JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - The Plaintiffs have filed this second appeal against the judgment of affirmance dismissing the suit for declaration of title, confirmation, or in the alternative, recovery of possession and injunction. 2. The undisputed genealogy showing the relationship of the parties is as follows: According to the Plaintiffs' case, the disputed homestead property with an area of Ac.0.02-1/2 decimals along with other properties had fallen to the share of Dhobi Bewa and Labanya Dei, the two daughters of Satyabadi. Subsequently, the aforesaid properties including the disputed property were purchased by Jugal in the name of Defendant No. 2 under the sale deed, the certified copy whereof has been filed as Ext 1. It is asserted that the Plaintiffs and the second Defendant are still members of the joint family and are in possession of homestead area of Ac.0.07-1/2 decimals including the disputed Ac.0.2-1/2 decimals of land and Defendant No. 2 is in possession of the balance Ac.0.02-1/2 decimals Subsequently, when Defendant No. 1 tried to create disturbance in their possession, the Plaintiffs on enquiry learnt that in an earlier suit filed by the present Defendant No. 2 against the present Defendant No. 1, Jugal, Dhobi Bewa and Labanya Dei, the matter was illegally compromised between the present Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 only whereunder the first Defendant fraudulently purported to have purchased the disputed Ac.0.02-1/2 deci.mals of homestead land from the second Defendant. It is alleged that the said compromise had not been signed by other parties to the suit (O.S. No. 60/235 of 1964/62), namely Jugal, Dhobi and Labanya, and as such was not binding on the Plaintiffs. It is further asserted that since the property which was the subject matter of the earlier suit including the disputed property of the present suit had been purchased by Jugal benami in the name of present Defendant No. 2, the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 2 who are the successor-in-interest of Jugal are the rightful owners-in-possession. 3. Defendant No. 1 who is the only contesting party in the suit filed a written statement denying the plaint allegations. It was pleaded that the disputed property along with other properties had been purchased by Defendant No. 2 and the compromise decree which was passed in the earlier suit was within the knowledge of Jugal and was binding on the Plaintiffs. It was pleaded that the disputed property along with other properties had been purchased by Defendant No. 2 and the compromise decree which was passed in the earlier suit was within the knowledge of Jugal and was binding on the Plaintiffs. It is also pleaded that Defendant No. 1 has perfected his right by adverse possession. Defendant No. 2 though remained ex parte, supported the case of the Plaintiffs in his evidence while being examined as p. w. 4. 4. The trial court held that the disputed property had been purchased by Defendant No. 2 and was not the joint family property of Jugal and his sons and as such, the Plaintiffs had no locus standi to challenge the validity of the earlier compromise decree. It was further held that Defendant No. 1 had also perfected his right, title and interest by adverse possession. The contention of the Plaintiffs regarding invalidity of the compromise decree on the ground that the compromise in effect being a sale of occupancy holding having not been registered was void u/s 31 of the Orissa Tenancy Act, was negatived. The lower appellate court on an independent assessment of the materials on record has affirmed the findings and the decree of the trial court. 5. At the time of hearing of this appeal, the Learned Counsel for the Appellants has raised the following contentions: (i) In view of the materials on record, the courts below should have held that the property had been purchased by Jugal in the name of Defendant No. 2; (ii) The compromise in the earlier suit had the effect of transfer of occupancy holding by way of sale and as such should have been registered as required u/s 31 of the Orissa Tenancy Act and, therefore, was a void transaction; (iii) The compromise having not been signed by Jugal was not binding on the Plaintiffs; and (iv) The finding regarding acquisition of title by adverse possession is not sustainable. The Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 has supported the findings of both the courts below. 6. The Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 has supported the findings of both the courts below. 6. While elaborating the first contention, it has been submitted that at the time of purchase of the disputed property and other properties, Defendant No. 2 was merely 17 to 18 years old and he had no independent source of income and admittedly Jugal was the Karta of the family and as such in the absence of any materials on record, it must be concluded that the consideration money was paid by Jugal. It is, of course, true that during the trial, Defendant No. 2 while being examined as p. w. 4 has supported the Plaintiffs' case for obvious reasons and has stated that he had no independent source of income. In view of the categorical case of Defendant No. 2 (P.W. 4) in the earlier suit filed in the year 1962 that the properties involved in the said suit (including the present disputed property) were his own properties having been purchased from out of the money given by his maternal uncles, the evidence of P.W. 4 is of no assistance. In the sale deed of 1961 (Ext. 1), there is a recital that the consideration money had been arranged by the maternal uncles of the purchaser. In the absence of any categorical evidence on record and keeping in view the allegations made in the earlier suit by Defendant No. 2, which had not been contested by Jugal, it must be concluded that the disputed property had been purchased by Defendant N6.2 and not by Jugal in the name of Defendant No. 2, as presently alleged by the Plaintiffs, In the plaint of the present suit, there is no allegation that the property had been acquired in 1961 from out of the joint family nucleus. Even assuming that the properties had been purchased by a co-sharer, in the absence of any pleading or proof regarding existence of joint family nucleus, it must be assumed that the property was the self acquired property of the purchaser. As such, the first contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is not acceptable and it must be held that the disputed property was, in fact, the self-acquired property of Defendant No. 2, as has been concurrently held by both the courts below. 7. As such, the first contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is not acceptable and it must be held that the disputed property was, in fact, the self-acquired property of Defendant No. 2, as has been concurrently held by both the courts below. 7. Once such a conclusion is reached, the position becomes clear that the Plaintiffs will have no further right to maintain the present suit, as they have no right, title and interest in the disputed property. However, since many other important questions have been raised, I deem it proper and necessary to deal with the other contentions. 8. Mr. R.K. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel, for the Appellants, has; vehemently contended that the compromise effected in the earlier suit had the effect of transferring an occupancy holding by way of sale and as such was required to be registered u/s 31 of the Orissa Tenancy Act. Section 31 of the Orissa Tenancy Act reads as follows: 31. Manner of transfer and notice to landlord. (1) Every transfer of an occupancy holding or a portion or share thereof whether by sale, exchange or gift shall be made by registered instrument except in the case of a sale in execution of a decree or of a certificate signed under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (B.& 0. Act IV of 1914); Provided that the State Government may exclude, from the operation of this sub. section, any class of transfer of occupancy holdings in any Government estate of which rent is payable direct to Government, and may make rules for carrying out the purposes of this section in such estates and, prescribe fines or penalties for the infringement of such rules: Provided further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of the Muhammadan law relating to gift, and in such cases of transfer the rules made under the first proviso shall have effect. (2) A registering Officer shall not accept for registration any such instrument unless the rent of each holding or a portion or share thereof is stated separately in the instrument and unless it is accompanied by a notice signed by the transferor and the transferee giving particulars of the transfer in the prescribed form and the fee prescribed for the service of such notice on the landlord. (3) When any such instrument is admitted to registration, the registering officer shall transmit the notice to the Collector who shall cause it to be served on the landlord named in the notice in the prescribed manner: Provided that when a sole landlord purchases a holding or a portion or share thereof notice need to be served. (4) In the case of a transfer of an occupancy holding or a portion or share thereof by bequest, the Court shall, before granting probate or letters of administration, require the applicant to file a notice giving particulars of the transfer in the prescribed form accompanied with the prescribed fee for the service of the notice on the landlord. When probate or letters of administration have been granted, the Court shall transfer the notice to the Collector who shall cause it to be served on the landlord named in the notice in the prescribed manner. (5) When the holding of an occupancy raiyat or a portion or a share thereof is sold in execution of a decree or of a certificate signed under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (B & 0. Act IV of 1914) other than a decree or certificate for arrears of rent due in respect of the holding or dues recoverable as such, and neither the purchaser nor the decree holder is the sole landlord, the Court or the Revenue Officer, as the case may be, shall, before confirming the sale, require the purchaser to file a notice giving particulars of the transfer in the prescribed form and to deposit a fee of the prescribed amount for the service of it. When the sale had been confirmed, the Court or the Revenue Officer shall transmit the notice to the Collector who shall cause it to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner. (6) When a mortgage of a holding of an occupancy raiyat or of a portion or share thereof is foreclosed and the decree-holder is not himself the sole landlord, the Court shall before making a decree or order absolute for the foreclosure, require the mortgagee to file a notice giving particulars of the transfer in the prescribed form and to deposit fee of the prescribed amount for the service of it. When the decree or order far foreclosure has been made absolute, the Court shall transmit the notice to the Collector who shall cause it to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner. (6-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proceeding provisions of this section, in any case of transfer of an occupancy holding or a portion or share thereof in a Government estate, of which rent is payable direct to Government, the notices referred to in subsections (2) to (6) shall not be required to be accompanied by any fee for the service of such notices on the landlord. (7) Nothing in this section shall bar any suit in a Civil Court for establishing setting aside a transfer. From a reading of Section 31, it is apparent that said section is applicable to transfer of properties effected by way of sale, mortgage or gift. In this connection, the Learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in ILR 1950 Cuttack 322 Paramananda Das and Anr. v. Sankar Rath. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision. However, in the present cases, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that an occupancy holding had been transferred by way of sale. The compromise effected between the present Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 in the earlier suit cannot be characterised as a sale merely because it was recited in the compromise that the present Defendant No. 2 had received Rs. 75/- towards consideration of the disputed property. That amount was the consideration for effecting the compromise in respect of part of the disputed property. Since the compromise was in respect of properties in dispute in the said suit, there was no requirement for registering the compromise and the compromise was valid and binding between the parties to the compromise. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the submission of the Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 that the compromise was in respect of a homestead property and not agricultural property and as such Section 31 of the Orissa Tenancy Act had no application, need not be considered. 9. Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, then submitted that the compromise had not been signed by Jugal and as such was not binding on the Plaintiffs who admittedly were not parties to the earlier suit. 9. Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, then submitted that the compromise had not been signed by Jugal and as such was not binding on the Plaintiffs who admittedly were not parties to the earlier suit. He has drawn my attention to several decisions including those of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1954 SC 82 Sunderabai Deshpande and Another Vs. Devaji Shankar Deshpande, Baldevdas Shivlal and Another Vs. Filmistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd. and Others, in support of the proposition that a compromise decree does not operate as res judicata u/s 11, Code of Civil Procedure, though it may operate as estoppel and a compromise decree essentially being a contract with command of the Court super added to it is not binding on those parties to the suit who have not signed the compromise. There is no dispute with the above proposition of law that a compromise decree is only binding on the parties to the compromise. It is true that the compromise had been effected between the present Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 and the other parties to the suit, namely Jugal, Labanya Dhobi had not signed the compromise. It was, therefore, open to Jugal or other parties, whose supposed interest in the property was affected by the compromise decree, to challenge the validity of the compromise decree in an appropriate proceeding in an appropriate manner. On the other hand, the materials on record reveal that not only Jugal kept silent, but also he acquiesced in the compromise decree, as would be I evident from the fact that he had signed the warrant of delivery of possession in favour of the present Defendant No. 2 in respect of the other properties rights whereof had been declared in favour of the present Defendant No. 2 in the compromise decree in the earlier suit. Since the Plaintiffs have not established any independent right over the disputed property and are claiming as the successors-in-interest of Jugal, they are not entitled to raise the question at this stage. As such, the third contention of Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, is bound to fail. 10. The last submission of Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, relates to the question of adverse possession. As such, the third contention of Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, is bound to fail. 10. The last submission of Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, relates to the question of adverse possession. It was argued that in the absence of any plea of ouster, the finding regarding adverse possession cannot be sustained. It was further contended, relying upon some oral evidence, that the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 2 ware in possession of the disputed property. The aforesaid contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is not tenable. The finding regarding possession of either party is essentially a question of fact, the validity of which cannot be challenged in a second appeal. Both the courts below have discussed the materials on record and however erroneous their conclusions might appear to the Appellants, I am not inclined to take a different view of the matter in this second appeal. The contention regarding absence of a plea of ouster is also misconceived. It is not the case of the Plaintiffs that Defendant No. 1 had continued to be a co-sharer with them. If the compromise between Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 was invalid, the possession of Defendant No. 1 under an invalid transaction was definitely adverse. The possession of Defendant No. 1 has been noted in the Record-of -Rights published on 28th of January, 1967. As such the possession of Defendant No. 1 from the date of the compromise decree and thereafter when the property had been recorded in his name in 1967 continued to be adverse and the suit having @been filed in the year 1981, the alternative finding of the courts below that Defendant No. 1 had acquired right, title and interest by adverse possession cannot be found fault with. 11. In the result, all the contentions of the Appellants fail and as such the second appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed