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1996 DIGILAW 1039 (ALL)

SHANKAR v. MUKHYA NAGAR ADHIKARI NAGAR NIGAM VARANASI

1996-09-12

B.S.CHAUHAN

body1996
B. S. CHAUHAN, J. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioners claiming promotion on the posts of Sanitary Supervisor. According to the petitioners they were acquainted as Assistant Sanitary Inspectors long time back and the main reliefs sought in the writ petition read as under: (1 ). Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 to promote the petitioners over the post of Safai Nayak (Sanitary Supervisor ). (2 ). Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to disturb the petitioners to work on the post of Sahayak Safai Nayak till their promotion to the post of Safai Nayak. 2. The writ petition was filed on 28-2-1995. and this Court issued notice to the respondents and directed them to file the counter affidavit to the writ petition. Again on 1-9-95 this Court passed the following order: "shri N. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents was granted time to file counter affidavit on 28-2-1995. No counter af fidavit has been filed. The petitioners have filed a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 2 to promote the petitioners to the post of Safai Nayak (Sanitary Supervisor ). It is question of fact as to whether the petitioners are entitled, according to seniority and qualification, to be ap pointed on the said post. The petitioners may represent their case alongwith Government Order before the respondent No. 1. In case the petitioners make any representation, as stated above, the respondent No. 1 is directed to decide the same by means of speaking order within a period of two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him. " 3. The matter was again listed on 9-5-96 and by that time the respondents herein failed to file the counter affidavit or dispose of the representation of the petitioners and thus this Court passed the following order: "despite ample opportunity having been provided to the respondents for filing counter affidavit, no counter affidavit has been filed. Shri Nripendra Misra, counsel for the respondents despite service is not present in the Court. Sup plementary affidavit has been filed today which was duly served on the respondents on 20-12-95 to which no reply has been filed. Shri Nripendra Misra, counsel for the respondents despite service is not present in the Court. Sup plementary affidavit has been filed today which was duly served on the respondents on 20-12-95 to which no reply has been filed. It has been alleged in the affidavit that the certified copy of the order dated 1 -9-95 was served on 27-9-95 in the office of respondent No. 1 alongwitn the Government Order and the representation but instead of deciding representation of the. petitioners as per directions made by the Court, respondent No. 1 has promoted other persons in back date (show ing 22-7-95) whereas, no orders for promotion of the petitioner has been passed as per the averments made in the supplementary affidavit which have not been controverted despite service of notice on the respondents. Allegations made, make out a case of Con tempt of Court. Respondent No. 1 Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Nigam, Varanasi is accordingly directed to appear in this Court personally on 10-7-1996 to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt of Court which is punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In the meantime, he shall immediately pass orders within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order regarding promotion of the petitioners in the light of directions already made in its order dated 1-9-95. 4. It may also be mentioned here that at the time of hearing none had appeared for the respondents as is evident from the order of that date. The respondents decided the representation on 18-5-96 as directed by this Court on 1-9-95 and 9-5-96. The claim of petitioner No. 2 was rejected. (Annexure-2 to the counter affidavit ). The respondents filed the counter affidavit to the main peti tion on 10-7-96. The facts mentioned in the counter affidavit are eye opener. It has been stated in the counter affidavit that the petitioner No. 1 had already been promoted as Sanitary Supervisor from the post of As sistant Sanitary Supervisor vide order dated 22-7-95 and the petitioners did not bring this fact to the notice of this Court when the orders dated 1-9-95 and 9-5-96 were passed. Regarding the case of petitioner No. 2, it has been stated that the petitioner had never been appointed by the respondents in any capacity what so ever. 5. Regarding the case of petitioner No. 2, it has been stated that the petitioner had never been appointed by the respondents in any capacity what so ever. 5. The petitioner No. 2 had filed suit No. 866/1988 before the Civil Court, Varanasi with the same prayer and the said suit was ex-parte decreed on 17-4-93. How ever, in execution of the said decree the accounts of the respondents-Nagar Nigam was attached. When the Nagar Nigam ap plied for the vacation of that order, the Civil Court passed an order on 2-2-94 to the effect that the said ex-parte decree and the order of attachment shall be recalled only if the respondents promote the petitioner No. 2 on the post of Sanitary Supervisor by com pleting all the formalities within 15 days of the said order. The learned III Additional Muhsif, Varanasi asked the respondents to give an undertaking in the Court to that effect. The said order dated 2-02-94 has been placed on record by the petitioner No. 2 himself. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order of the Civil Court, the respon dents approached this Court by filing a writ petition No. 8977 of 1994 in which the order of attachment etc. was vacated by this Court vide order dated 22-3-94 (Annexure 8 to the counter affidavit ). 7. As this Court came to know about the suppression of the material facts first time on 10-7-96, this Court issued notice to petitioner No. 2 as under what circumstan ces the petitioner No. 2 had suppressed the material facts from this Court, the petitioner No. 2 had filed reply to the same and made an unsuccessful attempt to per suade the Court that the prayer in the civil suit was entirely different from the prayer made in the writ petition, though there is no different whatsoever and the both are substantially the same. The copy of the plaint in the said suit No. 866/1988 has been filed by the respondents as Annexure 7 to the counter affidavit. The prayer in the said suit is also regarding the promotion of the petitioner No. 2 on the post of Sanitary Supervisor. 8. The petitioner No. 1 had been promoted to the post of Sanitary Supervisor on 22-7-95, but this fact was not brought to the notice of this Court. The prayer in the said suit is also regarding the promotion of the petitioner No. 2 on the post of Sanitary Supervisor. 8. The petitioner No. 1 had been promoted to the post of Sanitary Supervisor on 22-7-95, but this fact was not brought to the notice of this Court. The petitioner No. 2 had already agitated the same issue and succeeded before the Civil Court and the respondents had filed the writ petition against the said proceedings in Civil Court and the said writ petition is still pending before this Court. Petitioner No. 2 con cealed all these facts from this Court. 9. Thus, by omission negligence, mis representation and by concealment of material facts the petitioners succeeded in persuading this Court to issue a direction on 1-9-95 to the respondents to decide the rep resentation regarding the promotion of the petitioners. The Court was further-persuaded to pass an order dated 9-5-96 by which a Senior Officer of the respondents was directed to appear in person before this Court and face the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for not decid ing the representation as directed by this Court vide its order dated 1-9-95. 10. The main issue here in this case is whether this Court, by directing the respondents to decide a representation in a case where in respect of petitioner No. 1 there was no cause of action left and for petitioner No. 2 the Civil Court had already passed a decree and the matter is further subjudice in writ jurisdiction before this Court, can ask the respondents to sit in appeal against the order passed by the Civil Court or the interim order passed by this Court. 11. In Kamal Improvement Trust v. Prakashwanti 1995 (5) SCC 159 , the Apex Court has observed that acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and an erroneous interpretation equally should not be per petuated and perpetrated defeating of legis lative animation. 12. In A. R. Antuley v. R. S. Naik, 1988 (2) SCC 602 , the Supreme Court has ob served as under: "a decision touching the jurisdiction. . . . . . has to be not only consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the same cannot even be inconsistent with substantive provisions of the statutory law. . . . . . . . . . . . has to be not only consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the same cannot even be inconsistent with substantive provisions of the statutory law. . . . . . . the criteria of a right to an appeal is an act which requires legisla tive authority, neither an inferior court no the superior court nor both combined can create such a right, it being one of limitation and exception of jurisdiction. " (Attorney General v. Herman James Sillan (1964) 10 HLC 704 (HL ). 13. Similarly in Sardar Hasan Siddiqui v. STA Tribunal, AIR 1986 Alld. 132, this Court has observed as under: "a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. No ap proval or consent can confer jurisdiction upen such a Tribunal. No amount of acquiescence weaver or be like can confer jurisdiction if a Tribunal is lacking, the doctrine of nullity will come into operation and any decision taken or given by such a Tribunal will be a nullity. " 14. Similar view was taken by the Con stitution Bench of the Supreme Court in United Commercial Bank Limited v. Their Workman, AIR 1951 SC 230 . 15. A Division Bench of this Court on 19-8-93 while deciding the Special Appeal No. 480 of 1993 in Udit Narain Kshetriya High School Society Padrauna district Deoria v. District Magistrate, Deoria observed as under: "constitution of adjudicatory tribunals is a legislative act. It is for the legislature to prescribe tribunals for adjudication of disputes of various nature. It is not for the Courts to constitute such tribunals. Where no specific tribunal has been prescribed by the legislature for resolution of a dispute of a particular nature, such dispute may be taken to the ordinary Civil Court unless the juris diction of the court has been barred by a statutory provisions. Our attention has not been drawn to any law conferring jurisdiction upon either the Deputy Director of Education or Vice Chancellor to decide dispute of the nature involved in the present case. Reference of the said dispute to the said two authorities, in our opinion, was therefore, unwarranted. Our attention has not been drawn to any law conferring jurisdiction upon either the Deputy Director of Education or Vice Chancellor to decide dispute of the nature involved in the present case. Reference of the said dispute to the said two authorities, in our opinion, was therefore, unwarranted. If the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the dispute involved in the writ petition could not be conveniently decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitu tion, he could have relegated the parties to the forum available under the ordinary law. It is not suggested that no other forum was available ex cept the forum of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. " 16. Similarly, in Union of India v. Devki Nandanagarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96 , the Apex Court has observed that the Court cannot usurp legislative function. The Court cannot re-write the legislation for the reason that it had no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. 17. Thus, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that if an authority lacks jurisdiction to review its earlier order or does not possess any appellate power as the statute does not provide for it, direc tions issued by this Court to decide a repre sentation which tantamounts or amounts to review or to decide the appeal would be nullity. 18. So far as the instant writ petition is concerned, this Court was persuaded to pass the aforesaid orders by mis-representation and fraud. Had the petitioners brought the true and correct facts to the notice of this Court, the said orders could not Lave been passed. In the facts and circumstances of this case the orders passed by this Court on 1-9-95 and 9-5-96 have to be ignored for grant ing any relief to the petitioners. But in spite of all this even in such a case the respon dents cannot escape the liability to comply with such an order or to show the sense of responsibility either by filing the counter affidavit or for applying for modification of the said orders or by deciding the said repre sentation of the petitioner within the said stipulated period. 19. 19. In Mohammad Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majidrathor, AIR 1994 SC 2252 , the Apex Court observed as under: "the law of contempt is based on sound public policy by punishing any conduct which shakes the public confidence in the administration of justice. . . . . . . . The conduct of the appellant. . . . . . . . . is not in keeping with the responsibility of the office he holds. Greater respect should have been shown to court and if he was aggrieved by the order, he should have take prompt steps to invoke appellate procedure. The appellant could not ignored the order and plead the difficulties of implementation at the time contempt proceedings are initiated. " 20. Shri C. N. Dubey, the alleged con-temnor has tendered absolute and uncondi tional apology and filed two affidavits before this Court stating that for the entire time he was not posted there and even after the joining in the office he was mislead by Shn Shafat Ullah, the law Officer of the respondent-authority as it all has happened because of his negligence or even he might have colluded with the petitioners. Vide order dated 9th August, 1996, the said Shafat Ullah, the law Officer had been put under suspension for showing the negligence in this case. 21. Moreover, Shri Parikh, learned counsel for the alleged contemnor has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Kuldeep Narain Lal v. Mahendra Pal Jain, 1984, Cr. L. J. 1243, wherein this Court has held that if the order passed by the Court was a nullity for want or jurisdiction, the person may not be held guilty. Similar view had been taken by the Full Bench of Lahore High Court in Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Noor Hasan, AIR 1949 Lahore 131. 22. Shri Parikh has argued that in spe cial facts and circumstances of this case, it is desirable that this Court may accept the unconditional apology of the alleged contemnor and the notice of contempt be dis charged. 23. As Shri C. N. Dubey has placed suf ficient material on record to show that the defiance of the order of this Court had not been wilfully, I am of the view that in the fact and circumstances of the case, the notice of contempt be discharged after accepting the apology tendered by Shri Dubey. 23. As Shri C. N. Dubey has placed suf ficient material on record to show that the defiance of the order of this Court had not been wilfully, I am of the view that in the fact and circumstances of the case, the notice of contempt be discharged after accepting the apology tendered by Shri Dubey. Order is passed accordingly. 24. As both the petitioners have not disclosed the true facts before this Court undoubtedly this writ petition is nothing but an abuse of judicial process. Kabari Private Limited v. Shiv Nath Shroff, 1996 (1) SCC 690 ; Smt. Parwati Devi Jaiswal v. Kedarlal Jaiswal, 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 574; Suryanath Singh v. Khedu Singh, 1994 Suppl. (4) SCC 561 and Manipal Finance Corpora tion Ltd. v. T. Bangarappa, 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 507. 25. It is settled law that a person, who approaches the Court should not only come with clean hand but with clean mind, clean heart and clean objectives. Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 852 ; G. Narain Swami Reddy v. Govern ment of Kamataka, AIR 1991 SC 1728 and K. K. Sriniwas v. D. H. Premchand, 1994 (6) SCC62. 26. The petitioner No. 1 was under solemn duty to inform this Court that he had already been promoted vide order dated 22-7-95 and his petition has become infruc-tuous. As the petitioner No. 1 failed to do so and omission on his part has dragged this Court to take drastic steps as to call upon the respondents in contempt proceedings, his petition is dismissed as infructuous with costs, which is quantified at Rs. 500. 27. It may also be pointed out here that the civil suit No. 688/88 filed by the petitioner No. 2 was not maintainable at all in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976 which provides that no suit shall lie against the State Government or local authorities etc. and it further provides for transferring the pending suits from Civil Court to the Tribunal. Moreover, Section 2-B of the said act defines public servants which includes a person of the local authorities. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the judg ment delivered in civil suit is also a nullity and the petitioner No. 2 has abused the process of Court at every stage. 28. Moreover, Section 2-B of the said act defines public servants which includes a person of the local authorities. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the judg ment delivered in civil suit is also a nullity and the petitioner No. 2 has abused the process of Court at every stage. 28. The petitioner No. 2 invoked the writ jurisdiction on falsehood and mis-representation, equity does not find favour of the petitioner No. 2 rather it would bolder the abuse of process of Court. Petition of petitioner No. 2 is dismissed with costs, which is quantified at Rs. 5000. 29. Registry is directed to sent a cer tified copy of this order to the District Judge, Varanasi for recovering the said amount from both the petitioners as a decree of this Court. 30. I had also gone through the file of the vigilance wing of this Court, wherein the departmental proceedings had been in itiated against the III Additional Munsif, Varanasi, who had entertained the Civil Suit No. 866/88 and pass the order without juris diction. As the departmental proceedings had already been initiated and is pending, it is not desirable to comment upon the con duct of the judicial officer who proceeded with the civil suit without any jurisdiction. 31. With these observations, this peti tion is dismissed. Petition dismissed .