JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J. :---By this writ petition the petitioner is impugning the legality and correctness of the order dated 5-2-1990 passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Labour Court) Bhandara (for short 'the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner'). By the order dated 5-2-1990 the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner modified the order passed by him on 13-3-1989 since in the operative part of the order, according to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, some error crept in and the operative order was inconsistent with the finding given in the order dated 13-3-1989 by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. 2. The only ground of challenge in this writ petition is that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had no jurisdiction to review the order passed by him on 13-3-1989 and, therefore, the order dated 5-2-1990 impugned in the present writ petition is liable to be set aside. 3. Shri T.C. Jain, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 urged that the petitioner has filed Regular Civil Suit No. 93 of 1990, challenging the order passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Shri Jain further urged that in the said suit, the petitioner also made an application for grant of temporary injunction, which was rejected, and an appeal was filed. The appeal was also dismissed and thereafter the present writ petition was been filed. 4. Shri P.T. Trivedi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, countered the submissions made by Shri Jain, by submitting that in para 5 of the writ petition, he has mentioned the fact about filing of the suit by the petitioner and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has concealed or suppressed any material fact. 5. In para 5 of the writ petition, the petitioner states thus:--- "5. The said application, i.e. Annexure No. 2 was heard by the Commissioner, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, at Bhandara Court and final order has been passed on 5-2-1990. In this context, it is pertinent to note that the notice of the said application was not issued to the said petitioner and the petitioner had no knowledge of the said application. Before deciding the said application, the petitioner was not heard and the order was passed behind the back of the petitioner. In this context, it is pertinent to note that the notice of the said application was not issued to the said petitioner and the petitioner had no knowledge of the said application. Before deciding the said application, the petitioner was not heard and the order was passed behind the back of the petitioner. As stated above, the petitioner was not at all aware of the said order passed by the Commissioner and he came to know of the said order only when a copy of the same was filed in a civil suit filed by the petitioner against the respondent No. 2 regarding the said claim of compensation. Thus, the petitioner came to know of the said order only sometime in the month of September 1990. The petitioner had filed a civil suit regarding the matter but when the said order of the Commissioner was filed in the Court by the respondent No. 2, the Court held that the suit itself was not maintainable and hence no relief was granted to the petitioner. 6. It is clear from the above extracted para 5 of the writ petition that the petitioner admits the filing of the suit regarding the matter and submits that the Civil Court had observed that the suit itself was not maintainable. However, in the writ petition, not a word is stated as to whether the suit has been withdrawn by the petitioner or the suit was pending and during the pendency of the suit the present writ petition has been filed. The fact that nowhere in the writ petition it is stated that the suit has been withdrawn; an obvious inference is that the suit was pending at the time the writ petition was filed. This fact is not even disputed by Shri Trivedi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and he candidly concedes that at the time of filing of the writ petition the suit relating to the same subject-matter was filed and was pending before the Civil Court. If that be so, how could the petitioner be permitted to avail the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court is not meant to be invoked, where the party has already availed of the orgindary remedy of civil suit and where such party failed to obtain any interim relief. 7. If that be so, how could the petitioner be permitted to avail the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court is not meant to be invoked, where the party has already availed of the orgindary remedy of civil suit and where such party failed to obtain any interim relief. 7. Shri Jain, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, has brought to my notice the order passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Gondia, on 25-10-1990, refusing to grant temporary injunction to the petitioner in the suit filed by the petitioner before the Civil Court. Shri Jain has also placed before me for perusal the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order passed by the Civil Judge, rejecting the application for temporary injunction, and the said appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Court. Having failed in getting the injunction from the Civil Court and then filing the present writ petition under the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, such conduct would not make the petitioner entitled for invocation of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner by his conduct has disentitled himself from the grant of any relief. 8. Apart from this, it would be seen that this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction would not pass an order or set aside an order which may result in revival of an illegal order. It would be seen that in the claim filed by Smt. Dhrupatabai against the petitioner and respondent No. 1, seeking compensation for the death of her son, who was working as a Driver with the petitioner on his car bearing No. M.G.U. 222 insured with the respondent No. 1, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner while deciding Issue Nos. 2 and 3 as to whether the owner as well as the insurer were liable to pay any amount on account of compensation, penalty and interest, found that the owner was liable for penalty to the extent of 50 per cent of the compensation. However, in the operative portion of the order passed on 13-3-1989, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner directed both the owner as well as the insurer to pay the penalty equal to 50 per cent of the said amount of compensation from 1-3-1987 till the date of deposit at the rate of 6 per cent annum. However, in the operative portion of the order passed on 13-3-1989, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner directed both the owner as well as the insurer to pay the penalty equal to 50 per cent of the said amount of compensation from 1-3-1987 till the date of deposit at the rate of 6 per cent annum. The legal position is more than well settled that under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the penalty can only be imposed on the owner and not the insurer. By the order dated 5-2-1990 only this much correction is made that recovery of penalty and interest should be made as far as possible from the present petitioner owner. Thus, if the impugned order dated 5-2-1990 is quashed and set aside, an erroneous order dated 13-3-1989 to the extent the penalty and interest has been imposed on the insurer, would be revived, which this Court will not do in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had no power of review need not be gone into. 10. Accordingly, this writ petition has no merit and is dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.