JUDGMENT : Dipak Misra, J. - The judgment debtor-petitioner assails the order dated 7-1-95 passed by the Second Court, Civil judge (Sr. Division) Cuttack in Execution Case No 4/87 refusing to entertain a petition for the purpose of dismissal of the execution case instituted by the opposite parties herein. 2. A brief reference to the facts would suffice. In the year 1971 Ac.0.54 decimals of land was acquired for Chitrotpala Flood Protection Embankment in village Uttarakula. The Land Acquisition Collector passed an award u/s 11 of the Land Acquisition Act (in short, 'the Act') on 11-12-73. The claimant received the amount under protest and demanded higher compensation. Reference being made to the competent Civil Court award was enhanced on adjudication taxing the market price at Rs. 10000/- per acre. The said award was passed on 19-10-85. State of Orissa preferred First Appeal No. 36/86 before this Court but the same was dismissed. The opposite parties levied Execution Case No. 4/87 and prayed for additional market value as contemplated u/s 23(1-A) of the Act. Amendment as prayed for claiming the said entitlement was allowed by the executing Court despite serious objection raised by the State. As the objection was not accepted and amendment was allowed a Civil Revision was carried to this Court. While not interfering with the order allowing amendment direction was given to the State Government to file a calculation sheet in the executing Court with a further stipulation that the executing Court was to determine the benefits payable to the claimant. When such a calculation sheet was filed before the executing Court, the said Court held that the claimant was entitled to compensation u/s 23(1-A) of the act. Treating such determination as an award u/s 26 of the Act First Appeal No. 207/91 was preferred. In the aforesaid First Appeal this Court held that the claimant was entitled to the statutory benefits as provided u/s 23(1-A) of the Act. In pursuance of the direction contained in the First Appeal calculation sheet was filed and the calculation sheet submitted by the Decree-holder was accepted on 28.4.92 and direction was issued to pay the amount as per the said calculation. The State Government in compliance of the said order had made part payment. In pursuance of the direction contained in the First Appeal calculation sheet was filed and the calculation sheet submitted by the Decree-holder was accepted on 28.4.92 and direction was issued to pay the amount as per the said calculation. The State Government in compliance of the said order had made part payment. While the execution case was at that stage and the Decree holder was waiting for further payment to be made for full and final satisfaction of the decree a petition was filed on 28-11-94 for dismissal of the execution case on two grounds: (1) the Decree holder was not entitled to the additional market value at the rate of 12% as the same benefit had not been provided for in the decree; and (ii) the ratio in the case of Union of India v. Zora Singh reported in 1991 Vol 2 Scale 1128 having been overruled by the apex Court in a later decision in the case of K.S. Paripoornan Vs. State of Kerala and Others, th Decree-holder was not entitled to the statutory benefit provided u/s 23(1-A) of the Act and therefore, a fresh calculation is called for. The said petition was resisted to by the Decree-holder contending that the executing court could not travel beyond the decree; the order dated 28-4-92 had attained finality and there having been part compliance of the aforesaid order by the judgment-debtor it was not open to, him to challenge the same. The Court below accepted the contentions of the Decree-holder and rejected the petition filed by the judgment-debtor being devoid of merit. The revisionist assails the said rejection. 3. The learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the Petitioner submits that the order passed by the executing Court is unsustainable inasmuch as a change in law can be a factor for consideration u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is her submission that the basis for grant of statutory benefit having lost its existence, the ratio enunciated in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) should have its free play and the executing Court has committed serious illegality by not accepting the same. It is her submission that the basis for grant of statutory benefit having lost its existence, the ratio enunciated in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) should have its free play and the executing Court has committed serious illegality by not accepting the same. It has also been canvassed that the acceptance of calculation sheet and issuance of direction for payment do not create a bar for fresh consideration and the part compliance does not debar the judgment debtor to file a petition for dismissal of the execution case under the changed scenario. Mr. D. K. Das, the Learned Counsel for the opposite parties has vehemently urged that the executing Court has followed the direction incorporated in the judgment rendered in First Appeal No. 207/91 and it is incumbent upon him to proceed in accordance with the decree of the aforesaid First Appeal as the law does not permit the executing Court to travel beyond the decree. Further submission of Mr. Das is that the judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid First Appeal having gone unchallenged it is not open to the judgment-debtor to question the same in the execution proceeding. For this purpose, he has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Mohinder Singh Randhawa and another. He has also submitted that the order passed by the executing Court on 28-4-92 would operate as res judicata at the subsequent stage of execution proceeding. Aid is also sought for from the fact of part payment made by the State Government to justify the third submission that the State Government is estopped to challenge the further proceeding in the execution case having acceded to the calculation sheet. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions a close scrutiny of the judgment passed in First Appeal No. 207/91 is necessary. It is appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment. They read thus: xx xx xx In this case only dispute is relating to the statutory benefits specifically u/s 23-(1A) of the Act. There can be no dispute that claimant is entitled to solatium under Sections 23(2) and interest at the rate Provided in Sections 28 and 34(4) of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. Dispute centres round the entitlement to the additional compensation u/s 23(1-A) of the Act. There can be no dispute that claimant is entitled to solatium under Sections 23(2) and interest at the rate Provided in Sections 28 and 34(4) of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. Dispute centres round the entitlement to the additional compensation u/s 23(1-A) of the Act. It is now settled by larger bench of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1991 (2) Scale, 1128 Union of India and Anr. etc. etc v. Zora Singh etc. etc. that claimant is entitled to the additional compensation as provided u/s 23(1 A) of the Act, 1990 S.C. 981 Union of India and Anr. v. Philip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, has been held not to be correctly decided. Decision of larger bench therefore, would prevail while computing the statutory benefits under the Act. Since I have clarified the position, executing court shall calculate the statutory benefits. Both parties are directed to appear before the executing Court on 20-4-92 on which day executing court shall fix a date for beating both the parties to determine, the dates for calculating the total compensation payable to claimant taking into the various aspects into consideration. I am sure that the State Government will appreciate the delay in this case for claimant, to get the legitimate amount of due compensation and shall take all steps to pay the calculated amount by the executing court so that executing court may not have to take a rigid steps of attachment of properties of the State Government which at times puts the State Government and its officers to embarrassing position. From the aforesaid quoted portions it is absolutely clear that this Court in the First Appeal directed for payment of benefits to the claimant u/s 23(1-A) of the Act. This judgment was rendered on 12th March, 1992 and having gone unchallenged has attained finality. It is well settled that the executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree unless the decree is void. A decree is void if the Court passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in regard to the subject matter in issue. If a defect of jurisdiction does not strike at the root of the authority of the Court to pass any decree an executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree nor can it question its propriety or correctness. A decree is void if the Court passing it lacks inherent jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in regard to the subject matter in issue. If a defect of jurisdiction does not strike at the root of the authority of the Court to pass any decree an executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree nor can it question its propriety or correctness. If a decree is a nullity it is void and the nullity can be set up whenever and where-ever it is sought to be enforced. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision rendered in the case of Seth Hiralal Patni Vs. Sri Kali Nath, wherein their Lordships laid down as follows: The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the Defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it. The said principles have also been highlighted in the case of Sunder Dass Vs. Ram Prakash, wherein it has been held as follows: Now, the law is well settled that an executing court cannot go behind the decree not can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. The aforesaid decision provided the guidance for the executing Court to deal with the objections filed u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment passed in the First Appeal No. 207/91 cannot be regarded as a nullity and therefore, was beyond the competence of the executing Court to question its legality or propriety. That apart, if the decree passed by this Court has not been challenged that cannot be questioned in a proceeding for execution. In the case of Mohinder Singh Randhawa (supra) their Lordships of the apex Court held thus: We find on reference to the appellate degree of the High Court that it directed payment of some of the money u/s 23 (1-A) of the Act. In the absence of any challenge to the appellate decree in further proceedings, in execution case this is not open to challenge. Judged from this angle it can safely be concluded that the validity of the decree passed in the aforesaid First Appeal cannot be challenged before the executing Court as such a challenge is impermissible. 5. Immutability of the impugned order can also be perceived from another angle. After the judgment was rendered in the First Appeal, calculation sheet was submitted by the Decree-holder and the same had been accepted. Direction was issued for payment of the amount. A reversal thereof, as prayed for, is not allowable because the said order/direction operates as res judicata. Principles of res judicata is applicable to the execution proceeding. Decisions given at one stage of the execution proceedings operate as res judicata at later stage. Direction was issued for payment of the amount. A reversal thereof, as prayed for, is not allowable because the said order/direction operates as res judicata. Principles of res judicata is applicable to the execution proceeding. Decisions given at one stage of the execution proceedings operate as res judicata at later stage. It is settled in law that principles of constructive res judicata is applicable to execution proceeding and once an order has been passed the Decree-holder has right to execute the decree and the judgment debtor is liable to satisfy the decree and it is not permissible on the part of a judgment-debtor at later stage to raise similar pleas. For this view I am fortified by the decision rendered in Rajkishore Mohanty v. Kangali Moharana reported in AIR 1972 Ori 119 wherein it was held by the Full Bench of this Court as follows: XX XX XX (4) The principle of constructive res judicata is applicable to execution proceedings. (5) Where in response to the notice under Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment debtor either does not appear in Court or having appeared does not object to the execution on the ground that the execution application is barred by limitation, and the Court thereupon orders that the execution do proceed then by