ORDER : 1. W.P. No. 5069 of 1997 is for mandamus to direct the respondents 1 and 2 to enforce the mandatory provisions of the Trade Unions Act with reference to the constitution of the third respondent and to see that the Rules and Bye-laws of the third respondent conform to the Model Constitution as provided for by the Rules framed by the second respondent and to direct the respondents 1 and 2 to take action against the office bearers of the third respondent as per the Trade Unions Act. 2. W.P. No. 12043 of 1989 is also by the same person for quashing the order of the first respondent in his B-3/11122/88 dated June 20, 1989. 3. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner are as follows : The petitioner is a member of the third respondent-union. The 3rd respondent is registered, from 1961. Chapter 36 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual and the rules 3610 to 3618 therein specify the circumstances for recognition of a Union by the Railways. Third respondent-union was recognised by the second respondent in 1966. The Rules and Bye-laws of the Union were in conformity with the s Model Bye-laws and the conditions for recognition. Subsequently, there were several amendments. These amendments were not approved by the second respondent. The Rules and Byelaws of any union should provide for essential matters. If the Byelaws of the union are inconsistent with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, the registration of the Trade Union is liable to be cancelled. The amendments or alterations in the rules of the recognised trade union should be sent to the Registrar within 15 days, in default fine can he imposed. Ten amendments were made to Rules 10(a), 10(d), 12(v), 13(i), 13(viii), 16(2)(i), 17(i), 17(3), 18(c)(x), and 21(1). The amendments were contrary to the registered Bye-laws and in contravention of the Trade Unions Act. There have been several litigations from 1982 onwards. There were representations to the third respondent. The first respondent was also addressed on July 12, 1982 bringing to its notice several infirmities. On August 6, 1982 and October 1, 1981. Also the first respondent was also addressed with reference to the change in the constitution. The first respondent has given reply on December 13, 1982. The third respondent should not be allowed to continue in its illegal activities even a minute longer. On August 6, 1982 and October 1, 1981. Also the first respondent was also addressed with reference to the change in the constitution. The first respondent has given reply on December 13, 1982. The third respondent should not be allowed to continue in its illegal activities even a minute longer. Hence, respondents 1 and 2 must be directed to take action against the office bearers of the third respondent. 4. In W.P. No. 12043 of 1989 also the petitioner reiterated the allegation contained in the affidavit filed in support of the first W.P. No. 5069 of 1987. The petitioner has also stated that the third respondent had been plundering and committing atrocities in relation to the working of the Union and the several atrocities committed by the present management in the year 1980. The third respondent is affiliated to All India Trade Union Viz., All India Railway men's Federation concisely referred to hereinafter as "A.I.R.F." On account of the conduct of the President and other office bearers the union was split. Several memoirs left the third respondent union in 1982 and became members of another union. On or about December 27, 1982 1 the third respondent disaffiliated from A.I.R.F. Thiru M. Namasivayam was leading the union. The General Secretary indulged in political manoeuvres. As Thiru M. Namasivayam, could not succeed to get affiliation with I.N.T.U.C. he attempted to get recognition by A.I.R.F. The election for the office bears were not conducted properly. The election was conducted by Commissioner, appointed by, the High Court. Since fraud was committed, some members filed C.S. No. 160 of 1986 on the file of this Court for declaration that the election was null and void. The said suit is pending. Since there were several contraventions of the Trade Unions Act, by the third respondent W.P. No. 5069 of 1987 was filed before this Court. After certain communications, the first respondent by order dated May 23, 1989 cancelled the registration of the third respondent union. The third respondent filed C.S. No. 415 of 1989 before this court to set aside the cancellation order. During the course of the arguments in the application in the said suit, it was represented that the Registrar reconsidered his order of cancellation. The first respondent has no jurisdiction to revoke his order. However, he has passed an order on June 20, 1989 revoking the cancellation order. During the course of the arguments in the application in the said suit, it was represented that the Registrar reconsidered his order of cancellation. The first respondent has no jurisdiction to revoke his order. However, he has passed an order on June 20, 1989 revoking the cancellation order. Hence, it is prayed for quashing the said order. 5. The third respondent has filed a detailed counter in W.P. No. 5069 of 1987. In the counter-affidavit the third respondent sets out at the outset that the writ petition is not maintainable, because the petitioner is not a member of the is third respondent-union. The alleged violation of the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and the violation of the rules framed by the second respondent are not true. The amendments were passed by the resolution of the General Body. Immediately after the amendments were made, respondents 1 and 2 were informed. At no time, respondents 1 and 2 informed about the violations of the rules and the byelaws with reference to the amendments, the petitioner ceased to be a is member of this union from 1987. He has joined another union known as S.R.E.U. Hence, the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. There is no Bye-law or Rule, in the Railway Establishment Code requiring any prior approval from respondents 1 and 2 for amendments. The amendments made to the Rules had been acted upon by the Railway Administration, which would show that they have agreed to the amendments. The amendments are not inconsistent with the Trade Unions Act. The Railway Establishment Code relating to the rules of recognition provides for amendment of rules. The amendments of the Bye-laws had been published in a printed book and it was communicated to the first respondent within the time as per Section 28 of the Trade Unions Act. It is denied that the activities of the union are prejudicial to the provisions of the Trade Unions Act and against the interests of the members. The amounts collected from the members are duly accounted for. The audited statements have been sent to the respondents 1 and 2. Therefore, there is no substance in W.P. No. 5069 of 1987. 6. Second respondent also filed counter-affidavit in writ petition No. 5069 of 1987. The amounts collected from the members are duly accounted for. The audited statements have been sent to the respondents 1 and 2. Therefore, there is no substance in W.P. No. 5069 of 1987. 6. Second respondent also filed counter-affidavit in writ petition No. 5069 of 1987. Second respondent states that he is not a necessary arty and the writ petition is not maintainable as against the second respondent. The Railway Administration does not recommend any union for registration. The recognition for S.R.M.U. was given from September 21, 1966 with some conditions. The first one was that amendment to the Constitution should not Contravene the Model Constitution. Permission of the administrative member should be obtained for opening branch union. The register of members should be open for inspection at any time. The Southern Railway Maidoor Union approached the Administration for amendments of the Rules 1973. The administration gave its approval for is amendments in 1973, there was no further proposal submitted to the administration for the amendments. Especially subsequent to 1975, the facilities for the recognition are FNM/PNM facilities, office accommodation, telephone facilities, SCL and passes for organisational meetings. These facilities are extended to Southern Railway Mazdoor Union as it is a recognised union. The administration is not concerned with other allegations in the affidavit. 7. The main contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are as follows : (1) The petitioner is entitled to question the activities of the third respondent. (2) There are serious irregularities in the administration of the Union. (3) The amendments are not in accordance with the model constitution. (4) Once the registration is withdrawn, the second respondent has no power to reconsider the order passed or revoke the registration. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner has no locus standi to file these writ petitions and on that ground alone the writ petitions have to be dismissed. Secondly, there were no irregularities committed by the third respondent. Thirdly, the amendments were properly made and intimation was given to the respondents 2 and 3 then and there. Finally, he contended that the first respondent, who cancelled the registration can revoke the same. 9. Before going into the other questions let us so take up the question with reference to the maintainability of the writ petitions by the petitioner. Thirdly, the amendments were properly made and intimation was given to the respondents 2 and 3 then and there. Finally, he contended that the first respondent, who cancelled the registration can revoke the same. 9. Before going into the other questions let us so take up the question with reference to the maintainability of the writ petitions by the petitioner. The petitioner has stated in the affidavit filed in support of the W.P. No. 5069 of 1987 as follows : "I am an employee of the Southern Railway and I am a member of the 3rd respondent Union, since 1965." This statement has been denied in the counter of the third respondent and the denial has not been controverted by filing a reply. Therefore, the Court has to assume that the petitioner ceased to be a member of the third respondent-union. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even though he is not a member of the union as an employee of the Railway he has got interest in the welfare of the other workers and as so such he is entitled to maintain the writ petitions. Further as per Section 32 of the Trade Unions Act, 1936 a member is entitled to bring to the notice the offences committed by the Trade Union. Learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decission in S.P. Gupta Vs. President of India and Others, AIR 1982 SC 149 . In paragraph 23 of the said judgment, the locus standi is dismissed. The learned Judges considered the question of locus standi. In paragraph Bhagwati, J. concurred with the other single Judge and has summed the substance of locus standi as follows : "We would like to emphasise and it is that cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the act or omission of the State or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific legal injury to an individual or to a specific class or group to of individuals. In such cases, a member of the public hang sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person or specific class or group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission, do not wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protest, the member of the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action, at the instance of such member of the public would be to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured, which they do not want." In the said judgment known as the Judges case, the lawyers practising in the Bombay High Court wanted to interfere as the case related to transfer of Judges, before the Supreme Court. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that the lawyers of the Bombay High Court play a vital role. They are part of the judiciary and therefore they have an interest in the Judges' case. 11. The interest which the petitioner is having in the union case is nil; because he ceased to be a member. Consequently, as an employee of the Railway his complaint can only be of a secondary nature, while the members of the Union are the primarily injured persons. Assuming for the sake of consideration, there are irregularities in the administration of the Union when primary members are not making any complaint if the petitioner is permitted to make a complaint, it will be in effect entertaining the action at the instance of such a member if the public or group of persons, to foist a relief on the person or specific class or group of persons primarily injured which they do not want. 12. In paragraph 23 there is a warning in the following terms : "But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the Court in cases of this kind is acting bonafide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique considerations." 13. After the petitioner ceased to be a member I am not in a position to find as to how he is injured or prejudiced by the improper administration of the Union. After the petitioner ceased to be a member I am not in a position to find as to how he is injured or prejudiced by the improper administration of the Union. Therefore, after joining the rival union his attempt is only to get the third respondent-Union derecognised or cancel the registration with the second respondent which act cannot be said to be a bonafide act. Therefore, in my view the petitioner is not entitled to maintain the writ petitions. However, as arguments were advanced at length on the other points also, I feel it is necessary to consider them as well. 14. With reference to the irregularities in the administration. Learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the amendments made upto 1965-80 have not been approved. He also contended that the amendments are in violation of the provisions contained in the model constitution. Rules 3610 to 3618 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, Part B states the power of the General Secretary. The powers of the General Secretary as per rule 18 (c) originally was only to exercise general supervision and is control maintaining the registers, submitting statements etc. But in 1973 by an amendment he was given the power of the working committee, to suspend any office bearers of the Union viz., President, Working President and Vice President. In 1975-76 he was given further powers of the working committee with reference to closure of taking over or reorganizing or superseding or altering the jurisdiction of any branch when he deems such action is necessary. In 1989 he was given all the powers of the working committee when the working committee was not in session. After bringing to the notice of the aforesaid features, learned Counsel cited the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, which contain the conditions for the registration. Learned counsel contended that the amendment conferring unlimited powers upon the General Secretary is contrary to sub-section (j) of the Trade Unions Act. Therefore, there is a contravention of Section 6. Section 10 of the Trade Unions Act, empowers the second respondent to cancel the registration after serving a show-cause Notice dated February 10, 1989 was issued to the General Secretary of S.R.M.U. Madras. The second respondent passed an order on May 23, 1989 cancelling the registration. Therefore, there is a contravention of Section 6. Section 10 of the Trade Unions Act, empowers the second respondent to cancel the registration after serving a show-cause Notice dated February 10, 1989 was issued to the General Secretary of S.R.M.U. Madras. The second respondent passed an order on May 23, 1989 cancelling the registration. The cancellation was based on the memorandum from the Commissioner of Labour, Madras stating that the third respondent violated the provisions of Trade Unions Act, 1926 by making several amendments in the registered bye-laws and adopting the same. Thereafter the first respondent issued the show-cause notice and as there was no reply within 60 days, the first respondent cancelled the registration u/s 10(6) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. 15. Learned counsel contends that after having cancelled the registration, the second respondent has no power to reyoke the same. After an order is passed, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to prefer an appeal u/s 11 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The third respondent has filed Civil suit and the same is pending. While the said suit is pending, the second respondent has revoked the order of cancellation. Learned counsel contended that he has 10 no power to do so. After passing the order of cancellation he becomes functus officio. 16. Learned Counsel cited the following authorities in support of his contentions : (1) 1986 II LLJ 29O (Bom); and (2) 1987 II LLN 662. In Mukand Iron and Steel Works Ltd. Vs. V.G. Deshpande Registrar of Trade Unions Bombay and another, (1986) 2 LLJ 290 , the Registrar of Trade Union cancelled the registration on the ground that returns were not submitted. After passing the order, the returns were submitted subsequently. Thereafter the Registrar of Trade Unions withdrew the cancellation of the same. Relying upon the subsequent submission of returns, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court has held that the subsequent events cannot be taken note of by the Registrar and hence he has no power to review or withdraw the order, because of subsequent events. In the said case, review was based on the subsequent events not on account of any illegality or irregularity or on some facts which were not brought to the notice of the Registrar earlier. In the said case, review was based on the subsequent events not on account of any illegality or irregularity or on some facts which were not brought to the notice of the Registrar earlier. In this case, the order dated June 20, 1989 has taken into account, the fact that the earlier order was exparte. Secondly, that the amendments made were upto 1981 got duly approved by the Additional Registrar of Trade Unions. Further the amendments were submitted to the Additional Registrar in time for approval, but Additional Registrar has not approved them for reason of pendency of dispute, between the two unions, which was settled in the year 1986. The decision rendered in Mukand Iron & Steel v. Deshpande (Supra) is not the case of an exparte order. 17. The second respondent relied upon a decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 wherein the learned Judges of the Supreme Court held as follows : at P. 331 "There is no finality attached to an exparte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the exparte award and pass suitable orders." The learned Judges repelled the contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and therefore had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex-parte award and that the Central Government alone could set aside the award. Following the said decision, the second respondent has passed the subsequent order dated September 26, 1989. 18. Another decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in Rashtriya Mukund Employees Union v. Mukundlron & Steel Works Ltd. & Another (supra). This case is also a similar one to the cases relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and mentioned above. In this case also the registration was cancelled for contravention of provisions of Section 28 of the Trade Unions Act for failing to send an annual return. After the returns were sent subsequently, the registrar revoked his order of cancelling the registration. The said case was only on the fact that there was subsequent compliance. Therefore, a Bench of the Bombay, High Court found that it was clearly contrary to the statutory provisions. After the returns were sent subsequently, the registrar revoked his order of cancelling the registration. The said case was only on the fact that there was subsequent compliance. Therefore, a Bench of the Bombay, High Court found that it was clearly contrary to the statutory provisions. Learned Judges have also made it clear that they should not be taken to imply, that they are necessarily of the opinion that there is no case in which the order cannot be cancelled or revoked. What they have held was that the order of cancellation of registration could not he withdrawn or revoked merely because the original request was subsequently complied with or the default rectified after the order of cancellation. Further, learned Judges have also held that if there was a patent illegal course of conduct adopted by the Registrar the Register migh have limited power of withdrawing the order of cancellation. First of all, the said case is not a case of exparte order. Secondly from the said case it cannot he concluded that there cannot he any revocation or cancellation under any circumstances as the learned Judges themselves have indicated as above. 19. Learned Counsel for the third respondent relied upon the following authorities in support of his contention that the power of review is available to a Tribunal or an authority. (1) 1980 XI LLJ 152 (SC) (2) Satnam Verma Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1985 SC 294 (3) Mukand Iron and Steel Works Ltd. Vs. V.G. Deshpande Registrar of Trade Unions Bombay and another, (1986) 2 LLJ 290 . 20. In R.R. Verma and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1980) 3 SCC 402 the Apex Court has pointed out that the principle that power to review must be conferred by statue either specifically or by necessary implication, is not applicable to decisions purely administrative in nature. It has held that to extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. 21. Even though the registration and cancellation is administrative action on the part of the Registrar of Trade Unions, if it has been an order of registration and cancellation simpliciter. It has held that to extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. 21. Even though the registration and cancellation is administrative action on the part of the Registrar of Trade Unions, if it has been an order of registration and cancellation simpliciter. But once an order favouring the registration or cancellation, is made at the instance of another party, especially when two parties are interested in registration or cancellation of the registration, then it ceases to be purely an administrative order. On the other hand, it becomes 'lis' between the two parties and therefore, partakes the nature of the quasijudicial order. 22. The contention that once an order is passed exparte or otherwise by a Tribunal, the Tribunal becomes functus officio, unless specific powers are given to set aside the exparte order, has already been negatived by the Supreme Court in Satnam Verma Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1985 SC 294 . The Supreme Court following the earlier decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal & Others (supra) has held at p. 80 : "The Tribunal has the power to proceed exparte as provided by Rule 22. It should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharge the functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties." It also further held that "the Court proceeded to examine the question .... Tribunal became functus officio and therefore, will have no jurisdiction to set aside the exparte award and that as contended is before us the appropriate Government alone could set aside the exparte order passed by the Tribunal ... and rejected it." 23. The other decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitions in Mukand Iron and Steel Works Ltd. v. V. G. Deshpande and Another (supra) contended that when the Registrar cancels or withdraws the registration of a Trade Union, it has the option to appeal or to apply for A 2s fresh registration. The single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the said case has taken the aforesaid view. He distinguished the earlier Supreme Court Judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. The single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the said case has taken the aforesaid view. He distinguished the earlier Supreme Court Judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 by holding that the Supreme Court took the view u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the proceedings before the Tribunal would' be concluded only on the expiry of thirty days from the publication of award till then, the tribunal retained the jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it and had the power to entertain the application in connection with the dispute. But the latter n judgment of the Supreme Court viz : Satnam Verma Vs. Union of India (UOI), AIR 1985 SC 294 was not considered by the Bombay High Court. In the latter judgment the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in 1981 SC 606 was not confirmed on the ground that the Industrial Tribunal retains the control till the expiry of 30 days, when the proceedings get concluded. But on the ground that when sufficient cause was shown, the Tribunal was bound to set aside the exparte order. In such a situation, the Supreme Court held that the tribunal does not become functus officio. In view of the latter Supreme Court Judgment, I am not in a position to so agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Mukand Iron and Steel Works Ltd. Vs. V.G. Deshpande Registrar of Trade Unions Bombay and another, (1986) 2 LLJ 290 . 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that there were several irregularities committed by the office bearers of third respondent and therefore the respondents 1 and 2 must be directed to issue suitable direction against the third respondent. As pointed, out earlier, it is not for the petitioner, who has left the union and joined rival union to make such complaints; had he continued in the union his claim deserves to be considered. 25. Learned Counsel for the third respondent contended that only after the third respondent is complied with the conditions as contemplated in Rule 3612 contained in Part-B of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, the recognition was given by the Railways. There is no necessity for the third respondent to submit the amended rules. 25. Learned Counsel for the third respondent contended that only after the third respondent is complied with the conditions as contemplated in Rule 3612 contained in Part-B of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, the recognition was given by the Railways. There is no necessity for the third respondent to submit the amended rules. Further he contended that clause 15 in Part-C empowers the union to amend byelaws, by convening a general body meeting. 26. Learned Counsel for the third respondent contended that the rules were amended only in the interests of the union and its members. The approval of the Railways is necessary only for the initial recognition. For amendments there is no necessity for having its approval or consent. There is some force in this contention. All the amendments have been approved by the second respondent. In the additional typed set of papers at pages 28 and 29, Xerox copy of the approval date August 17, 1982 are enclosed. On February 13, 1983 also there is an approval. The amendments have been submitted in 1981. He has also produced the application for amendment. It is found in the order of the second respondent dated September 26, 1989. It is also stated in the order itself that though the amendments were submitted earlier they could not be considered for approval, as the suits in Courts were not finally disposed of. Therefore, we have to take it that the amendments were sent then and there but the approval was delayed. Hence, the respondent cannot be blamed for the delay. Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, learned Counsel for the third respondent, contended that the petitioner is not entitled for the writ of mandamus. According to him, the petitioner has also retired from service in 1990 and he is not a member of any union. The Railways have taken note of all the amendments. Hence, according to him the respondents have taken sufficient action and there was no necessity for any direction against them to take action. After going through the records I see some force in the aforesaid contention also. The last contention raised by Mr. Mutbukumarasamy also deserves to be considered. According to him after the member of the Parliament sent a complaint, the third respondent sent a notice on August 23, 1988. There were elections for the office bearers spread out in four States, during that period. The last contention raised by Mr. Mutbukumarasamy also deserves to be considered. According to him after the member of the Parliament sent a complaint, the third respondent sent a notice on August 23, 1988. There were elections for the office bearers spread out in four States, during that period. Hence a request was made for extending the time. But in the meantime on May 3, 1989 the cancellation order has come to be passed. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition for setting aside the exparte order after furnishing all the relevant materials required by the second respondent. After fully satisfied with the materials furnished by the third respondent, the second respondent has chosen to set aside the exparte order and revoke cancellation. These facts are not denied by the petitioner's Counsel. I have to take it that the failure of the third respondent to produce necessary materials before the second respondent pursuant to the complaint of the M.P. was based on some reason, which can be taken note of. After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, and the law at length, I am of the view to that the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.