D. K. SETH, J. The short hut simple question arising in this case is as to whether the order dated 8th April 1987. (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) cancelling the order dated 2nd July 1985 (Annexure T) transfer ring the petitioner, a teacher from Jalali Inter College, Jalali, District Aligarh to Bajna Inter College, Bajna, District Mathura, in the lighi of the judgment in the case of Om Prakosh Ratio, v. Swaroop Singh Toman, AIR 1987 SC 1672 could be valid on the enactment of the lit tar Pradesh Secon dary Education Services Commission and Selection Board (Amendment and Validation Act, 1991) hereinafter referred to as the Validation Act. 2. The facts giving rise to the case briefly summarised are that the petitioner was appointed Lecturer on regular basis on 1st October, 1974 in Jalali Inter College, Jalali, District Aligarh, a recognised Institution under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, hereinafter referred to as 1921 Act By an order dated 2nd July 1985 (Annexure T), the District Inspector of Schools ap proved the petitioners transfer from Jalali Inter College, Jalali to Bajna Inter College, Bajna, District Mathura, a recognised In stitution under the 1921 Act. Thereupon the petitioner joined Bajna Inter College immediately in the month of July 1985 and has been continuing there till the passing of the said order being Annexure 8. The petitioners transfer as aforesaid was can celled by the respondent no. 1 in view of the decision dated 9th May 1986 in the case of Om Prakash v. Swaroop Singh Tomar AIR 1987 SC 1672, referred to above. It is out of this order, the present writ petition arises. 3. By order dated 6th May, 1987, the operation of the order of cancellation was stayed due to which the petitioner con tinued to serve the said Bajna Inter College. 4. One Lala Ram Sheoram, a teacher of Bajna inter College, made an application for impleadment together with an applica tion for vacating the interim order sup ported by affidavit. The said application for impleadment was allowed by order dated 25th July 1996. The learned counsel for the added respondent, pursuant to the prayer made was allowed to rely on the affidavit in support of the application for vacating the interim order as counter affidavit to the main writ petition. Mr. The said application for impleadment was allowed by order dated 25th July 1996. The learned counsel for the added respondent, pursuant to the prayer made was allowed to rely on the affidavit in support of the application for vacating the interim order as counter affidavit to the main writ petition. Mr. Ashok Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has stated that no rejoinder affidavit would be necessary sine- he would be relying on a question of law, pure and simple. I have heard Mr. Ashok Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sukhendra Pal Singh, learned counsel for the added respondent and Mr. R. S. Parihar, learned Standing Counsel. Mr. Ashok Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that by reason of the enactment of the validation Act, the effect of the judgment in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra) cannot affect the order of transfer sought ty be cancelled since the same was validated retrospectively by reason of the enactment of the said Validation Axt. Secondly he contends that since the petitioners transfer was made prior to the rendering of the judgment in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra) i. e. on 9th May 1986, the petitioners transfer made prior to the said judgment could not be affected unless the same is challenged in appropriate proceeding and an order is ob tained thereon from the appropriate Court. 5. Mr. Sukhendra Pal Singh, learned counsel for the added respondent, on the other hand, contends that by reason of various decisions referred by him in the af fidavit supporting the application for vacat ing the interim order, the petitioners trans fer order was void ab initio and, therefore, the order of cancellation of the said transfer order, cannot be assailed. According to him, even without the order of cancellation, the petitioners transfer was void and it has been so held in various decision referred to by him which ultimately have found support by the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra ). He further sought o contend that the Validation Act could not be retrospec tive in operation. It could operate only prospectively. The Validation Act does not have any effect of wiping out the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana. It cannot invalidate the law laid down by the Apex Court. 6. Mr. Parihar, learned Standing Coun sel, adopted the submissions made by Mr. It could operate only prospectively. The Validation Act does not have any effect of wiping out the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana. It cannot invalidate the law laid down by the Apex Court. 6. Mr. Parihar, learned Standing Coun sel, adopted the submissions made by Mr. Sukhendra Pal Singh and contended that there was nothing wrong in the order (An-nexure 8) impugned. According to him, the Validation Act having been passed in 1991, the order of cancellation cannot be in validated. Inasmuch as in view of the order of cancellation of the order of transfer, the order contained in Annexure T did not have any existence. Therefore, there was no scope for its validation on account of the impact of the Validation Act. 7. In reply Mr. Ashok Bhushan con tended that the Validation Act can be retrospective in operation. Though by reason of the Validation Act, the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana is not wiped out but still it had the effect of validating the transfer made after July 14,1981. When the 1991 Act was passed, the order of cancella tion was non-existent because of its opera tion having been stayed by this Court through its order dated 6th May 1987. Un less the Validation Act is declared ultra vires or is amended or repealed, the same con tinues to have effect. The vires of the said Act was enacted subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, even then the petitioners transfer stands validated by reason of the said enactment. 8. The order of transfer was challenged in Writ Petition No. 17225 of 1986 by the petitioner. The said writ petition was dis posed of on 30th January, 1987 wherein it was observed that the petitioner could not challenge the said order because he had given his consent before transfer (Annexure 10 ). The order dated 8th April, 1987 (An nexure 8) was challenged by respondent No. 3 in a Writ Petition on 29th April, 1987 in which it was observed that it was the petitioner who is aggrieved and he should come forward. Thereupon the petitioner had moved the present writ petition. Thus it is apparent that respondents No. 3 is also espousing the cause of the petitioner which is synonymous to their own cause. 9. Thereupon the petitioner had moved the present writ petition. Thus it is apparent that respondents No. 3 is also espousing the cause of the petitioner which is synonymous to their own cause. 9. In order to appreciate the rival con tentions, it is necessary to trace the history of the enactment relevant for our purpose. 10. The condition of service of a teacher in the Inter College was governed by Section 16-G (2) (c) of the 1921 Act, so far as it relates to the transfer of service of a teacher from one Institution to another. Both recognised. The said 1921 Act had permitted transfer of service from one recognised Institution to another. The application of Section 16-G (2) (c) stood eclipsed by amendment of U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selec tion Board Act, 1982 (Act 5 of 1982), hereinafter referred to as the 1982 Act which provided in Section 16 that not withstanding anything to the contrary con tained in the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the Regulations made therein but subject to certain provisions other than Sec tion 16-G, every appointment of a teacher after the date of commencement of 1982 Act is to be made by the Management only on the recommendation of the Board except that Section 16-EE of the 1921 Act would apply mutatis mutandis in respect of retrenched employees. There were series of cases covering the controversy, some of which have been referred to in the affidavit filed by the added respondent holding one way or the other ultimately culminating in the decision of the Full Bench in the case of R. P. Bhatnagar v. Administrator, 1985 UPLBEC 346. But the law was declared in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra) by the Apex Court which laid down its observation in the following expression: "in view of the aforesaid consideration, we hold that upon the constitution of a Commission under the Services Commission Act it is no longer possible for a vacancy in the post of Principal, Headmaster or Teacher of the categories men tioned in the Schedule to Services Commission Act to be filled by the process of transfer under Section 16-G (2) (c) of the Education Act and its Regulations. . . " 11. The said decision was rendered on 9th May, 1987 by the Apex Court. . . " 11. The said decision was rendered on 9th May, 1987 by the Apex Court. There fore, the law as it stood on 9th May, 1986 was that as laid down in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra ). 12. Now the order of cancellation (Annexure 8) remained stayed by virtue of the interim order passed in the present proceedings. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the Validation Act was enacted with an object to amend the 1982 Act and to validate certain actions and to provide for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith. The statement of ob jects and reasons appearing in the Prefatory Note of the said enactment proceeds as fol lows: "an Act further to amend the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 and to validate certain action and to provide for matters incidental there to and connected therewith; It is hereby enacted in the Forty-second year of the Republic of India as follows:- Prefatory Note-Statement of Objects and Reasons.-The transfers of principals and teachers were being made from one Institution to another under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the regulations framed there under. This practice continued even after the enactment of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982. Some transfer orders were challenged through Writ Petitions in the Allahabad High Court. The Honble Supreme Court in a Civil Appeal held that the transfer of a Principal or a teacher from the one Institution to another in accordance with the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the regulations made there under is no longer possible in view of the provisions of sub section (2) of Section 16 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 which provides that the appointment of a Principal or a teacher, other than the appointment made by the management of an institution on the recommendations of the Secondary Education Services Commission or Secondary Education Selection Boards, as the case may be, shall be void. 2. 