JUDGMENT - A.D. MANE, J. :---In this writ petition, the question arises is whether the courts below were justified in dismissing the complaint under section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, filed by the petitioner in the matter of his dismissal from the service of the respondent No. 1 for his alleged misconduct in the discharge of duty as a Conductor under Clause (7) of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. 2. The petitioner was working as S.T. Bus conductor. On 10-11-1982 he was on duty on a bus from Vaijapur to Waluj via Gangapur. When the bus reached the stop from Aurangabad to Waluj, the Checking Inspector checked the bus. The Inspector noticed that some passengers were not given tickets of proper denomination. Moreover, the petitioner also failed to fill up the way bill and it was also not closed. Moreover, less cash was found in the Cashbag. It was further alleged that the petitioner was questioned by the Inspector but he behaved arrogantly with him. 3. The petitioner was served with the charge-sheet on 18-11-1981 on the aforesaid instances of misconduct. The allegations were replied by him on 26-11-1981. In his explanation and also in his defence he mainly stressed the following circumstances :-- (i) On that day there was Rasta Roko Andolan declared by Shetkari Sanghatana. (ii) The bus was overcrowded and there were 82 passengers boarded at Aurangabad bus stand. (iii) The stand incharge did not give him the dispatch and directed him to issue the tickets in the running bus. (iv) The passengers in the running bus started giving slogans and created troubles by knocking the bell. They started behaving disorderly. There was a lot of tension and situation became abnormal. Nevertheless, the petitioner could give tickets to 58½ of the passengers. (v) There was no intention to misappropriate the amount of Rs. 37.80 ps. which was found short in the cash. It may be stated that the petitioner examined 6 passengers who were alleged to have been found without tickets in the bus. They supported the say of the petitioner that they had not given any bus fare to him and, therefore, no tickets were issued to them. The stand incharge was also not examined. It may be stated that the petitioner examined 6 passengers who were alleged to have been found without tickets in the bus. They supported the say of the petitioner that they had not given any bus fare to him and, therefore, no tickets were issued to them. The stand incharge was also not examined. The Enquiry Officer believed the version of the Checking Inspector even though he expressed his doubts about the receipt of fare from the passengers. 4. The petitioner filed his complaint before the Labour Court against dismissal order dated 15-3-1982. The Labour Court by its order dated 30-6-1983 dismissed the complaint. That was challenged in Revision by the petitioner but his Revision also came to be dismissed on 24-4-1989. That is why the petitioner filed this writ petition. 5. Mr. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the findings recorded by the courts below that the complainant failed to prove that the order of dismissal was by way of victimisation, not in good faith but was in colourable exercise of power and authority, is perverse in a given situation of the case. In this context, Shri Sharma made a great emphasis on the certain circumstances as proved in the evidence adduced by the parties. The first circumstance is that at the relevant time there was Rasta Roko Andolan at Aurangabad. At the bus stand itself there was heavy rush of passengers. Due to heavy rush, it was highly impossible for the petitioner as a Conductor to discharge his duties in issuing tickets to each and every passenger in the S.T. bus before the S.T. bus reached to the next stage which was within a distance of 10/12 kms. It has also been urged that the passengers who were in the bus were shouting slogans and creating troubles by knocking the bell. The passengers in the bus, thus, behaved in an disorderly manner and it was well-nigh impossible for the petitioner to issue tickets to each and every passenger with exact denomination for the amount paid by the passengers. This abnormal situation, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, though undisputed, has not been appreciated by the courts below in proper perspective, when the Enquiry Officer without any consideration to this situation found faults with the petitioner. This abnormal situation, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, though undisputed, has not been appreciated by the courts below in proper perspective, when the Enquiry Officer without any consideration to this situation found faults with the petitioner. It is submitted that irregularities if any, in issuance of tickets to some of passengers or failure to give tickets to some passengers in a given situation, do not give rise for an action of departmental enquiry against the petitioner. 6. Coupled with the aforesaid circumstances, Shri Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, also stressed another circumstance, which is evident from the charge-sheet itself. It is alleged that the petitioner arrogantly misbehaved with the ticket-checker. The allegation, according to the Counsel, will have to be read in context to the situation as pointed out earlier. The petitioner justified in his failure to issue tickets to all passengers or issue wrong tickets to some of the passengers in that situation and if his explanation on the spot was not accepted, obviously, the petitioner cannot be blamed if he had become furious to justify his action in the given situation. It is argued, that the ticket-checker himself got annoyed with that conduct of the petitioner in presence of agitating passengers which must have given rise to level the aforesaid charges against the petitioner. 7. It is, therefore, submitted that if the evidence is tested with probability factor, the conduct disclosed by the petitioner cannot be said to be so blameworthy for which the action of dismissal was contemplated. It is submitted that penalty of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate to the act complained of against the petitioner. 8. Shri S.G. Mantri, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, in the first place, submitted that the findings recorded by both the courts below, accepting that the inquiry was proper in law and that punishment was rightly imposed being concurrent, cannot be interfered with in writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Shri Mantri, further, submitted that there is a mention about the past conduct of the petitioner and that past conduct, if considered, would further strengthen that the petitioner committed misconduct of such a serious nature which entails dismissal under Clause (7) of Discipline and Appeal Procedure. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised by the Counsel for the parties. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised by the Counsel for the parties. The first thing which cannot escape notice is that, that it was Rasta Roko Andolan day. There is substance when the petitioner stated that due to Rasta Roko Andolan, there was a heavy rush of passengers who boarded the bus from the departure spot itself. Not only that; but, some passengers were trying to board the bus when the bus was on motion. 10. It is stated by the petitioner that he was asked to issue tickets to passengers in the running bus. That means, the allegation that the petitioner failed to fill in way bill does not stand if regard be had to the aforesaid explanation of the petitioner, especially when that explanation is consistent with the situation that was prevailed at the starting point itself. Moreover, no contrary evidence is there on record from the Station Incharge. 11. Now, if we consider the further evidence about the alleged conduct of the petitioner, regard may also be had to the aforesaid situation, especially when the passengers who boarded the bus were mainly agitators of Rasta Roko Andolan. It is said by the petitioner that the passengers were shouting slogans in the bus and that there was tense situation. Not only that, but he stated that about 82 passengers had boarded the bus at the starting point itself. I ascertained from the Counsel the capacity of bus and it is submitted by the Counsel that the capacity is 50 sitting and 10 standing. If regard be had to the fact that there were 82 passengers in the bus, obviously it was beyond the physical capacity of the petitioner to contact each and every passenger in the running bus and issue them proper tickets. It was highly impossible or beyond the control of the petitioner to have issued the tickets to each and every passenger travelling in the bus before the bus reached the next stop at Waluj, where the ticket-checker party stopped the bus. It is equally important to mention that it was highly impossible in a given situation that the petitioner would not have committed any mistake in issuing proper tickets to some of the passengers. 12. The circumstances explained by the petitioner undoubtedly require due consideration which appear to have been intervened beyond his control to perform his duties. It is equally important to mention that it was highly impossible in a given situation that the petitioner would not have committed any mistake in issuing proper tickets to some of the passengers. 12. The circumstances explained by the petitioner undoubtedly require due consideration which appear to have been intervened beyond his control to perform his duties. The question whether the aforesaid defaults on the part of the petitioner in not issuing the proper tickets to some passengers or failure to give tickets to some passengers, etc. will have to be judged on the test of reasonable man like the conductor in a given situation. 13. The misconduct as contemplated under Clause (7) will have to be considered in the context in which it is used and its meaning determined in the context in which it appears. It is well settled that when any word is employed in a statute the general purpose of statute may control and determine the meaning of the term as stated in the statute. Applying the said principle of interpretation of statute, the word 'misconduct' as used in Clause (7) takes its content from specific circumstances and that word must be considered in the connection in which it is used and its meaning determined by examining the context in which it appears. The word 'misconduct' as used in Clause (7), I think, means failure to perform or discharge a duty and covers positive official misdoing or official misconduct as well as negligence. Can it be said that in the given situation as hereinabove discussed the petitioner can be said to have failed to perform or discharge his duties with positive official misconduct or official negligence? Obviously the answer would be in the negative. Indeed it cannot be said that the petitioner committed misconduct of such grave nature or of a wilful or intentional culpable negligence in the discharge of his duties on that day. It cannot be forgotten that under Clause (7) the acts of misconduct which entail dismissal of an employee from service will have to be considered on similar degree of seriousness. In determining whether the misconduct within the meaning of Clause (7) is shown to exist in a given case or whether the misconduct amounts in law to be 'misconduct' under Clause (7) all the attending and surrounding circumstances must be taken into account. In determining whether the misconduct within the meaning of Clause (7) is shown to exist in a given case or whether the misconduct amounts in law to be 'misconduct' under Clause (7) all the attending and surrounding circumstances must be taken into account. Thus, taking into account all the circumstances as discussed above together, it is not possible to subscribe with a view that the petitioner disregarded his duty to perform with requisite intention and has committed positive official misconduct or negligence in performing his duty as a Conductor on that day. 14. Unfortunately, the Enquiry Officer took into account the defaults on the part of the petitioner per se. Similar mistake appears to have been committed by the courts below in giving much weight to the defaults committed by the petitioner on that day without, however, taking into account the salient features in the case as it is evident from the circumstances disclosed hereinabove. I am, therefore, of the view that the so called defaults on the part of the petitioner in discharging his duties on that day do not constitute misconduct under Clause (7) so as to entail into his dismissal from service. Both the courts, therefore, committed error of law in dismissing the complaint, in as much as, the finding so recorded appears to be perverse and without application of mind and based on no evidence and/or based on extraneous or irrelevant evidence. The impugned orders are, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside. 15. On the question of back wages, I heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sharma and Mr. Mantri, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is true that the petitioner is out of job from December, 1982. Therefore, since last 14 years he is without any job. It is, however, not shown that he has not engaged himself in any other job. Moreover, the delay in getting justice cannot be attributed to the petitioner alone. Taking the overall picture of the case, I think, that the order of reinstatement is to be passed and the back wages to the extent of 20% can be awarded in favour of the petitioner. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of the courts below are quashed and set aside. The respondent Nos. Taking the overall picture of the case, I think, that the order of reinstatement is to be passed and the back wages to the extent of 20% can be awarded in favour of the petitioner. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of the courts below are quashed and set aside. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with continuity of service and benefits. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are, further, directed to pay the amount to the extent of 20% as back wages from the date of dismissal till he is reinstated. They are further directed to pay costs of this writ petition to the petitioner throughout. Petitioner allowed.