JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J.: To be or not to be has all along been a difficult question for the man-kind to answer. To act strictly in accordance with law or to show human consideration, sympathy or equity pose serious problems before the courts of law. 2. The appellant and the respondent No.7 are contenders for a post of Clerk-cum-Typist in Panihati Tran Nath High School (hereinafter referred to as the said school). The said school is an aided recognised school, and thus, is governed by the Recruitment Rules framed by the Director of School Education, West Bengal, in exercise of his power conferred upon him by clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-rule (1) and clause (i) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 28 of the Rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided), 1969, as also various notifications issued by the Education Department from time to time. The aforementioned 1969 Rules have been framed by the State in terms of its power conferred upon it under the provisions of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act. It is not in dispute that the said directions of the Director of School Education having been made pursuant to his statutory power have the force of law and recruitment of teaching and non-teaching staff in an aided school has to be done in terms thereof. Various proceedings for such recruitment have been laid down in the said Rules, which infer alia, are :– (1) prior permission of the District Inspector of Schools has to be obtained, (2) The concerned Employment Exchange has to be notified about the vacancy, (3) Upon the names of the candidates being sponsored by the Employment Exchange they are to be interviewed by a Selection Committee constituted for that purpose, whereafter the Selection Committee forms a panel, (4) After a panel is framed, in the event the Managing Committee approves the same, it is sent to the District Inspector of Schools for his approval in terms of Rule 6(n) thereof, (5) Only upon approval of such panel by the District Inspector of Schools, the Managing Committee of the school can appoint a teaching or non-teaching staff. But even such appointment has to be approved by the District Inspector of Schools. But even such appointment has to be approved by the District Inspector of Schools. In terms of the aforementioned Rules, when a vacancy occurred in the second post of Clerk-cum Typist in the said school, the school sought for prior permission to fill up the said vacancy from the District Inspector of Schools, 24 Parganas, North, who, in terms of his Memo dated 11.5.87, granted such prior permission directing preparation of panel in strict adherence to the recruitment procedure as laid down in his memo dated 28.8.81 and 25.4.83 and also directing that no appointment should be made before approval of panel by the District Inspector of Schools, 24 Pargans, North. The respondent No.7, Biswanath Bhattacharya admittedly filed a writ application in this court which was registered as C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 on 8.8.89 alleging, inter alia, therein that pursuant to a resolution adopted by the Managing Committee of the said school he had been appointed on ad-hoc basis as Librarian-cum Physical Instructor. In terms of a resolution dated 1.2.81, his duties were re-allocated as part-time Additional Assistant on a remuneration of Rs. 100/- per month. Upon a representation made by the Headmaster purported to be on the basis of an application dated 10.4.82 filed by the respondent No.7, members of the Managing Committee enhanced his remuneration. In a meeting dated 13.7.86, the Managing Committee accepted the fact that his appointment as a part time Librarian suffered from irregularities inherent in the very nature, but it was stated that it had no intention to terminate his service. By a resolution dated 18.9.88 the Managing Committee resolved that the respondent No.7 would continue to serve as Office Assistant in the school considering the exigency of clerical works. The District Inspector of Schools granted prior permission to fill up the vacant post of Second Clerk-cum-Typist. By a letter dated 11.5.87, the District Inspector of Schools acceded to the request made in terms of the letter of the Secretary dated 19.7.86 allowing the respondent No. 7 to be called for interview along with the candidates to be sponsored by the local Employment Exchange. By a letter dated 11.5.87, the District Inspector of Schools acceded to the request made in terms of the letter of the Secretary dated 19.7.86 allowing the respondent No. 7 to be called for interview along with the candidates to be sponsored by the local Employment Exchange. The said direction dated 11.5.87 was set aside by the Director of School Education in terms of his order dated 23.12.87 stating that it is irregular on the part of the said District Inspector of Schools to allow the respondent No. 7 to appear at the interview with others. The District Inspector of Schools was, therefore, directed to withdraw the said irregular order and he was warned not to issue such order in future without permission of the Director of School Education. The respondent No. 7 filed the aforementioned writ application, inter alia, for issuing a writ of Mandamus for forbearing from giving effect to the aforementioned order dated 23.12.87, passed by the Director of School Education as contained in Annexure ‘K’ therein and also for a Writ of or in the nature of Madamus commanding the respondents to forbear from holding any interview for the post of Second Clerk in the said school. It appears from the records that a copy of the writ petition was only served upon the learned Government Pleader. The matter came up before Susanta Chatterjee, J, on 10.8.89 and by an order of the said date, the learned Judge considered the grievances made by the respondent No.7 (who was petitioner therein) to the effect that he has not been allowed to appear at the interview for appointment in the post of Second Clerk along with other candidates and upon considering the materials on record and as suggested by the learned lawyers of both the sides directed the concerned authorities to allow the petitioner to appears at the ensuing interview provided he was found otherwise eligible for the said post as indicated in the petition. The aforementioned order as contained in Annexure 'K' to the writ petition was not set aside. No notice was served upon the school authorities, nor the counsel for the State was having any instruction. 3. The aforementioned order as contained in Annexure 'K' to the writ petition was not set aside. No notice was served upon the school authorities, nor the counsel for the State was having any instruction. 3. Pursuant to the said order, the respondent No. 7 was allowed to appear at the interview and from the broad sheet as contained in Annexure 'F' at page 70 of the stay application prepared by the Selection Committee it appears that whereas in respect of educational qualification, the respondent No.7 was given 4 marks, the appellant was given 10 marks. In the typing test, hand-writing and viva voce the respondent No.7 was given 4, 4.75 and 4.25, whereas the appellant/petitioner was given 3, 1.25 and 1.75. The respondent No.7 obtained total marks of 18. The total marks obtained by the appellant was 16 and one Sanjit Kumar Ghosh got 15 marks. It is to be noticed that the respondent No. 7 passed Higher Secondary Examination in supplementary examination which goes to show that he could not pass the final examination, whereas the appellant passed the said examination in 2nd Division in the year 1974. As despite preparation of the panel, the District Inspector of Schools was not taking any action, the appellant/petitioner filed the writ application praying for issuance of a Writ of or in the nature of Mandamus, inter alia, to publish the result of the interview held on 9.9.89. In the said application, an affidavit in opposition was filed wherein it was contended that the case of the respondent No. 7 had also been considered in terms of the order passed by this court in the aforementioned C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989, whereafter the petitioner sought for liberty to file an application for amendment of the writ application, inter alia, questioning the appointment of the respondent No.7 in the said post and raising various pleas including legal pleas therein. The said application for amendment was allowed by Susanta Chatterjee, J. in terms of an order dated 9.4.90. 4. Before the learned trial Judge, several contentions were relied as regards illegality of the appointment of the respondent No.7 which have also been urged before us. The learned trial Judge, inter alia, held that the order dated 10.8.89 passed by Susanta Chattejee, J. in C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 cannot be questioned by the petitioner/appellant. 4. Before the learned trial Judge, several contentions were relied as regards illegality of the appointment of the respondent No.7 which have also been urged before us. The learned trial Judge, inter alia, held that the order dated 10.8.89 passed by Susanta Chattejee, J. in C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 cannot be questioned by the petitioner/appellant. The learned trial Judge held that non-sponsoring the name of the respondent No. 7 by the Employment Exchange did not vitiate the proceedings. It was further held that the said order dated 10.8.89 is not a nullity nor the same could be corrected by this court. As regards the objection that in the first writ application, the same set of learned lawyers who had appeared for the respondent No.7, had appeared for the school authorities in the second writ application, the learned trial Judge held that the same by itself did not show any collusion between the respondent No. 7 and the school authorities. It was further held that although the approval to the panel was granted by the Additional District Inspector of Schools, he being of the same rank and for administrative reasons as he had been delegated with such powers, he had the power to approve the panel. It was held that this court had the jurisdiction to give a direction upon the school authorities to allow the respondent No.7 to appear at the interview. As regards the decision of the Selection Committee, the learned Judge held that educational qualification alone is not decisive" and this court in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot interfere with the selection process, It was further held that in any event, the writ petitioner having taken part in the selection process by appearing at the said interview, is estopped and precluded from questioning the said selection. On the basis of the aforementioned findings, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 5. Mr. Ganguly, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised various contentions in support of this appeal and took us through the respective cases of the writ petitioner, school authority and the respondent No.7. 6. On the basis of the aforementioned findings, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 5. Mr. Ganguly, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised various contentions in support of this appeal and took us through the respective cases of the writ petitioner, school authority and the respondent No.7. 6. It was submitted that admittedly the writ petitioner obtained the highest marks among the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange and as Susanta Chatterjee, J. in his order dated 10.8.89 passed in C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 directed the concerned authority to consider the case of the respondent No.7 for appearance at the interview subject to the finding that he is otherwise eligible for appointment, as the recruitment rules had not been followed, he was not eligible therefor. The said order dated 10.8.89 is not binding upon the writ petitioner as he was not a party thereto and thus the second writ application was maintainable and in support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on the decisions reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 , AIR 1985 SC 167 , AIR 1954 SC 1722, AIR 1922 Cal 274 and AIR 1988 SC 1531 . 7. The school authority and the writ petitioner colluded with each other resulting in passing of the said order dated 10.8.89. It was contended that mala fide on the part of the respondents would be evident from the following fact : Same set of lawyers appeared for the respondent No.7 and the school authority. From a communication dated 27.8.89 as contained in page 67 of the application for stay it would appear that the Managing Committee of the school was not communicated that the respondent No. 7 was to be permitted to appear at the interview subject to he is found otherwise eligible and thus there has been deliberate omission as regards eligibility clause of the respondent No.7. The Additional District Inspector of Schools had no jurisdiction to grant approval. 8. The letter of appointment as contained in annexure 'F' to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.5, if compared with annexure 'G' to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.7 it would appear that they do not tally with each other. 9. The Additional District Inspector of Schools had no jurisdiction to grant approval. 8. The letter of appointment as contained in annexure 'F' to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.5, if compared with annexure 'G' to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.7 it would appear that they do not tally with each other. 9. It was pointed out that the Selection Committee deliberately granted higher marks to the respondent No.7 in order to nutralise the better educational qualification of the petitioner and other candidates and thus the same is vitiated in law. 10. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that upon taking into consideration the facts and the surrounding circumstances it would appear that the entire process of selection was collusive. 11. The learned Counsel has relied upon a decision in the case reported in AIR 1992 SC 789 , AIR 1995 SC 962 and unreported decision of this Court in Matter No. 416 of 1989 and Appeal From Original Order No. 186 of 1989 (Md. Hasan Ali vs. Subal Chandra Mondal & Ors.) disposed of on 27.2.96 and also the unreported decision in the case of Miss Bulu Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. (C.O. No. 2978(W) of 1992) disposed of on 25.8.94. 12. The learned Counsel contends that in a case where the selection process is vitiated for more than one reason, the Court can call for the records and in support of his aforementioned contention, he has relied upon the decisions reported in 1994(5) SLR 567 and 1993(8) SLR 654. 13. As regards the finding of the learned Trial Judge that the petitioner is estopped and precluded from questioning the selection, the learned Counsel submit that the said question does not arise in view of the fact that the petitioner had no knowledge about the aforementioned order dated 10.8.89 passed by Susanta Chatterjee, J in the writ application filed by the respondent No.7. The learned Counsel also distinguished the decisions relied on by the learned Trial Judge. 14. Mr. Monoranjan Daw, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the school authority supporting the judgment delivered by the learned Trial Judge, inter alia, submits that this Court should not question the decision of the Selection Committee which was constituted in terms of the Rules and thus the selection process cannot be said to be bad in law. 14. Mr. Monoranjan Daw, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the school authority supporting the judgment delivered by the learned Trial Judge, inter alia, submits that this Court should not question the decision of the Selection Committee which was constituted in terms of the Rules and thus the selection process cannot be said to be bad in law. It was pointed out that while the order dated 10.8.89 was passed by S. Chatterjee, J in C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989, the question of collusion did not arise as the school authorities were not noticed therein. Mr. Daw, learned Counsel, urged that the writ petitioner in his original writ application or amended application did not question the constitution and/or decision of the Selection Committee and thus the said question cannot be raised before this Court. It was further submitted that apart from the fact he did not question the order passed by S. Chatterjee, J, now could not have maintained the writ application questioning the said order, inasmuch as, by reason thereof he was not prejudiced at all, as the petitioner's right was limited to the extent of his appearance at the interview along with other eligible candidates in view of the fact that his name has been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The petitioner had a right to be considered for appointment but had no right to be appointed and thus the writ application is not maintainable. 15. The learned Counsel contends that it is not a case where the respondent No. 7 has prayed for regularisation of his appointment and in that view of the matter, the decisions cited by Mr. Ganguly, learned Counsel for the appellant on that score have no application. Our attention has been drawn to the circular letter dated 17th July, 1988 whereby and whereunder one Namita Chowdhury was asked to look after all the affairs of the Secondary Education excepting the grant-in-aid matter as also the circular letter dated 3rd August, 1993 whereby the Additional Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Barrackpur, was informed in response to his letter dated 9.9.93 as regards his right to act as D.D.O. that he has been given such power. It was, therefore, submitted that this appeal should be dismissed. 16. Mr. Amarendra Nath Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.7 adopted the submission of Mr. Daw, learned Counsel for the school authorities. 17. It was, therefore, submitted that this appeal should be dismissed. 16. Mr. Amarendra Nath Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.7 adopted the submission of Mr. Daw, learned Counsel for the school authorities. 17. In view of the rival submissions of the parties as noticed hereinbefore, the question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether despite the aforementioned order dated 10.8.89 the petitioner can be permitted to question the appearance of the respondent No.7 at the interview, inter alia, on the ground that his name was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. 18. It is not in dispute that in terms of the Recruitment Rules it is necessary to notify the vacancy in the Employment Exchange. 19. However we can take judicial notice of the fact that this Court has been passing orders directing consideration of the case of the candidates who had been working in the school in question for a long time along with his sponsored candidates. In the instant case, however it appears that the respondent No.7 in his writ application has merely stated that his name was registered in the Employment Exchange. The date of such registration or his qualification was not mentioned. It is not in dispute that the Employment Exchange recommended the cases of such candidates who hold the requisite qualification. In the aforementioned C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 the Employment Exchange Officer was not a party. No allegation was made that the name of the petitioner had not been sponsored despite the fact that the names of other candidates who are junior to him in the matter of registration of their names in the Employment Exchange has been so sponsored and despite the fact that the petitioner is also eligible therefor. As indicated hereinbefore, the main grievance of the petitioner was against the order passed by the Director of School Education dated 23rd December, 1987. A perusal of the order dated 10.8.89 passed by S. Chatterjee, J would clearly suggest that no argument was advanced on that score and the submission was made only to the effect that he was not allowed to appear at the interview by the school authorities on the ground that his name has not been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The said order was evidently passed at the suggestion of the learned Counsel for the parties. The said order was evidently passed at the suggestion of the learned Counsel for the parties. Neither the learned Counsel for the State took any instruction from the Director of School Education nor any notice was issued to the School authority. In that situation, in our opinion, such an order which was passed on concession and without considering the fact in issue cannot be said to be an order which was binding on others. 20. The statements made in the writ application filed by the respondent No.7 in the aforementioned C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 clearly goes to show that he had all along been favoured not only by the school authorities but also by the D.I. of Schools despite the fact that the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 13.7.86 clearly accepted the fact that the appointment of the petitioner as a part-time Librarian suffered from inherent irregularities. It is curious to note that the D.I. of Schools also accorded permission to the Selection Committee to allow the respondent No.7 to appear at the interview. 21. The said decision, which would bear repetition to state, was deprecated in terms of the order of the Director of School Education, inasmuch as, evidently the same was contrary to the mandatory provision of the Recruitment Rules. It is true that this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review exercises a limited jurisdiction. It can interfere only when the decision of the administrative body suffers from illegality, irrationality or procedural irregularity. It is also true that this Court cannot sit in appeal over a decision of the Selection Committee but that does not mean that this Court would shut its eyes despite availability of bare facts on records of the case. Although this Court would not interfere with the Selection process but we may state that we had verified the hand-writing of the petitioner vis-a-vis the respondent no.7 appearing in the respective vakalatnama and the affidavits. We are astonished to find as to how the Selection Committee could allot 4.76 marks to the respondent no.7 while allotting only 1.75 marks to the writ petitioner. Ex-facie the signature of the respondent no.7 shows that his hand writing is absolutely bad in comparison to the signature of the writ petitioner. We are inclined to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the Selection Committee acted most un-fairly. Ex-facie the signature of the respondent no.7 shows that his hand writing is absolutely bad in comparison to the signature of the writ petitioner. We are inclined to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the Selection Committee acted most un-fairly. It is not disputed at the Bar and as a matter of fact Mr. Daw, learned Counsel himself contended that each and every candidate had a right to be considered for appointment. What meaning should be attributed to consideration? If the word consideration' in the matter of appointment is limited to the subjective satisfaction of the members of the Selection Committee, the matter may be different but that is not the law. All candidates are entitled to fair consideration at the hands of the Selection Committee. In other words, consideration of the candidature at the hands of the Selection Committee should be objective, fair and should not suffer from arbitrariness, nor the same should be capricious or fanciful. 22. We would not in exercise of our power under Article 226 of the Constitution refuse to do justice to a party who is entitled thereto. We do not mean to suggest that in each and every case this Court may do so. We only intend to point out that if a glaring injustice and non-fulfilment of the requirement of fair play is brought to the notice of this Court, the Court may act so as to complete justice to the parties. The hands of law are long enough to reach injustice. As a Court of justice and equity it must see that adherence to the rule of law is ensured and not flouted in the hands of the executives who dressed in little brief authority and in exercise of its discretion cripples the constitutional guarantee of fairness and reasonableness and convert it into a force, fraudulent and facade. The court must stem the rot. 23. Furthermore we are satisfied upon taking into consideration the facts and circumstances surrounding the appointment of the respondent no.7 that the same is mala fide both on facts as well as in law. 24. Our reasons for arriving at the said decision are recorded hereinafter.• Approval was granted by the Additional District Inspector of Schools who was not authorised, therefor. The Circular letters produced before us shows that the same had been issued for other purpose. 24. Our reasons for arriving at the said decision are recorded hereinafter.• Approval was granted by the Additional District Inspector of Schools who was not authorised, therefor. The Circular letters produced before us shows that the same had been issued for other purpose. In fact in terms of the Recruitment Rules the Director of School Education has delegated his power by reason of provision of statute in favour of the District Inspector of Schools without conferring any power to any other authority to exercise the said statutory function. The Circular letters in question had not been issued by the Director of School Education. In fact there is no provision for such delegation in the Recruitment Rules. The finding of the learned Trial Judge to the effect that there has been a sufficient delegation of authority of the D.I. of Schools, to say the least, is not correct, inasmuch as, the same ex-facie is violative of the provision of the Recruitment Rules. This aspect of the matter, has not been considered by the learned Trial Judge as in our opinion the same had not been argued before His Lordship. 25. The appointment letter in favour of the respondent no.7 was issued at 8 O'Clock in the morning by the Secretary (which was not the normal working hours of the school). Even if we ignore that there existed a lot of difference in the copy of such appointment letter filed by the School authority and the respondent no.7 respectively, as has been pointed out by Mr. Ganguly, the very fact that the appointment letter was issued at 8 O'Clock in the morning and the respondent no.7 was permitted to join the school at 11 O'Clock goes to show an undue haste on the part of the School authority to allow him to join the school. As would be evident from the Circular letter dated 28.2.83 as appearing at page 1227 of the Headmasters' Manual, 4th Edition, that the letters of appointments are required to be issued under registered post with A/D but for reasons best known to the School authorities the said requirement was dispensed with. An undue haste on the part of the concerned authorities prove the allegations of mala fide. 26. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S.P. Kapoor vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. An undue haste on the part of the concerned authorities prove the allegations of mala fide. 26. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S.P. Kapoor vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 2181 . We are, however, not unmindful that the Supreme Court in the case of K. Nagraj and Ors. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. reported in AIR 1985 SC 551 at page 559 held thus : “The reasonableness of a decision, in any jurisdiction, does not depend upon the time which it takes. A delayed decision of the executive can also be bad as offending against the provisions of the Constitution and it can be no defence to the charge of-if unconstitutionality that the decision was taken after the lapse of a long time. Conversely, decisions which are taken promptly, cannot be assumed to be bad because they are taken promptly. Every decision has to be examined on its own merits in order to determine whether it is arbitrary or unreasonable.” The question as to whether a decision of an administrative authority is mala fide or not must be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is true that he who alleges mala fide must prove the same. 27. It has been held by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bal Kalyani vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1993 Bom 10 wherein the allegation was made as against the Bureaucracy as regards allotment of lands in favour of a Co-operative Society formed by them to the following effect: "While evaluating a plea of mala fides, Court has to bear in mind that all the allegations are to be taken together and an inference to be drawn. (See observations in Hem Lal vs. State of Sikhim, AIR 1987 SC 762 : (1987 Cri.L.J 718) Deepak vs. Punjab University, AIR 1989 SC 903 and Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872 )". 28. In that decision it has been pointed out that all the allegations have to be considered together and inference has to be drawn from such materials which are not only available on records of the cases but also from the records maintained by the State. 28. In that decision it has been pointed out that all the allegations have to be considered together and inference has to be drawn from such materials which are not only available on records of the cases but also from the records maintained by the State. The aforementioned decision was referred to and followed in a judgement of Patna High Court in the case of Akhileshwar Mishra vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1995 Part 10. 29. It may be true that this court being a superior court, its order cannot be the subject matter of a judicial review, but it is also well settled that this court can rectify its mistake ex debito justitiae and, inter alia, in a case where fraud has been practised upon the court. From the order dated 10.8.89 passed by this court in C.O. No. 9849 (W) of 1989 it is evident that there has been a lot of difference between what was contained in the writ application and what was submitted before the learned trial Judge. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr., reported in AIR 1988 SC 1581. Sabasachi Mukherji, J (as the learned Chief Justice then was) while considering a case as to whether the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction to direct trial of a case under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, to a Judge of the High Court, inter alia, observed that the said order being without jurisdiction the same can be recalled ex debito justitiae. The learned trial Judge appears to have placed heavy reliance in the case of Isaacs vs. Robertson, reported in (1984) 3 All E.R. 140, but in Antulay’s case, the aforementioned decision has been distinguished. It was held that where an order is passed in contravention of the constitutional right and contrary to the express provision of an Act, it is open to the High Court to review its own order. The Apex Court observed : “We recognise that the distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction and an error made within the jurisdiction is very fine. So fine indeed that it is rapidly being eroded as observed by Lord Wilberforce in Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 1 All E.R. 208 at p. 244. The Apex Court observed : “We recognise that the distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction and an error made within the jurisdiction is very fine. So fine indeed that it is rapidly being eroded as observed by Lord Wilberforce in Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 1 All E.R. 208 at p. 244. Having regard to the enormity of the consequences of the error to the appellant and by reason of the fact that the directions were given suo motu, we do not find there is anything in the observations of Ittavira Mathay vs. Varkey Varkey (1964) 1 SCR 495 : ( AIR 1964 SC 907 ) which detract the power of the court to review its judgment ex debito justitiae in case injustice has been caused. No court, however high, has jurisdiction to give an order unwarranted by the Constitution and, therefore, the principles of Bhatia Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. D.C. Patel, 1953 SCR 185 at p. 190 : ( AIR 1953 SC 16 at pp. 18-19) would not apply.” 30. Ranganath Mishra, J (as the learned Chief Justice then was), also agreed with the said view, but gave additional reasons therefor. Oza, J, and Ray, J, agreed with the view of both the learned Judges. As has been submitted by Mr. Daw that the appellant/petitioner did not have any right to be appointed and he had merely a right to be considered for appointment, but such consideration for appointment was to be amongst the candidates who were legally entitled to appear at the interview and not with the candidate who appears to be a favoured child. Article 14, as it is well known, strikes at arbitrariness and arbitrariness is ante-thesis of equality. Having considered the entire background of the case, we are of the opinion that there appears to be enough substance in the submission of Mr. Ganuly that there had been some collusion by and between the school authorities and the respondent no.7. The District Inspector of Schools evidently, also acted without jurisdiction in allowing the respondent no.7 to appear at the interview, which order was later on set aside by the Director of School Education. Ganuly that there had been some collusion by and between the school authorities and the respondent no.7. The District Inspector of Schools evidently, also acted without jurisdiction in allowing the respondent no.7 to appear at the interview, which order was later on set aside by the Director of School Education. Moreover, as indicated hereinbefore, in terms of the recruitment rules, only the District Inspector of Schools can grant approval, but such approval having been granted by the Additional District Inspector of Schools who had no authority in the matter, was illegal and without jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that the State did not make any allegation that the Additional District Inspector of Schools was delegated with the requisite power of the District Inspector of Schools. Such an inference was drawn by the learned trial Judge on the basis of the statements made in paragraph 20 of the affidavit in opposition filed by the school authorities which was verified by the Secretary of the School as true to his knowledge, but such a knowledge being based on two circulars with which we have dealt with earlier, and as the said circulars clearly deal with another matter, we are of the opinion that the conclusion to the aforementioned effect by the learned trial Judge was erroneous. We do not think it apposite to consider the other submission made by Mr. Ganguly. However, it is well known that fraud vitiates all solemn orders. Even a decree obtained by adopting fraudulent means and an order obtained by taking recourse to suppressio vedi and suggestio falsi could not be binding upon the courts in other proceedings, and such an order can be challenged collaterally. It need not be set aside, and thus, the submission of Mr. Daw to the effect that the appellant/petitioner had made no prayer to set aside the said order dated 10.8.89, the writ petition was not maintainable, cannot be sustained. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Smt. Shrist Dhawan vs. Shaw Brothers reported in AIR 1992 SC 1555 . It is also true as has been submitted by Mr. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Smt. Shrist Dhawan vs. Shaw Brothers reported in AIR 1992 SC 1555 . It is also true as has been submitted by Mr. Daw and as has been held by the learned trial Judge that the petitioner had not sought for regularisation, but it has to be borne in mind that all appointments are required to be made in accordance with law and in terms of the provisions of the statute. The Court cannot ignore the dicta that the power of a statutory authority is limited and all such acts of a statutory authority must be limited within the four corners of the statute. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Bipadtaran Patra vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1994(2) CLJ 450 . Moreover, it is now well known that a person who comes by back door should go by that door. See 1994(2) SCC 204 . It is pertinent to note that the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors. reported in AIR 1992 SC 789 , observed :- “A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the jobs for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government Departments, Public Undertakings or Agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 days or more have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts.” 31. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts.” 31. It is also pertinent to note that qualification of typing was also required to be entered into the Office of the Employment Exchange Officer. The Employment Exchange Officer while sponsoring the names of 9 candidates had stated their qualifications as regards typing which, inter alia, means that their typing abilities were noted in the Office of the Employment Exchange as per certificate supplied by the concerned candidates. Such noting of qualification is also necessary in terms of the provisions of the Employment Exchange Manual as also in terms of the Recruitment Rules. The said fact would appear from page 65 of the stay application. The learned trial Judge does not appear to have considered this aspect of the matter at all. 32. The learned trial Judge, inter alia, held that the petitioner had no locus standi to question the order dated 10.8.89 passed by this court. It is not necessary for us to consider as to whether the petitioner was a necessary party in the earlier writ application or not, but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in the event illegality is committed by this court and/or fraud, is practised upon this court and the same is brought to this court's notice, this court in view of the decision in Antulay's case (supra) can rectify its mistake. Such mistake can evidently be rectified by a larger bench. The learned trial Judge, inter alia, held that the respondent No.7 was not ineligible as ineligibility did not exist according to the dictionary meaning. But in view of our findings aforementioned, it is not necessary to dilate on the aforementioned aspect of the matter any further. The learned trial Judge appears to have proceeded on the basis that in the earlier writ application the case of the respondent no.7 was that the employment exchange authorities did not forward his name in violation of the statutory provisions. Such a finding, as indicated hereinbefore, is contrary to the records and it is unfortunate that the records of the earlier writ application was not placed before the learned trial Judge. Had the learned trial Judge perused the records of the said writ application, we are sure that he would have come to a different finding. Such a finding, as indicated hereinbefore, is contrary to the records and it is unfortunate that the records of the earlier writ application was not placed before the learned trial Judge. Had the learned trial Judge perused the records of the said writ application, we are sure that he would have come to a different finding. The learned trial Judge in that view of the matter must be held to have committed an error in holding that the court could direct the respondent no.7 to appear at the interview, but as indicated hereinbefore, the said order was passed by Chatterjee, J, on the ground that he was prevented from appearing at the interview. Thus, an error of record appears to have been committed by the learned trial Judge. It is true as has been held by the learned trial Judge that the court cannot sit in appeal over the functions of the Selection Committee, but the learned trial Judge, as was done by us, did not compare the handwriting of the appellant vis-a-vis the respondent no.7 which are available on records. Although it is said that the court is an expert of experts but it has to be conceded that the courts do not have the expertise in the matter of evaluation respective merits of the candidates. But determining a question as to whether the handwriting of A is better than B, is not a matter which requires an expertise. Any layman can come to a conclusion by having a mere glance at the two different handwritings. We have done so in order to satisfy our conscience that arbitrariness was committed by the Selection-Committee in awarding marks and that is the reason we did not call for the records of the Selection Committee so as to consider the marks granted to the concerned candidates by the Selection Committee at the interview or at the typewriting. Such a matter might have fallen within the zone of consideration of the District Inspector of Schools. However, in this case, he did not exercise his jurisdiction at all. The learned trial judge further held relying on or on the basis of several decisions reported in 96 CWN 1066, 1992(4) SLR 567, AIR 1992 SC 1866 and AIR 1990 SC 434 that the petitioner/appellant was estopped and precluded from questioning the decision of the Selection Committee as he had taken part in the interview. The learned trial judge further held relying on or on the basis of several decisions reported in 96 CWN 1066, 1992(4) SLR 567, AIR 1992 SC 1866 and AIR 1990 SC 434 that the petitioner/appellant was estopped and precluded from questioning the decision of the Selection Committee as he had taken part in the interview. It is the specific case of the appellant that he was not aware before filing of the affidavit in opposition by the respondents that the respondent no.7 was permitted to appear at the interview in terms of the order dated 10.8.89 passed by this Court. He thereafter filed an application for amendment of the writ application wherein he had taken all relevant points. The said application for amendment was allowed. If a person was not aware as to on what basis another candidate was allowed to appear at the interview, the question of invoking the principles of estoppel would not arise. Moreover, the decisions relied upon by the learned trial Judge are also distinguishable on fact, but in view of our aforementioned finding, we do not intend to dilate on the matter any further. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any basis for the said finding of the learned trial Judge. As regards the plea of the petitioner that he was not aware of the said matter, the learned trial judge has held that the petitioner must be deemed to have participated in the selection process before the Selection Committee with knowledge of participation of the respondent No.7 in the same. No material exists on record for drawing such inference or a legal fiction. 33. In view of our findings aforementioned, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to refer to the other decisions cited at the Bar. However, the question which arises for consideration is what relief can be granted in the writ application. This court cannot issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to appoint the appellant/petitioner. It is for the District Inspector of Schools to consider the said matter in terms of Rule 6(n) of the Recruitment Rules. However, evidently the appointment of the respondent No.7 being wholly illegal is liable to be set aside. 34. Mr. This court cannot issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to appoint the appellant/petitioner. It is for the District Inspector of Schools to consider the said matter in terms of Rule 6(n) of the Recruitment Rules. However, evidently the appointment of the respondent No.7 being wholly illegal is liable to be set aside. 34. Mr. Ganguly submits that it is a fit case in which this court should direct appointment of the writ petitioner/appellant and in support of his aforementioned contention learned counsel relies on a decision reported in AIR 1987 SC 537 . In our opinion, the said decision has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the said decision, it has, inter alia, been held that a writ court can also exercise discretionary jurisdiction where a discretionary power has been granted to an administrative authority. In the instant case, the District Inspector of Schools is to perform a statutory function in terms of the Recruitment Rules. Such statutory function cannot be usurped by this Court. 35. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and order dated 18.9.95 passed by the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is allowed to the extent that the appointment of the respondent no.7 is set aside and the District Inspector of Schools (SE), 24 Parganas, North, is hereby directed to consider the panel sent by the Managing Committee of the school and pass an appropriate order on its own merits and without in any way being prejudiced by any observations made hereinbefore. The District Inspector of Schools shall pass an appropriate order at an early date and preferably within 3 weeks from the date of communication of this order. 36. Xerox certified copy of the order, if applied, be supplied within one week from the date of such application. 37. Prayer for stay of operation of the order is considered and refused. Satya Narayan Chakrabarty, J.: I agree. Appeal allowed.