Registrar of Trade Unions and Joint Labour Commissioner (H. Q. ) v. Lake Palace Hotel Karya Karta Union
1996-09-12
BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE, M.G.MUKHERJI
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Honble MUKHERJI, ACTG. C.J. – This special appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 17th April, 1995 passed by a learned Single Judge of our Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5870/93. (2). The Registrar of Trade Unions filed the writ application seeking to quash the judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Udaipur dated 7th August, 1993. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the learned District Judge has rightly set aside the order cancelling the registration of the respondent-Lake Palace Hotel Karya Karta Union dated 30.9.1991 and in that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge was not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order as passed by the learned District Judge and thus dismissed the application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the Registrar of Trade Unions and Joint Labour Commissioner was given liberty to proceed under Section 10 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 in accordance with law. (3). Mr. K.L. Jasmatia, learned Additional Advocate General in support of the special appeal contended before us that both the learned Single Judge as well as the learned District Judge failed to consider the legal provisions contained under the Trade Unions Act and decided the matter illegally by not taking the correct view of the law and accordingly, the orders impugned are liable to be set-aside and/or quashed. Mr. Jasmatia further contended that as per the provisions laid down under Section 10(b) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Registrar is empowered to cancel the registration after giving two months notice specifying the grounds in writing. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the learned District Judge could appreciate that in the present case, the Union concerned was given two months time to furnish returns as per the requirements under Section 28 of the Trade Union Act, but still then the learned District Judge as well as the learned Single Judge of our Court were of the considered view that a second notice ought to have been given to the respondent-Lake Palace Hotel Karya Karta Union before any decision to cancel its registration was taken by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Mr.
Mr. Jasmatia further contended that on a bare perusal of Section 10(b) of the Trade Unions Act, it was manifestly clear that such procedure so as to give a second notice was envisaged under law even though only one notice could do duty for the requirements of the statute. (4). We have given our due consideration to the provisions of the statute in this regard. The certificate of registration of a Trade Union may be withdrawn or cancelled by the Registrar if the latter is satisfied that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake or that the Trade Union has ceased to exist or ``has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of the Act or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter which was specifically provided for as per the requirements under Section 6. The proviso under Section 10(b) of the Trade Unions Act contained inter-alia a provision that not less than two months previous notice in writing specifying the grounds on which it is proposed to withdraw or cancel the certificate shall have to be given by the Registrar to the Trade Union concerned before the certificate is withdrawn or cancelled, otherwise than on the application of the Trade Union itself. (5). Mr. Jasmatia placed reliance on a Single Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Registrar of Trade Unions vs. Dum Dum Cantonment Businessmens and Traders Union (1), to contend that Section 10 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 did not require two notices and the requirement under Section 10 is well met if only one notice is issued and that notice is of not less than two months from the date of the cancellation. The two months limit has been reached in the reported decision within the proviso to Section 10. It was further held in that case that under Section 10 of the Trade Unions Act, the certificate of registration of a Trade Union may be cancelled if the Registrar of Trade Union is satisfied that the Trade Union has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of the Act. In the facts of that case, there was a wilful contravention of Section 28(4) by the Trade Union concerned.
In the facts of that case, there was a wilful contravention of Section 28(4) by the Trade Union concerned. It was specifically observed in para 6 of the said judg- ment that if it pleases the Registrar of Trade Unions, he may issued more than one notice. If he issues only one notice and that notice is of not less than two months from the date of the cancellation, the requirement of Section 10 is well met. The learned Single Judge in the facts of that case sought to probe deep in to what really amounted to an infraction of Section 28(4) of the Act, which the Appellate Authority missed. The learned Single Judge observed inter-alia that if upon the whole of the materials an infraction was found, obviously then there was an error apparent on the face of the record in the order recorded by the Appellate Authority and the Rule has to be made absolute. If however no infraction was found of Section 28(4), there was an end of the matter and the Rule has to be discharged. On examining the qu- estion as to what really amounts to violation of Section 28(4), the learned Single Judge held in that case that Section 28 is a general provision on returns. But, merely lodging of returns is not enough. The statutory authority, here the Registrar of Trade Unions, has to satisfy himself that the returns are in order and represent the true state-of-affairs. That is the reason for enactment of sub-section (4) which provides that for the purpose of examining the documents referred to in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the Registrar or any Officer authorised by him by general or special order, may at all reasonable times inspect the certificate of registration, account books, registers and other documents relating to a Trade Union at its registered office. Keeping the provision of sub-section (4) in the forefront of ones consideration, he diverted his attention to the refractory behaviour on the part of the human agency of the Trade Union concerned, as a result of which, the Registrars Inspector failed to obtain inspection on a particular date or dates.
Keeping the provision of sub-section (4) in the forefront of ones consideration, he diverted his attention to the refractory behaviour on the part of the human agency of the Trade Union concerned, as a result of which, the Registrars Inspector failed to obtain inspection on a particular date or dates. The attention of the Court having been invited to the averments made in the memo of appeal before the Appe- llate Authority that the Secretary of the Trade Union had requested the Inspector to shift the time of inspection and that the representative was waiting for the Inspector at that hour, but in vain, it was open to the gravest doubt as to whether the Court should be invited to go by the averments made in the memorandum of appeal before the Appellate Authority. If the Trade Union is so sanguine, it ought to have sworn an affidavit. But, on the other hand, the learned Single Judge found that there was an outrageous attitude on the part of the Trade Union in not cooperating with the Registrar and not allowing the Officer sent by the Registrar the proper facilities for holding an inspection, not only once, but twice. As regards the provisions for cancellation of registration, the learned Single Judge held that the certificate of a Trade Union may be cancelled if the Registrar is satisfied that the Trade Union has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar, contravened any provision of the Act. In the facts of the said reported decision, the learned Single Judge held that the facts left no room for doubt in the perspective of a prudent man that there was wilful contravention by the Trade Union of Section 28(4), which indeed has been rendered nugatory only because of the obstinacy on the part of the human agency of the Trade Union. He found a blameworthy mind in this perspective and nothing short of that on the part of the human agency of the Trade Union. The learned Single Judge further found that the Registrar can be satisfied within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the Act only when he issues the notification.
He found a blameworthy mind in this perspective and nothing short of that on the part of the human agency of the Trade Union. The learned Single Judge further found that the Registrar can be satisfied within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the Act only when he issues the notification. In the facts of the said case, the Registrar issued the notification which was being taken as the starting point of counting of two months within the meaning of proviso to Section 10 but obviously that limit was not reached when the certificate for registration was cancelled. The date when the Registrar records the order was the date which is the culminating point of his satisfaction, his satisfaction having started much earlier. Unless he was satisfied in doing so, he could not have issued the notification which he did earlier. The learned Single Judge attached no importance whosoever to the second order issued by the Registrar at the importunity of the Trade Union. To show indulgence to the Trade Union was not to waive the statutory right which the Registrar obviously had. Ignoring the contention on behalf of the Trade Union that even the two months time limit has not been reached within the proviso to Section 10, the learned Single Judge exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India made the Rule absolute and the order of the Appellate Authority was set aside and that of the Registrar of Trade Unions cancelling the registration of the Trade Union was restored. (6). Mr. Govind Mathur, learned advocate appearing for the respondent cited before us a Division Bench judgment of Patna High Court in Radheyshyam Singh and Ors. vs. Bata Mazdoor Union and Anr. (2), where the Single Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court, as referred to above, was taken note of and sought to be distinguished. It was held in the Division Bench judgment of Patna High Court that on a plain reading of the provisions of Section 10(b) of the Trade Unions Act, it must be held that a prior notice, apart from the one for the proposed cancellation or withdrawal of certificate of registration as contemplated under the proviso to Section 10 has to be given by the Registrar in a case where there is an allegation of contravention of any provisions of the Trade Unions Act by the Trade Union concer- ned.
In absence of such a previous notice, any proceeding for cancellation or withdrawal of registration would be deemed to be illegal and without jurisdiction. Thus, in the opinion of the Division Bench of Patna High Court, a previous notice should have been given by the Registrar under Section 10(b) other than one provided under the proviso. As regards the decision of the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Registrar of Trade Unions vs. Dum Dum Cantonment Businessmens and Traders Union (supra), it was observed that the facts in that case were different and the decision was not an authority on the point. The Division Bench of Patna High Court while discussing with the different facts of Section 10(b) expressed the view that a certificate of registration may be withdrawn or cancelled if the Registrar is satisfied (i) that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake; (ii) or the Trade Union has ceased to exist; (iii) or has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act; (iv) or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision; and (v) or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter provision for which is required by Section 6. Before withdrawing or cancelling the certificate, a two months notice specifying the grounds on which the action is proposed to be taken is necessary. The Scheme appears to be that the question of cancellation or withdrawal of the certificate cannot be lightly treated. In the case of contravention of any provision of this Act by a Trade Union, the words ``wilfully and after notice from the Registrar have been used. The word ``wilfully introduces what may be called mens rea : a blameworthy mind. There may be occasion where a complaint is filed before the Registrar about any actual or apprehended contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. The alleged contravention or apprehended contraven- tion may or may not be wilful. If the same is not wilful, upon a notice by the Registrar, it is possible that the Union may correct itself and may act according to the provisions of the Act. If it does not, the act may then be construed as wilful.
The alleged contravention or apprehended contraven- tion may or may not be wilful. If the same is not wilful, upon a notice by the Registrar, it is possible that the Union may correct itself and may act according to the provisions of the Act. If it does not, the act may then be construed as wilful. It, therefore, appears that whenever a situation arises where the Union has contravened or is likely to contravene any of the provisions of the Act, the legislature in- tended that a notice be given by the Registrar to the erring or defaulting Trade Union pointing out the contravention. If upon such notice, the Union does not correct itself, a situation may arise for giving a notice of the proposed cancellation of the registration as provided for in the proviso to clause (b) of Section 10. In the facts of the Patna High Court decision, what was complained of by the petitioners was that they were not being enrolled as members of the Union in contravention of Section 21 of the Act. The decision by the Trade Union not to enrol such persons as members may be wilful or may not be wilful. A Trade Union could upon notice by the Registrar in this regard revise its decision and enrol persons as members and, in that view of the matter, the act of the Trade Union will not be wilful. The Union, on the other hand, could satisfy the Registrar that the persons who had applied for membership were not fit to be enrolled as members and, as such, there was no contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. In such an eventuality, the situation may not arise calling upon the Union concerned to show cause why its registration should not be withdrawn or cancelled. The words ``wilfully and after notice from the Registrar are significant enough. However, on a plain reading of the Section it was held in the facts of the said case that a prior notice, apart from the one for proposed action for cancellation or withdrawal of certificate of registration as contemplated under the proviso to Section 10, has to be given by the Registrar, where there is any allegation of contravention of any provisions of the Act by the Trade Union concerned.
In absence of such a prior notice, any proceeding for cancellation or withdrawal of registration would be deemed to be illegal and without jurisdiction. (7). It was contended by Mr. Jasmatia that a notice dated 3rd July, 1991 was given to the respondent No.1 Trade Union and that the said notice was a sufficient notice in compliance of the Act, in pursuance of which registration was ultimately cancelled by the Registrar vide his order dated 30.9.1991. Mr. Jasmatia contended that there was no mandatory provision to issue a second show cause notice and that apart whether a second notice would be necessary would depend upon the facts of each case. In the facts of the present case, we find that the Union has simply failed to file annual return for the year 1984-85 despite the notice dated 3rd July, 1991, even though all other returns from 1986 to 1990 were filed. From that the Registrar took a view that the Union was in the know of the facts and materials, on the basis of which, an action was taken against the Union, which could be conside- red to be a reasonable opportunity of compliance. However, on a perusal of the facts, we do not agree. The Registrar of Trade Unions gave notice vide order dated 3.4.1991 to more than 1300 Trade Unions and the respondent No. 1 Union was also one of them. In reference to the notice dated 3.7.1991, registration of more than 900 Unions were cancelled. (8). It was further contended that even though there was delay of 14 days, the learned District Judge entertained the appeal as the Appellate Authority by condoning the said delay, even though law of limitation was not expressly applicable in respect of a proceeding under Trade Unions Act. We do not agree that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not available in the facts and circumstances of the case and the delay could not be legally condoned. (9). Under Section 10(b) of the Trade Unions Act, various grounds for issuance of a notice by the Registrar of Trade Unions are given as stated above.
We do not agree that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not available in the facts and circumstances of the case and the delay could not be legally condoned. (9). Under Section 10(b) of the Trade Unions Act, various grounds for issuance of a notice by the Registrar of Trade Unions are given as stated above. But, then it is very much clear from the statute that in case the Registrar desired to cancel the registration on the ground of Trade Union having wilfully and ``after notice contra- vened any provision of the Act, then of course the contravention ought to have taken place or occurred after notice. In the first notice, it has to be specifically mentioned that the Trade Union is contravening some provisions of the statute and if despite the notice, the Trade Union goes on contravening such provisions, a second notice would be necessary in our view, prior to taking of the final decision regarding can- cellation of the registration of the Trade Union concerned. That not specifically having been so done, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think that the view taken by the learned District Judge and learned Single Judge of our Court is erroneous or called for any interference. We however, hold that in appropriate cases, where contravention is of a different kind, one single notice of two months may do duty for both the notices but that is unfortunately not the case here. (10). In the result, the present special appeal stands dismissed, though without any order as to costs.