim from the side of the petitioner : (i) Azim Uddin v. State of UP and others, Writ Petition No. 31604 of 1995, decided on 6. 5. I would only make a passing reference to the three Division Bench authorities of this Court on the same point which supports the claim from the side of the petitioner : (i) Azim Uddin v. State of UP and others, Writ Petition No. 31604 of 1995, decided on 6. 5. 1996 by Hon. N. L. Ganguly, J. and Hon. R. N. Ray, J. (ii) Keshav Babu Shivhare v. Superintendent of District Jail, Hamirpur and others, 1996 All JIC 223. (iii) Ram Nareshv. District Jail Banda, 1995 All JIC 728. 14. The Writ Petition, therefore, succeeds. The detention order dated 16-11-1996 passed by the District Magistrate, Mau Respondent No. 2 (Annexure-1 to the Writ Petition) is hereby quashed. The detenu Madan Chauhan be released forthwith unless required in connection with some case. N. L. Ganguly, J.- I agree. Petition allowed. .