Judgment : Paritosh K. Mukherjee 1. THIS writ petition was taken up for hearing for the first time on 4.9.1996 when this Court after hearing Sri R. C. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner directed to produce following decisions of Supreme Court, which are set out herein below :- (i) Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454 . (ii) Ranjeet Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 . (iii) Union of India v. Parmanand, AIR 1989 SC 1185 . (iv) Dr. B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, JT 1995 (8) SC 65. 2. TODAY, at the time of resume hearing Sri R. C. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner produced the aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court on the point as to whether Writ Court is entitled to interfere with the quantum of punishment if the punishment is disproportionate to the charge, as referred to in the aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court. In the instant case, the petitioner who was conductor, his services have been dismissed by order dated 2.2.1988. 3. IT appears from the charge-sheet dated 27.5.1987, which is written in Hindi and if translated in English will run as follows :- "That on 4.4.1987 Sri Praveen Kumar, Conductor came to Sri Ram Prasad, Senior Officer Incharge for signatures on a family chit pass for the journey of Karoli (Kela Devi). At that time Sri Ram Prasad, Senior Officer Incharge was busy in preparation of an answer to the Assembly question. Since the chit pass was against the departmental rules the Senior Officer Incharge refused to sign. After some time Sri Praveen Kumar, Conductor came with Sri Alok Kumar, Conductor S/o Sri M. P. Singh (under suspension) to the Senior Officer Incharge. At that time both of you were in a drunken state. Both of them accused the Senior Officer Incharge as well as Sri Panna Lal Junior Officer Incharge who was present there and used filthy language. By beating table and showing indiscipline they brought a very bad name to the department in full public gaze. Therefore, you are responsible for not performing your duties sincerely, compelling the officer Incharge to act against the departmental rules, against your conduct by consuming liquor, insulting your superior officers by abusing in filthy language, indiscipline and violating the rules and circulars of the department. Therefore, you are responsible for not performing your duties sincerely, compelling the officer Incharge to act against the departmental rules, against your conduct by consuming liquor, insulting your superior officers by abusing in filthy language, indiscipline and violating the rules and circulars of the department. The following are the documents in support of the aforesaid charge. 1. Reports of Sri Ram Prasad and Sri Panna Lal (copy enclosed). In view of the aforesaid reasons you are directed to submit your written statement within 15 days or before to this office, stating your defence in respect of each charge. You are also warned that in case your written statement is not received to the under signed within the aforesaid stipulated period then it will be deemed that you have nothing to say in respect of the aforesaid charges. Accordingly ex parte decision will be taken in the matter and the decision so taken will be implemented. You are also informed that in case you want to produce any witness in support of your defence in that event you may send his name and address in your written statement." 4. THE only point calls for consideration by this Court is as to whether High Court is entitled to interfere in writ jurisdiction with the quantum of punishment. In the case of Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), the Supreme Court on the said point, inter alia, has observed as follows :- "In a petition under Article 226, the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal over the findings of disciplinary authority. But where the finding is utterly perverse, the Court can always interfere with the same." In this connection. Supreme Court in the aforesaid case referred to a decision in the case of Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 (728), and in conclusion Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the following extent:- "Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The order dated May 6, 1977, removing the appellant from service and the Order dated 31st January, 1978 of the Chief Conservator of Forest, Himachal Pradesh dismissing his appeal and the Order of the High Court dismissing his petition in limine are quashed and set aside. The appellant is reinstated in service. His two increments with future effect shall be withheld. The appellant is reinstated in service. His two increments with future effect shall be withheld. He should be paid 50% of the arrears of salary from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. The period between the date of termination of service and reinstatement shall be treated for other purposes as on duty." 5. THE aforesaid decision of Supreme Court has been followed in the case of Ranjeet Thakur v. Union of India (supra), wherein Supreme Court observed as follows:- "Judicial review, generally speaking is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision making process". THE question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. THE doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of Judicial review, would ensure that even on as aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." THE aforesaid decision of Supreme Court in the case of Ranjeet Thakur v. Union of India (supra), was solely based on the decision of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 WLR 1174, wherein Lord D. Plock, inter alia, observed that "any thing disproportionate should be discarded." 6. BUT in a later decision in the case of Union of India v. Parmanand (supra), the Supreme Court made a solitary, departure when the judgment was delivered by Hon'ble K. Jagannatha Shetty, Hon'ble A. M. Ahmadi and Hon'ble Kuldeep Singh, JJ., wherein their Lordships have held to the extent that the power vested with the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India may not be available to a High Court in exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, although the said case arose out of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. With due respect to their Lordships of Supreme Court, the Judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Parmananda (supra) was "per incurium", as it did not directly follow the aforesaid other two decisions of the Supreme Court operating in the field, and no specific cause has been given for making a departure. 7. BUT Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Dr. B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (supra), inter alia, has observed as under:- "No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. BUT for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert Section 11A in it to confer this power even on a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under Section 11A is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be Justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to Government employees or employees of the public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal, etc., to public servants does not make a real difference, as the appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. BUT then, while seized with this question as a writ court, interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate." That being latest law of Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow the latest decision of Supreme Court in disposing of the writ petition finally. 8. IT has been argued in the instant case that the charge being so simple of abusing the respondents in drunken state was not a severe charge for which extreme punishment of dismissal from service was required. Having heard the respective submissions of Sri R. C. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri V. K. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents at some length, and having gone through the several pronouncements of Supreme Court, referred to above, including the decision of House of Lords to the effect that anything disproportionate should be discarded, this court is of the view that the extreme punishment of the dismissal of the petitioner from service by order dated 2.2.1988 deserve to be interfered by this Court as the punishment awarded was disproportionate to the charge. 9. THUS, this Court proposes to interfere with the punishment of dismissal, and sets aside the order dated 2.2.1988, passed by the respondent No. 2. This Court is further of the view that instead of remanding back the case to the disciplinary authority for imposing afresh punishment, commensurate to the simple charge, this Court imposes the penalty to the extent of awarding punishment of loss of two increments relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra). Petitioner will be reinstated in service and will be entitled to the payment of 50% of the arrears of salary, from the date of dismissal till reinstatement. The period between dismissal and reinstatement shall be treated for other purpose as on duty. 10. WRIT petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.