2. In order, therefore, to avoid the difficul ties arising out of the decision of the Supreme Court it has been decided to amend the aforesaid Act of 1982 to provide for the transfer of prin cipals and teachers from one institution to another and also for validating the transfers made after July 14, 1981, till the date of commencement of the amending Act. 3. This Bill is introduced accordingly. " 13. By reason of the enactment, a proviso was added after the proviso to Sec tion 16 of the Validation Act by Section 2 of the said Validation Act amending Section 16 which was validated by Section 3 thereof. The texts of Sections 2 and 3 are quoted below: "2. Amendment of Section 16 of U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982.-In Section 16 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act, 1982, in sub-section (1), after the existing proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted and be deemed always to have been inserted, namely: "provided further that the appointment of a teacher by transfer from one institution to another, may be made in accordance with the regulations made under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Educa tion Act, 1921. " "3. Validation.-Notwithstanding any judg ment, decree or order of any Court or authority, the appointment of a teacher by transfer from one institution to another made in pursuance of the regulation made under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Educa tion Act, 1921, on or after July 14,1981 and before the commencement of this Act, shall be and deemed always to have been valid and lawful as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times. " 14. Subsequently Section 16 was replaced and substituted altogether by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1993 by reason whereof Section 16 of the 1982 Act stands at the present moment as follows:- "16. " 14. Subsequently Section 16 was replaced and substituted altogether by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1993 by reason whereof Section 16 of the 1982 Act stands at the present moment as follows:- "16. Appointment to be made only on the recommendation of the Board.- (1) Not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the regulation made thereunder but subject to the provision of Sections 21-B, 21-C, 22-D, 33, 33-A and 33-B, every appointment of a teacher, shall, on or after the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board (Amendment) Act, 1922, be made by the Management only on the recommendation of the Board: Provided that in respect of retrenched employees, the provision of Section 16-EE of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, shall mutatis mutandis apply. Provided further that the appointment of the teacher by transfer from one Institution to another, may be made in accordance with the regulations made under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Educa tion Act, 1921. (2 ). Any appointment made in contraven tion of the provision of sub-section (1) shall be void. " 15. By reason of the second proviso to Section 16 of the 1982 Act, the effect of Section 16-G (2) (c) of 1921 Act, since eclipsed by enactment of 1982 Act, stood removed, The said removal stood validated with retrospective effect from July 14,1981 and the eclipse of 1982 Act stood altogether wiped out because of Section 3 of the Validation Act deeming the said proviso to be in force at all material times not withstanding any judgment, decree or order or any Court or authority in respect of transfer of a teacher from one Institution to another made pursuant to Section 16-G (2) (c) of the 1921 Act and the regulation made there under. 16. Thus the effect of the said Valida tion Act was that the transfer of the petitioner made on 2nd July 1985 was a valid piece of action notwithstanding the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra) and the provision of Section 16 of the 1982 Act, which stood excepted by addition of the second proviso through Section 2 of the Validation Act having been always in force by reason of Section 3 of the Validation Act. 17. 17. Now it is an established principle of law that there is no restriction on the plenary jurisdiction of legislation by the legisla ture within the field or subject. In exercise of such plenary jurisdiction the legislature can remove infirmity in any law indicated in any judgment. The legislature has absolute power to give- effect to such enactment either prospectively or retrospectively. However, by such enactment, the legislature cannot set aside, annul or override a judg ment of the Court. The cases which have since been decided by the Courts cannot be wiped out by such enactment. But those cases in respect whereof no decision has been given by any court or which has not reached finality and is still awaiting decision are excepted and can very well be attracted within the purview of such validation even retrospectively. Validating Acts, are enacted in order 10 remove defects in the statute retrospectively for the purpose of saving the actions taken under such defective statutes when such defects are pointed out in some judgments. Such legislation removed the in firmity without affecting the judgment al ready delivered in a particular case which remains binding between to the parties inter se despite such legislation. Such legislation, therefore, is not an encroachment on judi cial power. 18. In the case of Sri P. C Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 192 , it was held: "when a legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a Court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important condition, of course, is that the legislature mast possess the power to impose the lax, for, if it does not the action must even remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legis lative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does not possess or exercise, A Courts decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the jurisdic tion. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Some times this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by reenacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already col lected to stand under the re-enacted law. Some times the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and ay legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon Courts the legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the Court which becomes inef fective after the change of the law. " 19. The same view has been taken in the cases of West Rannad Electric Distribu tion Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1962 SC 1753 ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1138 ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U. P. , AIR 1973 SC 1405; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1389 ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1683 ; and Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR1987 SC2310. 20. The above cases were referred to and relied upon in the case of Bhubarmshwar Singh and another v. Union of India and others, (1994)6 SCC 77 . The view is also reiterated in the case of State of Orissa and another v. Copal Chandra Rath and others (1995) 6 SCC 242 . Therefore, the validation with retrospective effect is within the legis lative competence of the legislature while legislating the said Validation Act for removing the defect pointing out in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra) without wiping out the said decision while removing the defect or rather conflict in between the 1982 Act and 1921 Act to the extent as provided in Section 2 of the said Validation Act. 21. 21. By reason of the present position of Section 16 of the 1982 Act together with the proviso which is deemed to have been in the Section at all material limes, the order of transfer (Annexure T) of the petitioner stood validated since the same was effected Song after 14th July, 1981, namely, on 2nd July 1985. Therefore, the order cancelling the transfer cannot be sustained in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case. Inasmuch as the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana was the law laid down and was binding and, therefore, the order of cancellation (Annexure 8) would have been valid and final if not challenged by means of the present writ petition and the operation thereof was not stayed by the im pugned order. On the date of legislation of the Validation Act, the order of cancellation (Annexure 8) having remained stayed and subject-matter of one in pending proceed ing, the order of transfer dated 2nd July 1985 (Annexure i) was in force and, as such, was attracted ad covered by the Validation Act. 22. The apart, the order of cancellation (Annexure 8) was based solely on the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra ). The Validation Act having specifically expressed validity of the transaction (Annexure 1) notwithstanding any judg ment, decree or order of any Court or authority shall be valid and lawful. The said expression used in Section 3 of the Valida tion Act clearly lays down that not withstanding the judgment in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra), the transaction (Annexure 1) is valid and lawful and further that notwithstanding the order of any authority, the transaction (Annexure 1) is valid and lawful. In other words, not withstanding the order of respondent No. 1 which is authority the order contained in Annexure 8, the transaction remains valid. 23. Further more by reason of the ex pression that the added second proviso were m force at all material times in the 1982 Act presupposes that the second proviso was in existence fictionally and operative right from the date of legislation of 1982 Act by reason of the deeming provision as enacted by Section 3 of the Validation Act. There fore, the said proviso is deemed to have been in force on 2nd July 1985 when the order (Annexure 1) was passed. There fore, the said proviso is deemed to have been in force on 2nd July 1985 when the order (Annexure 1) was passed. The order, there fore was valid when it was passed. The said validity cannot be affected by the decision in the case of Om Prakash Rana (supra) or by the order of cancellation (Annexure 8) by any authority. By reason of the second proviso having remained in force at all material times, the transaction stood valid before the order of cancellation (Annexure 8) could be passed or was actually passed. By reason aforesaid, the implication of the Validation Act renders the order of cancellation void and ineffective. The intention of legislature as is apparent from the state ment of objects and reasons is clear and unambiguous and was aimed at removing the contradiction and/or conflict between Section 16-G (2) (c) of the 1921 Act and Sec tion 16 of the 1982 Act and to reconcile both the provisions operating in the same field in order to bring about a workable application for avoiding unnecessary complications resulting into serious and unending compli cated situations acting derogatory to the purpose of the legislation which would act contrary to the advancement of the purpose of the legislation. An interpretation of a legislation is to be given in a manner so as to advance the purpose of the enactment and to further the purpose therefore. The inter pretation hereby given above seems to be in consonance with the above principle which is by now an established one. 24. In view of the facts and circumstan ces of the case and in view of the observa tions made above, therefore, the impugned order contained in Annexure 8 cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. Let a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly. 25. The writ petition thus stands al lowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .