Judgment : R. K. Gulati, J. 1. This is a tenant's writ petition and arises from proceedings under Section 21 (1-A) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972) hereinafter referred to as "the Act." 2. BRIEFLY stated the facts are that the third respondent, Sultan Jahan Adeeb was an Operator in the Telephone Exchange at Mussoorie. She retired from service on 31-3-1983. After retirement, on 24-4-1984 she along with her mother arrayed as respondent No. 4, purchased an accommodation known as "sussex Cottage" located at King Craig Library', Motor Road, Mussoorie, through a registered sale deed which was in the occupation and in the tenancy of the petitioner. The third respondent filed an application before the Second respondent, namely, the Prescribed Authority, Deh radun, for the release of the said accommodation in her favour on the allegations, inter-alia that she was in Government ser vice as Junior Supervisor, at Telephone Ex change, being a Government servant, she was allotted an official accommodation for her residence at posts and Telegraph Holiday Home, Mussoorie, which she had vacated on 15-9-1984 on account of cessation of her employment. She asserted that the accommodation in question was purchased for her permanent residence after her retirement; she had invested her entire fund, security and other saving in the purchase of the said property ; despite several oral requests the tenant-petitioner has not vacated the premises in dispute; she had no other place to live in Mussoorie other than the building in dispute and temporarily she was living with her married daughter. The tenant-petitioner contested the application for release. However, by an order dated 26-7-1988 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application for release. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against that order was also dismissed on 17-6-1989 by the District Judge, Dehradun. Feeling still aggrieved the petitioner has preferred this writ petition seeking quashing of the aforesaid two orders, and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge. 3. Feeling still aggrieved the petitioner has preferred this writ petition seeking quashing of the aforesaid two orders, and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge. 3. BOTH, the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority have recorded categorical finding that the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 were attracted to the present case inasmuch as the third respondent was a Government Servant and was allotted a public building for her residence which she had vacated on ac count of cessation of her employment. The correctness of those findings of fact recorded by the aforesaid authorities were not disputed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. THE learned counsel however, argued that the remedy under Section 21 (1-A) was not available to the third respondent who had purchased the property in dispute after her retirement knowing fully well that it was a tenanted property occupied by the tenant-petitioner. It was submitted that the third respondent cannot be permitted to disturb the tenant, i. e. the petitioner on the ground that she was entitled to the special advantage conferred on her by Section 21 (1-A) of the Act. THE argument was that the remedy under Section 21 (1-A) was not available to a landlord who subsequent to his or her retirement acquires the tenanted accommodation as its landlord by transfer, purchase or otherwise. According to the learned counsel the protection under those provisions was available only to such employees who were landlords while still in employment and availed the benefit or protection after retirement in respect of a tenancy subsisting during their service. According to the learned counsel the protection under those provisions was available only to such employees who were landlords while still in employment and availed the benefit or protection after retirement in respect of a tenancy subsisting during their service. In order to re-enforce the submissions, the learned counsel referred to the provisions contained in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act and also to the proviso attached to Section 21 (1-A), It is the cessation of the employment, urged the learned counsel, and not the use and occupation of a public building/government accommodation which was required to be vacated or had been vacated, was relevant for the entertainment of an application under Section 21 (1-A) of the Act, THE learned counsel for the petitioner went on to argue that the present Act was a beneficial legislation for tenants to provide protections to them against their eviction except for situations provided under the Act and, therefore, Section 21 (1-A) should be construed strictly bearing in Kind the purport and the objection of sub-section (1) of Section 21. It was also the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that sub section (1-A) should be read as proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 because it provides for exception to the provisions contemplated under that sub-section. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon tie two decisions of this Court in J. C. Gupta and others v. District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1978 ALJ 1306 and Kalyan Rai Saxena v. IInd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1982 (1) ARC 363. The U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was promulgated as it would be evident from the preamble of the Act, in the interest of general public for the regulation of letting, rent and eviction of tenants from certain classes of building situated in the urban areas and the matters connected therewith. Sub-section (1-A) was inserted by the U. P. Amendment Act No. 22 of 1976. Sub-section (1-A) was inserted by the U. P. Amendment Act No. 22 of 1976. That provision reads as under: " (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this sub section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction of such application shall take effect only on the date of the actual cessation. " 5. THE expression "public building" is defined in Section 3 (o) of the Act and says that it means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government, (including the Government of any other State) and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation. THE accommodation occupied by respondent No. 3 as official accommodation during her employment was a public building, is not in dispute. 6. SECTION 20 of the Act sets out specific grounds on which a landlord may file a suit to evict a tenant. Except for those grounds provided under that provision, the landlords are not entitled to sue for eviction of tenant. SECTION 21 speaks of proceedings for release of a building in occupation of tenant. 6. SECTION 20 of the Act sets out specific grounds on which a landlord may file a suit to evict a tenant. Except for those grounds provided under that provision, the landlords are not entitled to sue for eviction of tenant. SECTION 21 speaks of proceedings for release of a building in occupation of tenant. Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of SECTION 21 the Prescribed Authority is enjoined with the power on an application of the landlord in that behalf to order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof, upon the proof of the twin conditions, namely, that the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation either in its existing form of after demolition and new construction for himself or any member of his family amongst others, or his residential purpose or for the purposes of any profession, trade or calling and secondly, that the hardship which the landlord would suffer from the refusal of the application would be greater than the hardship likely to be caused to the tenant from the grant of the release application. In the case of Kalyan Rai (supra) a Division Beach of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope "and ambit of sub-section (1-A). It was pointed out that the said provision is an integral part of Section 21 of the Act and it has to be read alongwith the other sub-sections of Section 21. It engrafts a deviation from the general rule contained in sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. It was held as under: "in our opinion Section 21 (1-A) was enacted for providing an immediate shelter to a landlord who is left without any accommodation in consequence of having to vacate upon cessation of his employment, a public building. The legislature appears to have made this provision to meet the exigency arising out of the landlord confronted with the serious problem of finding an accommodation for his residence after being deprived of the use of a public building which was allotted to him in consequence of his employment, so that the landlord might rehabilitate himself without going through the rigorous and time consuming process envisaged under Section 21 (1). The legislature thought that such a landlord might be relieved of the obligation of having to establish that the bona fide requires the accommodation belonging to him or that as between him and his tenant, he would suffer greater hardship. It appears that in a contingency covered by Section 21 (1-A) the Legislature presumed that the need of the landlord would be genuine and that his requirements must necessarily take precedence over those of the tenant. " 7. IN the case of J. C. Gupta (supra) a learned Single Judge of this Court had also expressed somewhat a similar view as in the case of Kalyan Rai Saxena (supra). There are several other-decisions of this Court in which similar view has been expressed, but it is not necessary to multiply the citations. Suffice it to say that the legal position emerging from the decisions referred hereinabove and other decisions, is settled in so for as this Court is concerned. Indeed this position was not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties and, therefore, it is not considered necessary to reiterate what has been stated in those decisions. 8. THE mate question that falls for consideration is whether on a true construction of the requirement of Section 21 (1-A) it is necessary in law that the person seeking the protection of that provision should have been the landlord of the tenanted property from which the eviction is sought before the cessation of his employment. Section 21 (1-A) postulates benefit for certain class of landlords and can appropriately be described as specified landlords who have had to vacate the public building upon cessation of their employment. The cause of action arises from the fact that the landlord of a tenanted property has been asked to vacate an official accommodation and that he has no other place to live in. Any temporary occupation of an accommodation by a landlord entitled to protection of that provision, as a licensee or at the mercy of someone, will not disentitle him to get the benefit thereof. Any temporary occupation of an accommodation by a landlord entitled to protection of that provision, as a licensee or at the mercy of someone, will not disentitle him to get the benefit thereof. In the case of J. C. Gupta (supra) it was held that for succeeding in a case under that sub-section the landlord was required to establish the following three requirements: (i) that he was in occupation of a public building for residential purpose; (ii) that he had to vacate that building on cessation of his employment; (iii) he is the landlord of the building from which the eviction of the tenant is being sought. 9. THERE is no pre-condition that the landlord should have acquired that status before the cessation of his or her employment. Whether a person becomes landlord of a tenanted property a day before or a day after the cessation of employment, is not the criteria on which the maintainability or non- maintainability of the application is to be judged under those provisions. All that is necessary is that when an application for release is made, the person concerned should be the landlord of the tenanted accommodation besides fulfilling the other requirements of which a mention has been made earlier. On the parameter of that provision being satisfied the landlord be comes entitled straightway to the release of the accommodations as a matter of course. This follows from the language of Section 21 (1-A) itself which is very emphatic and mandatory. 10. THE proviso attached to that sub section is only an enabling provision which permits the landlord in occupation of a public building allotted to him, because of his employment to apply for the release of his own tenanted accommodation within a period of one year before the expected date 'of cessation of his employment. THE order of eviction, however, takes effect only on the actual cessation of employment. It was not disputed and indeed, it could not have been disputed in view of the settled position in law that an application could validly be made under Section 21 (1-A) after the retirement or cessation of the employment. During the course of arguments learned counsel for the petitioner preferred to the first proviso attached to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. During the course of arguments learned counsel for the petitioner preferred to the first proviso attached to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. That proviso deals with the tenanted accommodation which is purchased after the Act came into being and the application for release there of is made by its landlord. The said proviso reads as under: "provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such acquisition and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years. " The above proviso existed on the statute book since the very inception of the Act from the year 1972. As noticed earlier, sub-section (1-A) was inserted in Section 21 by way of amendment of U. P. Act No. 22 of 1976. When the amendment was brought about the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 was also there. The legislature in its collective wisdom did not consider it necessary to enact a similar provision in sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 like the one contained in the first proviso aforesaid. The omission was not accidental but with purpose. It is suggestive of different legislative intent. The presumption is that the legislature is aware of existing state of law. If the legislature intended to impose a similar restriction like the one contained in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 or that the protection under the provision inserted by way of amendment was impermissible where the tenanted property was purchased or acquired otherwise, after the cessation of employment there was nothing easier for the legislature but to enact such provision under sub-section (1-A) also. In not doing so, the clear intention was to make available the benefit and protection of sub-section (1-A) to all specified landlords irrespective of whether the status of the landlord in respect of the tenanted accommodation was acquired either before or after the cessation of employment. 11. In not doing so, the clear intention was to make available the benefit and protection of sub-section (1-A) to all specified landlords irrespective of whether the status of the landlord in respect of the tenanted accommodation was acquired either before or after the cessation of employment. 11. THE argument that the provision under Section 21 (1-A) should be read subject to the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 21 or its proviso, cannot be accepted. THE distinction sought for by the learned counsel for the petitioner between the so-called two sets of landlords for availability and non- availability of Section 21 (1-A) on the ground that those who were the landlords of the tenanted accommodation before the cessation of the employment and the other who acquired that status after the cessation of employment, does not flow from the language employed in Section 21 (1-A). It is settled that when language of a provision is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its ordinary meaning and effect regardless of the consequences. Section 21 (1-A) is transparent and unequivocal. No question of strict construction arises when the statutory provision is reasonably open to only one meaning and construction. An unnatural and unreasonable interpretation is impermissible. In order to accept the interpretation placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be to virtually rewrite the provision. It would amount to legislate something not provided by the legislature which is not open to a court of law. THE contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. 12. THE public interest required that persons residing in a public building or official accommodation should vacate the same on cessation of their employment. THE question then would arise that where should those persons go? It was in these special circumstance that the legislature thought of enacting the provision in sub-section (1-A) to meet the exigency, arising out of the landlord being confronted with the serious problem of finding an accommodation for his residence after being deprived of the use of the public building which was allotted to him because of his employment, so that the landlord might rehabilitate himself without undergoing torturous course of litigation and draged into time consuming and un avoidable uncertain litigation after cessation of employment, but may be given immediate possession of his tenanted own house or accommodation. It is perhaps for this reason that the sub- section (1-A) of Section 21 opens with a non-obstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2". Section 2 provides for exemption from the purview of the Act to certain categories of buildings. Considering the urgency of such matters, the legislature thought it proper that the specified landlords may seek eviction of the tenant under Section 21 (1-A) in a summary manner instead of filing a regular suit even in respect of the building that does not come within the purview of the Act and is covered by the exemption clauses of Section 2 of the Act. 13. ANY other construction of sub-section (1-A) would defeat the very intent and avowed object for which it was enacted and introduced by way of amendment. 14. THE other argument that Rent Control Act (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972) is a beneficial enactment only for the tenants, is also not correct. It is an over-simplification of the legislative import of the Rent Act. It will be more appropriate to say that the Rent Act regulates incidence of tenancy and inter se rights and obligations of the landlord and tenant. Some provisions fall under the category of beneficial legislation to the tenant and the others with regard to the landlord. Section 21 (1-A) is a provision for the benefit of certain claw of landlords as observed earlier. THE Act being a social welfare legislation has to be construed reasonable and justly maintaining equilibrium between the landlord and the tenant keeping in view the legislative policy as well to protect and advance the objects of the Act. Broadly speaking, in construing the enacting words, the Court may fake account of what the Act discloses and what was in tended to achieve. In dealing with benevolent legislation the Court ought to interpret the Act so as to prevent mischief and to promote the remedy. Section 21 (1-A), which is a beneficial legislation, must be given a wider interpretation which is likely to promote its object rather than hindering its achievement. THE beneficient object can not be denied full effect by a circuitous process of interpretation. Section 21 (1-A), which is a beneficial legislation, must be given a wider interpretation which is likely to promote its object rather than hindering its achievement. THE beneficient object can not be denied full effect by a circuitous process of interpretation. It is settled, in construing the beneficial provisions in case of ambiguity the Courts ought to apply social beneficient rule of construction, which fulfils the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed keeping in view however the language employed. In Pandey Orson v. Ram Chandra Sahu and others, AIR 1992 SC 195 , it was held that beneficial provision extending protection to a class of citizens should be construed liberally. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act, inter-alia observed as follows: ". . . . . . . The provision is beneficial and the legislature's intention is to extend protection to a class of citizens who are not in a position to keep their property to themselves in the absence of protection., Therefore, when the legislature is extending special protection to the named category, the court has to give a liberal construction to the protective mechanism which would (sic) the protection and enable the sphere of protection to be effective than limit by scope. " 15. IN this context one has to bear in mind the settled principles of rule of interpretation that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to the other provisions in the same Act, so as to make it a consistent enactment of the whole statute and to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy either within a Section or between a section and other part of the Statute. 16. IN Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhedia v. Sri Changdeo Sugar Mills Limited and others, AIR 1962 SC 1548 the Supreme Court has held: ". . . . . . It is necessary that two sub-sections must be construed as a whole 'each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest'. The two sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent, an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so and to avoid repugnancy. The two sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent, an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so and to avoid repugnancy. If, repugnancy cannot possible be avoided then a question may arise as to which of the two should prevail. But that question can arise only if the repugnancy cannot be avoided. . . . . . It is not legitimate for the courts to rewrite sub-sections particularly when on the construction it is found that there is no repugnance between the two sub-sections. That clearly is the function of the legislature which enacts law and not of the courts which interprets them. " In the case of Kalyan Rai (supra), as already stated this Court has taken a view that sub-section (1-A) is an integral part of Section 21. It provides for contingencies not covered by sub-section (1) of Section 21. "the question of repugnancy between the two sub-sections namely, sub-section (1) (a) and sub- section (1-A) does not arise. On the contrary, there is a vital difference between them. It is incorrect to say that if the protection of sub-section (1-A) is allowed to all specified landlords in a like manner irrespective of the fact whether they become landlords of the tenanted property before or after the cessation of their employment, if would conflict with the spirit of sub-section (1) (a) of Section 21 or the scheme underlying thereunder. The contention is, accordingly, rejected. 17. AS all the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner are without any sub stance, as already discussed above, the writ petition is devoid of merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. The interim order dated 18-7-1989 shall stand discharged. Petition dismissed.