JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition is directed against the order dated 18.7.1996 passed by the learned Addl. Civil Judge (Junior Division), Udaipur City, Udaipur whereby the plaintiff was allowed to produce the photostat copy of the partnership deed under section 65 of the Evidence Act. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-non-petitioner at the very outset raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability for the present revision petition against the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court whereby permission was granted to the plaintiff to produce certain documents. His main contention is that the impugned order is revisable under section 115(c) CPC. The essential conditions for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Court is to show that the subordinate Court acted in the matter of exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.In Harakchand v. State of Raj., 1970 RLW 320 , a Full Bench of this Court interpreted Section 115(c) CPC and held that Cl. (c) of Section 115 CPC is applicable only if the subordinate Court appears to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. This clause is to be construed as meaning, "if the subordinate Court appears to have acted in the matter of exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity" not as meaning "if the subordinate Court appears to have acted while exercising its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." Illegality or material irregularity must have occurred in the manner in which the jurisdiction of the subordinate Court is exercised, i.e. in the manner in which that case is heard or decided. Whether a particular evidence was admissible according to law or not is a question of law which the trial Court was entitled to decide and if any error has been committed in deciding that question, it cannot be said that such error was in any way an error in the manner of exercise of jurisdiction. 3. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the defendants-petitioners has argued that the present revision petition filed by them is perfectly maintainable under section 115 CPC. In the instant case, what the learned trial Court was required to adjudicate was whether the document sought to be produced was in accordance with the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act ? In the instant case, what the learned trial Court was required to adjudicate was whether the document sought to be produced was in accordance with the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act ? According to him, the document in question was neither a certified copy nor a true copy nor a attested copy of the alleged partnership deed. Hence, it was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. Although, initially, on the application it was mentioned that it is purported to be u/0.13, R. 5 CPC but as a matter of fact, it was filed u /s. 65 of the Evidence Act. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, 1973 RLW 473 , wherein it was held that according to illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, production of unverified and uncertified copy does not amount of Official Act. He has, therefore, contended that the learned trial Court did not correctly held that the above document falls within any of the illustrations given in Section 65 of the Evidence Act. There was a total non-application of mind and in such a situation, the aggrieved party has got a legitimate right to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 CPC. 5. I have considered the rival arguments made at the bar. By the impugned order, the learned trial Court has allowed the plaintiff to produce the photostat copy of the alleged partnership deed. This is important to note that the plaintiffs have stated that the original was not available with them. Hence, the plaintiff was entitled to apply for the production of the secondary evidence under section 65 of the Evidence Act. Illustration (a) of Section 65 if the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a documents in the following cases : (a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the documents is sought to be proved or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it and when after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it. In the instant case, the document was to be proved against the defendants and the document in question is a photostat copy which was prepared by mechanical process from the original as per Section 63(2) of the Evidence Act. Hence, the learned trial Court has not committed any error in allowing the plaintiff to produce the secondary evidence in the shape of a photostat copy of the original. It was not challenged or controverted that the alleged document is not a photostat copy of the original. Moreover, even assuming that the order of the learned trial Court is erroneous or is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 65 of the Act, the essential question determined by the learned trial Court is with regard to its admissibility.In Harakchand's case (supra), a Full Bench of this Court examined the relevant case-law and concluded : "The sum and sentence of the matter is that unless an error of law or fact committed by the subordinate Court has arisen because (1) there is illegality or material irregularity committed in the manner in which it is exercised, the order passed by the subordinate Court cannot be revised simply on the ground that the order is erroneous either on a point of fact or on a point of law. Their lordships of the Privy Council in Rajah Amir Hssan Khan plaintiff and Sheo Baksh Singh defendant (15) held that the subordinate Court has perfect jurisdiction to decide case and even if it decided wrongly, it did not exercise its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." In para 15 of the Judgment, the Full Bench further observed as under : "The same is true when the Court is construing a document for the purpose of deciding whether it is admissible for want of registration. Construction of a document is no doubt a question of law, but simply because it is a question of law, it does not mean that in construing a document as having particular import, the subordinate Court acted with illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Wanchoo C.j. (as he then was) in Mohanlal v. Sampatlal , has taken the view that the filing of a trial Court that a document is not a promissory note and was admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty could be revised.by the High Court under section 115 CPC. Wanchoo C.j. (as he then was) in Mohanlal v. Sampatlal , has taken the view that the filing of a trial Court that a document is not a promissory note and was admissible in evidence on payment of duty and penalty could be revised.by the High Court under section 115 CPC. With utmost respect, we are of the opinion that this view is not correct. Similarly, the observations of this Court in Poonamchand v. M/s. Bastiram Deokishan that the question as to whether a document is admissible or not admissible is a matter of procedure is not correct. A construction of a document is a part of proceedings of a Court and if these proceedings are conducted properly and a mistake is made in construing the document, the order passed by the Court is not revisable. 6. Thus, in view of the clinching decision on the point, I hold that the present revision petition which is against the order admitting certain document in evidence is not open to challenge in revision. 7. The result is that the present revision has got no force and it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Order accordingly. *******