Honble ARORA, J. – This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26.7.94 passed by the learned Single Judge, by which the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant and maintained the order dated 25.1.93 passed by the Labour Court, Jodhpur, by which the learned Judge of the Labour Court dismissed the application filed by the appellant-peti- tioner under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, `the Act) on the ground that it is not maintainable and the workman may approach the appropriate forum for the redressal of his grievances. (2). Appellant Moti Lal was working as Mono Coster (eksuks pkyd) in the Government Printing Press, Jodhpur, during the period from October, 1979 to March, 1980, on daily wages basis. During this period, some additional payments were made to the workman on account of over-time. In the internal audit it was found that some excess payments have been made to the daily rated workers and some persons have been given appointments contrary to the instructions and rules. In pursuance of the report of the Internal Audit Party it was ordered by the Director that the amount of excess payment made to the various daily wages employees may be recovered. In pursuance to the order dated 3.8.82 of the Director, the letter dated 17.9.82 was issued by the Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Jodhpur to the appellant-petitioner directing him to deposit a sum of Rs. 530/- which was paid to him in excess. It was, also, mentioned in this letter that if the amount is not deposited then the same will be deducted from his wages payable in the month of September, 1982 and onwards. The appellant- workman did not deposit the amount and raised an objection that this amount is not liable to be deducted and it was rightly paid to him. As the amount was not deposited, a sum of Rs. 100/- was deducted from his wages of October, 1982. (3). The appellant thereafter moved an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act before the Labour Court, Jodhpur, challenging the order of recovery of the earned wages amounting to Rs. 530/-. It was mentioned in the application filed by Shri Moti Lal that the applicant worked on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. (3). The appellant thereafter moved an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act before the Labour Court, Jodhpur, challenging the order of recovery of the earned wages amounting to Rs. 530/-. It was mentioned in the application filed by Shri Moti Lal that the applicant worked on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. 5/- per day in the Government Press, Jodhpur as the Assistant Mono Coster since October, 1979 to March, 1980 on different dates and an amount of Rs. 340/- was paid to him and an order has been passed by the Superintendent, Government Press, Jodhpur on 17.9.82 on the basis of the order dated 3.8.82 passed by the Directorate for the recovery of the amount of Rs. 400/-. It has, also been men- tioned in the application that the amount of Rs. 130/- paid as over-time payment to him has, also, been ordered to be recovered from the applicant and from the wages of the month of October, 1982 of the applicant, Rs. 100/- have been recovered and remaining amount of Rs. 430/- is to be recovered @ Rs. 100/- per month from the monthly wages of the applicant. It has, also, been mentioned in the application that ten to fifteen more persons were, also, employed on daily wages basis with the non- applicant but the applicant and one Shri Hukam Singh have been selected as the persons from whom the recoveries are being made and, therefore, the recovery proceedings are discriminatory and amounts to unfair labour practice and there is a dispute between the parties regarding the recovery of this amount. It was, therefore, prayed that the amount in question may be computed. (4). This application was opposed by the non-applicant and it was stated in the reply that on what basis and for what period the amount of Rs. 400/- was paid to Moti Lal, has not been mentioned in the vouchers and as an unauthorised payment was made to him, therefore, it was ordered to be recovered. It was, also, mentioned in the reply that the applicant was appointed on daily wages basis and no over-time amount was payable to him and as the excess amount of Rs. 130/- was, also, paid to Moti Lal which was objected to by the Internal Audit Party, therefore, the order for the recovery was made. It was, also, mentioned in the reply that the applicant was appointed on daily wages basis and no over-time amount was payable to him and as the excess amount of Rs. 130/- was, also, paid to Moti Lal which was objected to by the Internal Audit Party, therefore, the order for the recovery was made. An additional objection was taken by the non-applicant that the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is not maintainable and the applicant can approach the appropriate forum for the redressal of his grievances under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act or under Section 7(2) of the Payment of Wages Act. (5). Both the parties led their evidence and the learned Judge of the Labour Court, by his order dated 25.3.93 dismissed the application filed by the appellant-applicant on the ground that it is not maintainable as it does not fall within the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Aggrieved with the order passed by the learned Judge of the Labour Court, the appellant-petitioner preferred the writ petition before this Court which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 26.7.94 and it is against this judgment that the appellant has preferred this appeal. (6). It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the application moved by the appellant before the Labour Court was maintainable because the claim of the appellant was that wrongful deductions are being made by the authorities from the monthly wages of the applicant and consideration of these deductions was a question which was incidental and integrally connected with the computation of the wages and, therefore, the learned Single Judge and the learned Judge of the Labour Court were not justified in rejecting the application on the ground that it is not maintainable. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the order passed by the respondent making deduction from the wages of the appellant was a void order which can be ignored by the Labour Court while granting the relief and the Court had juris- diction to decide whether the deduction was made rightly or wrongly as it was incidental to the controversy. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance over : Ambica Mills Company Ltd. vs. S.B. Bhatt and Ors. (1), the Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan & etc. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance over : Ambica Mills Company Ltd. vs. S.B. Bhatt and Ors. (1), the Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan & etc. (2), Nityanand M. Joshi & Anr. vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. (3). (7). Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has supported the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as well as by the learned Judge of the Labour Court and further submitted that the question : whether the amount regarding which the internal audit party has raised an objection and in pursuance to which the order has been passed by the competent authority for the recovery of the amount, can be recovered from the workman or not, is a question which can be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal on a reference being made to the Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act or it can be adjudicated under Section 7(2) of the Payments of Wages Act but cannot be decided on an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The learned Judge of the Labour Court was, therefore, justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance over : M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand & Ors. (4) and P.K. Singh & Ors. vs. Presiding Officer & Ors. (5). (8). The short controversy which requires consideration in the present case is relating to the scope of Section 13C(2) of the Act and the maintainability of the appellants application under this Section before the Labour Court. Before dealing with this controversy, we think it proper to first consider the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the parties. (9). In Ambica Mills Company Ltd. vs. S.B. Bhatt & Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court held that ``in dealing with the claim arising out of the deduction or delay made in the payment of wages, the authority inevitably would have to consider the question incidental to the said matter. For determining the scope of these incidental questions, care must be taken to see that in the guise of deciding the incidental matter the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably and unduly extended. For determining the scope of these incidental questions, care must be taken to see that in the guise of deciding the incidental matter the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably and unduly extended. Care must, also, be taken to see that the scope of incidental question is not unduly limited so as to confer orimpair the considering of the question as to what could be reasonably regarded as incidental question. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx In our opinion, it would be inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast or a general rule which will afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which can be legitimately considered by the authority and those which cannot be so considered. (10). In the Central Bank of India Pvt. Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc. (supra), the case of the respondent-workman was that besides attending to his routine duties as clerk he had been operating the adding machine provided for the use in the clearing department of the branch and as such he was entitled to Rs. 10/- as special allowance for operating the adding machine as provided in the Shastri Award. The bank disputed this claim. The Supreme Court, while considering the claim of the workman, held that :– ``In construting Section 33-C we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations. The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of Section 33-C cases which would fall under Section 10(1). Where industrial disputes are between em- ployees acting collectively and their employer, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under Section 10(1). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of Section 33-C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting Section 33-C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this Section cases of the existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workman. In other words, though in determining the scope of Section 33-C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under Section 10(1) of the Act for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of Section 33-C. (11). In Nityanand M. Joshi vs. the L.I.C. of India & Anr.(supra), the applications were filed by the workman for computing in terms of money the benefits of holidays and for recovering the amount. The Apex Court held that ``this case falls squarely within Sub- section (2) of Section 33-C as there is no award or settlement under which the benefit of holidays had already been computed. (12). The scope of Section 33-C(2) camp-up for consideration before the Supreme Court in : East India Coal Company vs. Rameshwar (6), and the Apex Court held that :– ``A proceeding under Section 33-C (2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. But the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman and his employer. (13). The scope of Section 33-C(2) again camp-up for consideration before the Supreme Court in S.B.B.J. vs. R.L. Khandelwal (7), and the Supreme Court held that :– ``It is not compent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made in the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act. (14). In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand & Anr. (14). In Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Suresh Chand & Anr. (supra), the controversy before the Supreme Court was : what is the effect of contravention of Section 33(2) (b) on an order of dismissal passed by an employer in breach of it : Does it render the order of dismissal void and inoperative so that the aggrieved workman can say that he continues to be in service and is entitled to receive wages from the employer? It is only if an order of dismissal passed in contravention of Section 33(2) (b) is null and void that the aggrieved workman would be entitled to maintain an application under Section 33-C(2) for determination and payment of the amount of wages due to him on the basis that he continues in service despite the order of dismissal. The Supreme Court, considering its earlier judgments and the law on the point held that :– ``It is, therefore, impossible to accept the argument that the contravention of Section 33 renders the order of discharge or dismissal void and inoperative and if that be so, the only remedy available to the workman for challenging the order of discharge or dismissal is that provided under Section 33-A, apart of course from the remedy under Section 10, and he cannot maintain an application under Section 33-C(2) for determination and payment of wages on the basis that he continues to be in service. The workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated, on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10, that the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer was not justified and has set-aside that order and reinstated the workman. (15). In P.K. Singh and Anr. vs. Presiding Officer & Ors. (supra) , it has been held by the Supreme Court that ``where workmans claim under Section 33-C(2) cannot be disposed of unless his right to such claim is first adjudicated on a reference under Section 10(1), his application under Section 33-C (2) is not maintainable. (16). (15). In P.K. Singh and Anr. vs. Presiding Officer & Ors. (supra) , it has been held by the Supreme Court that ``where workmans claim under Section 33-C(2) cannot be disposed of unless his right to such claim is first adjudicated on a reference under Section 10(1), his application under Section 33-C (2) is not maintainable. (16). The principles discernible from the decisions discussed above is that where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and is denied such benefits by his employer, he can approach the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the Act for the recovery of monetary and non-monetary benefits which can be computed in terms of the money. The denial by the employer will only require the Labour Court to enquire whether the right is existing or not because the benefit sought to be recovered must necessarily be pre-existing benefits or the benefits flowing from the pre-existing right. The adjudication of the basis and foundation of the claim is the principle function of the concerned industrial tribunal. Under Section 33-C(2) the Labour Court cannot entrench upon the adjudicating functions of the Tribunal because that would amount to trespass- ing over the power of the Tribunal which has the jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide the matters. The Labour Court, exercising its powers under Section 33-C(2) can construe and interpret a settlement, award, order, statute or a rule but under the pretext of interpretation, it cannot create new right under this Section. (17). The proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are in the nature of execution proceedings for enforcement of the existing rights. The object of Section 33-C is to provide speedy and effective remedy for the realisation of the money for which the workman is entitled to receive from the employer or the benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and to enforce and execute the existing rights. For the maintenance of the application under Section 33-C(2), two conditions are necessary to be satisfied, i.e., (i) that the workman is entitled to receive any money or benefit; and (ii) that the benefit is capable of being computed in terms of money. For the maintenance of the application under Section 33-C(2), two conditions are necessary to be satisfied, i.e., (i) that the workman is entitled to receive any money or benefit; and (ii) that the benefit is capable of being computed in terms of money. The application under Section 33-C(2) can be maintained to enforce and execute the existing rights but where the claim is seriously and genuinely disputed and decision for ascertainment of the dispute is necessary then such matters cannot be decided under Section 33-C(2) of the Act because that gives rise to an industrial dispute. Determination and investigation of the workmans right to relief and corresponding obligations of the employer, are not the matter incidental or intimately and integrally connected with the computation of the benefit claimed by the workman. The adjudicatory process which gives rise to industrial dispute should be left for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act or can be determined under Section 7(2) of the Payment of Wages Act. The dispute can be decided in an appropriate adjudication proceeding and not in the proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. (18). The enquiry contemplated under Section 33-C(2) is only incidental to the main determination. The Labour Court can decide, in the process of computation, the extent of the liability of the employer under the existing right and other incidental matters but it cannot decide the question whether the workman is entitled to receive any money or benefit from the employer because that forms the subject matter of industrial dispute and such investigation is impermissible under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court, under Section 33-C(2) has no adjudicatory jurisdiction and it, also, cannot embark upon in the cases covered by the settlement. The determination of the workmans right and relief and corresponding liability of the employer, are out- side the scope of Section 33-C(2) as it cannot be said to incidental or integrally and intimately connected with the matter and the Labour Court has to work within its limitation while exercising the powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. (19). Now, coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant was paid certain amount in the form of over time as well as some wages for the period between October, 1979 to March, 1980. During the internal audit, it was objected as being found illegally paid. (19). Now, coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant was paid certain amount in the form of over time as well as some wages for the period between October, 1979 to March, 1980. During the internal audit, it was objected as being found illegally paid. The order for the recovery of the amount was passed by the competent authority and the recovery, in pursuance to that order, was made. That order has not been challenged by the appellant. Unless the correctness and propriety of the order is adjudicated, the workman cannot claim adjustment. Though a void order can be ignored by the Labour Court and the relief can be granted but the order in the present case, prima facie, cannot be said to be void or illegal unless the order is declared as such in an adjudicatory process by a competent forum. Without determining the correctness and validity of the order, the Labour Court, under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, cannot grant any relief to the appellant because the adjudicatory process is out-side the scope of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. (20). The dispute which arise in the present case on an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act moved by the appellant, are : whether the appointment of the workman as a daily rated worker was proper or not; whether he could have been appointed and is entitled for the wages as there was a ban; whether the amount of Rs. 100/- has been illegally ordered to be deducted from his wages; whether the daily rated worker is entitled for the over- time allowance; whether the workman was entitled for these allowances under any statute, rule, contract or award etc.; whether there was a contract for making over-time payment to the daily rated workers? These disputed questions can be adjudicated by a competent Court in an appropriate adjudicatory process and cannot be adjudicated in an execution proceeding like under Section 33- C(2) of the Act. These are the principal question and not incidental and, therefore, they can be adjudicated by a competent Court. (21). The learned Judge of the Labour Court was, therefore, right in holding that the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, in which the reliefs have been claimed by the appellant, cannot be entertained and no relief can be granted to him by the Labour Court. (21). The learned Judge of the Labour Court was, therefore, right in holding that the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, in which the reliefs have been claimed by the appellant, cannot be entertained and no relief can be granted to him by the Labour Court. The judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant, is, also, based on the sound reasons and does not require any interference. (22). In the result, we do not find any merit in this special appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.