SARDAR v. RAM KHILAUNA — 1996 DIGILAW 1085 (ALL)

A. P. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) TWO set of suits, one by respondents being suit No. 58 of 1969 which was filed by Ram Khilauna, Charni, Rathi, since deceased represented by legal representatives, hereafter called convenantees the term which has throughout been used by the Courts below as well, Covenantees sought the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale against Ram Khilari and Nihal Singh, hereinafter addressed, like before by Courts below, as vendors. The case as set up by them was that vendors had entered into an agreement of sale with them in respect of Chak No. 92 measuring 23. 83 acres, which is the land in suit, on 19. 4. 69 for a sum of Rs. 14,000/- out of which vendors accepted a sum of Rs. 12,000. 00 as earnest money as advance payment of the price of the land settled between covenantees and vendors. In pursuance of the said agreement covenantees were put in possession over the land in suit and they put a hut on it and sowed sugarcane crop in one acre but on 7-5-69 the vendors sold the same land (land in suit) to Sardar and Sher Singh, hereinafter called as vendees for a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 though the vendees know of the agreement of the sale between the covenantees and vendors inrespect of the land in suit but vendees still purchased it. Other averments of readiness and willingness and sending of notice etc. were also made by covenantees. The vendors, however, denied having ever agreed to sell the land in suit according to vendors they sold the land in suit to vendees whereafter covenantors with some persons approached them and protested against sale of land in suit to vendees and on the pressurisation of some senior citizen of the village they agreed to sell to the covenantors some other property which they wanted to purchase accordingly on their asking they signed the papers which covenantors have since misutilised by fraudulently preparing the agreement deed for the land in suit. Vendees also filed their separate written statement and denied knowledge of the agreement deed and also joined with vendors in denying execution of the agreement deed and settlement of contract of sale between vendors and covenantees for sale of the land in suit. Vendees also filed their separate written statement and denied knowledge of the agreement deed and also joined with vendors in denying execution of the agreement deed and settlement of contract of sale between vendors and covenantees for sale of the land in suit. This suit of covenantees was decreed by the trial Court and the decree of the trial Court was confirmed by the first appellate Court, hereafter called 1st appellate Court. Second Appeal No. 1974 of 78 has been filed by vendees impugning the decree passed by Courts below decreeing the suit of the covenantees (suit No. 58 of 69 ). Second suit being suit No. 58 of 71 was filed by vendees seeking declaration of their title and possession over the land in suit pursuant to attachment of the land in suit by the order of Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Cr. PC and its apprehended release in favour of the Covenantees. Suit No. 58 of 71 was dismissed by the trial Court and also by the 1st appellate Court. Both the Courts heard and decided the two suits jointly. second Appeal No. 1975 of 78 has been filed by vendees impugning the decree o the Courts below dismissing their said suit for declaration and possession of the land in suit. Vendees claimed title and possession over the land in suit under the sale deed dated 7. 5. 69 whereas covenantees claimed possession over it on the basis of the agreement deed dated 19. 4. 69 (Ext. 12) both of which were executed by the vendees for the same land. ( 2 ) AS observed above trial Court as well as the Ist appellate Court decreed covenantees suit and dismissed vendees suit. Finding arrived at by the Courts below was that the sale deed was dishonestly got executed to defeat the agreement of sale and that vendors plea that it was not executed by them which was fraudulently procured was disbelieved for want of proper proof. It was also found that vendees had prior notice of the agreement deed executed by vendors for sale of land in suit to covenantors and they purchased the land in suit in bad faith. Agreement deed was held proved having been duly executed by vendors. It was also found that vendees had prior notice of the agreement deed executed by vendors for sale of land in suit to covenantors and they purchased the land in suit in bad faith. Agreement deed was held proved having been duly executed by vendors. ( 3 ) SHRI Murlidhar, learned Senior Advocate who appeared for appellants (Vendees) in both the appeals has not given emphasis to challenge the findings of fact which have been recorded by the Courts below for decreeing Suit No. 58 of 69 and for dismissing Suit No. 58 of 7 1 against which review can be legally sought by the appellants in this Court which has to interfere only on the grounds of substantial question of law having been either wrongly decided or left undecided though it was required to be decided for having arisen in the case. No such illegality in arriving on the findings of fact by the Courts below could be pointed out by the learned Senior Advocate. ( 4 ) SHRI Murlidhar also did not press the appeal on the question of law on which the appeal was admitted for hearing by this Court at the state of Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question which was framed by this Court for admission of the appeal reads as follows :-"whether the transfer in favour of the defendant-appellants (vendee for this judgment) was protected by Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act and/ or Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act. " ( 5 ) SO far Section 41 is concerned it protects such transfers of immovable property which is made for consideration by an ostensible owner of that property though he was not possessed of the right of making the transfer of that immovable property which still vested with the person having interest in that property, and with whose permission the transferer was made by the ostensible owner thereof. Such transfer is saved provided it is proved that before purchasing that property the transferee had taken due care to ascertain that the transfer was vested with the power to effect the transfer and further that he himself had acted in good faith. Such transfer is saved provided it is proved that before purchasing that property the transferee had taken due care to ascertain that the transfer was vested with the power to effect the transfer and further that he himself had acted in good faith. ( 6 ) APPLICABILITY of this provision to save the sale deed dated 7-5-69 will be dependent on the proof of following facts: (a) The transferee had taken reasonable care to ascertain the power of the transferor that the possessed power to transfer the land in suit. (b) that he himself did not know of the agreement of sale having been entered into between vendors and the covenantees before they purchased the land in suit and that they had purchased it in good faith and not to defeat the contract of sale of the land in suit by the covenantors. ( 7 ) NONE of these facts, which are the prerequisite for seeking protection of Section 41 of the Act, could be established by the vendees. As already said hereinabove this Court would not indulge into the exercise of re-assessing the evidence which was tendered by the parties to the suit so as to judge the correctness of the finding recorded on facts pleaded by the parties which have to be accepted as final. On the findings of fact finally settled by the Courts below the vendors conceded Mr. Murlidhar also vendees cannot invoke the provisions of Section 41 of T. P. Act. Protection of the said provision for saving the transfer of the land in suit in their favour therefore cannot be availed of by the vendees and on the facts finally settled by the Courts below, Section 41 is not attracted. ( 8 ) SO far Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 is concerned it too has no application to the case at all. ( 8 ) SO far Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 is concerned it too has no application to the case at all. It empowers a holder of contract of sale to enforce his contract even against a subsequent owner of the property except if the subsequent owner has purchased that property for value without notice of the contract and in good faith vendees having failed to establish (a) purchase of land in suit in good faith, (b) lack of knowledge of the contract of sale which existed between vendors and the covenantors in respect of the land in suit cannot also seek protection of last part of clause (b) of Section 19 which operates as exception to the power of the covenantees to enforce the contract of sale from a subsequent owner also. The result of the above discussion therefore is that this appeal cannot succeed on the points raised in its support in the memo of appeal. ( 9 ) SHRI Murlidhar however sought permission of the Court to argue a new point in support of the appeal which according to Shri Murlidhar arises from the finding recorded against covenantors by the Ist appellant Court. ( 10 ) IT was argued that though the Ist appellate Court held that the agreement of sale had been altered by the covenantors so as to introduce two marginal witnesses in the agreement deed namely Ram Swaroop and Mool Chand, who were not the marginal witnesses of the agreement deed when it was originally entered into. Taking advantage of the finding recorded in that respect by the Ist appellate Court the learned counsel contends that since the covenantors had made manipulations in the agreement deed so as to introduce independent witness in it in place of the original partisan witnesses of the agreement of sale it cannot be enforced for that reason. ( 11 ) THE finding reference to which was made by Shri Murlidhar is being extracted hereunder :"this submission of the learned counsel does not seem to be without force. The agreement Ext. 12 has been scribed on two stamp papers. The first stamp paper is of the value of Rs. 1. 50 and the other stamp paper is of the value of Re. 1/ -. The agreement Ext. 12 has been scribed on two stamp papers. The first stamp paper is of the value of Rs. 1. 50 and the other stamp paper is of the value of Re. 1/ -. On first stamp paper we find the thumb impression of Harchandi and the signatures of Tuhi Ram on the left side of the margin, besides the thumb impressions of the executors Nihal Singh and Ram Khilari and of Charni, Rathi, Buddhi and Pyare Lal, the covenantees and signatures of Ram Khilauna, one of the five covenantees. After the signatures and thumb impressions of the said persons, there had left no space on the stamp paper to obtain any further signatures or thumb impressions. On this stamp paper, there is no thumb impression of witness Mool Chand and signatures of witness Ram Swaroop. On the second stamp paper, we do not find the thumb impression of Harchandi and signatures of Tuhi Ram and in their place the thumb impression of Mool Chand and signatures of Ram Swroop are found at the left hand margin towards bottom Side. There is overwriting in deep ink, where it is Written "mishani Mool Chand Putra Fattey Jat Sakin Chhata, Jila Mathura and Ram Swarup Putra Devi Ram Jat Sakin Khitwata. " A mere look to this stamp reveals that previously the witnesses were somebody else and by doing overwriting Mool Chand and Ram Swarup were made witnesses. If really Mool Chand and Ram Swarup were the attesting witnesses of the deed, their thumb impression and signatures respectively should also have been on the first stamp paper. It appears that originally Harchandi and Tuhi Ram were the witnesses even on the second stamp paper, but subsequently the names of Mool Chand and Ram Swarup were introduced by doing overwriting. This raises a strong suspicion against the genuineness of the fact that Mool Chand and Ram Swarup were really the attesting witnesses originally and in their presence the deed was executed. Keeping this fact in view the evidence of Mool Chand and Ram Swarup will be judged. " ( 12 ) FROM the above quoted findings of Ist appellate Court it is fully born out that the Ist appellate Court had agreed with the appellants that alteration had been made by the covenantors in the agreement of sale (Ext. Keeping this fact in view the evidence of Mool Chand and Ram Swarup will be judged. " ( 12 ) FROM the above quoted findings of Ist appellate Court it is fully born out that the Ist appellate Court had agreed with the appellants that alteration had been made by the covenantors in the agreement of sale (Ext. 12) for introducing Ram Swarup and Mool Chand two independent persons as marginal witnesses of the said agreement. It has further been observed by the Ist appellate Court that the said interpolation in the agreement of sale was made by the covenantor only the second page of the agreement deed where there was availability of space to enable them to do so whereas on the first page there being no availability of space for making the manipulation of the names and signatures of the marginal witnesses who had originally signed the agreement deed remained intact. It was further found that Harchandi and Tuhi Ram who were the original marginal witnesses of the agreement deed were not independent witnesses inasmuch as Harchandi was the father-in-law of one of covenant whereas Tuhi Ram was their family member and interpolation for introducing the two independent marginal witnesses in the agreement of sale was made so as to give authenticity to the said agreement of sale. ( 13 ) SHRI Murlidhar contended that since manipulation, overwritings and additions made by covenantors in the agreement deed amounted to material alteration in the agreement deed the same, therefore, was rendered void and could not be specifically enforced. On the contrary Sri Janardan Sahai, learned counsel for covenantors contended firstly that the view of the Ist Appellate Court that there was manipulation and additions and overwritings for adding and introducing fresh and new marginal witnesses namely, Ram Swaroop and Mool Chand is not a correct finding and that finding is liable to be set aside as from the very purusal of 0the agreement deed the said finding will appear to be perverse. Secondly, he contended as an alternative argument that even if it is accepted that Ram Swaroop and Mool Chand were subsequently introduced by the convenantees as independent marginal witnesses of the contract of sale so as to give authenticity to the said agreement; it did not make any difference to its validity in the light of the legal position that for execution of a valid agreement of sale marginal witnesses are not required to witness its execution. ( 14 ) SO far as first contention of Shri Janardhan Sahai is concerned, I do not find myself in agreement with him. I have myself pursued the portion of second sheet of the agreement deed wherein names of Mool Chand and Ram Swarup had been introduced as marginal witnesses. The manner and the space where their names have been introduced leaves no room for doubt that there names and signatures were subsequently introduced. The finding recorded by the lower appellate Court in that respect, in my opinion, does not call for interference which in my opinion is not ruled out from the document itself. ( 15 ) COMING to the second argument of the learned counsel which has been made by him as an alternative argument the same will be tested in the light of the argument of Shri Murlidhar who contends that the alteration of the deed of agreement for introducing the two witnesses, namely, Ram Swarup and Mool Chand amounts to material alteration and, therefore, on account of that alteration the agreement deed is rendered void and unenforceable as against the appellants. ( 16 ) IN support of his contention Shri Murlidhar placed reliance on M. S. Anirudhan v. Thomcos Bank Ltd. , AIR 1963 SC 746 , whereas Shri Sahai relied on Kalianna Gounder v. Palani Gounder, AIR 1970 SC 1942 . The first case relates to a guarantee given to the bank by a surety where the amount of guarantee was changed by the debtor from the original sum of Rs. 25,000. 00 to a sum of Rs. 20,000. 00 without the knowledge of the guarantor to make it acceptable by the bank from which the debtor had taken the loan on the guarantee so given by the guarantor. 25,000. 00 to a sum of Rs. 20,000. 00 without the knowledge of the guarantor to make it acceptable by the bank from which the debtor had taken the loan on the guarantee so given by the guarantor. J. D. Kapoor and M. Hidayatullah, JJ, did not agree with the guarantors contention that the alteration was substantial as it was not to the prejudice but on the contrary to the benefit of the guarantor which was made by the debtor who happened to be the agent of the guarantor himself when the instrument was in debtors custody. A. K. Sarkar however did not agree with the majority view and held that since the instrument though was changed to the advantage and benefit of the guarantor, as the change reduced his liability under the guarantee, still it stood avoided as it did not represent his consent and was an unilateral action of the debtor which was different from what was agreed to by him. Accordingly to Justice Sarkar since the changed terms of the contract were not agreed between the guarantor and the bank and did not constitute a contract as per the changed terms, the same was not binding upon the guarantor. ( 17 ) IN the second, case, a contract of sale was under review in a suit for specific performance. Defendant tried to avoid the contract on two grounds firstly, that the amount of Rs. 2,000/which was shown in the agreement of sale having been paid in the instalment had not been paid and the plaintiff, in fact, paid only Rs. 350. 00 and promised to pay the balance of Rs. 1650. 00 within three days which, however, despite demand was not paid by the plaintiff, therefore, the agreement of sale stood annulled. The second ground on which the defendant wanted to avoid the agreement of sale was that the instrument of contract of sale when it was in the possession of the plaintiff was changed so as to insert in it a declaration that the property which was subject matter of sale, was free from all encumbrances. ( 18 ) THE Supreme Court, which was approached by the plaintiff, turned down both the objections raised by the defendant for avoiding his liability under the contract of sale witnessed in the agreement deed. ( 18 ) THE Supreme Court, which was approached by the plaintiff, turned down both the objections raised by the defendant for avoiding his liability under the contract of sale witnessed in the agreement deed. The Supreme Court found that from the evidence on the record it was not proved by the defendant that the sum of Rs. 350. 00 only was paid to him at the time of execution of the deed of contract instead of Rs. 2,000. 00 which was the amount mentioned having been paid to him. The Supreme Court disbelieved defendants plea on this point firstly for the reason that he was an educated person whereas plaintiff was an illiterate person, therefore, he was not in a position to pay smart with the defendant; the second reason was that there was neither a foot note in the agreement deed or any other writing witnessing payment of Rs. 350. 00 only instead of Rs. 2,000. 00 therefore, it was not possible, in view of the recital in the deed, that only Rs. 350. 00 was paid instead of the sum of Rs. 2,000. 00 on the second question too, the Supreme Court did not agree with the defendant that the finding of unilateral alteration was made out from the evidence on record. The Supreme Court re-assessed the evidence and held that there was no unilateral alteration in the instrument but what was stated to be material alteration was added in a second reading of the document by its scribe himself before the deed was signed by the parties. ( 19 ) THE Supreme Court, however, proceeded to lay down the law on the subject presuming that the change complained of by the defendant was made subsequently by an unilateral act of the plaintiff or on his behalf. The Supreme Court held that since the additions made in the instrument were inconsequential as it merely expresses that which was implied by law in the deed as originally written, or which carries out the intention of the parties to the agreement already apparent on the face of the deed and that the alteration does not otherwise prejudice the party who is liable under the agreement deed, the alteration was not a material alteration. ( 20 ) THE Supreme Court held that since it was the duty of the vendor to make the property, which is subject matter sale, free from all encumbrances before its sale, therefore, the assertion made in the instrument for inserting that declaration from the side of the vendor was inconsequential specially so when on facts too it was evident that the land which defendant agreed to sell, was not subject to any, and was free from all, encumbrances. ( 21 ) QUOTING the law stated in Halsburys Law of England and by the Privy Council in Nathu Lal v. Mt. Gomti Kaur, AIR 1940 PC 160, the Supreme Court concluded as follows :-"since the defendants were liable to clear the encumbrances, if any, subsisting on the land before executing the sale deed, assuming that the covenant was incorporated after the execution of the deed, it cannot be regarded as a material alteration on that account. for, it does not alter the rights or liabilities of the parties or the legal effects of the instrument. " ( 22 ) SHRI Murlidhar asserts that the observation of the Supreme Court quoted hereinabove makes it abundantly clear that if the alteration changes the legal effects of the instrument in question the alteration will be material alteration. He also placed reliance in this regard on the law of Halsburys Law of England quoted in Valianna (supra) which is to the following effect :"a material alteration is one which varies the rights, liabilities or the legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state or otherwise varies the legal effects of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduced to certainly some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void or otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed. " (Halsburys Law of England Vol. II 3rd Edn. Art. 599 at P. 368 ). ( 23 ) SHRI Sahai, however, sought reliance on the law stated in Art. 604 at pp. " (Halsburys Law of England Vol. II 3rd Edn. Art. 599 at P. 368 ). ( 23 ) SHRI Sahai, however, sought reliance on the law stated in Art. 604 at pp. 370 and 371 which has been extracted by the Supreme Court in para 15 of the report it reads :"an alteration made in a deed, after its execution in some particular which is not material does not in any way effect the validity of the deed x x x x an alteration is not material which does not vary the legal effect of the deed in its original state, but merely expresses that which was implied by law in the deed as originally written, or which carries out the intention of the parties already apparent on the face of the deed, provided that the alteration does not otherwise prejudice the party liable thereunder. " ( 24 ) IN the background of the law noticed above now it is necessary to test the nature of the alteration which has been made by the covenantors in the agreement deed in question. According to Shri Murlidhar the alteration by adding names of two independent persons as marginal witnesses of the deed as witnesses of the contract of sale which according to the appellants had been fraudulently procured by the covenantors from them was for the purpose of adding authenticity to the deed of agreement which but for that alteration to the mind of the covenantors was likely to be disbelieved by the Courts as the two marginal witnesses who had signed the deed were either inimical to appellants or were closely related to them; the alteration according to the learned counsel in the circumstances was a material alteration. On the other hand it was countered by Shri Sahai that whatever be the purpose of the alteration with which it was made by covenantors until it is established that the legal effect of the deed got varied due to the alteration in question it is not a material alteration. ( 25 ) THE alteration which covenantors made in the agreement deed (Ext. ( 25 ) THE alteration which covenantors made in the agreement deed (Ext. 12) was certainly for the purpose of proving the same as having been executed by the vendors in the presence of Ram Swaroop and Mool Chand who were independent persons and whose testimony if required for proving the execution of the deed stood on much stronger footing as compared to the testimony of the original marginal witnesses who, because of their relationship with covenantors and enemity with appellants, did not occupy a position where the Courts could have safely placed reliance on their testimony in the matter of proof of the execution of the agreement deed by the vendors. ( 26 ) IT is true as argued by Shri Sahai that in the case of an agreement of sale there is no legal requirement of marginal witnesses to witness its execution but that does not mean that witnessing of execution of agreement of sale is prohibited by law and examination of witnesses for proving execution of the instrument by the vendors, that be, is ruled out by law. No doubt, the law does not make it compulsory for execution of an agreement of sale being witnessed by marginal witnesses but it also does not rule it out, that is the reason that in umpteen number of cases which are coming to courts involving question as to whether or not the agreement deed was executed resort is had by the covenantors, that be, on the testimony of its marginal witnesses and the scribe and Courts too place reliance on their testimony for finding out the fact of the execution of the instrument. This Court, therefore, cannot close its eyes from the hard realities of our social system where there is acute rivalry between purchasers of land and most of the sale deeds executed in favour of one is challenged, not mostly by its executors, but generally by a third person claiming that he had already obtained a sale agreement for the same land from the vendor who sold it to defendant fraudulently. ( 27 ) IN this background if we test the alteration in question there should be no iota of doubt left to conclude that by the said alteration the covenantors tried to add sanctity to the instrument (Ext. ( 27 ) IN this background if we test the alteration in question there should be no iota of doubt left to conclude that by the said alteration the covenantors tried to add sanctity to the instrument (Ext. 12) which in their opinion, with the signatures of their relatives and enemies of vendees who were originally projected as witnesses of the execution of that instrument, was not likely to pass the test of genuineness with the tough scrutiny of the law Courts therefore, they thought it necessary to introduce names of other two marginal witnesses in place of the original ones to rule out any doubt about its genuineness. ( 28 ) HOW legal position of an instrument is varied is now the question which must be examined. ( 29 ) THERE are certain types of instruments which require attestation by marginal witnesses, some of them have been provided in Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act but there are many including contract of sale and sale deed which is not required by law to be signed by two marginal witnesses but rare are cases where such instruments, which though are not required to be signed by marginal witnesses being witnesses of its execution, are got so witnessed by marginal witnesses. Therefore, legal position which is sought to be varied by the alteration made in the instrument is not to be judged in the abstract terms of law but has to be judged from the intention of the maker of the alteration and the purpose with which he had made that alteration. What will be the ultimate result of the alteration when it is tested in law Courts is not the test for determining its nature, the test is the purpose which was sought to be achieved by its maker which making the alteration. If the purpose was to make a slight variation without causing any prejudice to the other party but for his benefit as in the case of Anirudhan ( AIR 1963 SC 746 ) (supra) where the guarantee offered by Anirudhan was reduced from Rs. 25,000. 00 to Rs. 2,000. 00 and in the case of Kalianna ( AIR 1970 SC 1942 ) (supra ) where an innocuous statement, which made no difference either to the instrument nor caused any prejudice to the vendor and was inconsequential. 25,000. 00 to Rs. 2,000. 00 and in the case of Kalianna ( AIR 1970 SC 1942 ) (supra ) where an innocuous statement, which made no difference either to the instrument nor caused any prejudice to the vendor and was inconsequential. Obviously from that alteration legal effect of the instrument was not changed whereas in the present case the result which the covenantors sought to achieve from the alteration they made by introducing names of the two witnesses in the agreement of sale was for its acceptability by law Courts as a sacrosanct piece of document witnessing the execution of the agreement of sale. For the above reason therefore it cannot be said that the alteration in question which was made by the covenantors in the agreement deed, which is subject matter of scrutiny in the present case, is one which is identical to the alternation which was subject matter of scrutiny in Anirudhan and Kalianna cases (supra) which the Supreme Court in its respective judgment, reported in ( AIR 1963 SC 746 and AIR 1970 SC 1942 ) (supra) held to be insignificant and inconsequential. The fact that by making alteration the covenantors tried to give sanctity to the execution of the deed of agreement is also corroborated from the fact that said witnesses whose names were added by way of alteration had infact been examined by them for proving the execution of the agreement deed which had infact been denied by the vendors and the trial Court also placed reliance on their testimony in holding that the said agreement deed had in fact been executed by the vendors which had denied its execution. The alteration made by the covenantors in the agreement deed was thus a material alteration as it was to the prejudice of the vendors who, in view of the testimony of those two witnesses, whose names were subsequently introduced in it, were faced with a difficult situation of failing in their endeavour to prove that the said agreement deed was fraudulently manufactured by covenantors on a document their signatures were obtained on the pretext of transfer of some other property. ( 30 ) ON the facts, circumstances and the legal position already discussed in detail hereinabove I am of the view that the alteration which was made in the agreement deed by the covenantors must be held to be a material alteration which had the result of avoiding the agreement at the opinion of the vendors and was rendered void ab initio having no binding effect on the vendors. The agreement, therefore, cannot be enforced against the vendors for the reason of its having been altered without their knowledge and consent. ( 31 ) IN the result, both the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts below in both the suits are accordingly set aside. Suit No. 58 of 69 which was filed by covenantors for specific performance of the agreement deed (Ext. 12) is dismissed with costs throughout whereas Suit No. 58 of 71 which had been filed for declaration of the rights of the vendees over the land in suit is decreed with costs throughout. The vendees are accordingly declared owners of the land in suit by virtue of the sale deed which was executed by the vendors transferring the land in suit in their favour on 7-5-69. Appeals allowed. .