application of Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would be deemed that the plea of limitation had been raised and rejected and consequently the judgment-debtor would not be permitted at a later stage of the same execution proceedings to raise the plea of limitation. Similar view has also been taken by Rajasthan High Court in the case of Janki Vallabh v. Moolchand and Ors. reported in AIR 1974 Raj 168 . In the said decision reference has been made to the principles enunciated in the case of Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others. It is worth-while to reproduce the reasonings indicated in the aforesaid decision: The Supreme Court in Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others, has clearly laid down that the scope of the principle of Res judicata is not confined to what is contained in Section 11 but is of more general application. According to this judgment, res judicata could be as much applicable to different, stage of the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits. Mohindra Kumar and Others, has clearly laid down that the scope of the principle of Res judicata is not confined to what is contained in Section 11 but is of more general application. According to this judgment, res judicata could be as much applicable to different, stage of the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits. Their Lordships have held that where the principle of res judicata is invoked in the case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit, the nature of the enquiry which the adjectival law provides for the decision being reached, as well as the specific provisions made on matters touching such decision are some of the material and relevant factors to be considered before the principle is held applicable. From these observations of the Supreme Court, it can safely be held that the principle of 'res judicata can be attracted to the proceeding taken at different stages in a particular suit or execution proceeding. From the aforesaid analysis the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed on 28-4-22 operates as res judicata. 6. The learned Addl. Government Advocate has canvassed before this Court that the basis of findings of the direction given in the First Appeal was on the ratio of Zora Singh's case. The said decision having been overruled the judgment-debtor has sought for dismissal of the execution case, without further payment. She has also contended that part payment on the basis of the direction of the executing Court cannot invite the doctrine of estoppel. It is also contended by her that the grievance of the judgment-debtor is not unfounded and therefore the executing Court should have looked into it. I have already held that the decree passed in the First Appeal having attained finality cannot be called in question before the executing Court. Change of law is not a ground which confers jurisdiction on the executing Court to unsettle a decree passed by the higher court. In a given case if the change of law touches the inherent jurisdiction of the Court the situation may be different. It is not disputed and rightly so that this Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree in the First Appeal. As the change of law does not render the decree a nullity, the validity of the same has to be treated as unquestionable before the executing Court. It is not disputed and rightly so that this Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree in the First Appeal. As the change of law does not render the decree a nullity, the validity of the same has to be treated as unquestionable before the executing Court. The grievance of the judgment debtor may not be unfounded but that is beyond the scope of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, In this regard reference may be made to a decision rendered in the case of Smt. Lichubala Biswas and Ors. v. Jindar Mondal and Ors. reported in AIR 1990 Cat. 132 wherein it has been held thus: The Petitioner's grievance on this score does not appear, therefore, to be unfounded. But I do not see what can be done in this regard in this proceeding since that will definitely amount to interfering with the decree as passed by the learned Subordinate judge and as confirmed by this Court. This being the position of law the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate is difficult to accept. That apart the payment of partial payment of compensation pursuant to the direction by the executing Court amounts to acceptance of the order and any attempt to wriggle out of the same is an exercise in futility. It is the bounded duty of a judgment-debtor comply with the decree. In a land acquisition proceeding land of the citizens are acquired for various purposes. The Land Acquisition Act provides forums for adjudication. Once adjudications are made the State Government is liable to pay the determined sum towards compensation. The same has to be paid with promptitude. A person whose land has been lost remains in constant restive state. Having lost the land he aspires to receive just compensation. The State is not expected to deprive the citizen of the lawful compensation after statutory determination on some pretext or other. The case in hand is a bright example of the same. The decree was passed in the First Appeal in the year 1992, calculations were accepted in April, 1992, part payment has already been made but presently an attempt is made to challenge the decree as unlawful. The State Government is not to be treated as an ordinary litigant who sometimes either under pressure or lack of advice or with mala fide intention tries to linger the proceeding to have advantage over the adversary. The State Government is not to be treated as an ordinary litigant who sometimes either under pressure or lack of advice or with mala fide intention tries to linger the proceeding to have advantage over the adversary. State like any other litigant is entitled to challenge the legality or propriety of an order but an onerous duty is cast to scan and scrutinise the real infirmity and vulnerability in the order. In the absence of that it can be said without any hesitation that the duty is not done, burden is not discharged and laxity is perspicuous, 7. As all the submissions raised by the learned Additional Government Advocate are devoid of merit the Civil Revision is dismissed with costs which is assessed at Rs, 560/-. Final Result : Dismissed