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Madras High Court · body

1996 DIGILAW 1103 (MAD)

Ramachandran (died) and Others v. Balasubramaniam and Others

1996-10-31

GOVARDHAN

body1996
Judgment : First defendant is the appellant. .2. The averments in the plaint are as follows: The suit property belonged to Seeni Ammal who died intestate in the year 1969 leaving the defendants 1 to 8 and the plaintiff as her legal representatives. The first defendant is her son. Plaintiff and the second defendant are the children of Annalakshmi Ammal one of the deceased daughter of Seeni Ammal. Defendants 3, 7 and 8 are the daughters of Seeni Ammal. Defendants 4 to 6 are the children of Ramu Ammal another deceased daughter of Seeni Ammal. The second defendant is the wife of the first defendant. The plaintiff and other defendants were having regard and respect for the first defendant. The first defendant was residing in item No.3 of the suit properties and was managing item Nos.1 and 2. He was paying the due share of the income from those properties to the plaintiff and defendants 3 to 8. The plaintiff is entitled to 1/12th share. The defendants 1, 3, 7 and 8 are entitled to 2/12th share. Second defendant is entitled to 1/12th share while the defendants 4 to 6 are entitled to 2/12th share. The first defendant had sold 17 cents of item No.1 of the suit properties to defendants 9 to 11, who are aware of the right of the plaintiff and other co-sharers. The sales in their favour are not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded a partition and separate possession of his 1/ 12th share by issuing notice. The first defendant has sent a reply stating that Seeni Ammal has gifted the properties to him during her lifetime and he is in enjoyment of the same. Hence, the suit. 3. The first defendant in his written statement contends as follows: The first defendant is the only son of Seeni Ammal and were provided with jewellery and other gifts as per the custom. The first defendant has spent for all those marriages and for subsequent welfare of his sisters. The plaintiff lost his mother at a very young age. The plaintiff and his sisters were brought up by the first defendant and Seeni Ammal. Since, the father had not provided for the marriage of his daughter, the first defendant has married the second defendant at his cost. The plaintiff lost his mother at a very young age. The plaintiff and his sisters were brought up by the first defendant and Seeni Ammal. Since, the father had not provided for the marriage of his daughter, the first defendant has married the second defendant at his cost. Seeni Ammal, out of love and affection towards her son and gratitude, for the sense of duty of the first defendant. In incurring expenses towards the sisters, has gifted the suit property to the first defendant to the knowledge of her daughters and their children, in 1964. The first defendant has transferred the registry in his name and was treating the same as his own property, paying taxes, etc. He had remodelled and invested heavily in construction of the suit property. Plaintiff was approving them as an onlooker all the time. The first defendant has perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession and ouster. The suit is barred by limitation. Seeni Ammal died in the year 1969. The first defendant has improved the property and invested the suit property. The plaintiff has therefore no right over the suit property. There was no common enjoyment and no payment of any shares to the other heirs of Seeni Ammal. The suit is vexatious. It is liable to be dismissed. 4. Defendants 4, 5, 6 and 8 have submitted to the decree and prayed for a preliminary decree for partition being passed. 5. The 9th defendant in his written statement contends as follows: The first defendant was in absolute possession and exclusive enjoyment of the suit property especially item No. 1 of the same. He had purchased 17 cents in item No.1 of the suit property along with the defendants 10 and 11 as bona fide purchasers for value without the knowledge of the right and interest of the plaintiff if any. The plaintiff and defendants 2 to 8 never raised any protest or objection either before or after purchase by these defendants. They are estopped from questioning these defendants’ purchase. The defendants 9 to 11 are bona fide purchasers for value and the suit against them is liable to be dismissed. 6. The plaintiff and defendants 2 to 8 never raised any protest or objection either before or after purchase by these defendants. They are estopped from questioning these defendants’ purchase. The defendants 9 to 11 are bona fide purchasers for value and the suit against them is liable to be dismissed. 6. On the above pleadings, the learned Sub Judge, has held that the first defendant has not prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession and ouster, the defendants 9 to 11 are not bona fide purchasers for value the suit is not barred by limitation and on those findings granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for. Decree has also been passed in favour of defendants 4, 5, 6 and 8. 7. Aggrieved over the same, the first defendant has come forward with this appeal. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would argue that the trial court has failed to see that the plaintiff has not proved that the first defendant was managing the suit property on behalf of other co-sharers after the death of Seeni Ammal and was paying their share to the plaintiff and other defendants and has practically failed to appreciate the documentary evidence and oral evidence adduced before the court which would show that the first defendant has perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession and ouster and therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial court are liable to be set aside. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has also made it clear that the first defendant does not stress the plea of oral gift made by the first defendant in the trial court and is confining himself on the basis that the first defendant has prescribed title to the suit property by adverse possession and ouster. .9. Before proceeding further to analyse the evidence of both, sides, it is necessary to recollect the law on the subject of adverse possession and ouster. As regards co-owners, the law is well settled that there can be no adverse possession by one co-owner, unless there has been a denial of title and an ouster to the knowledge of the other. Before proceeding further to analyse the evidence of both, sides, it is necessary to recollect the law on the subject of adverse possession and ouster. As regards co-owners, the law is well settled that there can be no adverse possession by one co-owner, unless there has been a denial of title and an ouster to the knowledge of the other. The Supreme Court has held in the decision Mohammed Daqar v. Naim-un-Nissa, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 548, that the possession of one co-owner cannot be adverse to the other co-owners, unless there is denial of the latter’s right to their knowledge by the person in possession and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. As regards co-owners, the law is that there can be no adverse possession by one co-owner unless there has been a denial of title and an ouster to the knowledge of the others; and the same principle applies to the case of a transferee from a co-owner, who professedly takes a transfer of the whole property from him. In order to render the possession of one co-owner to the others, not only must be the occupancy under an exclusive claim of ownership, in denial of the rights of the other co-owners, but such occupancy must have been made known to the other co-tenants, either by express notice or by such open and notorious acts as must have brought home to the other co-owners knowledge of the denial of their right. The ouster of the other co-owners, in order to render the possession adverse, need not be by violent or intimidating expulsion or repulsion; nor need notice of the adverse holding be actually brought home to the other co-owners by personal or formal communication; it is sufficient, if the contrary is not proved that the circumstances show that such knowledge may reasonably be presumed. 10. 10. Our High Court has held in the decision reported in Ibramsa Rowther v. Shaik Meerasa Rowther, (1972)1 M.L.J. 466 , that "if a co-owner does not assert his rights for a considerable length of time with the result that the other side is handicapped, by lapse of time and disappearance of evidence, from proving that his exclusive possession was occupied with open denial and open repudiation of the title of the other co-owner either at the inception of subsequently, the co-owner has been inactive must take the consequence for the long delay in bringing the suit which has prejudiced the other side and occasioned the loss of evidence by lapse of time. Courts may presume ouster from exclusive possession for a considerable length of time. 11. Now let us consider the case on hand bearing the above principles with regard to the law of adverse possession, ouster, co-sharers, in order to appreciate the case of the first defendant that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property to the exclusion of the others from the date of Seeni Ammal in the year 1969. 12. P.W. 1 the plaintiff has stated even in chief examination that the first defendant was enjoying the suit properties after the death of Seeni Ammal and on account of the relationship between the first defendant and himself, he was having confidence and respect towards the first defendant. P.W. 1 was employed in the Agricultural Department. According to P.W.1 from 1985, enmity arose between the first defendant himself and since he refused to get the daughter of the first defendant to be married to his son. According to P.W.1, it was only in the year 1986, he sent a notice protesting the construction put up by the first defendant in the third item of the property. He would contend that prior to 1985, no improvement was made by the first defendant in the third item of the property. As regards the third item of the property, the first defendant has put up a construction in it in 1985 as evidenced by Ex.B-89. He would contend that prior to 1985, no improvement was made by the first defendant in the third item of the property. As regards the third item of the property, the first defendant has put up a construction in it in 1985 as evidenced by Ex.B-89. D.W.5, the clerk in the Srivilliputhur Municipality has stated that till 1969, the assessment in respect of this property was in the name of Seeni Ammal and thereafter, it has been transferred in the name of the first defendant and it continued to be in the name of the first defendant from 1969 onwards. A suggestion was put to D.W.5 that without a formal enquiry, the assessment has been transferred in the name of the first defendant and he has denied the same. The trial court has not given credence for the transfer of the assessment on the ground that the application filed for transferring the assessment has not been filed in court. But, D.W.5, has stated that any application for transfer of the assessment will be maintained only for three years and thereafter, they would destroy it. The application having been filed in the year 1969, the trial court has committed an error in not giving due credit to the transfer of the assessment in respect of the third item of the property in the name of the first defendant. The first defendant as D.W.3 has stated that the electricity consumption charges are levied only to him and the assessment has also been transferred in his name as evidenced by Exs.B-60 and B-61. According to D.W.1, for putting up a latrine in the year 1965, he had applied to the Municipality and Ex.B-89 is the approved plan for the same. The payment of tax in respect of these properties is evidenced by Ex.B-102. He has also stated that adjoining the third item of the property, he put up two constructions bearing door Nos.76-A and 76-B in the year 1976 and receipts for payment of tax for these property are Exs.B-103 to B-106. The electricity service connection is in his name and the receipts for payment of electricity consumption charges are Exs.B-107 to B-160. Nothing has been elicited to discredit the evidence of D.W.3 regarding this item of property. D.W. 1 and D.W.2 who sail along with the plaintiff have not given any evidence to disbelieve the evidence of D.W.3. The electricity service connection is in his name and the receipts for payment of electricity consumption charges are Exs.B-107 to B-160. Nothing has been elicited to discredit the evidence of D.W.3 regarding this item of property. D.W. 1 and D.W.2 who sail along with the plaintiff have not given any evidence to disbelieve the evidence of D.W.3. According to D.W.I, the 5th defendant, he is residing in the same street, where the first defendant is residing and the assessment has been transferred in respect of the house in which he is residing from the name of his mother to his name. But, he has not objected to the transfer of assessment in respect of the third item of the property in favour of the first defendant. It is not as if he was not aware of the procedure for transferring the assessment. His failure to object to the transfer has been lost sight by the trial court. In his chief-examination, he has stated that after the death of Seeni Ammal, it was decided in the Panchayat held by the elders of the village, that the first defendant has to manage the properties. But, at the same time, he has stated that the said decision of the Panchayat has not been pleaded by him in his written statement. He would also say that the persons who have participated in the panchayat are people from other villages and he cannot say the names of those persons. From the evidence of D.W.1, it is seen that the 5th defendant is giving evidence regarding the enjoyment of the property on behalf of the others only to make gain and his evidence is of no use to the plaintiff in establishing his case. The 8th defendant who has been examined as D.W.2 has stated that the first defendant has not carried out any improvement in the third item of the property. This is patently a wrong statement given by D.W.2, since it is not disputed by the plaintiff that the first defendant has made improvement in the third item of the property. According to D.W.2, after the death of their mother, Seeni Ammal, first defendant was managing the properties at their request and was giving share to them. But, during cross-examination, she has admitted that the direction given to the first defendant to manage the properties on their behalf was not reduced to writing. According to D.W.2, after the death of their mother, Seeni Ammal, first defendant was managing the properties at their request and was giving share to them. But, during cross-examination, she has admitted that the direction given to the first defendant to manage the properties on their behalf was not reduced to writing. She would admit that she has not pay any kist. She would also say that she has not given instructions to her advocate to prepare her written statement and the plaintiff alone has been enquired as to what was their defence in the suit. She would even say that she does not know who her advocate was. From the evidence of D.W.2, it is seen that the 8th defendant has been set up by the plaintiff to support his case that the first defendant was in enjoyment of the properties on behalf of the other co-sharers at their request and it is not to their exclusion. .13. D.W.3 would say that as far as the first item of the suit property is concerned, he has made improvements in it by constructing a well and pumpshed and getting electricity service connection by engaging men and his evidence is supported by the documentary evidence under Exs.B-3 to B-18 and B-22 to B-25 and B-33 to B-48 during the years 1965 to 1986. The payment of deposit for getting service connection, payment of electricity charges, construction of the well and pumpshed etc. are made by the first defendant to the knowledge of the others would show that they have not objected or obstructed to it at any time between 1965 and 1986. 14. According to D.W.1, his mother has mortgaged item No.1 of the suit property under Ex.B-2 in the year 1943 and he had discharged this debt. He has put up the pumpshed after getting sanction for the approved plan and the entire plan has been marked as Ex.B-3. payment of necessary fees and getting service connection No.323 would show that the first defendant was enjoying the property to the exclusion of the plaintiff and others. He has put up the pumpshed after getting sanction for the approved plan and the entire plan has been marked as Ex.B-3. payment of necessary fees and getting service connection No.323 would show that the first defendant was enjoying the property to the exclusion of the plaintiff and others. He would even say that for putting up the shed and for erecting pumpset, he bought the necessary articles on loan basis from one Sankaran Nadar and since he had not discharged the debt in time, the said Sankaran Nadar had issued a notice under Ex.B-19 and he has even attached the properties and to prove the same he has filed Ex.B-20. It is only in pursuance of this attachment order, he has discharged the debt of Sankaran Nadar and it is evidenced by Ex.B-21. Exs.B-26 to B-30 are relevant documents showing the mortgage of the first item of the property by the first defendant, discharge of the loan by the first defendant by making payments between 1973 and 1985. So also, the loan incurred by the first defendant for erecting a pumpset in the first item of the property and the attachment which he has suffered are evidenced by Exs.B-19 to B-21 and these are all of the year 1972. .15. The first defendant has also stated that along with his mother, he obtained a loan in the year 1961 from the Land Mortgage Bank and after the death of his mother, it was transferred in his name and to prove the same, he has filed Ex.B-26. The discharge of this loan by the first defendant is proved by Ex.B-27, Exs.B-28 to B-30 are the receipts for payment of various amounts by the first defendant towards this debt. The first defendant has also obtained a loan from the Government on the security of the properties in items 1 and 2 as evidenced by Exs.B-49 to B-58. The documents under Exs.B-49 to B-68, B-66 and B-67, the receipts would show that towards the debt incurred by the first defendant, the Government has also issued an attachment notice to the first defendant and after the receipt of the said notice, he has discharged the debt. The first defendant has suffered not only attachment of items 1 and 2, but also has even suffered a decree towards the debt incurred by him with the Co-operative Society. The first defendant has suffered not only attachment of items 1 and 2, but also has even suffered a decree towards the debt incurred by him with the Co-operative Society. Exs.B-62 to B-65 are the relevant documents between the years 1970 and 1974 which the plaintiff and other defendants cannot plead ignorance. .16. We have already seen the transfer of patta in respect of all the three items in the name of the first defendant. The reason given by the trial court for not accepting the transfer of the registry and the patta on the ground that the original application has not been filed does not appear to be a proper one. The claim of the plaintiff that out of love and affection and regard he had towards the first defendant, he did not protest the improvements made by the first defendant and alienations made by him is not convincing and acceptable since the plaintiff was a Government servant in the Agricultural Department who cannot be said to be ignorant of the consequences of these transfers. As already observed by me, from 1969 to 1985, neither the plaintiff nor the other defendants have taken any objection to the conduct of the first defendant in making improvements in the property, undergoing sufferings on account of the attachment and notices by the advocate of the creditor of the first defendant. The possession and enjoyment of the property by the first defendant from 1969 to 1985 has been open, exclusive and notorious to the knowledge of the plaintiff and others. It is hostile to the plaintiff and others since there is no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and the other defendants who support him that the first defendant was sharing the income of the property with them. No step has been taken by any of these persons who claim a partition to assert their right over the suit properties. The possession of the first defendant and enjoyment of the suit properties is in denial of the rights of the plaintiff and other defendants if any to their knowledge is seen from the oral and documentary evidence adduced before the trial court. The overt acts of the first defendant in effecting improvement by construction of well, pumpshed latrine, etc. discharge of the debts incurred by the mother as well as himself with the co-operative society, Government, etc. The overt acts of the first defendant in effecting improvement by construction of well, pumpshed latrine, etc. discharge of the debts incurred by the mother as well as himself with the co-operative society, Government, etc. and assessment of title by transferring patta in his name in respect of all the three items of suit properties and having electricity service connection in his own name and by making payment of kist for item No.2, electricity consumption charges to item No.2, payment of property tax in respect of item No.3 and also the electricity consumption charges would all go to show that the enjoyment of the properties by the first defendant was hostile to the interest of the plaintiff and other defendants who claim to be the co-owners of the property. This type of enjoyment would show that there is a clear ouster and the trial court has ignored all these acts of the first defendant and has held that the plaintiff is entitled to a partition. I am of opinion that it cannot be sustained. For all these reasons, I am of opinion that the judgment and decree of the trial court are liable to be set aside and the appeal has got to be allowed. 17. In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissing the suit. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in the appeal as well as in the suit.