Judgment :- Sivarajan, J. These three agricultural income tax referred cases arise for the assessment years 1977-78,78-79 and 79-80. Common question referred for the above three years is as follows: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Rubber Board is entitled to the exemption as provided under S.4(1)(b) of the ait Act, 1950 read with S.4(6)(a) and 4(6)(c) of that Act". 2. The assessee is the Rubber Board, Kottayam constirated under S.4 of the Rubber Act, 1947, It is functioning as a statutory body under the administrative control of the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India. The Board is working for the development of rubber and rubber Industry in the country as provided under the provisions of the Rubber Act, 1947 (Act No. XXIV of 1947). Admittedly, the Board is mainly holding research institutions and for the said purpose, rubber estates are maintained. The Board derives income, inter alia, from sale of planting materials and rubber. 3. For the assessment years in question, the assessee claimed exemption in respect of its income form rubber estates under S.4(1)(b) r/w Ss.4(6)(a) and 4(6)(c) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950. The assessing authority rejected the said claim on the ground that the assessee has not adduced any evidence in support of the said claim and assessed the same to tax under the Act. The assessee took up the matter in appeal before the appellate Assistant Commissioner of Agrl. Income tax & Sales tax, Kottayam. The appellate Asst. Commissioner noted that S.2 of the Rubber Act, 1947 declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the union should take under its control the rubber industry, and mat admittedly the income if any, derived by the Rubber-Board is utilised for the development of Rubber industry. The appellate Authority further observed that even then it will not fall under S.4(1)(b) of the Act, which states that any agricultural income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purpose, to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in the State. She further observed that the decision of the Mysore High Court cited by the assessee relates to Coffee Board and Mysore Agricultural Income tax, which cannot be applied in the same sense under the Kerala Agricultural Income tax Act. She further observed that the decision of the Mysore High Court cited by the assessee relates to Coffee Board and Mysore Agricultural Income tax, which cannot be applied in the same sense under the Kerala Agricultural Income tax Act. She accordingly, held that the income derived by the Rubber Board is not exempted under S.4(1)(b) of the Act. 4. The assessee took up the matter in further appeal before the Kerala Agricultural Income tax appellate Tribunal, Addl. Bench, Kottayam. Relying on the provisions of the Rubber Act and the provisions of S.4(1)(B), Ss.4(6)(a) and (c) of the Agrl. Income Tax Act, the assessee contended before the Tribunal that the Rubber Board is doing its activities under a legal obligation for the advancement of rubber industry in public interest. It was also submitted before the Tribunal that the income derived by the Rubber Board is to be credited to the 'general fund', which is actually spent wholly for public purposes as envisaged under S.4(6)(c) of the Agrl. Income tax Act. Relying on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Coffee Board v. Deputy Commr. of Agrl. Income tax, Mysore (1964) 52ITR 126), the assessee contended that its entire income is exempted from tax under the Agrl. Income tax Act by virtue of the provisions of S.4(1)(b) of the said Act. The Agrl. Income Tax appellate Tribunal accepted the said plea and accordingly, held that the assessee is eligible for exemption as a Trust functioning under a legal obligation for advancement of public utility, as provided under S.4(1)(b) r/w Ss.4(6)(a) and (c) of the Act. While holding so, the Tribunal rejected the contention made on behalf of the Department that even if the Rubber Board is to be treated as one working under legal obligation as contemplated under S.(1)(a) of the Act, still it cannot be treated as a charitable institution working for the advancement/ development of public in general. But, it is contemplated only advancement in rubber industry in which only a section of the public is interested. This was done relying on the observations of the Karnataka High Court, which is extracted at page 23 of the paper book. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the Department reiterated the contentions which were put forward before the Tribunal and contended that the assessee is not a charitable institution entitled to exemption under S.4(1)(b) of the Act. This was done relying on the observations of the Karnataka High Court, which is extracted at page 23 of the paper book. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the Department reiterated the contentions which were put forward before the Tribunal and contended that the assessee is not a charitable institution entitled to exemption under S.4(1)(b) of the Act. It was also contended that the appellate Tribunal erred in its finding that the assessee exists for the advancement of an object of public utility, in that the Rubber Board exists only for the benefit of a section of the public. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee, on the other hand, contended that going by the provisions of the Rubber Act, 1947, the provisions of which have been set out in detail in the order of the Tribunal it is clear that the Rubber Board is doing its activities under a legal obligation for the advancement of rubber industry in public interest. He also submitted that the decision of the Karnataka High Gout in Coffee Board v. Deputy Commr. of Agrl. Income tax, Mysore (1964) 52 ITR 126 had considered the provisions of the Mysore Agrl. Income tax Act, 1957, which are more or less similar to the provisions of the Kerala Agricultural Income tax Act in material particulars, in the context of an assessment on Coffee Board, which is constituted under the Coffee Act and held that the Coffee Board which derives agricultural income from properties held by the research wing of the Coffee Board is exempted as a charitable institution and I hat the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the facts of this case also. He accordingly submitted that the Income tax appellate Tribunal has rightly held that the Rubber Board is entitled to the exemption pleaded. 7. Before we proceed to consider the question, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Agricultural Income tax Act, 1950 as also the pro visions of the Rubber Act, 1947. S.4(1)(b) of the Kerala Agrl. He accordingly submitted that the Income tax appellate Tribunal has rightly held that the Rubber Board is entitled to the exemption pleaded. 7. Before we proceed to consider the question, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Agricultural Income tax Act, 1950 as also the pro visions of the Rubber Act, 1947. S.4(1)(b) of the Kerala Agrl. Income Tax Act, 1950 reads as follows: "4(1)(b):- Any agricultural income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in the State; and where any such income is accumulated or set apart for application to such purposes in the State, to the extent to which the income so accumulated or set apart is not in excess of twenty five per cent of the agricultural income from such property". S.4 (6) sub-clause (a) thereof, which defines 'trust' thus: - "Trust" includes any other legal obligation". S.4(6)(c) which defines 'charitable purposes as follows:- "Charitable purposes" includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of public utility". 8. The first question to be considered is as to whether the Rubber Board constituted under S.4 of the Rubber Act, 1947 is a 'trust' wholly for charitable purposes coming under S.4(1)(b) of the Act. By virtue of the provisions of S.4(6)(a), a 'legal obligation' is also included within the definition of 'trust' and by virtue of the pro visions of S.4(6)(c) of the Act, an assessee which exists for the advancement of an object of public utility, can be said to exist for charitable purposes. In view of the provisions quoted above, it is clear that the assessee satisfies that by virtue of the provisions of the Rubber Act, it can be considered to be a legal obligation 'which exists for the advancement of an object of public utility, then the first limb of the provision of S.4(1)(b) is satisfied thereby entitling it to the benefit of exemption from payment of tax in respect of the agricultural income earned by it. 9. Before proceeding to refer to the provisions of the Rubber Act, it is also necessary to understand what is meant by an object of "public utility". 10. 9. Before proceeding to refer to the provisions of the Rubber Act, it is also necessary to understand what is meant by an object of "public utility". 10. The question as to whether the Andhra Chamber of Commerce, a company registered under S.26 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 formed with the primary object to promote and protect trade, commerce and industries, to aid, stimulate and promote the development of trade, commerce and industries and to watch over and protect the general commercial interest of India or any part thereof was entitled to exemption from payment of tax under S.4(3)(1) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 in respect of its income derived by it from letting out a portion of the building owned by it came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Commr. of Income tax v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce (1965) 55ITR 722). The Supreme Court held that the income of the Chamber of Commerce from its building was exempt from tax under S.4(3)(1) of the Income tax Act as the building was held under a legal obligation wholly for charitable purposes. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that the advancement or promotion of trade, commerce and industry leading to economic prosperity ensures for the benefit of the entire community; that prosperity would be shared also by those who engaged in trade, commerce and industry, but on that account the purpose is not rendered any the less an object of general public utility and that the promotion and protection of trade, commerce and industry cannot be equated with promotion and protection of activities and interest merely of persons engaged in trade, commerce and industry. It was also observed that the legislature had used language of great amplitude. 11. It was also observed that the legislature had used language of great amplitude. 11. In the context of the expression 'public' used in the said sub-section the Supreme Court further observed that the expression 'object of general public utility' is not restrained to objects beneficial to the whole of mankind; that an object beneficial to a section of the public in an object of general public utility; that to serve as achari table purpose, it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or even all persons living in a particular country or province; that it is sufficient if the intention is to benefit a section of that public as distinguished from specified individuals; that the section of the community sought to be benefited must undoubtedly be sufficiently defined and identifiable by some common quality of the public or impersonal nature and that where there is no common quality uniting the potential beneficiaries into a class, it may not be regarded as valid. These principles have been re-iterated by the Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Rana Caste Association v. Commissioner of Income tax, Gujarat (1971) 82 IT 704) and subsequent decision in Addl. Commissioner of Income tax v. Surat Art Silk Clo the Manufacturers Association (SC)(198Q) 121 ITR 1), etc. 12. Now, it is necessary to consider the provisions of the Rubber Act to see whether the Rubber Board is a legal obligation, which exists for the advancement of an object of public utility. The long title of the Act states that it is an Act to provide for the development under the control of the union of the rubber industry. The preamble to the Act says that it is expedient to provide for the development under the control of the union of the rubber industry and S.2 of the Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the union should take under its control of the rubber industry. 13. The Rubber Board is constituted by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette as provided under S.4 of the Act having perpectual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable. 14. 13. The Rubber Board is constituted by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette as provided under S.4 of the Act having perpectual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable. 14. The Board is constituted with a Chairman appointed by the Central Government and 23 members representing rubber producing interests, small growers, manufacturers and labour, members of Parliament, Executive Director, Ex-officio and the rubber Production Commissioner (Ex-officio). S.6A of the Act provides for appointment of an Executive Director to exercise the power and perform such duties under the direction of the Board. It also provides for appointment of a Rubber Production Commissioner and a Secretary to the Board. 15. The Board is provided with two funds, namely, General Fund and Pool Fund, under Ss.9A and 9B of the Act. These provisions relating to the General and Pool Funds are as follows: 9A. General"fund - (1) To the general fund shall be credited - (a) all sums forming the funds of the Board immediately before the commencement of the Rubber (Production and Marketing) Amendment Act, 1954; (b) all amounts paid to the Board by the Central Government unde sub-s.(7) of S.12. (2) The general fund shall be applied (a) to meet the expenses of the Board; (b) to meet the costs of the measures referred to in Section B; (c) to meet the expenditure incurred in the performance of the functions under this Act or under rules made thereunder; and (d) for making such grants to rubber estates or for meeting the cost of such other assistance to rubber estates as the Board may think necessary for the development of such estates; 9B. Pool Fund - (1) To the pool fund shall be credited - (a) all sums realised by sales of rubber imported or purchased under S.8A; (b) any of the sum which the Board may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, transfer from the general fund to the pool fund. (2) The pool fund shall be applied only to the rehabilitation of small growers in such manner as may be prescribed." S.12 gives power to the Board levy of Rubber, cess, duty or excise etc. (2) The pool fund shall be applied only to the rehabilitation of small growers in such manner as may be prescribed." S.12 gives power to the Board levy of Rubber, cess, duty or excise etc. S.12(7) dealing with the duty of excise collection reads as follows: "The proceeds of the duty of excise collected under this section reduced by the cost of collection as determined by the Central Government shall first be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India, and then be paid by the Central Government to the Board for being utilised for the purposes of the Act, if Parliament by appropriation made by law in this behalf so provides". Section 22 provides for control of the Board by the Central Government and this read as follows: "All acts of the Board shall be subject to the control of the Central Government which may cancel, suspend or modify as it thinks fit any action taken by the Board". So also, S.24 deals with liability to keep amounts of the Board and S.25 provides for power of Central Government to make rules regarding the working of the Rubber Board. 16. As could be seen from the provisions of the Act, which have been discussed above, the Act is enacted for the development of the rubber industry under the control of the union and that control of the rubber industry was taken over by the union in the public interest. The Rubber Board is constituted with the above objects under S.4 of the Act. Its functions as provided under S.8 of the Act are to promote by such measures as it thinks fit the development of the rubber industry, undertaking, assisting or encouraging scientific, technological and economic research, training students in improved methods of planting, cultivation, maturing and spraying, supply of technical advice to rubbers-growers; carrying out any other duties which may be vested in the Board under rules made under this Act. The Rubber Board is also duty bound to give advise to the Central Government on all matters relating to the development of the rubber industry with regard to participation in any International Conference or scheme relating to rubber, to submit reports to the Central Government regarding its activities and the working of this Act and also to furnish such other reports relating to the rubber industry as may be required by the Central Government. 17. 17. There are two funds provided for the Board under Ss.9 A and 9B of the Act namely; (1) General Fund and (2) Pool Fund. All sums realised by sales of rubber imported or purchased under S.8A shall be put in the pool fund and the same shall be utilised only for the rehabilitation of small growers in such manner as may be prescribed. Admittedly, the Board is mainly holding research institutions and rubber estates as part of its obligations under S.8 of the Act particularly sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-s.(1) thereof. 18. It is clear from the aforesaid provisions of the Rubber Act that the Rubber Board's activities are in the nature of a legal obligation for the advancement of rubber industry and in public interest. Considered in the light of the principles discussed herein above it is clear that the activities of the Rubber Board constitute advancement of an object of public utility. 19. The Karnataka High Court in Coffee Board v. Deputy Commissioner of Agrl. Incometax, Mysore (1964) 52ITR126) was concerned with the question as to whether the agricultural income derived by the Coffee Board from the farms maintained by the research department thereof are exempted from liability to assessment of agricultural income tax under S.12(f) of the Mysore Agricultural Income tax Act. There, the assessee, namely, the Coffee Board constituted under the provisions of the Coffee Act was maintaining two research stations. In these stations, coffee and other commercial crops are grown. The primary question was whether the income realised by the sale of the crops grown in these research stations is liable to be taxed under the Act. The provision of S.12(f) of the Mysore Agricultural Income tax Act, 1957 r/w explanation thereto was similar to the provisions of S.4(1)(b) r/w S.4(6)(a) and (c) of the Kerala Agricultural Incometax Act, 1950. The said section and the Explanation is extracted below for convenience sake. "S.12(f) of the Act says that agricultural income tax shall not be payable on that part of the total agricultural income of a person which is: "Any sum derived from land held under a trust or other legal obligation wholly or partly for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and actually spent for the said purposes". "S.12(f) of the Act says that agricultural income tax shall not be payable on that part of the total agricultural income of a person which is: "Any sum derived from land held under a trust or other legal obligation wholly or partly for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and actually spent for the said purposes". There is an Explanation appended to that Section and that Explanation reads: "In this section, charitable purpose includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of general public utility". 20. After referring to the provisions of the Act quoted above, the Karnataka High Court referred to the provisions of the Coffee Board Act, which contains provisions similar to the provisions of the Rubber Act and thereafter, the Court observed that it is clear that the Board is holding the two research stations mentioned earlier under a legal obligation for the purpose of advancing an object of general public utility. The income derived from those stations are credited to the "General Fund" which fund is actually spent wholly or partly for the public purposes as envisaged in S.12(f) and the assessee is entitled to the exemption asked for. The Karnataka High court rejected the contentions made on behalf of the Department that the Board has no legal obligation to maintain the research stations and that research stations merely benefit the coffee planters and none else and hence S.12(f) is inapplicable and observed as follows: " We feel constrained to say that the revenue has taken a very narrow view of the matter. Assuming, without deciding, that a Section of the public does not come within the scope of the expression "general public" it is wrong to say that the knowledge gained from these research stations merely benefit the planters. It has a wider impact. The knowledge gathered in these stations is bound to improve the quantity and quality of our coffee crop and thereby give the general public, in the sense in which the revenue wants us to understand that expression, better and cheaper coffee. It is also likely to improve our foreign trade in coffee and thus add to our earnings from foreign trade. The scheme is intended to benefit the producer, the consumer and the country". 21. It is also likely to improve our foreign trade in coffee and thus add to our earnings from foreign trade. The scheme is intended to benefit the producer, the consumer and the country". 21. We are of the view that the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Coffee Board v. Deputy Commissioner of Agrl. Income tax, Mysore is on all fours to the facts of this case. We also adopt the reasoning of the Karnataka High Court We accordingly, hold that the assessee has a legal obligation created under the Rubber Act for the advancement of rubber industry and in public interest, which is an object of public utility. The Incometax appellate Tribunal, according to us, has considered the matter in the right perspective and arrived at the aforesaid finding. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Incometax appellate Tribunal, 22. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Agrl. Income tax and Sales Tax appellate Tribunal, Addl. Bench, Kottayam for passing consequential orders.