JUDGMENT R. L. Khurana, J.— The petitioner by virtue of this writ petition made under Articles 226/227, Constitution of India, has sought the quashing of the order dated 13-9-1984 as contained in Annexure PP of respondent No. 1 and the order dated 31-1-1985 of the respondent No. 1 as contained in Annexure PAU. 2. Respondent No. 2 is a registered Co-operative Society. It deals with public functions of the State The State has its shares in the respondent No. 2. Its functions are subject to the control of the State through various authorities including the Registrar, Cooperative Societies in terms of the provisions of the H. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968, and the rules framed thereunder. The respondent No. 2 is, thus, an instrumentality of the State. It is thus subject to writ jurisdiction of this Court. 3. Petitioner was appointed as a Clerk: by respondent in 1966. In the year 1976 he came to be appointed as Incharge Forwarding, which post was subsequently redesignated as Assistant Manager. Vide order dated 7-3-1981 the petitioner was promoted as Branch Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 800-40-1000/50-1250/70-1600 with basic salary of Rs. 800 per month with effect from 1-3-1981. 4. Respondent No. 3 who is a Deputy Registrar in the Department of Co-operative Societies of the State Government is on deputation with respondent No, 2 and is functioning as its Managing Director. The petitioner earned the wrath of respondent No. 3 because he refused to succumb under his pressure to act in a wrongful and illegal manner. Respondent No. 3 thus has always been finding fault with the petitioner and has been issuing memos for alleged acts of indiscipline, disobedience and insubordination without any basis The trouble started when respondent No 3 deployed a truck of HIM PROCESS for the carriage of apple boxes from his own orchard and from the forwarding agency of his brother and other relations. The freight paid for such deployment of the truck was less than the market rate. Freight at market rate was claimed by the petitioner In addition, he also demanded charges for the unnecessary withholding of truck. This was not to the linking of respondent No. 3. In the month of July 1982 respondent No. 3 wanted that the petitioner should show apple juice of the value of 50/60 thousand rupees sale proceeds thereof would be shared by them. This was not to the linking of respondent No. 3. In the month of July 1982 respondent No. 3 wanted that the petitioner should show apple juice of the value of 50/60 thousand rupees sale proceeds thereof would be shared by them. The petitioner refused to oblige the respondent No. 3 This fact was reduced into writing by the petitioner in his letter dated 12-7-1982. This was not liked by respondent No. 3. Vide Annexure PH dated 14/20-7-1982 respondent No. 3 directed the withholding of increment of the petitioner. His pay for the month of July 1982 was also withheld. On an appeal having been filed by the petitioner, his increment and pay was ordered to be released by respondent No. 3. The petitioner was then served with an order dated 21-7-1982 (Annexure PK) whereby he was reverted to the post of Assistant Manager. The petitioner represented to the Administrator of respondent No. 2 against his illegal reversion due to the illegal actions and high handedness of respondent No. 3. A representation was also made to respondent No. 3. An appeal was also filed before the Administrator, which was dismissed on 13-9-1984 vide order Annexure PP. 5. Respondent No. 3 did not stop at that. He on 24-7-1982 called for the explanation of the petitioner with regard to the sale of juice and raising objections thereto. Explanation was duly offered by the petitioner. Vide another memo of 24-7-1982 respondent No. 3 called for the explanation of the petitioner with regard to signing of the log book of the truck. This memo was also duly replied to by the petitioner. The third memo dated 24-7-1982 was also issued to petitioner calling for his explanation with regard to recovery of the amount of forwarding bills. Yet by another memo dated 22/24-7-1982 explanation of the petitioner was called for in connection with shifting of goods to the room adjoining the office. The sick leave applied for by the petitioner was also refused by respondent No. 3. The petitioner was not granted leave when his wife was ill. He was marked absent. His medical reimbursement bills and T. A. bills were not sanctioned by respondent No. 3. The sick leave applied for by the petitioner was also refused by respondent No. 3. The petitioner was not granted leave when his wife was ill. He was marked absent. His medical reimbursement bills and T. A. bills were not sanctioned by respondent No. 3. Though the petitioner was transferred from Parwanu and Kundli, he was never informed as to whom the charge at Parwanu was to be handed over inspite of the fact that he had sought instructions in this regard by sending telegram to respondent No. 3. The petitioner was also charge sheeted for some alleged acts of misconduct and consequent upon a disciplinary enquiry having been held, major penalty of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect was imposed upon him. His appeal has also been dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order at Annexure PAU. 6. The petitioner has challenged the validity and legality of the reversion order dated 21-7-1982, Annexure PK, and confirmed in appeal vide order dated 13-9-1984, Annexure PP, and the order of penalty dated 3/4-5-1984, Annexure PAS, and confirmed in appeal vide order dated 31-5-1985 as at Annexure PAU. 7. The respondents 2 to 4 filed reply affidavit resisting the petition. It was averred that the petitioner was promoted as Branch Manager on probation. Since his work during the probation period was not found satisfactory, he was reverted to his parent post of Assistant Manager. No enquiry was required to be held under the rules for the purpose of reversion during the probation period. The order of reversion carried no stigma. The order of reversion was even confirmed in appeal by respondent No. 1. Allegations of mala fides and bias against respondent No. 3 were emphatically denied, It was further averred that for the acts of misconduct, the petitioner was charge-sheeted under the relevant rules. An enquiry was held in accordance with the rules. Full and fair opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself. He was found guilty of the acts of misconduct complained of and consequently the disciplinary authority after accepting the findings of the inquiry officer, had imposed the major penalty of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the penalty imposed has been legally dismissed by respondent No. 1. An objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition was also raised. 8. The appeal filed by the petitioner against the penalty imposed has been legally dismissed by respondent No. 1. An objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition was also raised. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 9. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents is with regard to the maintainability of the present petition. It has been contended that respondent No. 2 which is a Co-operative Society registered under the provisions of H. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968, is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with respect to the matters pertaining to the service of its employees. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra v, H. P. State Co-operative Bank and others, 1993 (2) Sim LC 243. In the said case the Court had the occasion to consider whether the three Co-operative Societies, namely, H.P. State Co-operative Bank Ltd., the Kangra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and the H. P State Co-operative Marketing and Development Federation Ltd., registered under the provisions of H. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968, were amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court in regard to the matters pertaining to the service of their employees. It was held that the said three Co-operative Societies were not "other authorities" and as such could not be characterised as "State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 10. It is the admitted case of the parties that the Society respondent No. 2 stands superseded and Administrator has been appointed therefor by respondent No. 1. It was held that the said three Co-operative Societies were not "other authorities" and as such could not be characterised as "State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 10. It is the admitted case of the parties that the Society respondent No. 2 stands superseded and Administrator has been appointed therefor by respondent No. 1. On the similar facts, while dealing with the question whether the Hamirpur District Co operative Marketing and Consumers Federation Ltd was amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court in the matter pertaining to the service of its employees, a Full Bench of this Court in Ajmer Singh v. Hamirpur District Co-operative Marketing and Consumers Federation Ltd, 1995 (1) Sim LC 395, by following the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Tika Ram v. Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal and others, (1984) 4 SCC 219, has held that an officer of the Government is always amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court and since the writ petition has been directed against the order passed by Administrator of the Society, the same was maintainable. 11. In the present case, the present writ has been directed against the two orders of the Registrar, Co operative Societies passed in appeals against the orders of the Administrator. Therefore, the present writ is maintainable, even if for the sake of arguments it be assumed that respondent No. 2 Co-operative Society is not an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 12. Vide office order dated 6/7-3-1981 as at Annexure PA the petitioner was promoted as Branch Manager (Forwarding) in the pay scale of Rs. 800-40-1000/50 1250/70-1600 at a basic pay of Rs. 800 per month with effect from 1st March, 1981 Annexure PK is the office order dated 21-7-1982 whereby the petitioner was reverted to his original post of Assistant Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 650-1300 with effect from 21-7-1982. The order reads :— "HIM PROCESS The Himachal Fruit Gro- Head Office : wers Co-operative Mar- Himprastha keting and Processing Bhawan, Shimla- Society Limited 171 001. No. FGS. 3-41/77-46 Dated 21st July, 1982. OFFICE ORDER With the prior approval of the Administrator, Shri Ashok Kumar, Branch Manager who is on probation, is hereby reverted to his original post of Assistant Manager in the pay scale of Rs, 650-1300 with effect from 21st July, 1982. No. FGS. 3-41/77-46 Dated 21st July, 1982. OFFICE ORDER With the prior approval of the Administrator, Shri Ashok Kumar, Branch Manager who is on probation, is hereby reverted to his original post of Assistant Manager in the pay scale of Rs, 650-1300 with effect from 21st July, 1982. His pay will be fixed as per normal rules. Sd/- Managing Director Endst. No. FGS. 3-41/77-46 Dated 21st July, 1982. Copy to :— 1. Shri Ashok Kumar, Assistant Manager, Himprocess-Warehouse, Parwanu for information and compliance. 2. Accounts Clerk, Warehouse, Parwanu, for necessary action. He will please intimate to this office the basic pay drawn by Shri Ashok Kumar, Assistant Manger, on 1st February 1981. 3. P.F. Sd/- Managing Director." 13. The appeal filed by the petitioner against this order before respondent No. 1 was dismissed on 13-9-1984 vide order Annexure PP. 14. Supporting the order of reversion, the learned Counsel for the respondents has contended that the promotion of the petitioner vide Annexure PA was on probation in accordance with the recruitment and promotion rules governing the employees of the Society respondent No. 2 which were framed with the approval of respondent No. i. Since the work and conduct of the petitioner was not found satisfactory, his probation period was extended by one year with effect from.1-3-1982. The petitioner failed to improve his work and conduct even during the extended period of probation, therefore, he was reverted to his original post of Assistant Manager, Under the relevant recruitment and promotion rules reversion to a lower service, grade or post on being found unsuitable will not amount to penalty. In support of his contention the learned Counsel has referred to Rule 3.7 (6) and Rule 6.18 (iv) of the recruitment and promotion rules governing the service of the employees of respondent No. 2. Clause (6) of Rule 3.7 reads :— "Every employee recruited on regular basis as a monthly rated employee on his appointment to a post shall be treated on probation for a period of twelve months from the date of appointment. The period of probation may be extended but the total probation period shall not exceed twenty four months in any case. Such employee may be discharged at any time during the probation period on one months notice or by paying an amount equivalent to one months emoluments in lieu of such notice without assigning any reason for such discharge. The period of probation may be extended but the total probation period shall not exceed twenty four months in any case. Such employee may be discharged at any time during the probation period on one months notice or by paying an amount equivalent to one months emoluments in lieu of such notice without assigning any reason for such discharge. Correspondingly, the employee may also terminate his services in the like manner by giving one months notice or paying one months salary in lieu of notice. In either case the employee shall have to hand over the charge of the post and get relieved under a written order of the Board or the competent authority as the case may be, failing which such person shall remain liable for any loss or damage attributable to his charge of the post.” Clause (iv) of Rule 6.18 provides :— "Reversion to a lower service, grade or post of an employee officiating in a higher service, grade or post on the ground that he is considered, after trial or promotion to be unsuitable for such higher services, grade or post or on administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct " 15. Be it stated that the order Annexure PA whereby the petitioner was promoted as Branch Manager does not stipulate that the promotion was on probation. Nor any probation period has been mentioned therein. A bare perusal of the same shows that the petitioner was promoted in a substantive capacity. It was not an officiating promotion. 16. Clause (6) of Rule 3.7, quoted above, is not applicable to the appointments to higher post by way of promotion. It is applicable only to direct recruitments. There is no other rule providing for promotion in respect of appointment by promotion. 17. Assuming that in view of the provisions contained in Clause (iv) of Rule 6.18, quoted above, by implication it can be said that probation is prescribed even for appointments by way of probation, as stated above, no period of probation was prescribed in Annexure PA. Besides, before a person can be reverted to his original lower post, the competent authority has to record that such person after trial on promotion was found to be unsuitable for such higher post to which he was promoted. 18. Besides, before a person can be reverted to his original lower post, the competent authority has to record that such person after trial on promotion was found to be unsuitable for such higher post to which he was promoted. 18. In Annexure PK, whereby the petitioner was reverted, it is stated that the petitioner was reverted "with the prior approval of the Administrator". No such approval has been placed on the record of the present case. Besides, there is nothing on the record to show as to who had recommended the reversion of the petitioner The Administrator himself was the competent authority to assess the work and conduct of the petitioner. Therefore, before directing the reversion of the petitioner, he was required, under the law, to record his satisfaction that the work and conduct of the petitioner during the period of probation was found to be "unsatisfactory". No such thing appears to have been done in the present case. 19. In view of the fact that neither the petitioner was promoted as Branch Manager on probation nor there is anything on record to show that the competent authority had recorded its satisfaction that the work and conduct of the petitioner was not satisfactory during the alleged period of probation, the order of reversion as contained in Annexure PK and affirmed in appeal by the respondent No. 1 vide Annexure PP is bad and cannot be sustained. 20. Next arises the question whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner vide Annexure PAS and affirmed in appeal vide Annexure PAU consequent upon the disciplinary proceedings having been initiated and conducted against the petitioner in accordance with law, 21. While challenging the penalty imposed upon him as well as the disciplinary proceedings conducted against him, it has been contended by the petitioner that no reasonable opportunity was afforded to him during the course of enquiry inasmuch as neither the copies of documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority in the memorandum of charge were supplied to him nor he was allowed the inspection thereof. The inquiry officer as well as the presenting officer appointed in the case were the witnesses cited in the list of witnesses annexed to memorandum of charge. The inquiry officer as well as the presenting officer appointed in the case were the witnesses cited in the list of witnesses annexed to memorandum of charge. The inquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry inspite of specific objection laving been raised by the petitioner in this regard, and that no copy of the report of the inquiry officer was supplied to him before the penalty of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect came to be imposed upon him 22. The record of the disciplinary enquiry was perused by this Court and it was noticed as under :— (a) As many as 28 documents were relied upon by the disciplinary authority in Annexure II annexed to memorandum of charge served upon the petitioner, inspite of repeated requests made by the petitioner he was neither supplied the copies of such documents nor he was permitted to inspect such documents. The inquiry officer proceeded with the inquiry without supplying copies of the documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority and without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to inspect such record ; (b) A specific objection was raised by the petitioner vide his application dated 21-2-1984 Annexure PAH/1 to the effect that since the inquiry officer and the presenting officer were cited as witnesses in the list of witnesses Annexure III attached to the memorandum of charge, they should not proceed with the enquiry. Inspite of such specific objections having been raised, the inquiry officer continued with the enquiry ; (c) No copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner before the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of stoppage of four increments with cumulative effect on the petitioner. 23. The apex Court in Committee of Management Kisan Degree College v. Shambhu Saran Pandey and others, 1995 (II) LLJ 625, has held that if the department seeks to rely on any document in proof of the charge, the principles of natural justice would require that such copies should be given to the delinquent. If the documents are voluminous, it is open to the delinquent to obtain appropriate extract at his own expense by the inspection of the record. If that opportunity is not given, it would be violative of principles of natural justice. 24. Again in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. etc. If the documents are voluminous, it is open to the delinquent to obtain appropriate extract at his own expense by the inspection of the record. If that opportunity is not given, it would be violative of principles of natural justice. 24. Again in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. etc. v B Karu-nakaran etc etc., AIR 1994 SC 3074, it has been held that delinquent is entitled to the copy of the enquiry report before the penalty is imposed upon him. Such copy of the report of inquiry officer has to be furnished to the employee even if the rules are silent or against it, and such a copy has to be furnished to the delinquent irrespective of the fact whether he had asked for it or not. Refusal or failure to furnish the copy of the enquiry report means denial of reasonable opportunity. 25. As stated above, admittedly, no copy of the report of enquiry officer was supplied to the petitioner before penalty was imposed upon him. Besides, the record of the enquiry shows that even the copies of the documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority in the memorandum of charge were not made available to the petitioner nor he was allowed inspection thereof so as to enable him to obtain appropriate extracts therefrom. It is also made out from the record of the enquiry that: a specific objection was raised to Shri R. P. Kaushik continuing as inquiry officer and Shri L. R. Sharma continuing as the presenting officer since they were cited as witnesses against the petitioner during the course of enquiry Such objection was ignored by the enquiry officer and he preferred to continue with the enquiry. On the objection having been raised by the petitioner, the only course open to the inquiry officer to have referred the matter to the disciplinary authority for appropriate orders. 26. On the material coming on the record, we are satisfied that the disicplinary enquiry carried out against the petitioner was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice and there has been denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. Consequently, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner vide Annexure PAS, affirmed the appeal vide Annexure PAU by respondent No. 1, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside 27. Consequently, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner vide Annexure PAS, affirmed the appeal vide Annexure PAU by respondent No. 1, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside 27. For the reasons stated above, the present petition is allowed, The impugned orders at Annexures PK, PP, PAS and PAU passed by the respondents No 4 and 1 are quashed Consequent upon quashing of such orders, the petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in the post of Branch Manager with all consequential benefits. 28. Before parting with the present case, we may clarify that the quashing of the impugned orders contained in Annexures PAS and PAU shall not debar the respondents from initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. The parties are left to bear their own costs.