ORDER : M.K. Mukherjee, J. 1. Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. For possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, a case was registered against the respondent under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ("Act" for short). On completion of investigation, the prosecution filed charge-sheet against him after obtaining sanction from the State Government. The Principal Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Hyderabad took cognizance upon the charge-sheet and issued process against the respondent. After entering appearance, he filed an application seeking his discharge under Section 239 Criminal Procedure Code. The learned trial Judge rejected that application and aggrieved thereby, the respondent moved the High Court in revision. By an order dated 18-7-1990, the High Court disposed of the revision petition by directing the State Government to reconsider the question of according sanction for prosecution of the respondent after giving him an opportunity to offer an explanation against the accusation made against him. Pursuant to the said direction, the State Government considered the explanation submitted by the respondent and rejected the same with the following order: "The Government have examined the detailed explanation submitted by Shri P. Suryaprakasam for reconsideration of the earlier sanction of prosecution by the Government. After careful consideration of the explanation, the Government have decided that there is no ground to modify the earlier order of the Government sanctioning prosecution. His petition is accordingly rejected." 3. Thereafter, the respondent filed another application before the learned trial Judge seeking his discharge on the ground that the Government did not consider his explanation in terms of the direction of the High Court. The learned trial Judge rejected that application and aggrieved thereby, he filed another revision petition before the High Court which was allowed and thus the proceeding against the respondent was quashed. The above order is under challenge in this appeal. 4. In passing the impugned order, the High Court first made the following observation: "In fact it is a settled law that while framing charges, the court should apply its mind and consider the entire materials not only produced by the prosecution but also the explanation and the materials produced by the accused and this should be objectively done and not subjectively. But in this case, the lower court has utterly failed to do so." (emphasis supplied) and then proceeded to consider the documents filed by the respondent to substantiate his claim that no offence as alleged was committed by him. After a detailed discussion thereon, the High Court upheld his claim and quashed the proceeding. 5. Without meaning any disrespect to the High Court, we are constrained to say that the settled law is just the reverse of what the High Court has observed in the above-quoted passage as would be evident from even a cursory reading of Sections 239 and 240 Criminal Procedure Code, which admittedly govern the case of the respondent. According to the above sections, at the time of framing of a charge what the trial court is required to, and can, consider are only the police report referred to under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code and the documents sent with it. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond that. Of course, at that stage the accused may be examined but that is a prerogative of the court only. Though, in view of the clear language of the above sections, no authority need be cited for the above proposition still we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142 (to which one of us was a party) for therein, the scope and ambit of the above sections came up for consideration and it was held: (SCC p. 144, para 6) "6. Having regard to the fact that the offences, for which charge-sheet was submitted in the instant case and cognizance taken, were triable as a warrant case the Magistrate was to proceed in accordance with Sections 239 and 240 of the Code at the time of framing of the charges. Under the above sections, the Magistrate is first required to consider the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code and examine the accused, if he thinks necessary, and give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard. Under the above sections, the Magistrate is first required to consider the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 Criminal Procedure Code and examine the accused, if he thinks necessary, and give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard. If on such consideration, examination and hearing the Magistrate finds the charge groundless he has to discharge the accused in terms of Section 239 Criminal Procedure Code; conversely, if he finds that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable by him he has to frame a charge in terms of Section 240 Criminal Procedure Code." 6. From the impugned judgment, we next find that the High Court took exception to the fact that the respondent's explanation was not properly considered by the State Government in spite of the earlier order of the High Court as quoted above. This finding of the High Court is also against the law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 wherein, in dealing with the question as to whether such an opportunity of giving an explanation and hearing must be granted to the accused and the non-grant of the same would vitiate the order of sanction in a case under Section 5(2) of the Act, this Court observed: (SCC p. 268, para 67) "It is equally well settled that before granting sanction the authority or the appropriate Government must have before it the necessary report and the material facts which prima facie establish the commission of offence charged for and the appropriate Government would apply their mind to those facts. The order of sanction is only an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial one nor is a lis involved. Therefore, the order of sanction need not contain detailed reasons in support thereof as was contended by Shri Jain. But the basic facts that constitute the offence must be apparent on the impugned order and the record must bear out the reasons in that regard. The question of giving an opportunity to the public servant at that stage as was contended for the respondents does not arise." (emphasis supplied) 7. But the basic facts that constitute the offence must be apparent on the impugned order and the record must bear out the reasons in that regard. The question of giving an opportunity to the public servant at that stage as was contended for the respondents does not arise." (emphasis supplied) 7. Again in State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri, (1996) 1 SCC 542 this Court held, relying upon its earlier judgment in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 that the opportunity which has to be afforded to the delinquent officer under Section 3(1)(e) of the Act of satisfactorily explaining about his assets is before the court when the trial commenced and not at an earlier stage. (emphasis supplied) 8. As already stated, the High Court in quashing the proceedings not only looked into the documents filed by the respondent in support of his claim that no case was made out against him even before the trial had commenced ? but relied upon them to conclude that no offence was committed by him. This approach of the High Court is also contrary to the settled law of the land which was reiterated in Minakshi case, (1994) 4 SCC 142 with the following words: (SCC p. 145, para 8) "8. Apart from the infirmity in the approach of the High Court in dealing with the matter which we have already noticed, we further find that instead of adverting to and confining its attention to the documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240 Criminal Procedure Code the High Court has dealt with the rival contentions of the parties raised through their respective affidavits at length and on a threadbare discussion thereof passed the impugned order. The course so adopted cannot be supported; firstly, because finding regarding commission of an offence cannot be recorded on the basis of affidavit evidence and secondly, because at the stage of framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the functions of a trial court to delve into and decide upon the respective merits of the case." 9. For the foregoing discussion, it must be said that the order of the High Court is patently wrong and accordingly, we set aside the same. The learned trial Judge will now proceed with the case in accordance with law. 10. The appeal is thus allowed.