D. K. SETH, J. The petitioner desig nated as General Manager in the erstwhile U. P. Government Roadways, later re- desig nated as the Regional Manager, was ap pointed on deputation to the Government of Sikkim, on the post of General Manager, Sikkim Nationalised Transport, with the Headquarter at Ganktok. He continued on the said deputation from 20-3-1976 till 31-3-1978 namely the date of the retirement from service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh while on deputation, as aforesaid. On ac count of such deputation the petitioner was paid composite compensatory allowance of Rs. 600 on the petitioners basic pay of Rs. 1500. Out of the said composite compen satory allowance fifty per cent was treated as deputation specialpay as per terms and con ditions of Sikkim Government Notification dated 19th May, 1976. According to the petitioner the said special pay formed part of the petitioners pay and, as such, the same was to be included while computing the petitioners pension. Since he had retired while on deputation therefore, he is entitled to a higher pension, which was denied to him, namely when calculating the quantum of pension, the special pay was omitted. On 4th December, 1976, the petitioner made a representation, (Annexure-2 to the petition explaining the position in support of cal culation of pension. But the said repre sentation was not decided for a long time Ultimately by an order dated 20th April 1987 (Annexure-3 to the petition) the petitioners representation was rejected. In the above background the petitioner claimed the following reliefs: " (a) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to include Rs. 300 towards pension together with basic salary which the petitioner was getting at the time of retirement. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay arrears of pension and gratuity on the basis of total salary of Rs. 1500+300=1800 together with arrears which was due since 1st April, 1978. (c) Issue any other writ, order or direction as this Honble court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) Award cost of the petition in favour of the petitioner. " 2. 1500+300=1800 together with arrears which was due since 1st April, 1978. (c) Issue any other writ, order or direction as this Honble court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) Award cost of the petition in favour of the petitioner. " 2. In the counter-affidavit the respon dent No. 1, State of Uttar Pradesh con tended that after creation of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation ( here in after referred to as UPSRTC) the post of General Manager of the erstwhile U. P. Government Roadways was re-designated as the Regional Manager. The petitioner, who was on deputation in Sikkim, had retired from service on 31-3- 1978. But he continued to serve the Sikkin Rashtriya Parivahan on a consolidated pay of Rs. 2000 per month till 31st March, 1980. The terms and conditions of the petitioners deputa tion to Sikkim Parivahan were fixed by Government Order, dated 22nd June 1977, (Annexure-CAl ). In terms there of the com pensatory allowance sanctioned by ths Sik kim Government could not be included for the purposes of computing pension payable by the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh. The Sikkim Government had issued a Pay Certificate to the petitioner, wherein it was duly mentioned that the petitioners pay was Rs. 1500 per month. The petitioners pension was accordingly calculated and the special pay did not find mention in the last pay certifi cate of the petitioner. The representation of the petitioner, therefore, was rejected by an order dated 28-4-1987 (Annexure-CA2) 3. No rejoinder-affidavit to the said counter-affidavit appears to have been filed. Mohd. Jafar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also did not claim that any rejoinder- affidavit has been filed against the said counter-affidavit. 4. The respondent No. 2, UPSRTC, in its counter-affidavit had pointed out that the petitioner having been retired on 31-3-1978, continued to serve the Sikkim Parivahan till 31st March, 1980 at a con solidated Pay of Rs. 2000 per month. The petitioner was sent on deputation on the terms and conditions contained in the Government Order dated 22-6-1977 (Annexure-CA 1 ). The representation of the petitioner for including the composite com pensatory allowance towards computation of pension was rejected by the State Government vide order dated 20th April, 1987 (Annexure-CA 2 ). 2000 per month. The petitioner was sent on deputation on the terms and conditions contained in the Government Order dated 22-6-1977 (Annexure-CA 1 ). The representation of the petitioner for including the composite com pensatory allowance towards computation of pension was rejected by the State Government vide order dated 20th April, 1987 (Annexure-CA 2 ). The petitioners services was given on loan to the Govern ment of Sikkim with the terms and condi tions applicable to the State Government officers. The compensatory allowance sanc tioned by the Government of Sikkim, there fore, cannot included while computing pen sion. In the last Pay Certificate issued by the Government of Sikkim, special pay was not mentioned. The said Last Pay Certificate mentions the petitioners pay as Rs. 1500 per month. There was nothing on record to show that the petitioner was being paid any special pay. The petitioner is guilty of inor dinate delay in moving the writ petition. 5. The petitioner, in the rejoinder-af fidavit had reiterated his case, as made out in the writ petition. It is contended by the petitioner that the officers from different States were obtained on deputation in Sik kim for managing its Rashtriya Parivahan. Therefore, for the purposes of uniformity of pay and terms and conditions of other States the Government of Sikkim has formulated and framed its own terms and conditions for the officers of other States. The petitioner was deputed to Sikkim on the terms and condition that might be made available to the petitioner by the Government of Sik kim. The petitioner had never made any request for including compensatory al lowance towards calculation of pension, he had only claimed inclusion of Special pay for the said purposes. The petitioner ad mitted that he was a State Government employee and his services were given on loan to the Government of Sikkim since he had retired while on deputation, therefore, the Special pay is liable to be included for computing pension. The petitioner ad mitted that in the Last Pay Certificate the Government of Sikkim had mentioned the amount of last pay drawn as Rs. 1500. It was not necessary to included the special pay in the said certificate. The State Government rejected the petitioners valid claim by order dated 20-4- 1987. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any delay. 6. Mohd. 1500. It was not necessary to included the special pay in the said certificate. The State Government rejected the petitioners valid claim by order dated 20-4- 1987. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any delay. 6. Mohd. Jafar, learned counsel ap pearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that since the special pay formed part of the petitioners pay, therefore, the same is liable to be included towards computation of pension. He sought to explain delay on the ground that he waited for decision on his representation and only when the repre sentation was rejected in the year 1987 he could move the present writ petition. He also contended that since the petitioner is entitled to pension calculated on the pay including special pay, therefore, the writ petition should be allowed. 7. Sri Sameer Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of U. P. S. R. T. C. con tended that the application is not main tainable on account of tielay. Inasmuch as the petitioner having retired in 1978 had moved the writ petition in the year 1990 namely, after long period of 12 years. Secondly, he contended that the petitioner having not challenged the order, dated 20-4-1987 by which his claim had been rejected, no relief can be granted to the petitioner so long as the order remains there. 8. He further contended that the petitioner having been appointed in terms of the Government Order dated 22-6-1977 and he being the State Government Officer cannot claim any special status because of his deputation. The alleged special pay al lowed by the Government of Sikkim cannot alter the situation. Then again there was nothing on record to show that the petitioner was being paid the alleged special pay. 9. Learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 adopted the argument of Sri Sharma and contended that though the petitioner himself had indicated the fact of rejection of his representation, in the writ petition itself, he did not challenge the said order. Even when the non- chal lenge of the said order dated 20-4-1987 was taken as a ground in the counter-affidavit of the respondent No. 1 as well as in that of respondent No. 2, the petitioner had never attempted to challenge the said order though the petitioner had filed his rejoinder affidavit to the counter- affidavit of the U. P. S. R. T. C. on 14-7-1992. 10. After having heard the learned counsel for both the parties it appears that apart from the question of merit two inter esting questions emerge for our decision. If the said decision goes in favour of the petitioner only then we are called upon to enter into the merit of the claim of the petitioner. We, therefore, propose to decide the said two questions, as has been raised by Sri Sharma, learned counsel for the Cor poration, supported by the learned Stand ing counsel, first. 11. Whether the petitioner can main tain the present writ petition for the pur pose of seeking the relief prayed without challenging the order, dated 20-4-1987, aforesaid, is the first question, raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. 12. It is apparent from the statement made in the writ petition itself that the petitioner had made a representation on 4th December, 1976 (Annexure-2 to the peti tion, He retired from service on 31st March, 1978. He did not take any steps till 1990 to assert his claim. On the other hand he waited for the outcome of his repre sentation, which was rejected on 20th April, 1987. Though he has mentioned the said fact in para-19 of the writ petition (An-nexure-3 to the writ petition) yet he has not challenged the said order. Unless the order is challenged the court is not called upon to interfere with the same. The said order stares on the face of the petitioner with regard to his claim, which stands decided and disposed of by the said order. The effect of the said order can not be wiped out unless the same is quashed or otherwise declared void or nullity. Since the petitioner has not challenged the said order despite the grounds taken in the counter-affidavit (para-10 of the counter-affidavit of respon dent No. 1 and para-7 of the counter af fidavit of respondent No. 2), therefore, this court is not called upon to interfere with the said order. Accordingly, we are of the view that unless challenged the court is power less to interfere with a particular order, not challenged before it. So long as the said order remains valid the petitioner does not have any case. In other words, the petitioner having not challenged the same he has waived his right with regard to the claim and is estopped from re-agitating the claim. 13. So long as the said order remains valid the petitioner does not have any case. In other words, the petitioner having not challenged the same he has waived his right with regard to the claim and is estopped from re-agitating the claim. 13. The second question raised is that whether this Court should exercise its dis cretion in view of inordinate delay in moving the writ petition. 14. Admittedly, the petitioner had retired on 31st March 1978. The petitioner had claimed inclusion of special pay in cal culation of pension by means of his repre sentation dated 4th December, 1976. He was aware of his claim in the year 1976. After his retirement on 31-3-1978 he did not take any steps nor he made any further rep resentation neither he approached this court even after 31-3-1980 till then the petitioner remained on extended service nor did he take any steps to assert his right. He waited till 20-4- 1987 to witness his rep resentation rejected. Even then the petitioner did not activate himself with in reasonable time after rejection of his claim on 20-4-1987. He woke up from his slumber in 1990. No explanation explaining the delay has been given in the writ petition. Admittedly, making of successive repre sentations for a long period or waiting for the out-come on the representation made for indefinite long period definitely speaks against the petitioners diligence in assert ing his claim by invoking the writ jurisdic tion, a factor to be taken into account in order to exercise discretion by the court when its writ jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. 15. Admittedly, there has been inor dinate delay, unexplained on the part of the petitioner, in invoking writ-jurisdiction. The lack of diligence delay and laches on the part of the petitioner dis-entitles him from seeking equity jurisdiction of this court to exercise its discretion. 16. Then again the representation made by the petitioner in the present case is not a remedy appointed by law. Learned counsel for the respondent cites decision in the case of Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. The State of Bihar and others AIR 1973 SC1343 and relies on para- 8 there of. 16. Then again the representation made by the petitioner in the present case is not a remedy appointed by law. Learned counsel for the respondent cites decision in the case of Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. The State of Bihar and others AIR 1973 SC1343 and relies on para- 8 there of. In the said case it was held mat submission of memorials one after another for nearly three years were in the nature of mercy petitions and the petitioners there in should have realised that in pursuing a remedy which was not duly appointed by law, he was putting in peril a right of high value and significance. By reasons of his conduct, the petitioner there in has disabled the High Court from exercising its extraordinary powers in his favour. 17. He also relied on the ratio decidendi in the case of Prabodh Verma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1985 SC 167 and refers to para-50 there of. In the said case it was held that though the High Court ought not to dismiss the writ petition on mere technicalities or because the proper relief has not been asked for but it should not therefore, condone every kind of laxity, particularly, where the petitioner is represented by an Advocate. 18. It is the consensus view of the Supreme Court that extra ordinary power exercised under Article 226 is discretionary and such discretion is exercised where the Court finds that the person seeking to in voke the extraordinary jurisdiction is not guilty of laches or undue delay. The Court intervenes only when it is satisfied that there is no laches or delay on the part of the petitioner or that the same has been proper- explained. Pursuit of extraordinary legal remedy such as departmental repre sentation or correspondence the nature of an appeal for mercy are not grounds for condoning the delay, unless such appeal or representation is provided in the Statute is the view taken by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases Raja Lakshmaiah Setty v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 997 at page 997. Gian Singh Mann v. High Court of Pun jab andharyana, AIR 1960 SC 1894 (para-3) making of repeated representations after the rejection does not exonerate delay in moving the Court as has been observed in the case of State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray, AIR 1976 SC 2617 (para-6) and State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar, Alr 1976 SC 1639 (para 14 ). Pursuing an ill conceived remedy has been held not to be a proper explanation for the delay and such a ques tion has been left to the discretion of the court in the case of Ram Chandra Shanker Deodhar v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259 (para-10 ). The proper stand ard, however, has been held to be whether in the circumstances of the case, the time that he has been elapsed can be said to be reasonable in the case of Babu Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC1713 (para- 11 ). The reasonableness has to be assessed by the court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case touching the con duct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to general public etc. is the view taken in the case of Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India 1984 (3) SCC 362 (para-9 ). 19. In the present case, the repre sentation made by the petitioner is not a remedy appointed by law and he waited till 1990 though the representation was rejected in the year 1987. Then again even-after 1987 there was three years delay which is thoroughly unexplained. At the same time he waited on a remedy not appointed by law till 1987. The petitioner had all along been represented by an Advocate. The ground of non-challenge of the order, dated 20-4-1987 was taken in the counter-affidavit, served on the petitioner in the year 1992 even then the same was not challenged. The laxity, there fore, in the present case, cannot be con doned. Over and above, the defect in the present case is a mere technicality. The laxity has the effect of operating as waiver and estoppel which is a right accrued to the other side by lapse of time, a fact which can not be over-looked. 20. The laxity, there fore, in the present case, cannot be con doned. Over and above, the defect in the present case is a mere technicality. The laxity has the effect of operating as waiver and estoppel which is a right accrued to the other side by lapse of time, a fact which can not be over-looked. 20. Thus both the questions having been answered against the petitioner, the writ petition can not be sustained and, thus according to us it is not necessary to go into the question of merit of the case. 21. In the result the writ petition fails and is here by dismissed. There will, how ever, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .