Judgment :- D. RAJU, J. 1. The above appeal has been filed under Section 46 of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963) hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ by the various occupants of different extents of land who claimed ryotwari patta on the ground that they are ryots in possession and occupation of ryoti land under the provisions of the Act challenging the orders of the authorities below, rejecting their claim and directing the issue of patta in favour of the first r espondent/land-holder. 2. The present enquiry culminating in the above appeal under the Act preceded by different proceedings, some among the parties and some between the State and the land-holder, needs a brief reference for a proper understanding of the nature of the claim projected in the above appeal. The lands in question formed part of Esanamadam Estate which consisted of larger extent covered by three title deeds namely T.D. Nos. 270, 271 and 272. Originally, the entire estate comprising five survey groups of villages covered by the three title deeds were notified as an estate under Section 1 (4) of the Act in G.O.Ms. No. 3193, Revenue Department, dated 19-11-1965 and it was actually taken over by the Government under the Act on 15-12-1965. After the said notification, the land-holder-Adheenam appears to have filed W.P. No. 4823 of 1965 on the file of this Court, challenging the notification for taking over the Inam Estate. Though initially while entertaining the writ petition, interim order of stay was also granted, subsequently the same appears to have been dismissed on 24-6-1966 by a common order made in the said writ petition as wed as in W.P. No. 1552 of 1965. The matter has been pursued by the land holder before the Supreme Court of India in C.A. No. 672 of 1967 and stay of further proceedings was obtained from the Apex Court. Thereupon, the Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal on 30-11-1970 without detriment to the claims of the land holder Adheenam under Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Inams (Supplementary) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 31/1963). The landholder thereupon filed a petition before the Settlement Officer, Madurai under Section 5 of the Act for a declaration that the village in question was not an Estate within the purview of the Tamil Nadu Act 31/1963. The landholder thereupon filed a petition before the Settlement Officer, Madurai under Section 5 of the Act for a declaration that the village in question was not an Estate within the purview of the Tamil Nadu Act 31/1963. The Settlement Officer, by his proceedings dated 17-1-1972, held that the non-ryotwari area constituting Esanamadam was a minor inam. As against that order, one Ayyasami felt aggrieved and preferred an appeal before the Inam Abolition Tribunal (Sub-Court), Tirunelveli under Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1963. The Tribunal by its common order in R.A. Nos. 32, 42, 43 and 45 of 1972 dated 19-3-1975 held that the grant covered by T.D. Nos. 270 and 272 are Minor Inams to be dealt with under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Tamil Nadu Act 30/1963), while the grant covered by T.D. No. 271 was a part village or new Inam Estate to be dealt with under the Tamil Nadu Act 26/1963. As against the said order of the Inam Abolition Tribunal, the landholder preferred revisions before this Court in C.R.P. Nos. 2195, 2196 and 2305 of 1975. Ultimately this Court by a common order dated 10-2-1978 held the grant covered by T.D. No. 271 is a part Inam or new Inam Estate to be dealt with under the Tamd Nadu Act 26 of 1963. The subject matter of the proceedings now under consideration in this appeal relates to Vallankottai survey group out of the total five survey groups of villages which are concerned. 2 (a). The Settlement Tahsildar, Branch Settlement Office, Madurai, initiated suo motu enquiry under the Rules framed under the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963 and served the prescribed notice in the statutory form on the occupants of the land and also the landholder Adheenam, apart from having the prescribed notice in the statutory form also published in the several places as required. The landholder Adheenam as also the occupants have filed their conflicting claims for patta in their respective favour. The parties on either side marked volume of documents besides adducing oral evidence. After considering the materials produced on record, the Settlement Tahsildar, by his proceedings S.R. Nos. The landholder Adheenam as also the occupants have filed their conflicting claims for patta in their respective favour. The parties on either side marked volume of documents besides adducing oral evidence. After considering the materials produced on record, the Settlement Tahsildar, by his proceedings S.R. Nos. 1 to 180/TNV/78 dated 8-2-1979 held that the suit lands are the absolute property of the landholder Adheenam and as such are private lands in character, that the lands being those falling within Section 2(13)(ii)(b) of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, it was enough if there was proof of ownership of the lands by the Adheenam and that personal cultivation is not to be insisted upon and that the landholder Adheenam had been treating the lands in Vallankottai village as his private land and therefore was entitled to ryotwari patta under Section 9 (2) (a) of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963. (b) In coming to such a conclusion, as noticed earlier, the Settlement Tahsildar held that the Inam grant covered by T.D. No. 271 is a new Inam Estate, that according to the amended Act, Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 which came into force on 1-1-1964 a religious institution need not prove personal cultivation and it would suffice if the land-holder proves that the suit lands belonged to him as private or pannai land as defined under the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, that the appellants claimants before him cannot merely take shelter under Section 65(1) of the Act and unless it was proved that the land was already included in the holding of a ryot they should satisfy strictly the requirements of Section 10(2) (a) of the Act and they cannot succeed in getting ryotwari patta in their name by merely relying upon Section 10 (2) (b) of the Act. The Settlement Tahsildar also chose to rely upon certain other proceedings arising out of the application of the Rent Reduction Act, 1947 and also the Tamil Nadu Public Trust Act 57 of 1961 to come to the conclusion that the occupants in question have not proved to have acquired any kudiwaram rights in the lands in their possession, but that they were only cultivating tenants. The Settlement Tahsildar also held that the landholder Adheenam was not shown to have parted with kudiwaram rights in favour of the occupants, he being the owner of both warams the grant in the case having been shown to be of both warams and not merely melwaram alone. The Settlement Tahsildar was also of the view that the claim in question among the parties has to be considered and dealt with keeping into account the fact that it is a new Inam Estate and not an Estate within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 or an existing Inam Estate. 3. Aggrieved, the appellants pursued the matter before the Inams Abolition Tribunal (Sub-Court), Tirunelveli in R.A.(I.A.T.) No. 4 of 1979. The learned Tribunal by its Order dated 30-1-1982 confirmed the order of the Settlement Tahsildar holding that the appellants are not entitled to patta and that the findings of the Settlement Tahsildar that the lands are the private lands of the landholder Adheenam, that he did not part with his kudiwaram rights at any time in favour of the occupants and that the landholder Adheenam being a religious institution was not required to prove direct cultivation, was rightly held to be entitled to the ryotwari patta. Hence, the above appeal. 4. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellants, took elaborate pains to argue the matter at length with particular reference to the development of case law relating to the criteria to be applied in determining the character of the land namely, as to whether a particular land was a private land or ryoti land and the conditions to be satisfied for the grant of patta in favour of either the land-holder or the ryot. The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the decision reported in I.L.R. 39 Madras 341 = 2 L.W. 117 ( Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Somaya ) which came to be confirmed in the decision reported in I.L.R. 42 Madras 400 = 10 L.W. 400 ( Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasad Nayudu v. Somaya and others), and some of the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 214, = 59 L.W. 151 (Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppammal ); 1952 (1) M.L.J. 71 = (1951) 64 L.W. (Suppl.)1 (Full Bench) ( Periannan v. Amman Kovil ), 1964 (1) M.L.J. 232 = 76 L.W. 776; (The State of Madras rep. 214, = 59 L.W. 151 (Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppammal ); 1952 (1) M.L.J. 71 = (1951) 64 L.W. (Suppl.)1 (Full Bench) ( Periannan v. Amman Kovil ), 1964 (1) M.L.J. 232 = 76 L.W. 776; (The State of Madras rep. by the Collector of Tirunelveli v. S.P.K. Koya and others); A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1005 ( Chidambaram v. Santanaramaswami ); A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1066 ( P. Venkataswami v. D.S. Ramireddi) and finally the decision reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 604 = 1991-1-L.W. 16 (Pollisetti Pullamma and others v. Kalluri Kameswaramma (Dead) by L.Rs. and others). In our view, except for historical background of the stages of development of the law, it would be unnecessary to advert to the details of the principles down in those decisions except the latest one rendered by the Apex Court reported in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C.) (supra). 5. The decision in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C.) (supra) arose out of appeals from the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (A.P. Act 26 of 1948) which was in pari materia to the then Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (26 of 1948). After reviewing elaborately the case law on the subject, the Apex Court held as hereunder:— “21. Before the High court the findings of the courts below that the temple owned the melvaram and kudivaram interests in the lands and the defendants had not acquired permanent rights of occupancy in the lands apart from the Act had not been disputed by the defendants. The dispute, therefore, was confined to two questions, namely, first, whether the village was an “estate” under the Madras Estates Land Act and, secondly, whether the concurrent finding of the courts below that the lands were private lands of the temple was correct or not. The dispute, therefore, was confined to two questions, namely, first, whether the village was an “estate” under the Madras Estates Land Act and, secondly, whether the concurrent finding of the courts below that the lands were private lands of the temple was correct or not. While deciding the second question and dismissing the Second Appeals and the Civil Revision Petitions, the learned Judges discussed the relevant case law and therefrom Satyanarayana Rao, J. with whom Viswanatha Sastri, J. concurred, at paragraph 49 page 346 of the report and held that the following propositions were established: “(1) If the land is known to be ryoti at its inception the only mode by which it could be converted into private land is by proof of continuous cultivation for a period of 12 years prior to the commencement of the Act. (2) Even if the nature of the land is not known, continuous cultivation for the required period of 12 years before the commencement of the Act would conclusively establish that the land is private land. (3) If there is no proof of cultivation for a continuous period of 12 years before the commencement of the Act, the land may be proved to be private land by other methods; provided the land was not shown to be once ryoti. (4) Cultivation of the lands or leasing of the lands under short-term leases may be one mode of proof. (5) An intention to cultivate or resume for cultivation is also a test to decide that the land is private land and such intention may be established by any other means, not necessarily by cultivation and by cultivation alone. (6) The essence of private land is continuous course of conduct on the part of the land holder asserting and acting on the footing that he is the absolute owner thereof and recognition and acceptance by the tenants that the land holder has absolute right in the land. (7) Mere proof that the land-holder is the owner of both the warams is not sufficient to prove that the land is private land.” Considered in the light of the definition of “private land”, sections 13 and 15 of the Estates Abolition Act and the basic concept of “domain or home-farm land”, we are of the view that the propositions 4, 5 and 6 above have to be doubted. 22. 22. Viswanatha Sastri, J. who concurred, summarised his conclusions as under: “I may now summarise my conclusion on the legal aspects of the case. Where land proved or admitted to be once ryoti land is claimed to have been converted into private land, the claim is untenable unless the land-holder proves direct cultivation for a period of 12 years before 1st July, 1908. No other mode of conversion is permissible. Where you have to find out whether a land is private or ryoti its original character not being known, proof of direct cultivation of the land by the land holder for 12 ye ars before 1st July, 1908, would, without other evidence, conclusively establish its character as private land, but this is not the only mode of proof permitted to land-holder. Other evidence may be adduced and looked into and might consist, among other matters, of direct cultivation of the land at some period anterior to 12 years preceding 1st July, 1908 but this is not indispensable. Direct cultivation may be valuable and weighty evidence and may be inferred from accounts and other records usually kept by large landholders. If, owing to lapse of time or other reasons, evidence of direct cultivation is not forthcoming, its absence is not fatal to the claim that the land is private. S. 185 of the Act does not shut out, but on the other hand allows all evidence that would be relevant and admissible under the law of evidence, to prove that fact in issue, namely, whether the land is private or ryoti. Local usage or custom and the letting of the land as private land in leases, before 1898 are specifically mentioned in S. 185(1) and (2) as being relevant evidence but other evidence is also expressly made admissible under S. 185 (3). Local usage or custom and the letting of the land as private land in leases, before 1898 are specifically mentioned in S. 185(1) and (2) as being relevant evidence but other evidence is also expressly made admissible under S. 185 (3). The classification of lands as private lands at the time of the permanent settlement or in the early records of zamindaries, the terms of the grant of an under-tenure, the assertion and enjoyment by the land-holder of the right to both the warams, the intention to retain with himself the kudiwaram right and the consequent right to resume direct cultivation if he chooses, leases of the lands as private lands or with terms and conditions inconsistent with any right of occupancy in the lessees, admissions by tenants that the land-holder is the owner of both warams and that they have no occupancy rights, changes in the personnel of the tenants, variations in the rates of rent payable by the tenants-these and kindred matters would be relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that the lands are private lands. The probative value of such evidence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The burden of proof that a particular land in an estate is private land rests on the land-holder, the statutory presumption being the other way. This burden is not discharged merely by proving that both the warams were granted to or enjoyed by the land-holder once upon a time. There must be evidence of the treatment of the lands as private lands by the land-holder, either by direct cultivation or otherwise in the manner above stated”. Considering the statutory definition, in our opinion, the third paragraph and last part of last paragraph above have to be doubted. Raghava Rao, j. who dissented, summarised his conclusions separately.” “30. The basic concept of domain or home-farm land and the concept of cultivation as private land by the landholders used in the definition had, therefore, to be borne in mind in determining private land. The observation of the Division Bench in the impugned Judgment that it is not possible to regard the pronouncement in Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Somayya (I.L.R. 39 Mad. The observation of the Division Bench in the impugned Judgment that it is not possible to regard the pronouncement in Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Somayya (I.L.R. 39 Mad. 341 = 2 L.W. 117) as an authority for the proposition that domain within the meaning of S. 3(10) of the Estates Land Act must be held to mean land around the mansion home of lord and appurtenant thereto, has therefore to be rejected. The decision of the High Court of Madras in Chellapalli case was confirmed by the Privy Council in Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasad Nayudu v. Somayya (I.L.R. 42 Mad. 400 = 10 L.W. 410 (P.C.). The learned single judge in the instant case also relied on the observations in Chellapallis case . The learned single Judge rightly observed that the test laid down by Wardsworth, Offg. C.J. were approved by the Supreme Court in Chidambarams case in identical language and that the legislature did not use the word ‘domain’ or ‘home-farm land’ without attaching to them a meaning and it was reasonable to suppose that they would be given to them in ordinary English, namely to connote ‘land appurtenant to the mansion of the lord of the manor kept by the lord for his personal use and cultivated under his ‘personal supervision’ as distinct from land let to tenant to be farmed without any control from the lord of the manor other than such control as in cident to the lease. We respectfully agree. To this extent the propositions of the learned Judges in Periannans case (supra) the tenability of which we doubted, can no longer be held to be good law in view of this courts decision in Chidambarams case and P. Venkataswami v. D.S. Ramireddy (1976) 3 S.C.C. 665 ). “31. In P. Venkataswami v. D.S. Ramireddy (1976) 3 SCC 665 ) the question was whether the landlord was entitled to ryotwari patta. The High Court applied the tests in Periannans case . Referring to provisions of Sections. 13 and 15(1) of the Estates Abolition Act (which we have quoted earlier) and reiterating what was said in Chidambarams case, this Court held: “Thus even on the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 considered by the Madras Full Bench, this Court appears to have taken a different view. Referring to provisions of Sections. 13 and 15(1) of the Estates Abolition Act (which we have quoted earlier) and reiterating what was said in Chidambarams case, this Court held: “Thus even on the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 considered by the Madras Full Bench, this Court appears to have taken a different view. Apart from this, the provisions we are concerned with, namely, Section 13 (b) (iii) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 requires as a condition ‘that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, by his own servants or hired labour’. We are unable to agree that the words ‘has cultivated’ could imply a mere intention to cultivate.” Apart from Article 141 of the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the decision in Chidambaram and Venkataswami are in consonance with the objects and purposes of the Estates Land Act, the Estates Abolition Act, the Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the accepted objectives of the Land Reforms legislation.” 6. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the grant of the inam in this case as “Kattukuthagai” inam as evidenced from the certified copy of the Inam Fair Register marked as R-14, in respect of T.D. No. 271, is not sufficient to substantiate the pannai or private character of the land and that the decision reported in 1964 (1) M.L.J. 232 = 76 L.W. 776 ( State of Madras v. S.P.K. Koya) does not conform to the decision of the Privy Council reported in 1942 (2) M.L.J. 367 = 55 L.W. 356 (P.C.) (Secretary of the State for India v. Srimath Vidhya Sri Varada Thirtha Swamigal) on which it purports to rely. It was also contended for the appellants that even though the grant was considered to be of both warams, the same by itself is not sufficient to enable the land-holder to get ryotwari patta unless the lands are proved to be of pannai or private character and that they have been cultivated by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stook in the ordinary course of husbandry for a continuous period of twelve years or in terms of the concession shown for a continuous period of three years within a period of twelve years immediately before the 1st day of April, 1960. Adverting to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908, and the corresponding provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (supra) squarely applies to the case on hand and the principles laid down by the majority view of the Full Bench reported in 1952 (1) M.L.J. 71 (1951) 64 L.W. Suppl. 1 (supra) relating to the cultivation test which were doubted and held to have been overruled cannot be applied in any form or manner to sustain the claim of the landholder against the avowed object of the legislation to confer permanent, heritable and transferable right of occupancy on the tenants. In trying to get over the hurdle of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966, as also the decision of a Division Bench reported in 1975 T.L.N.J. 278 (Udayan and others v. Adheenakarthar, Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam), it was contended that the final word having been said on the subject by the Supreme Court in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C) (supra) altering the law by categorically holding that the basic concept of domain or home-farm land and the concept of cultivation as private land by the land-holders used in the definition of the words had to be borne in mind in determining private land and that domain or home-farm land connotes land appurtenant to the mansion of the lord of the manor kept by the lord for his personal use and cultivated under his personal supervision as distinct from land let to tenant to be farmed without any control from the lord of the manor other than such control as incidental to the lease. Strong reliance has been also placed upon the observations that the view taken by the Apex Court is in consonance with the objects and purposes of the Estates Land Act, the Estates Abolition Act, the Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the accepted objectives of the Land Reforms Legislation. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants the decision in 1975 T.L.N.J. 278 (supra) cannot any longer be said to be either correct or acceptable. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants the decision in 1975 T.L.N.J. 278 (supra) cannot any longer be said to be either correct or acceptable. As for the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966, it was contended that mere amendment of Section 9 (2) without corresponding amendment of the definition clause in Section 2(13) will not make any substantial change to the position and that without satisfying the requirements of Section 2(13) the landholder cannot claim for ryotwari patta in his favour. The further submission in this regard on behalf of the appellants was that when the main and earlier enactment conferred higher rights of occupancy and rights against eviction the later Act cannot be construed to take away such rights of the occupants and the authorities under the Act and the Courts must go by the provisions of the Act rather than the intendment. Reliance in this regard was placed by the the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants on the decision reported in 1957 (2) M.L.J. 369 . (Srinvasa Ayyangar v. Revenue Court, Tanjore). Finally, it was contended for the appellants that the materials on record do not substantiate either the pannai or private character of the land or that the landholder had been cultivating the lands for the required period and on the other hand, the appellants have sufficiently proved that the occupants hereditarily and without interruption have been in possession, cultivating the lands, paying the melwaram or the theervai to the land-holder by also digging wells and enjoying the lands with rights of a ryot over ryoti lands and, therefore, the authorities below committed a grave error both on law and on facts in rejecting the claim of the appellants and sustaining the claim of the landholders-Adheenam. 7. Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent-landholder, contended that the principle laid down by the Apex Court in 1991 (1) L.W. 16(SC) (supra) cannot be straightway applied to the case on band which concerns with a new Inam Estate and that the criteria for consideration in such a case is different altogether is borne out by the different scheme and treatment meted out to new Inam Estates under Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963. It was also contended for the landholder that indisputably the landholder-Adheenam being a religious Institution, the benefit of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 enures to it and in respect of pannai or private lands it was not necessary for the landholder religious institution to prove continuous personal cultivation for the stipulated period and that on the other hand the landholder religious institution is entitled to ryotwari patta on proving that the lands are pannai or private lands and that the landholder religious institution has not carved out separately or parted with its Kudiwaram rights in favour of the occupants who are merely cultivating tenants of the landholder with no further occupancy rights of a ryot. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent-landholder also contended that the appellants cannot also claim or get ryotwari patta in their favour unless it was established by them that the character of the lands are really ryoti and such lands were included in the holding of a ryot within the meaning of Act and consequently, the appellants are not entitled to any relief whatsoever in this appeal. The concept of ryoti interest was, according to the learned counsel for the landholder, unknown in the case of a new Inam Estate till the coming into force of the Act, unlike in the case of an existing Inam Estate in respect of which rights of ryot or ryoti interest were conferred upon occupants since 1936. While adverting to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966, it was contended that the religious institutions were exempted from the necessity to prove continuous personal cultivation unlike other landholders and this provision was found to be absolutely essential on account of the impediments and other disabling factors placed in the way of a landholder religious institution personally undertaking pannai cultivation with the enactment of Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952, and Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, and, therefore, full effect must be given to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966. Strong reliance was placed upon the decision of the Division Benches reported in 1975 T.L.N.J. 278 (D.B.); and an unreported decisions in S.T.A. No. 8 of 1982 dated 15-11-1988 ( K.V. Subramaniam and others v. His Holiness Srila-Sri Ambalavana Pandarasannadhi Avergal, Adheenakarthar, Tiruvavaduthurai Adheeham ) and the further fact that a Special Leave Petition filed against S.T.A. No. 8 of 1982 came to be dismissed by the Apex Court. 8. We have carefully considered the contentions of the learned counsel on either side. The fact that the grant in question covered by T.D. No. 271 is a new Inam Estate, is a concluded one in view of the earlier decision of this Court and there can be no controversy over the same. In the certified copy of the Inam Fair Register Extract, in so far as this inam is concerned, it is found described as “Kattukuthagai” village inam. A Division Bench of this Court, in the decision reported in 1964 (1) M.L.J. 232 (supra) dealt with the scope and purport of such a grant and the scheme underlying the concept and held as follows:— “The expression “Kattukuthagai Village,” particularly in Tirunelveli District has been interpreted to mean and to refer only to a tenure in land. The questions have been considered by the Judicial Committee in Secretary of the State for India v. Srimath Vidhya Sri Varada Thirta Swamigal 1942 (2) M.L.J. 367 = 55 L.W. 356 (P.C.) and the view taken is that the term “Kattukuthagai” refers only to a conferment of a freehold in the land though no doubt to be held by the grantee on favourable terms. The definition of “kattukuthagai” in Wilsons Glossary as “land held in form at a permanently fixed money rent which is usually light” is accepted as the true and correct definition. The Judicial Committee referred to the observations of Wallace, J., in Madai Delavoi Thirumalayappa v. Karuppayi Ammal (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 375) and approved the dictum of that learned Judge who observed in that decision as follows:— “Kattukuthagai” was in essence a lease or grant or land at a favourable rent. The Judicial Committee referred to the observations of Wallace, J., in Madai Delavoi Thirumalayappa v. Karuppayi Ammal (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 375) and approved the dictum of that learned Judge who observed in that decision as follows:— “Kattukuthagai” was in essence a lease or grant or land at a favourable rent. There was nothing in the term itself from which one is entitled to infer that what was handed over was only the Melwaram.” Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed: “That is the exact point now before their Lordships, whose examination of the matter leads them to the same conclusion.” “We do not feel called upon to refer to other decisions on the subject as we are of opinion that a Kattukuthagai Village is an inam village, where the inam is that of the land and not of mere melwaram alone.” As a matter of fact, the said decision has been followed and applied by another Division Bench of this Court in an unreported decision in S.T. Appeal No. 8 of 1982 (supra) by their Lordships S. Mohan, J, as the learned Judge then was and Padmini Jesudurai, J.). The above referred to decisions have considered the issue at considerable detail with particular reference to the practice prevailing in Tirunelveli District and it may be noticed at this stage that the case on hand also pertains to the said dist rict only and, therefore, the ratio laid down squarely applies to the present case on all fours. The attempt of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to contend that those decision are not correct because the decision of the Privy Council relied upon does not warrant or justify such conclusions arrived at by the Division Benches of this Court, has no merit of acceptance’ and is purely an attempt made in vain. The Division Benches of this Court are entitled to infer legitimately from the conclusions arrived at by the Privy Council and derive inspiration to lay down its own principles and the distinction attempted has no merit. In our view, having regard to the well settled legal position that “Kattukuthagai Village” inam refers to grant of the land as such and not mere melwaram, it inevitably leads to the conclusion that the entire land, the ownership thereof consisting of both warams was the subject matter of the grant. In our view, having regard to the well settled legal position that “Kattukuthagai Village” inam refers to grant of the land as such and not mere melwaram, it inevitably leads to the conclusion that the entire land, the ownership thereof consisting of both warams was the subject matter of the grant. Consequently, the lands in question unquestionably bear the character of private or pannai lands only. The entire lands relating to “Easanamadam Estate” were notified under Tamil Nadu Inams (Assessment) Act, 40 of 1956, as ‘pannai lands’, inviting objections from the interested parties and none of the appellants or their predecessors in interest ever filed any objections disputing the declaration made. As a matter of fact, some of the earlier proceedings relating to the lands in question, though some of which are not between the appellants and landholder-Adheenam, also fortify this conclusion arrived at by the authorities below and accepted by us, above. 8 -A. That apart, merely because the lands in question were cultivable lands and being actually cultivated by some of the lessees alone, it cannot be asserted that they are ryoti lands in the holding of a ryot who has been inducted by the landholder and granted such right by carving out Kudiwaram interest and conferring upon such tenants any such occupancy rights. Both the authorities below have carefully analysed the oral and documentary evidence in their proper perspective and in the light of the well s ettled principles of law governing the same and concurrently held that the appellants had no Kudiwaram interest or occupancy rights in the lands in question and the payment of ‘theervai’ and surcharge etc., as per assessment from time to time the Government by the landholder Adheenam also went to support the claim of the land holder. The appellants have miserably failed to substantiate their claims about the character of the land as also the nature of their rights or interest as claimed by them or as en titling them to ryotwari patta in their favour. The fact that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1961, have been applied to the lands in question also go to belie the claim of the appellants in appeal. 9. The fact that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1961, have been applied to the lands in question also go to belie the claim of the appellants in appeal. 9. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants strenuously and strongly projected the claim of the appellants drawing inspiration mainly from the latest pronouncement of the Apex Court reported in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C.) (supra) and emphasised the fact that the landholder Adheenam not having in this case pleaded or substantiated any claim of personal cultivation for the stipulated period. This submission overlooks the substantial and vital difference between the class of case considered by their Lordships of the Apex Court and the present case before us. The case before the Apex Court was with reference to a legislation on par with the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 which dealt with an estate as defined in Section 3(2) (d) of the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908, before its amendment by Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1936. The present appeal is one arising under Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963 relating to an inam estate, — meaning thereby an existing inam estate or a new inam estate, with different schemes underlying the same and also providing for different considerations among an existing inam estate on the one hand and new inam estate on the other. The inams governed by Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963 also at times involved or related to religious institutions and the legislature thought fit as a matter of policy to provide for the protection of the interests of religious institutions also, as much as they cared or shown their concern for the interests of tenants, if not more. Consequently, the legislature enacted Tamil Nad u Act 27 of 1966 whereunder it has chosen to exempt a landholder which is a religious institution from the necessity or need to prove personal cultivation for the stipulated period to get patta in favour of such religious institution. The amendment which recasted the proviso to read, “Provided that in the case of a landholder other than a religious institution the private land specified in clause 13 (11) (a) of Section 2, is proved to have cultivated.”. The amendment which recasted the proviso to read, “Provided that in the case of a landholder other than a religious institution the private land specified in clause 13 (11) (a) of Section 2, is proved to have cultivated.”. In view of the above, the test of personal cultivation or the need for proof of personal cultivation for the statutorily stipulated period has been dispensed with in respect of grants in favour of the religious institution and it is sufficient to show that the religious institution was the grantee or owner of both the melwaram and Kudiwaram interest in the lands and that the landholder religious institution has not subsequently carved out the kudiwaram interest and parted with the same in favour of any ryot. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the amendments introduced by the provisions contained in Section 9(2) without corresponding amendment of the definition of ‘Private land’ in Section 2 (13) will not ensure to the benefit of the landholder Adheenam effectively is a mere futile attempt to wriggle out, somehow, of the inevitable consequences flowing out of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 enacted with a definite purpose and aim and the legislature, in our view, achieved the same effectively by excepting the religious in stitutions from the necessity to prove personal cultivation for the required period unlike the other class or category of landholders and the efficacy of the amendments introduced to Section 9 which relates to the grant of ryotwari patta in favour of a landholder religious institution does not in any way depend upon any further amendment being made to Section 2 (13) of the Act. Irrespective of the definition clause in Section 2 (13) and the criteria laid down therein, it is always open to the legislature to carve out a distinct class of in the operative provisions of the Act by way of an exception to mete out a special treatment. As a matter of fact, Section 2 opens by stating that “in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires landholders” and consequently, the proviso enacted and exception carved out in Section 9(2) will have full force and effect and outlive the stipulation in the general definition clause, Section 2 (13) of the Act. The decision in (1959) 2 M.L.J. 369 (supra) in our view, has no relevance or application to the case before us. The decision in (1959) 2 M.L.J. 369 (supra) in our view, has no relevance or application to the case before us. In view of the above conclusion of ours, the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 squarely apply to the case on hand and as a matter of fact, this essential and differential aspect of the case renders on this ground also the ratio laid down in the decision reported in 1991 (1) L.W. 16 (S.C.) supra, inapplicable to this case. The effect and implication of the said special provision enacted in order to protect the interest of landholder-religious institutions came to be considered by two Division Benches of this Court. 9-A. In 1975 T.L.N.J. 278 (Udayan and others v. Adheenakarthar, Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam) a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Veeraswami, C.J. and S. Natarajan, J. as the learned Judge then was, held as hereunder:— “But, by an amendment to Section 9, the cultivation test has been made inapplicable to a landholder, which is a religious institution. This, then gives rise to a peculiar situation. While what was not, prior to Madras Act 26 of 1963, a land is an estate as defined by the Estates Land Act and its character could not, therefore, be judged whether it was pannai or private or ryoti, as the provisions of that Act would be inapplicable subsequent to the enactment of Madras Act 26 of 1963, the character of the land falls to be decided with reference to those tests under the Estates Land Act. Once the cultivation test is excluded, the burden of the landholder to establish the character of the land as private or pannai can be discharged only by his showing his intention to retain the ownership of the land in himself”. The same view was expressed by yet another Division Bench consisting of S. Mohan, J., as the learned Judge then was and Padmini Jesudurai, J., in an unreported decision dated 15-11-1988 in S.T.A. No. 8 of 1982 (supra). The contention on behalf of the appellants that the above referred to Division Bench Judgments may require reconsideration and that they cannot be said to be good law in view of the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C.) supra, has no merit. The contention on behalf of the appellants that the above referred to Division Bench Judgments may require reconsideration and that they cannot be said to be good law in view of the decision of the Apex Court reported in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C.) supra, has no merit. The two Division Bench Judgments came to be rendered adverting to and giving due weight and effect to the special provisions enacted by Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 and not by relying upon the ratio of the Full Bench decision in 1952 (1) MLJ 71 = (1951)64 L.W. Suppl. 1 (F.B.) supra, and at any rate, on the basis of propositions 4, 5, 6 of the Full Bench decision, the correctness of which was doubted by the Apex Court, and held to have been stood overruled. The effect of sum and substance of the statutory provision enacted by Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 is to do away with the personal cultivation test or requirement, in respect of claims under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963 by a land holder which happens to be a religious institution too and the object of such a special provision envisaged is to protect the interests of the religious institutions and it is this aspect that was mainly taken into account in rendering the above referred to Division Bench Judgments. The need and necessity for such a special provision and protection of religion institutions must have been justifiably felt by the legislature, as a matter of policy, in the teeth of several other tenancy laws which carried restrictions or created impediments in the absolute discretion of the owner of lands, when such owner happened to be a religious institution, in undertaking personal cultivation of all their lands. In our view, the principles laid down in the decision reported in 1991-1-L.W. 16 (S.C.) supra do not in any manner impair the efficacy or correctness of the law laid down by this Court in the two Division Bench Judgments, when considered taking into account the statutory protection specially enacted in favour of and in order to protect and safeguard the interests of the religious institutions, apparently fearing their very existence itself, otherwise. The special provision enacted under Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 cannot be said to have deprived the tenants any of their vested rights. The special provision enacted under Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 cannot be said to have deprived the tenants any of their vested rights. As noticed earlier, the inam in question is indisputably a New Inam Estate, to which the provisions of the Estates Land Act, 1908 had no application and de hors the rights conferred under the very provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, the tenants had no other rights and consequently the nature and extent of rights which could be claimed by a tenant in occupation could be only those conferred under Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, subject to the amendments introduced to the same by Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966, which has also become part and parcel of the very Act, Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963. 10. Both the learned counsel appearing on either side have taken us through the orders of the authorities below and we are of the view that notwithstanding some observations made, therein, the ultimate conclusions arrived at by them about the character of the land or the entitlement of the landholder Adheenam in this case for patta cannot be said to be in any manner vitiated due to any infirmities in law or of facts, justifying our interference with those concurrent orders. The reliance placed by the authorities below upon some of the earlier proceedings cannot be said to be erroneous. Though some of then may not directly be between parties, and no question of res judicata can be said to be involved, still, those documents and orders which related to the very inam in question and between the landholder and the State cannot be simply brushed aside also as irrelevant. The previous litigations and proceedings would, at any rate constitute relevant material also in appreciating the factual claims of the respective and parties on merits. As rightly contended for the 1st respondent-landholder Adheenam by Mr. B. Kumar, learned counsel, it is not that every one who is found to be in possession, cultivating the lands and paying waram or rent to the landholder, can be said to have acquired Kudiwaram interest or become entitled to occupancy rights, with particular reference to the peculiar and special connotations those concepts bear in the type of legislations viz. land tenure laws with which we are concerned. land tenure laws with which we are concerned. The conclusions of the authorities rejecting the claims of the appellants, therefore, cannot in any manner be said to be vitiated. 11. For all the reasons stated above, we who see no merits in the above appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs.