JUDGMENT 1. :- The petitioner who is an ex-employee of the Railway Protection Force has moved this Court by way of this writ petition and has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ, direction or order for setting aside the impugned order, dated 5th May, 1989 passed by the Chief Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, (W.R.) Church Gate, Bombay (respondent No.2) and the order, dated 20th December, 1988 passed by the Division Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force (W.R.), Vadodara (Gujarat), respondent No. 3 herein whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated from Railway Protection Force (for short 'RPF'). 2. The petitioner Jaglal Singh pursuant to his regular selection was appointed as `Rakshak' in R.P.F. on 17th January, 1985 and was posted at Viramgam, Railway Protection Force and since then the petitioner had been rendering his services regularly till his dismissal from service by the respondents vide impugned orders dated 5th May, 1989 and 20th December. 1988 passed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. 3. The background in the contract of which the petitioner was sought to he implicated in a ease of alleged theft of the railway property is that on 12th and 13th May, 1989 the petitioner was posted at Viramgam post of R.P.F. and was performing his duty during the relevant time, i.e., 8.00 hours to 16.00 hours. It has been contended that the theft took place in the night intervening 12th & 13th May, 1988 in Viramgam railway yard and one Abdul Ali was apprehended on the spot by Sub-inspector Ram Prasad Saroj. On investigation it was revealed that there were seven accused including one Abdul Ali who are involved in the alleged theft. It has been further contended in the petition that out of seven accused persons who were apprehended, four accused persons, namely, Ahmad Babubhai, Yaseen Mohammad, Haneef and Mustfa were arrested on 23rd May, 1988, while two accused, namely, Saleem and Nijambhai were arrested on 24th May. 1989. It has been further contended that the above named six accused persons made a confessional statement before respondent No. 4 Ram Prasad Saroj S.I., R.P.F. Viramgam, Western Railway, Gujarat, as a result of which the petitioner was implicated in the case. 1989. It has been further contended that the above named six accused persons made a confessional statement before respondent No. 4 Ram Prasad Saroj S.I., R.P.F. Viramgam, Western Railway, Gujarat, as a result of which the petitioner was implicated in the case. It was stated by the accused that the petitioner had approached two accused, namely, Saleem and Ahmad Bapubhai on bicycle in village Raiyapur on 12th May, 1988 at about noon and told them that the accused along with some more persons who went to railway yard Viramgam and met him there near Aligarh Gate in the night. Accordingly they collected remaining five persons armed with hacksaw blades and met the petitioner at about 12.00 pm. on the same night. It has been further contended that thereupon the petitioner told the co-accused to go to railway yard and remove the old electric poles by cutting them. It is further stated that at the instance of the petitioner they went to the railway yard and cut two electric poles. It has been further contended that while removing the poles, R.P.F. staff on duty chased them and thereafter they fled away leaving behind the blades and the stolen property. It has been further contended that the electric blades were standing in the dumping place of scrap goods of the railway yard and were not having any service line on it and as such they were rendered completely useless. 4. It has been further contended in the petition that on 23rd and 24th May, 1988 the petitioner was on leave which was duly sanctioned by the Authority. On 25th and 26th May, 1988 the petitioner was on sick leave and joined duty on 27th May, 1988. The petitioner was shocked and surprised to know that in the record of the railways the petitioner had been shown as `wanted' since 24th May, 1988; whereas in fact he was on leave from 23rd to 26th May, 1988 and thereafter remained continuously on duty up to 3rd January, 1989 when he was dismissed from service. The petitioner was shocked and surprised to know that in the record of the railways the petitioner had been shown as `wanted' since 24th May, 1988; whereas in fact he was on leave from 23rd to 26th May, 1988 and thereafter remained continuously on duty up to 3rd January, 1989 when he was dismissed from service. It has been further contended in the petition that the alleged story of theft was concocted and manipulated by railway Authorities particularly respondent No. 4 the Sub Inspector, R.P.F. It has been further contended that during his service tenure the petitioner had detected 8 to 10 cases of theft in railway yard, Viramgam and that the accused persons had implicated the petitioner falsely as he was one of the main obstruction in their unlawful activities. Respondent No.4 taking advantage of the situation got this confessional statement recorded from the accused that the alleged theft was committed with the abetment of the petitioner. It has been further contended that the confessional statement of the co-accused implicating the petitioner recorded by respondent No.4 was not voluntary and was recorded under coercion and duress of respondent No. 4. 5. On 3rd January, 1989 the petitioner was served with the impugned order dated 20th December, 1988 (Annex. l) passed by Divisional Chief Security Commissioner, R.P.F. (Western Railway), Bombay (respondent No.2). In para 4 of the impugned order it is recorded that since seven accused persons-outsiders will be facing trial in the Court of law, the authority is satisfied that it will not be reasonably practicable nor it is necessary to hold a regular inquiry as provided under Rule 153 of R.P.F. Rules, 1987, since there are a multitude of impediments to hold the inquiry in view of the vagrant and unsettled life of the accused due to which their whereabouts will not be known and further they will have change of mind due to the delinquent constable winning them over and in case of acquittal of all or any of them, they will not maintain their original version. Moreover the inquiry under the Railway Properties Unlawful possession Act was conducted by a responsible officer of the Force who is the delinquent constable's own superior and it is not conceivable that a superior will involve his subordinate without reason and, therefore, the petitioner has not cast any aspersion against his superior. Moreover the inquiry under the Railway Properties Unlawful possession Act was conducted by a responsible officer of the Force who is the delinquent constable's own superior and it is not conceivable that a superior will involve his subordinate without reason and, therefore, the petitioner has not cast any aspersion against his superior. It has been further recorded in the impugned on its rolls whose conduct is impeached by the administration and who indulges himself in discreditable activities sullying the image of the Force. It is in view of the above that prima facie presumption of guilt was drawn by th disciplinary authority, respondent No.2 without issuing any show cause notice, charge-sheet or even an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who made deposition against the petitioner during the inquiry and holding of inquiry was dispensed with in gross violation of Rule 153 of the R.P.F. Rules, 1987 and the petitioner was condemned unheard and was dismissed from service as indicated above. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of dismissal the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Chief Security Commissioner, R.P.F. (W.R.) Vadodara, Gujarat, respondent No.3 and the appellate authority vide its order, dated 5th May, 1989 dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner vide Annexure 2 by observing that the disciplinary authority had appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the reasons to dispense with the inquiry and, therefore, the punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the petitioner was justified. The petitioner was communicated the impugned order of dismissal of his appeal vide letter dated 19th May, 1989. The petitioner was communicated the impugned order of dismissal of his appeal vide letter dated 19th May, 1989. It was under these circumstances that the petitioner has moved this Court by way of this writ petition contending inter-alia that there was no foundation, circumstance or ground to implicate the petitioner and in absence of the objective material on record or even the evidence of the material witnesses who could depose against the petitioner and who could be cross-examined by the petitioner if defence, regular inquiry was dispensed with by the disciplinary authority on its mere whims, conjectures and surmises that since it was not reasonably practicable nor it was necessary to hold a regular inquiry as contemplated by R.P.F. Rules, 1987 and in view of the multitude of impediments which are likely to arise it will not be necessary to hold such inquiry and presumption of guilt was thus drawn against the petitioner by not giving him the basic opportunity of even being heard as contemplated by the rules and in violation of principles of natural justice in this regard. It has been further contended that before passing the impugned order it was incumbent upon disciplinary authority to have followed the procedure prescribed under the rules for conducting disciplinary inquiry against delinquent by placing the petitioner under suspension at the first instance and then conduct the inquiry in accordance with law by summoning the relevant evidence and by affording sufficient opportunity to the petitioner of being heard before any presumption of guilt could be drawn against him and which has not been done in the instant case. 6. It has been contended by Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner that the case of the department is wholly based on confessional statement of the accused persons in respect of which the petitioner has not been given any opportunity of cross examination and reliance could not be placed on the testimony of co-accused since there is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioner had ever tried to win over the accused and disciplinary authority has drawn false assumption and in the absence of any material on record that the accused persons will be won over by the petitioner and, therefore, the regular inquiry had even dispensed with. It has been further contended by Shri Bhandari that the very fact that disciplinary authority has so observed in the impugned order that in case of acquittal accused will not maintain their original version on mere apprehension that they may be won over by petitioner and hence may not support case of department itself shows that entire case is false and fabricated and the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order on presumption that the accused persons will be acquitted and the said erroneous presumption could not be drawn by disciplinary authority contrary to the material on record. Further merely because the accused persons are leading a vagrant and unsettled life, does not justify the dispension of the inquiry by Disciplinary Authority. 7. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following judgment : Bhagirathmal v. Union of India, (1989) 1 Rajasthan LR 54 and Gokul Chand Sharma v. Union of India, SB CWP No. 1761/1986 decided on 1st December, 1992 . In the matter of Bhagirathmal v. Union of India (1990 Lab IC 47) (supra), the petitioner who was a member of R.P.F. had moved this Court by way of writ petition praying inter-alia that the impugned order of termination of his service passed by Asstt. Security Officer was illegal and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. The petitioner had assailed both the orders of termination as well as the order passed by the appellate authority. The contention of the petitioner was that both the orders are illegal, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice in view of the fact that Rule 41 of the R.P.F. Rules. 1959 provides for nature of penalties which may he imposed on the delinquent employee including removal from service Rule 44 provides for procedure for imposing major penalties and under this rule an elaborate inquiry is contemplated after giving full opportunity of hearing to delinquent employee to meet the case of the department and to put his defence. Rule 47 of the Rules provides for special procedure to be observed in certain cases and it provides that where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to he recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the rules. Rule 47 of the Rules provides for special procedure to be observed in certain cases and it provides that where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to he recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the rules. the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it deems fit. The impugned order was challenged on the ground that there were no circumstances or grounds or objective materials which could justify the formation of satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not practicable to follow the procedure contemplated under Rule 44 of the Rules. Furthermore the dispensation of the inquiry was by itself not sufficient to prove that the charges levelled against the delinquent employee are automatically proved. It was consequently held by this Court that the action of removal from service suffers from mala fide both in law and fact and consequently the impugned order was quashed and set aside. Likewise in the matter of Shekhar Tengoor v. Union of India and others, SB CWP No. 955/81 decided on 24th May, 1985 it was held by this Court that in cases where the inquiry is sought to be dispensed with on the ground that no witnesses would come forward to depose against delinquent employee, it is not necessary that there must be some material before the disciplinary authority to show that the delinquent employee has extended threats to the witnesses and the witnesses have expressed their inability to oppose the inquiry. Mere possibility of use of violence in future by the delinquent employee against the witnesses would not be a relevant ground for dispensing with the inquiry. In the matter of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 (1985 Lab IC 1393) , the Apex Court has also observed that the disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with the disciplinary inquiry rightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motive or merely in order to avoid holding of inquiry because the department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Art. 311(2) of the Constitution is not binding upon the Court in so far as the power of review is concerned and in such cases the Court is at liberty to strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. In the matter of Kedarnath v. Union of India, (1984) 2 Serv SLR 347 (1984 Lab IC 682) , the inquiry was dispensed with solely on the ground that only eye witness to the alleged incident was not likely to come forward and give testimony against the delinquent. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that such a ground was not germane to the consideration for dispensation of the inquiry. In the matter of Gokul Chand Sharma v. Union of India (supra), the petitioner who was a member of R.P.F. Western Railway, Bombay had challenged the impugned order of termination from service before this Court on the ground that the disciplinary authority had not dispensed with the inquiry on the ground, it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry against the delinquent on mere conjectures and surmises and the impugned order was assailed by the petitioner on the ground that it has resulted in deprival of fair opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and his defence has been seriously prejudiced as a consequence thereof. Following the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Bhagirathmal v. Union of India (1990 Lab IC 47) and Tulsiram Patel v. Union of India (1985 Lab IC 1393) and Shekhar Tengoor v. Union of India (supra), the following principles had emerged for consideration of this Court:- 1. Dispensation of enquiry is no more the subjective satisfaction of the authority, but the discretion of the authority has to be exercised on objective facts on record. 2. The practicability referred to under Rule 47 must be with reference to the following of the procedure laid down under Rule 44. The term "reasonable and practicable" has, whatsover, nothing to do with the prospective success of enquiry. Practicability is not to be confused with expectancy or the chances of success of the enquiry contemplated against the delinquent member of the force. 3. The term "reasonable and practicable" has, whatsover, nothing to do with the prospective success of enquiry. Practicability is not to be confused with expectancy or the chances of success of the enquiry contemplated against the delinquent member of the force. 3. When the decision of the employer to dispense with the enquiry is questioned, the employer must be in a position to satisfy the Court that holding an enquiry will be either counter productive or may cause irreparable and irretrievable damages. The impugned order of termination was consequently set aside and the petitioner was directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits including pension, gratuity and other service benefits in accordance with law. 8. In the reply to show cause notice the respondents have controverted the above contentions of the petitioner by taking a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction of this Court that since the petitioner was serving in the R.P.F. at Viramgam and was dismissed while so serving there, this writ petition is not maintainable. Further the appeal against the dismissal order having been considered and rejected at Bombay the petition is therefore, liable to be dismissed on this count alone. 9. On the question of territorial jurisdiction it has been contended by Shri Bandari that the impugned order of termination, dated 20th December, 1988 as well as the appellate order, dated 5th May, 1989 both were communicated and served on the petitioner at Ajmer in Rajasthan and, therefore, this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 10. On merits it has been contended by the respondents in their reply that the fact of the matter is that during small spell of his service career, the petitioner was awarded two penalties in the years 1987 and 1988 respectively and was finally dismissed from service by respondent No.2 by invoking the provisions of Rule 161 (ii) of R.P.F. Rules, 19e 7 on 20th December, 1988. It has been further contended that the petitioner suffers from guilt and mere denial of the charge of theft is not a ground to absolve the petitioner from his liability in respect of theft of railway property. It has been further contended that the petitioner suffers from guilt and mere denial of the charge of theft is not a ground to absolve the petitioner from his liability in respect of theft of railway property. It has been further contended that due to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Divisional Security Commissioner (respondent No.3) had no alternative but to invoke Rule 161(II) of R.P.F. Rules, 1987 and dispensed with the inquiry in the manner provided in the Rules by recording the reasons for dispensing with the same. Further the appellants authority has also confirmed the findings of the disciplinary authority and that the cases of this nature deserve to be examined from a different angle than the ordinary cases where the question of discipline of armed force is involved. It has been further contended that the Constitutional requirements laid down in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India are not applicable, since there is no provision for show cause notice in the R.P.F. DAR Rules, 1987 and, therefore, the petition is not maintainable and the same deserves dismissal. 11. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the following judgments : Collector of Customs, Culcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1124 , State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 , ( AIR 1985 SC 1289 ) and Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 : (1994 AIR SCW 3287) . In the matter of Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1963 SC 1124 ) (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that on principle when once an order of an original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of the latter authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of: and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the appellate authority. In the matter of State of Raj. v. M/s Swaika Properties ( AIR 1985 SC 1289 ) (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that transaction must be integral part of the cause of action sufficient to invest the High Court with jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner. In the matter of State of Raj. v. M/s Swaika Properties ( AIR 1985 SC 1289 ) (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that transaction must be integral part of the cause of action sufficient to invest the High Court with jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner. The question before the Supreme Court in appeal was whether the service of notice at registered office of the respondent was an integral part of cause of action and was sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification of State of Rajasthan. It was held by the Apex Court that answer to this question must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. In the matter of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994 AIR SCW 3287) (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that territory within which the cause of action wholly or in part, arises is to be decided on facts pleaded in the petition disregarding the truth or otherwise thereof. Since averments in the petition did not disclose that even a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court, it was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions and also examined the ratio of the judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court as referred to above. 13. With regard to the preliminary objection advanced by learned counsel for respondent regarding maintainability of this writ petition on the question of territorial jurisdiction, I am of the opinion that notwithstanding the fact that impugned order dated 5-5-89 as well as appellate order, dated 20-12-88 whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service as a member of RPF, were passed by the said authorities at Bombay and Gujarat respectively, the said impugned orders were communicated and served on the petitioner at Ajmer in Rajasthan which is apparent from record and since a part of cause of action had arisen in Rajasthan this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide this writ petition. I am further of the opinion that Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Railways, New Delhi (respondent No.1) exercises complete administrative control over its subordinate offices located and functioning at different stations of Western Railways and since Ajmer is also within the administrative control of the Western Railways, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. I am further of the opinion that it is cardinal principle of law that justice should be both speedy and inexpensive and in a country like India ordinary citizens cannot afford the luxury of litigation which is becoming expensive day-by-day and not within the reach of common man. Hence it will be wholly improper at this stage not to entertain and decide the writ petition on the question of territorial jurisdiction alone particularly when the petitioner deserves to succeed on merits of the case. 14. This writ petition was filed in this Court on 4-10-89 and the same has been pending in this Court for past more than six years and this Court has already taken cognizance by admitting writ petition on 2-11-1i9 and thus it will be wholly improper to reject this petition merely on technical grounds. This Court also has to keep in view that the petitioner has been out of employment for last seven years and hence it will be too harsh and hard to deny justice to the petitioner who fully deserves relief on merits of the case and hence I am of the opinion that it will be improper to reject this petition on technical grounds. 15. On merits, I am of the opinion that the impugned order of termination from service dated 20th December, 1988 as well as the appellate order, dated 5th May, 1989 are not sustainable since the same have been passed in gross violation of the procedure contemplated under R.P.F. Rules, 1987 read with Art. 311(3) of the Constitution of India and I am of the considered opinion that it was wholly improper for the appropriate authority to dispense with the regular inquiry on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable nor it is necessary to hold regular inquiry as provided under Rule 153 of the R.P.F. Rules. I am further of the opinion that R.P.F. Rules 1987 do not over-ride the Constitutional provisions as envisaged under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution which mandates that no such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given `reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges'. With regard to clause (3) of Art. 311 of the Constitution that if in respect of any such person as aforesaid the question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry as is referred in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person is concerned, I am of the opinion that the satisfaction to be recorded by the authority dispensing with such inquiry is not merely a subjective satisfaction but has to he exercised objectively after taking into consideration all the material on record and it is not open to such authority to impose extreme penalty of dismissal or removal from service of a delinquent without giving him sufficient opportunity of hearing and adducing evidence in his defence as contemplated by clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Since the said provision has been incorporated by the legislature in public interest and for public good, it has to be strictly construed and hence I am of the considered opinion that it was not open to the Disciplinary as well as Appellate Authority to dispense with holding of a proper departmental inquiry before imposing the penalty of removal from service on the petitioner, which admittedly has not been done in this case. 16. As a result of the above discussions, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders dated 20th December, 1988 and 5th May, 1989 passed by respondent Nos. 3 and 2 respectively are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits as admissible to him under the Rules. Parties are left to bear their own cost.Petition allowed. *******