JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J.:---One of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the review application filed by the respondents (for short 'the tenant') before the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, for reviewing the order dated 9-8-1989 was hopelessly time barred but despite that the Reviewing Authority did not consider the question of limitation and allowed the review application filed by the tenant and thus the order passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, in review application on 31-5-1990 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 2. Since the writ petition can be disposed of on the aforesaid contention, the facts in details need not be adverted to and suffice it to say that the petitioner (for short 'the landlord') made an application under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short 'the Rent Control Order') before the Rent Controller, Amravati, on 11-6-1984. The case set out in the application by the landlord was that the premises in question comprising of two rooms shops situated on Morshi Road near Jaistambha, bearing Municipal House No. 508/19 in Ward No. 43 of Amravati Town, were required by the petitioner for opening a showroom of rubber product. The application was contested by the tenant and the Rent Controller after holding enquiry by an order dated 23-5-1988 rejected the application of the landlord under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. The landlord carried the order passed by the Rent Controller in appeal before the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, under Clause 21(1) of the Rent Control Order. The Appellate Authority heard the appeal and by an order dated 9-8-1989 allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the Rent Controller dated 23-5-1988 and granted permission to the landlord to issue quit notice to the tenant under Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. This time, the tenant made an application under Clause 21(2-a) of the Rent Control Order before the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, for review of the order dated 9-8-1989. The application for review was made by the tenant before the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, on 26-2-1990. In opposing the review application, the landlord raised the objection that the review application was time barred. The application for review was made by the tenant before the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, on 26-2-1990. In opposing the review application, the landlord raised the objection that the review application was time barred. This objection about limitation raised by the landlord is duly reflected from the impugned order and in para 3 of the order, this objection has been noted by the Resident Deputy Collector. However, without considering the objection of limitation raised by the landlord the Resident Deputy Collector allowed the review application and set aside the order passed by his predecessor on 9-8-1989. 3. Clause 21(2-a) of the Rent Control Order reads as under : "21(2-a). The Collector may, either on his own motion at any time or on the application of any party interested made within ninety days of the passing of an order, review any order passed by himself or any of his predecessors-in-office and pass such order in reference thereof as he thinks fit so however that no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order." 4. It would be seen that the power of review has been conferred on the Appellate Authority, viz., the Collector to review the order either passed by himself or his predecessors-in-office on his own motion or on the application filed by person interested. If the Collector on his own proceeds to review the order passed by him or his predecessors-in-office, no limitation is prescribed under sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order, but if the party seeks review of the order of the Appellate Authority by making the application, such application is required to be made within 90 days of the passing of the order. Thus, sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order prescribes limitation for making an application for review of the order passed by the Appellate Authority and that limitation is 90 days from the date of passing of the order sought to be reviewed. The Limitation Act and its provisions have not been expressly extended in the Rent Control Order. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides as under : "29(2). The Limitation Act and its provisions have not been expressly extended in the Rent Control Order. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides as under : "29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 5. Though the limitation provided in sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order may be treated as special law, but since the Reviewing Authority is not a Court as contemplated, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall not be attracted. Sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order for the purpose of limitation is self-contained in the matter of review of the order passed by the Appellate Authority. It is true that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special law, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, to the extent it is not expressly excluded by any special law, may be attracted, but since the Reviewing Authority is not a Court, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall not apply. In (Nityananda M. Joshi and others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others)1, 1989(2) S.C.C. 199, while considering the question whether the Labour Court while adjudicating the question under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was a Court within the meaning of section 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or for that matter whether section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked to such proceedings by the Labour Court, the Apex Court observed thus :--- "3. In our view, Article 137 only contemplates applications to courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a Court. In our view, Article 137 only contemplates applications to courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a Court. Further section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is "when the Court is closed". Again under section 5 it is only a Court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a Court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963." 6. Again in (Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ramandan Prasad and others)2, (1976)1 S.C.C. 361 , the Apex Court considered the question whether the Collector acting under section 15 of the Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands of Raiyats) Act, 1951, was a Court and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was applicable in such proceedings, and held that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application if the Authority is not a Court and it held that the Collector acting under section 15 of the Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, 1951, was not a Court, though it was vested with specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held thus : ".... The Third ground on which the decision of the High Court rests relates to the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We do not see how section 5 could be invoked in connection with the application made on October 17, 1965 by the first respondent. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act an appeal or application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act an appeal or application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. The Collector to whom the application was made was not a Court, though section 15 of the Act vested him with certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure; also, the kind of application that was made had no time limit prescribed for it, and no question of extending the time could therefore arise. We, therefore, think that the High Court misdirected itself in referring to section 5 of the Limitation Act." 7. I have no manner of doubt that the Appellate Authority/Reviewing Authority is not a Court as contemplated under section 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, there is no power conferred on the Reviewing Authority to condone the delay if the order passed by the Appellate Authority is sought to be reviewed on the application made by a party beyond the time prescribed. As observed above, sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order prescribes limitation for making an application for review of the order passed by the Appellate Authority and that limitation is 90 days from the date of passing of the order sought to be reviewed, and if no such application for review is made within 90 days from the date of passing of the order and the aggrieved party makes an application only after 90 days from the date of passing of the order, such application for review cannot be entertained. In this view of the matter, limitation of 90 days in the present case would commence on the date of passing of the order i.e. 9-8-1989. Apparently, the review application has been made on 26-2-1990 i.e., much beyond the period of 90 days and, therefore, it was barred by time. Apart, it would be seen that the tenant applied for obtaining the certified copy of the order dated 9-8-1989 on 9-2-1990 i.e., after limitation of making the review application had already expired, and therefore, the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order cannot be excluded. Apart, it would be seen that the tenant applied for obtaining the certified copy of the order dated 9-8-1989 on 9-2-1990 i.e., after limitation of making the review application had already expired, and therefore, the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order cannot be excluded. Even otherwise, if the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order is excluded, i.e. only for a period from 9-2-1990 to 21-2-1990, and even if that is added to the period of 90 days, the review application is hopelessly time barred. No application for condonation of delay was made by the tenant either along with the review application or thereafter, and as observed above, looking to the provisions contained in sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order, such an application would not be maintainable because no power is conferred on the Reviewing Authority to condone the delay in making the application for review beyond the time prescribed under sub-clause (2-a) of Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order. The objection of the landlord raised before the Reviewing Authority that the application for review was time barred, was well merited, but the Reviewing Authority has not at all adverted to this aspect, despite the fact that such a contention has been specifically raised. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, the order passed by the Reviewing Authority, i.e. the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, on 31-5-1990 cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 9. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati, on 31-5-1990 is quashed and set aside. No costs. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Petition allowed.