ORDER A.S. Tripathi, J. 1. This petition u/s 482 Cr. P.C. has been presented by the petitioner for quashing the investigation & further proceedings in cases registered at Crime Nos. 116/91 and 82/94 by the respondents. 2. Petitioner, at present, claims to be posted as Assistant Transport Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior. Petitioner had entered the Government service on 20.4.1976 as Transport Sub-Inspector and on his meritorious service, he has been promoted to the rank of Regional Transport Officer since 19.10.1990. 3. The respondents had made allegations against the petitioner that he had acquired properties beyond his known source of income and was guilty of the offences u/s 13 (1) (e) as also section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (For short, the 'Act'). A case against the petitioner was registered in the year 1991 and the matter was being investigated for the last four years and nothing has come out against the petitioner. The respondents are simply harassing the petitioner on the pretext of investigation, without any result. 4. Petitioner alleged that on 22.10.1991, the respondent No. 2 Shri S.D. Khan, without any authority, had made a raid on the house No. 83, situate in the Laxmibai Colony, Gwalior. No search warrant was given to the respondent for that purpose. The house in which the raid was made did not belong to the petitioner. It belongs to his father-in-law Shri Hardayal Patel, who was living therein and he had constructed the said house of his own sources, who was a renowned landlord and a businessman. The house hold articles seized from that house belongs to the family of Hardayal Patel and ladies of his family and the petitioner had no concern with the same. Same day search of the office of the petitioner was also made and the seizure memos were prepared Annexures A/1 and A/2. Nothing was found in the chamber of the petitioner to show that any property was acquired beyond the source of income by the petitioner. The raid was conducted and investigation was continuing without any proper authority by the Superintendent of Police, against the provisions of section 17 of the Act. Nothing was found in the chamber of the petitioner to show that any property was acquired beyond the source of income by the petitioner. The raid was conducted and investigation was continuing without any proper authority by the Superintendent of Police, against the provisions of section 17 of the Act. The seizure made and the case registered against the petitioner was without following the prescribed legal procedure as contained in Section 9 of the M.P. Lok Ayukt Evam Up Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981 (for short, the Adhiniyam) and rule 16 of the Rules framed thereunder. At present, the investigation was being continued by the respondent No. 3 without any legal authority. The petitioner had fully explained the article and the property mentioned in the seizure memos, but inspite of that fact the investigation is continuing without any legal authority. Reply of the petitioner is Annexure A/3 on record. 5. Petitioner claims to have belonged to a well to do family having large agricultural properties in village Gormi, Tehsil Mehgaon, District Bhind. Petitioner owns two old houses built by his ancestors in his village long before his entry into service. Petitioner owns 44 big has of irrigated land in the village. From the income of the agriculture two bighas land was purchased in the name of the petitioner long back on 12.11.1968. Besides this, petitioner's wife Smt. Ramkali Thapak was doing milk dairy business independently in village Dhondri, Tehsil Mehgaon, District Bhind since 5.1.1992. This fact was already intimated to the Transport Commissioner and the copies of letters are Annexures A/5 (i) and A/5 (ii). Petitioner's wife was having 5 bighas of land in village Dhondri given by her brother for starting dairy business. Father-in-law and brother-in-law of the petitioner are rich people having large properties. Petitioner had received permission for business of his wife and acquisition of property by letter dated 14.1.1982. Petitioner's wife had obtained land from her brother by registered sale-deed dated 3.2.1982. Copy of the sanction dated 14.1.1982 is Annexure A/6 and the sale-deed is Annexure A/7 on record. Wife of the petitioner had her own income and had purchased four bighas of land out of her own income in the name of her son Piyush Thapak and petitioner had obtained sanction for the same which are Annexures A/8 and A/9. This fact was intimated to the then Regional Transport Officer by letter dated 28.9.1985 Annexure A/10. Wife of the petitioner had her own income and had purchased four bighas of land out of her own income in the name of her son Piyush Thapak and petitioner had obtained sanction for the same which are Annexures A/8 and A/9. This fact was intimated to the then Regional Transport Officer by letter dated 28.9.1985 Annexure A/10. The RTO Jabalpur had also accorded permission dated 16.5.1986 for the registered sale-deeds which are Annexures A/11. A/12 and A/13. Similarly, permission for purchase of land by the wife of the petitioner were granted through letters Annexures A/14, A/15 and A/16. 6. Details of these transactions of acquisition of properties by the income of ancestral property and income of the wife of the petitioner from dairy business as also from the properties given by father-in-law and brother-in-law of the petitioner were enumerated in Annexures A/17 to A/31. Father-in-law and brother-in-law of the petitioner had given gifts to his wife for which gift tax was also paid and receipts were obtained which are Annexures A/32 to A/37 on record. Petitioner's wife had purchased shares in Gwalior Rubber (P) Ltd. by her own income for which the petitioner had informed the Department concerned and the copy of letters are Annexures A/38 and A/39. Petitioner had clarified the stand taken by his wife and his father-in-law in respect of the house No. 83 situate in Laxmibai Colony, Gwalior. This house was purchased by father-in-law of the petitioner by a registered sale-deed dated 6.6.1983 from one Shrimati Usha Sabhrawal w/o Shri Trilak Raj Sabbarwal for Rs. 90,000/-. Father-in-law Hardayal Patel was the owner of the said house and was living in the same. Property tax etc. were paid which are evident by Annexures A/44 and A/45. 7. Petitioner alleged that it was made clear in the Circular No. 1511 / SPE/90/CR. 233/87 dated 2.3.1990 issued by Deputy Inspector General of Police, Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Bhopal that in the investigation of Cases relating to properties disproportionate to the known source of income, the Investigating Officer must ask the head of department of the accused officer to furnish information of income and expenditure in a Performa prescribed. This circular has not been complied by the respondents and the respondent No. 2 was continuing with the investigation arbitrarily. This procedure adopted by the respondents is violative of the provisions of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. This circular has not been complied by the respondents and the respondent No. 2 was continuing with the investigation arbitrarily. This procedure adopted by the respondents is violative of the provisions of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. 8. Petitioner further claims that the wife of the petitioner was self-earning member and she has been paying wealth tax, income tax and gift-tax which are evident from documents marked as Annexures. Annexures A/47 to A/54 and other documents from Annexures A/60 to Annexure A/86. 9. The respondents had concocted a story that a car No. MP 07 5500 belongs to the petitioner. The registration of this car is shown to be in the name of Smt. Meena Gupta, R/o Delhi. Petitioner has no concern with this car and a malicious allegation has been made against the petitioner in respect of this car. This fact is clarified from the Annexure A/87 filed on record. 10. The respondents being not satisfied with the above car to be fastened against the petitioner, they cooked up a story that three other cars were acquired Benami in the name of Meena Gupta by the petitioner for which another Crime No. 82/94 was registered. A false and baseless allegation was also made against the petitioner in respect of Jeep No. MP 06 1299. This again does not belong to the petitioner rather it belongs to Gwalior Rubber Pvt. Ltd. Malanpur which is evident from the Registration Book Annexurc A/88. 11. The agricultural income of the father of the petitioner was clearly evident from Annexures A/89, A/90, and A/91 and comes to minimum to Rs. 3, 60, 000/-. Petitioner had also received an amount of pay salary and DA and had a savings of Rs. 75,000/- in his service career which are evident from Annexure A/92. The earning of the wife of the petitioner was separate and was quite substantial as is evident from Annexure A/93 to A/95. 12. The value of the seized property was only Rs. 700000/- which is totally explained and there is nothing on record to make out any charge against the petitioner even prima facie u/s 13(1) (e) of the Act. The Investigation is being continued against the petitioner in a malicious manner for the last five years without any result and the same is liable to be quashed. 13. 700000/- which is totally explained and there is nothing on record to make out any charge against the petitioner even prima facie u/s 13(1) (e) of the Act. The Investigation is being continued against the petitioner in a malicious manner for the last five years without any result and the same is liable to be quashed. 13. The respondents, on the other hand, filed a reply and alleged that the petitioner has not been able to explain the acquisition of the house No. 83 situate in Laxmibai Colony, Gwalior. Claim of the petitioner was false that this house belongs to his father-in-law. Although it stood in the name of Hardayal Patel, but the same was a Benami Transaction. The respondents further alleged that the petitioner was having no other income except his salary etc. from service. 14. Heard counsel for the petitioner S/Shri D.K. Katareand A.K. Baruaand, Shri K.N. Gupta, Government Advocate for the respondents/State and perused the entire record. 14. The first point raised in this petition was that the investigation is being continued for the last five years and without any result. The main allegation against the petitioner was that House No. 83 situate in Laxmibai Colony, Gwalior was acquired by him as Benami in the name of his father-in-law. This fact is belied by the registered sale-deed, copy of which is produced on record. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner's father-in-law was a rich man and he had purchased the said house for his own family and there was no question that the petitioner had purchased this house Benami in the name of his father-in-law. Petitioner has his wife and son and he could very well purchase the said house in their name. It was highly improbable that a man will purchase a Benami property in the name of his father-in-law. Further father-in-law of the petitioner had died and for mutation his sons had applied. In these circumstances, it could never be said or imagined that the house in question was belonged to the petitioner and was purchased Benami in the name of father-in-law- Copy of the sale-deed is filed on record which was in the name of father-in-law of the petitioner Shri Hardayal Patel. Hardayal Patel had died and his sons had applied for mutation. The petitioner has not taken any steps nor filed any objection in this matter. Hardayal Patel had died and his sons had applied for mutation. The petitioner has not taken any steps nor filed any objection in this matter. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case that Hardayal himself was a rich man and the house was purchased by him in the town of Gwalior, it could not be assumed or reasonably inferred that it was a Benami transaction and actually purchased by the petitioner. This allegation, therefore, is, totally belled in view of the sale-deed standing in the name of Hardayal Patel, the father-in-law of the petitioner and after his death, his sons had applied for mutation and no objection has been raised by the petitioner or any member of his family. Therefore, acquisition of the house by Hardayal Patel is established on record and the allegation that it was a Benami transaction by the petitioner is totally falsified and as such, no investigation or prosecution could be launched against the petitioner for acquisition of the said house. 16. There is no immoveable property alleged to have been acquired by the petitioner. Agricultural land which was in the village was ancestral property and the land which was purchased from agricultural income has been fully explained by the petitioner. In respect of the cars and jeep, they do not stand in the name of the petitioner or any of his family member, and (hey are not in possession of the petitioner. The car stands in the name of Smt. Meena Gupta of Delhi and the same has not been seized and the petitioner does not claim the same to have been belonging to him or any of his family member. Therefore, this allegation is again uncalled for. Petitioner had not purchased any car or jeep and he is not liable to explain. The car and jeep stand in the name of different persons and the petitioner was not bound to explain their acquisition. The allegation that registration of these vehicles was in the fake name again could not call upon the petitioner to explain as he does not possess any of these vehicles at all. 17. Similarly house hold articles seized were ordinary articles available in every house, like beds, sofa etc. Utensils, clothes suit cases etc are ordinary articles which could very well be acquired by a person who is in service for more than 20 years. 17. Similarly house hold articles seized were ordinary articles available in every house, like beds, sofa etc. Utensils, clothes suit cases etc are ordinary articles which could very well be acquired by a person who is in service for more than 20 years. None of these articles could be said to have been beyond the source of income of petitioner which has been fully explained. Both the petitioner and his wife are self-earning members. They have their separate income and in these circumstances it could not be said mat the household articles seized were beyond the source of income for petitioner or his wife. 18. Petitioner has always been informing the head of department in respect of acquisition of properly and business of his wife. He has also been giving statement of his acquisition of property and income in his department which are fully borne out from the document as referred above. The seized articles worth only Rs. 70000/- which has been fully explained and have been purchased by the petitioner and his wife from their income which was quite reasonable. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on different provisions of the Adhiniyam and the Rules framed thereunder. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam provides :- 9. Provisions relating to complaints - Every complaint involving an allegation shall be made in such form as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a deposit of 25 rupees. The complainant shall also swear an affidavit in such form as may be prescribed before the Lokayukt in this behalf. 20. Rules 16 framed under the Act provides that :- 16. Procedure to be adopted at the Investigation - When the Lokayukt or Up-lokayukt conducts an investigation under the Act, he shall, after a copy of the complaint on the statement of grounds of the investigation has been served on the public servant concerned, afford reasonable opportunity to him or his authorised representative to inspect or copy of the affidavit of the complainant and other documents, which may have been filed in support of such complaint, affidavit or statement. 21. Despite the repeated demands made by the petitioner, no such complaint has been brought on record. 21. Despite the repeated demands made by the petitioner, no such complaint has been brought on record. Nothing has been shown to the Court that the petitioner was afforded any opportunity to explain the acquisition of property or articles found in the house, rather surreptitiously a raid was conducted and these allegations were made in the year 1991. Since then nothing was found beyond the income of the petitioner and the investigation is lying idle. Petitioner had served a notice on 25.4.1994 Annexure A/3 but a evasive reply was given by the respondents on 27.5.1994 Annexure A/4 that the investigation is being continued. Such type of investigation, without any reasonable or plausible result is unlawful and unauthorised and should not be allowed to continue only with a view to harass a particular officer. 22. The next point raised on behalf of the petitioner was that the investigation is being continued against the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Second proviso to Section 17 reads as under:- Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 13, shall not be investigated without the order of a Police Officer, not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. 23. The investigation was initially started by respondent No. 2 who was Deputy Superintendent of Police and now it is being continued by respondent No. 3 who is an Inspector of Police without any authority by the Superintendent of Police or any superior officer, which was a statutory requirement. In respect of Respondent No. 2 no authority has been brought on record or notice of the court or being made available to the petitioner and the entire investigation was unauthorised in view of IInd proviso to section 17 of the Act. Petitioner has given details of the income and income of his wife and acquisition of property has been fully explained by him. 24. Reliance was placed by the petitioner on the case of Ananda Bezbaruas v. Union of India 1994 Cri. LJ 12, and a case reported in 1988 Cri LJ 853 (SC) wherein it was held that :- non consideration and evaluation of material on record - ingredient constituting offence is not established the proceedings are liable to be quashed at the initial stage. 25. LJ 12, and a case reported in 1988 Cri LJ 853 (SC) wherein it was held that :- non consideration and evaluation of material on record - ingredient constituting offence is not established the proceedings are liable to be quashed at the initial stage. 25. In the case of Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of MP, AIR 1977 SC 796 Hon. the Supreme Court held that :- The onus that a particular transaction was benami and the owner is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a difinite character, which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. 26. As pointed out earlier the purchase of house in question by Hardayal Patel is established on record, and after his death his sons had applied for mutation, and the petitioner has no concern with the same, therefore, by any evidence or circumstance it could not be inferred that it was a Benami transaction. 27. Reliance was further placed by the petitioner on the case of Krishna Reddy v. State Dy. Superintendent 1993 Cri LJ 308 as also on the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre. AIR 1988 SC 1990 in which Hon. The Supreme Court held that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and therefore no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings even though it may be at the preliminary stage. 28. Similar view was taken in the case of Collector Land Acquisition v. Smt. katiri, AIR 1987 SC 1353 and State of A.P. v. P.V. Pavithran, AIR 1990 SC 1266 . 28. Similar view was taken in the case of Collector Land Acquisition v. Smt. katiri, AIR 1987 SC 1353 and State of A.P. v. P.V. Pavithran, AIR 1990 SC 1266 . Petitioner also relied on the case of State of UP v. R.K. Shrivastava, AIR 1989 SC 2222 , State of West Bengal, v. Swapna Kumar, AIR 1982 SC 949 , R.P. Kapoor V. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 , Man Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR 1979 SC 1455 , Mansa Ram v. S.P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239 and the cases reported in 1966 Cri LJ 1357 (SC) and 1979 Cri LJ 936 (SC) 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the IInd Proviso to Section 17 of the Act was not complied with in view of the fact that the permission granted by the Superintendent of Police was not a speaking order giving reasons for investigation and the same was invalid. In such cases, speaking order must be passed in giving permission for investigation of offence u/s 13(1) (e) of the Act. Any mechanical order does not fulfil the requirement of II proviso to Section 17 of the Act. It was so held in the case of Mansa Ram v. S. P. Pathak, Supra and Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR (1986) SC 481. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that the entire investigation is barred in view of Section 8 (c) of the Adhiniyam, in view of the fact that the house was purchased on 6.6.1983 and the FIR was lodged on 18.12.1991. Section 8 of the Adhiniyam reads as under :- 8. Matter not subject to enquiry - The Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt shall not enquire into any matter - (a) in respect of which a formal and public inquiry has been ordered under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1950 (No. 37 of 1950); (b) which has been referred for inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 (No. 60 of 1952); or (c) Relating to an allegations against a public servant, if the complaint is made after expiration of a period of five years from the date on which the conduct complained against is alleged to have been committed. 31. Clause (c) of Section 8 of the Adhiniyam clearly prohibits any inquiry in respect of the property acquired before five years of the lodging of the FIR. 32. 31. Clause (c) of Section 8 of the Adhiniyam clearly prohibits any inquiry in respect of the property acquired before five years of the lodging of the FIR. 32. Learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that Section 8 of the Adhiniyam prohibits only inquiry and not investigation. 33. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is not tenable in view of the fact that the explanation appended to Section 7 of the Adhiniyam clearly clarifies the position that the expression 'inquiry' includes investigation by a police agency put at the disposal of Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt in pursuance of sub-section (3) of Section 13. This clarifies the position that the word 'inquiry' used in Section 8 of the Adhiniyam includes investigation. As such, the investigation in respect of the house which was acquired before five years of the lodging of the FIR was clearly prohibited u/s 8 (c) of the Adhiniyam. 34. In this view of the matter, since the main allegation against the petitioner was in respect of the acquisition of the house which is barred u/s 8 (c) of the Adhiniyam, other items have already been examined, therefore, nothing remains to be explained by the petitioner, and as such, there was nothing to be inquired for the alleged offence u/s 13 (1) (e) of the Act. 35. The respondents have not been able to find out any evidence against the petitioner for the last five years. Investigation in respect of the house is barred, other articles are fully explained, therefore, it is nothing, but an abuse of the process of law to continue such inquiry for the last five years, when nothing could be found for prosecution of the petitioner. 36. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that even if the permission granted by the Superintendent of Police Annexure R/1 is vitiated for the offence u/s 13 1 (e)of the Act, but the same could not be vitiated in respect of the offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act. 36. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that even if the permission granted by the Superintendent of Police Annexure R/1 is vitiated for the offence u/s 13 1 (e)of the Act, but the same could not be vitiated in respect of the offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act. Section 13(1) (d) is quoted below :- 13 (1) (d) Criminal Misconduct by a Public Servant - A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct - xxx xxx xxx (d) if he- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtain for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. 37. In this respect also, nothing has been brought on record to show that the petitioner had acquired anything by corrupt and illegal means abusing his position as public servant, for himself or any member of his family. 38. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that it may be found in future, if further investigation is continued. (38-A). I am unable to understand this logic, for the last five years nothing has been found to constitute an offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act, and in future, if anything is found the investigation may be permitted to continue. At this stage, it is sufficient to say that since nothing has been found for constituting the offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act the investigation has lost its ground. No purpose will be served to continue the investigation to fish out against the petitioner till he remains in service. Further in future, if anything is found against the petitioner for constituting the offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act, the respondent will always be free and able to proceed against the petitioner according to law. But at this stage, since there is nothing on record to even suggest anything for the offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act it will be a mockery of investigation to be permitted to continue for fishing out anything till the petitioner remains in service. Therefore, the argument by the learned counsel for the respondent is not tenable. 39. But at this stage, since there is nothing on record to even suggest anything for the offence u/s 13 (1) (d) of the Act it will be a mockery of investigation to be permitted to continue for fishing out anything till the petitioner remains in service. Therefore, the argument by the learned counsel for the respondent is not tenable. 39. Respondents in their return have already admitted that total income of the petitioner from known verified sources was Rs. 4,93,000/-. Respondents have also not denied that the agricultural income was also rupees one lac. The total income of the petitioner's wife has taken to be Rs. 4,02,000/- who was a self earning member and was paying income tax. The income from the milk dairy is besides the income as admitted by the respondents. In this way, the total property-assets valued by the respondents to be explained by the petitioner was only Rs. 3,79,600/-. According to their own admission of the respondents, the total assets having been fully explained by the income of the petitioner and his wife by their own sources, and therefore, no offence u/s 13 (1) (e) of the Act was at all made out. As such, arbitrary investigation should not be allowed to continue after a long lapse of time. 40. It is very important to note that in a case for the alleged offence u/s 13 (1) (e) of the Act it is necessary as the section itself requires that the accused must be given an opportunity at the first hand to explain the assets alleged to have been acquired by him. Only, if he fails to explain, then the prosecuting agency may proceed to investigate the matter and prosecute him. Before giving opportunity for explanation, laying down raid and seizure of the house hold articles, the manner in which it was done in this case, is against the provisions of law. 41. Again it may be pointed out that wherever investigation is authorised under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt Department, duty of the investigating agency is to afford opportunity to the accused first to explain, and if he fails to explain, only then raid and seizure is required. 42. 41. Again it may be pointed out that wherever investigation is authorised under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt Department, duty of the investigating agency is to afford opportunity to the accused first to explain, and if he fails to explain, only then raid and seizure is required. 42. Learned counsel for the respondents pointed out in such a situtation, the accused will be able to remove the household articles and the articles for which the accused is called upon to explain and the documents of acquisition of property could not be seized. 43. That may be a case where shares, fixed deposit receipts are to be seized, when explanation for acquisition of the same could not be given. Merely, because a complaint has been received, laying down raid and seizure without calling upon the accused to explain is an abuse of the mandated provisions of Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act itself. The explanation appended to Section 13 (1) (e) of the Act further clarifies this position that :- For the purposes of this Section, "known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 44. Unless an opportunity is given, it cannot be said that the accused/Government servant failed to satisfactorily account the pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Therefore, the Section itself requires that first an opportunity be given to the public servant to explain and only when he fails to satisfactorily account for, any steps like raid or seizure be made for the offence under Section 13(1) (e) of the Act which is not being at all done here in this case, which cannot be permitted under law. 45. It is also noteworthy that for other offences, even heinous offence like murder, Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes time limits for completing the investigation. Even the Code of Criminal Procedure does not permit the investigation in heinous offence to continue for indefinite period. Even in cases under the Act, only reasonable period for investigation is permissible under law. Investigation could not continue for long and indefinite period, like this one in which years have passed with no result. Even the Code of Criminal Procedure does not permit the investigation in heinous offence to continue for indefinite period. Even in cases under the Act, only reasonable period for investigation is permissible under law. Investigation could not continue for long and indefinite period, like this one in which years have passed with no result. This is nothing but an abuse of process of law and must be curved by this Court. 46. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to the cases of Union of Inda vs. B.R. Bajaj, AIR 1994 SC 1256 and State of Tamil Nadu vs. Thirukkural Perumal, (1995) 2 SCC 449 , in which it has been held that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. should be sparingly exercised and not at the initial stages of the investigation. It is true that at the initial stages of the investigation, inherent powers of the court should not be exercised to quash the proceedings, but when after long lapse of time nothing could be found to substantiate the offence prima facie, in spite of fishing for all these years, it certainly makes out a case for interference under the inherent powers of this court. 47. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Choudhary Bhajanlal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 , the Supreme Court held that :- The investigation of a cognizable offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strike compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable features of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. Indeed, a noticeable features of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the court on being approached by the person, aggrieved for the redress of any grievance, has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of Constitution. It needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable upto unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of such power will be tent-amount to recognition of 'Divine Power, which no authority on earth can enjoy. 48. In the leading authority of R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 before illustrating a few category of cases where inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings could be exercised by the High Court, their Lordships defined the jurisdiction generally in the following terms :- The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quah proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. 49. The High Court of Patna in Surendra Kumar Yadav vs. State of Bihar 1989 Cri LJ 1967 having referred to several authorities on the point summed up the scope of exercise of inherent jurisdiction as under :- The inherent power of the High Court under sec. 482 Cr. 49. The High Court of Patna in Surendra Kumar Yadav vs. State of Bihar 1989 Cri LJ 1967 having referred to several authorities on the point summed up the scope of exercise of inherent jurisdiction as under :- The inherent power of the High Court under sec. 482 Cr. P.C. is a wide and wholesome power and if the court feels satisfied that the materials do not justify the continuation would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court will not hesitate to quash the proceedings in exercise of its power. The real touchstone is whether the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice require that the proceedings be quashed and that its continuation would be an abuse of the process of the court. 50. A few decisions specifically touching the quashing of F.I.R. and the investigation may also be noticed. (50) (1) State of A. P. Vs. P. V. Pavithran, referred above, is not only an authority for the proposition that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can be exercised for quashing the first information report, and the investigation thereon, it also lays down the guidelines for exercising such jurisdiction. The High Court had quashed the FIR on the ground that there was inordinate delay in the investigation. Their Lordships holding that 'no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that whenever there is inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such a delay was a ground to quash the FIR or the proceedings arising therefrom', vide para 7 observed :- There is no denying the fact a lethargic lackadaisical manner of investigation over a prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceedings to live every moment under extreme emotional and mental a tress and strain and to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to indolence or inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused, the court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation. (50) (2) Anurag Chopra and others vs. State & ors. (50) (2) Anurag Chopra and others vs. State & ors. (1989 Cri.LJ 2227), the High Court of Delhi invoked its inherent powers for quashing FIR where having considered the material on record the case appeared to be one where any expectation or even remote chance of prosecution resulting in conviction did not exist. (50) (3) A decision from the High Court of Orissa in Sureshchandra Swain v. State of Orissa, 1988 Cri. LJ 1975 provides an illuminating reading on the point. It was said that Section 482 Cr. P.C. in terms, was not confined only to proceedings before the Court after cognizance has been taken, it was a bleary power so as to secure the ends of justice and there was nothing which prevented inherent powers of the court to reach its end where an obvious injustice was perpetuated in the shape of investigation. On a review of the available case-law on the point, the conclusion reached were summarised as under :- (1) If the FIR does not disslose the commission of a cognizable offence against the accused, then the investigation commenced upon such FIR is liable to be quashed. (2) The High Court may quash such investigation either under Section 482 Cr. P.C. or Under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. (3) No such quashing of the investigation would be made if by the time the consideration is made by the High Court, materials have come to light as a result of the investigation disclosing prima facie commission of an offence by the accused; and (4) Even in such cases the investigation may be quashed if it is established that the carrying on of the investigation has resulted in mis carriage of justice. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken in Suresh Chandra Swain's case (supra) 51. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken in Suresh Chandra Swain's case (supra) 51. Even at the risk of repetition (keeping in view the law discussed hereinabove) the conclusions emerging from the facts and circumstances of the case may be summed up :- (i) Some one unknown has flunk up a vague and general complaint against a public servant and that man does not have the courage to show his face till this date; (ii) The complaint received at the Head quarters of the Special Police Establishment at Bhopal has been forwarded to the Gwalior Office in a routine manner without showing any application of mind to the aspect whether the compliant deserved to be enquired into even prima facie or not; (iii) During a period of five years nothing has been done in the name of investigation except pulling a public servant (petitioner) from time to time and making such enquiries as have not led investigation or in any positive direction and without at any time forming an opinion by the investigator as to why if at all the explanations furnished the information given, and the documents supplied by the public servant were not satisfactory or acceptable. (iv) The complaint forming basis of the proceedings is an extremely vague and general type of complaint it is highly exaggerated till this day nothing has been brought out to suggest that the complaint had the slightest possible ring of truth in it. (v) Though a period of five years has elapsed, from the date of the complaint and since when the Special Police Establishment has been seized of the complaint but not an iota of evidence has been collected to suggest that if prosecuted the public servant would be liable to be convicted. On the contrary, the only effect of the complaint being inquired into during the period of last five years has been to keep the public servant proceeded against under a fear psychosis, naturally causing extreme emotional and mental stress and strain (to borrow the words of their Lordship from P.V. Pavithran's case (supra). The net effect of the above said conclusions is that the proceedings against the petitioner initiated by the respondents and kept on pending for a long period amount to sheer abuse of the process of the law. Their continuation would be perpetuating abuse. They are liable to be quashed. 52. The net effect of the above said conclusions is that the proceedings against the petitioner initiated by the respondents and kept on pending for a long period amount to sheer abuse of the process of the law. Their continuation would be perpetuating abuse. They are liable to be quashed. 52. This is a case where from the Special Police Establishment may gain experience and think of laying down guidelines for its own use in the matter of entertaining anonymous or pseudonymous complaints made to it Should it not ascertain, before embarking upon an investigation (or even an inquiry) whether the complainant at all exists on earth or not ? Whether a vague application containing generalised and reckless innuendos can be called as complaint to be taken cognizance of, so as to set the bail of law rolling ? Special Police Establishment is meant to concentrate on things of substance and not to waste its time and energy on such communication made to it, which it will be a misnomer to call a complaint. They had to be cautions and visualise such situations where any mischief monger may throw a waste piece of paper in the courtyard containing high sounding allegations made recklessly and thus making them run amuck only to find at the end of their pursuit a mole out of a hill, with none to be proceeded against as the informant would be just not traceable. Person really aggrieved and people really public-spirited do not hide their faces nor bear marks as the informant in this case, has done. The Special Police Establishment has to be wary of such informations and such informants. 53. Thus, from the discussion of the facts and circumstances of the case and the law on the relevant points, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner has been able to explain the acquisition of properties standing in his name. No opportunity was given to the petitioner before laying down the raid for explaining the source of income from which properties and articles were required. Since the acquisition of the properties alleged have been fully explained, there could not be any prima facie case for prosecution of the petition. 54. No opportunity was given to the petitioner before laying down the raid for explaining the source of income from which properties and articles were required. Since the acquisition of the properties alleged have been fully explained, there could not be any prima facie case for prosecution of the petition. 54. Further the offence under Section 13 (1) (e) of the prevention of corruption Act could not be investigated unless the Police Officer not below the rank of superintendent of Police, has passed a speaking order authorising investigation. The order passed by the Superintendent of Police, authorising some investigation must be a speaking order as held in Bhajanlal's case referred above. A copy of the order submitted by the respondents authorising the investigation is not at all a speaking order and it is without application of mind only filling the gaps in the prescribed proforma. 55. Besides all these, the entire properties assigned to the petitioner have been fully explained by income tax returns by respective petitioners. The case reported in AIR 1993 SC 313 in para 12 the apex Court emphasises that income tax returns when filed much earlier, there was no chance of any manipulation. Any property covered by income tax returns could not be seized on the allegation of lack of known source of income and the same have to be returned to the owner. 56. As such, it is held that no prima facie case for prosecution of the petitioner has been made out in spite of long lapse of investigation and the raid conducted was uncalled for. This Court at this stage has to intervene in such a circumstance as the petitioner has been suffering harassment without any substance for a long time. 57. In view of the discussions made above, this petition is allowed. The investigation and further proceedings in cases registered at Crime Nos. 116/91 and 82/94 by the respondents are hereby quashed. Property seized from the petitioner is directed to be returned to him.