S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner perused the record. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal whereunder holding, that the dispute referred for adjudication having already been determined conclusively in the proceedings under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the reference made under Section 4-K of the Act was incom petent and bad in law which was not re quired to be adjudicated upon afresh, the petitioner has approached this Court seek ing redress praying for the quashing of the said order. 3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary the disposal of this case, lie in a narrow compass. Before the initiation of the proceedings giving rise to the impugned order, the petitioner had initiated the proceedings under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act challenging his suspension and termination of service ef fected in the month of October, 1978. In the conciliation proceedings registered on the basis of this dispute being C. P. Case No. 96 (S) of 1978, a settlement was reached be tween the employer and the petitioner as contemplated under Section 18 (3) of the Act on 21-2- 1979. Under this settlement apart from the other things which had been settled it was also settled that the suspen sion order dated 21-2-1979 was to stand revoked from the date of settlement and in case the petitioner reports for duty within 15 days, in that event, he will be provided a fresh engagement in the revised scale of Rs. 165/- per month. It was clearly and specifi cally provided under the terms of the aforesaid settlement that the parties to the dispute agreed that apart from the amounts which had been determined to be payable to the workman, he will not be entitled to any other amount and all the disputes will be deemed to have been finally settled and concluded. 4. However, at the instance of the petitioner the State Government made a reference on 8-5-1980 for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 4. However, at the instance of the petitioner the State Government made a reference on 8-5-1980 for adjudication under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Under this reference, the question which was required to be decided was as to whether the order of the employer terminating the services of his workman, Sri R. K. Chaturvedi, Sales man on 14-10-1978 was justified and in accordance with law and in case if it was not so, in that event to what relief benefit the workman was entitled to. 5. The petitioner admitted the settle ment dated 21-2-1979 but alleged that the terms of the settlement had not been ful filled by the employers and therefore, a dis pute was raised which led to the reference in question. The employer raised a prelimi nary objection to the effect that the refer ence was barred by the settlement arrived at between the parries on 21-2-1979. This issue was decided by the Tribunal as a preliminary issue. 6. The Tribunal under the impugned order came to the conclusion that it was not disputed that a settlement between the employer and the workman had been reached in the conciliation proceeding on 21-2-1979. It has been found that the aforesaid settlement was a settlement as contemplated under Section 18 (3) of the Act. It was also observed that although the settlement was not signed by the workman concerned but by his representative, yet this fact could not invalidate the same. It was observed that the workman could not be allowed to disown the settlement by con tending that it had been signed by his repre sentative and not by him. It was also found that the settlement clearly indicated that the dispute regarding termination of services was clearly covered thereunder. No in dustrial dispute in regard to the alleged ter mination of the services of the workman on a date anterior to 21-2-1979 could be raised after the recording of the settlement in ac cordance with law and in the circumstances, in face of the terms of the settlement a dispute as referred for adjudication could not be deemed to have been surviving so as to call for and warrant an adjudication. 7. 7. The Tribunal in the aforesaid cir cumstance, upheld that validity of the settlement dated 21-2-1979 and finding it to be binding on the parties concluded the proceedings deciding the preliminary issue against the workman. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that since the petitioner had not been allowed to join the duties in terms of the settlement dated 21-2-1979, the industrial dispute could not be taken to have come to an end and when this matter in regard to the non-compliance of the settlement was reported to the Regional Conciliation Officer of the Labour Depart ment and was put in motion leading to the reference it was not open to the Tribunal to refuse to adjudicate upon the dispute or refuse to answer the reference made to it It has been urged that the dispute involved in C. P. Case No. 96 (S) of 1978 was confined to the matter relating to the suspension of the petitioner and recovery of some amount. It is further urged that with the revocation of the suspension, the question of fresh ap pointment did not arise and the terms of the settlement were self contradictory. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the facts pleaded in paragraph 21 of the writ petition indicating that the proceeding leading up to the im pugned order had infact been initiated sub sequent to 21-2-1979. What has been urged is that the terms of reference before the Tribunal were quite different from the terms of the settlement dated 21-2-1979 and infact the impugned order amounts to the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction by the Tribunal over the order of reference passed by the State Government for which the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. In other words what has been urged is that the impugned order amounts to setting aside of an order of ref erence passed by the State Government and is entirely without jurisdiction. It has been further urged that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to refuse to adjudicate upon the reference. 10. I have given my anxious considera tion to the questions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 11. It has been further urged that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to refuse to adjudicate upon the reference. 10. I have given my anxious considera tion to the questions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 11. A "settlement" as defined under Section 2 (t) of Act means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings and includes a written agree ment between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding there such an agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such a manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the State Government and the Concilia tion Officer. 12. The provisions contained in Sec tion 4-K of the Act stipulate that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute to a Labour Court if the matter of industrial dispute is one of those contained in the First Schedule, or to a Tribunal if the matter of dispute is. one contained in the First Schedule or the Second Schedule for ad judication. Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the State Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court. 13. Under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, the provision con tained in Section 6-B regulates a settlement arrived at outside the conciliation proceed ings. 13. Under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, the provision con tained in Section 6-B regulates a settlement arrived at outside the conciliation proceed ings. However under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 framed under the provisions of the J. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 in Rule 5 thereof it has been specifical ly provided that a settlement arrived at before a conciliation officer shall be signed in the case of an employer, by the employer himself or by his authorised agent or when the employer is an incorporated company or other body corporate, by the agent, manager, or other principal officer of the corporation and in the case of a workman, either by the workman himself or by the President or the Secretary of the Union of Workmen, competent to represent the workman under Section 6-1, or of a Federa tion of such Union, or by an Officer of such Union or Federation authorised in this be half by the President of such Unions or Federation, or where there is no such Union, by five representatives of the workmen duly authorised in this behalf at a meeting of the workmen held for the pur pose. 14. The petitioner has alongwith the writ petition filed a true copy of the settle ment dated 21-2-1979 as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. A perusal of the aforesaid copy indicate that it has been signed on behalf of the employer by V. P. K. Juhari their authorise representative and for the workman by Shri H. S. Jauhari, authorised representative but the aforesaid copy also clearly indicates that Sri R. K. Chaturvedi himself has also signed the said settlement further in the writ petition, it has not been alleged anywhere that the aforesaid settle ment had not been signed by the petitioner. Infact in paragraph 5 of the writ petition, it has been asserted that a settlement was ar rived at between the parties on 21 -2-1979. In the aforesaid circumstances, the finding returned by the Tribunal to the effect that the settlement dated 21- 2-79 was infact a settlement arrived at between the employer and the workman in the conciliation proceedings and was a settlement with the regours attached to it as envisaged under Section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is not liable to be interfered with. 15. 15. In the present case, as already noticed hereinabove, the provisions con tained in Section 4-K of the Act vests the State Government with the jurisdiction to refer an existing or apprehended industrial dispute or any matter appearing to be con nected with or relevant to the dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court or Tribunal. It is therefore, obvious that on the date of reference, the industrial dispute must exist or is apprehended. The Labour Court or Tribunal as is apparent from the provisions contained in Section 4-K of the Act is re quired under the law to determine only such an industrial dispute. It seems to me that under the law, it is not required that the Labour Court or Tribunal should decide or determine an industrial dispute which was not in existence on the date of reference. In the present case, the dispute in regard to the termination of the service of the petitioner claimed to have been effected in the month of October, 1978 could not be deemed to be existing on the date or reference which was made on 8-5-1980. The settlement arrived at between the workman and the employer with the rigours attached to it as envisaged under Section 18 (3) of the Act conclusively disposed of all the other disputes in regard to the alleged termination of service of the petitioner effected in the month of October, 1978 and the matters connected therewith. Labour Court or Tribunal could not, under the law, are authorised to open a closed chapter setting at naught the finality of a settlement arrived at in the conciliation proceedings acting contrary to the stipula tion contained in Section 18 (3) of the In dustrial Disputes Act. A settlement being a settlement arrived at in the conciliation proceedings in accordance with the law con tinues to be binding on the parties as well as the authorities under the Industrial Dis putes Act and any adjudication contrary to the terms of the settlement reduced in writ ing in a settlement reached during the con ciliation proceedings could not be taken to be permissible under the law. 16. 16. It seems to me that the question is not as to whether the Tribunal was sitting in appeal over a reference made by the State Government or adjudicating upon its validity or otherwise but the real question was as to whether the Tribunal could be deemed to be vested with any jurisdiction to pass an order which had the effect of reopening a matter in regard to an industrial dispute which stood already concluded and disturb the finality of the terms of the settle ment in disregard of the mandate of law as contained in Section 18 (3) of the Act. 17. In my considered opinion the Labour Court had, no jurisdiction in such a case to proceed to adjudicate upon a matter which had to be taken as having been finally determined conclusively in the circumstan ces referred to hereinabove. 18. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I find absolutely no justifiable ground for any interference in the impugned order, while exercising the extraordinary jurisdic tion envisaged under Article 226 of the Con stitution of India. 19. The writ petition is clearly devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. 20. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .