JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner is a registered Co-operative Society under the Rajasthan Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The said society was constituted with the object to promote housing facilities in the State of Rajasthan by providing loans to the needy persons. The petitioner is having its registered office at Jaipur and is represented before this court through is Managing Director. 2. The grievance of the petitioner as unfolded by this petition is that respondent No. 2 was appointed by the petitioner on purely temporary basis on daily wages as a typist at its registered office at Jaipur. He was issued appointment letter dated 16.11.84 at Jaipur while the said respondent was already in employment of the petitioner society since 13.11.84 at Jaipur. The short ground on which the services of the respondent were terminated was that as his services were no more required by the petitioner, the petitioner accordingly terminated the services on 29.6.85 vide Ex. 2 (Annexure 3) and alongwith the termination order the petitioner had handed over a cheque for Rs. 600/- to respondent No.2 in lieu of one month's notice in accordance with the provisions of section 28-A of the Act. The said cheque was encashed by the respondent. 3. Thereafter respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act before the Prescribed Authority constituted under the Act at Ajmer whereby he challenged the termination order dated 29.6.95. At this stage it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of Section 28-A (1), (4) & (5) of the Act : "28-A. Notice of dismissal or discharge by employer- (1) No employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than 6 months except for a reasonable cause and after giving such employee at least one month's prior notice or on paying him one month's wages in lieu of such notice : Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with for such misconduct, as may be defined in the rules made by the State Government in this behalf and supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose in the prescribed manner. (4) While passing an order under sub-section (3), the prescribed authority shall have power to give relief to the employee by way of re-instatement or by awarding money compensation or by both. (5) The decision of the prescribed authority under this section shall be final and binding both on the employer and the employee." 4. The prescribed authority at Ajmer vide its award (impugned) directed re-instatement of respondent No. 2 with back wages and also gave a positive finding in favour of respondent No. 2 by holding the termination order as illegal after recording this reasoned finding on the basis of evidence on record. It will be relevant to refer to the application moved by respondent No. 2 before the learned prescribed authority wherein the said applicant had specifically raised a preliminary objection that his services were terminated by the employer without assigning any reasonable cause and the said order of termination was passed simplicitor, since the Managing Director wanted to show favour to some other person who was appointed on 1.5.1985 as he belongs to his native village. The said colleague of respondent No.2 was also serving in the same office of the petitioner as a steno-typist in the same pay scale as a daily wager. 5. The impugned award of the prescribed authority, Ajmer (respondent No.1) has been challenged before this court on the ground interalia that the impugned order is completely illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction being contrary to the provisions of the Act, since the prescribed authority at Ajmer had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter by entertaining the complaint of respondent No. 2 on the ground that since the said respondent was appointed by the petitioner at Jaipur and was serving at Jaipur, therefore, he had no locus standi to have moved the complaint before the prescribed authority at Ajmer. Further contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondent No. 1 had consequently assumed the jurisdiction not vested in it in accordance with law, since during the course of employment the said respondent had rendered services to the petitioner for the period w.e.f. 16.11.84 to 24.6.95 and, therefore, the cause of action arose at Jaipur and since the termination order was also issued from the registered office at Jaipur. Hence the prescribed authority at Jaipur alone was empowered to deal with the matter. 6. Hence the prescribed authority at Jaipur alone was empowered to deal with the matter. 6. The next grievance of the petitioner is that the impugned award of the prescribed authority directing re-instatement of respondent No. 2 with back wages is not a speaking order, since no positive finding has been recorded by the prescribed authority on the basis of which it had arrived at the conclusion that respondent No.2 deserves re-instatement which back wages. 7. The next grievance of the petitioner is that the impugned award is not sustainable in law for the simple reason that prior to joining the service of the petitioner respondent No.2 was already in employment in Gangapur Oriental and Spinning Mills at Gangapur during the period 1.7.85 to 8.8.86; during the said period he had rendered services to the said organisation and this fact respondent No.2 had deliberately concealed from the petitioner before joining the service with the petitioner. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard that the very fact that he had received adequate compensation to the tune of Rs. 4125/- from the erstwhile employer of respondent No. 2, i.e., M/s. Gangapur Oriental Spinning Mills vide Annexure 16 pursuant to the award of Labour Court at Udaipur dated 17.4.86, he was not entitled to challenge the same before the Authority. It has been contended by learned counsel in this regard that this fact has been deliberately concealed by respondent No. 2 and an F.I.R. was also lodged against the said respondent with the local police vide Annexure 18. 8. In the reply filed by respondent No. 2 the aforesaid contentions of the petitioner have been controverted on the ground inter-alia that the appointment order dated 13.11.84 (Annexure 2) was communicated to the said respondent at his Ajmer address and this fact is evident from the order dated 11.4.86 passed by the learned prescribed authority, Ajmer in case No. 7/85 wherein a positive finding has been recorded by the learned authority that objection of the petitioner regarding the point of jurisdiction was adequately dealt with and decided after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and the said authority had arrived at the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the said authority is made out and the petition is maintainable. 9. 9. During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended at the bar that respondent No. 2 had not informed the petitioner company regarding his having remained in the service of M/s. Gangapur Spinning Mills during the period 1.7.85 to 8.7.86 when admittedly he was in service of the said company, since the services of respondent No. 2 had earlier been terminated by his first employer he had challenged the impugned termination order before the Labour Court at Udaipur. Learned Labour Court vide its impugned award dated 14.4.86 had directed re-instatement of a respondent No. 2 with all consequential benefits. Prior to the said order respondent had joined the services of the petitioner, the second employer w.e.f. 16.11.84 and he remained in service of the petitioner up to 29th June, 1985. The grievance of the petitioner is that respondent No. 2 had given this information of his past service with the first employer, i.e., Gangapur Spinning Mills to the petitioner and having suppressed this fact he was not entitled to any relief from the learned Tribunal at Ajmer. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and examined their rival claims and contentions as well as the relevant documents on the record as well as the impugned award dated 12th July, 1990 passed by the learned Tribunal at Ajmer. Prima facie I am of the view that the impugned award does not call for any interference from this court for the reason that in view of the well reasoned findings recorded by learned Tribunal that prior to passing impugned order of termination, the petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 28-A of the the Act which mandates on the employer to follow the procedure provided under the said Rules. From the perusal of the impugned order of termination, it is more clear that respondent No. 2 was not given any opportunity to show cause in accordance with the requirements of Section 28-A of the Act which specifically provides that no employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment an employee who has been in such employment for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and after giving such employee at least one month's prior notice or pay in lieu of one month's notice. The only exception which is made under the said provisions is in respect of those employees whose services have been dispensed with by the employer on the charge of misconduct as defined in the rules of the State Government in this behalf and which too has to be supported by satisfactory evidence recorded after an enquiry held for the purpose in the prescribed manner. 11. Admittedly this is not a case where any misconduct has been attributed to respondent No. 2 by the petitioner and assuming it to be so it was mandatory upon the employer to have constituted a proper enquiry in accordance with the rules and to have recorded proper evidence after giving the aggrieved party sufficient opportunity of hearing in this regard. 12. In absence of this I am of the opinion that it was not open to the employer to have raised any grievance before the learned Tribunal on the ground that respondent No. 2 had not disclosed the factum of his previous employment with his erstwhile employer. My observations are fortified from the findings of the learned Tribunal in this regard wherein the learned Tribunal has observed that at the most employer in such a situation is entitled to deduct all the wages for the period 1.7.85 to 8.7.86 and nothing beyond this. 13. I have been informed by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the answering respondent has not claimed any wages for the aforesaid period pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal, the question of any deduction by the petitioner for the above period does not arise. 14. Regarding the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner in para 9 of the memo of petition that the very fact that such respondent had tendered his resignation with his erstwhile employer, i.e., Gangapur Spinning Mills and had not informed the employer, resignation of the petitioner amounts to wilful misconduct. In my view it does not amount to wilful misconduct on the part of respondent No. 2, since assuming it to be correct no departmental enquiry admittedly was ever held or initiated by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act. 15. As a result of the above discussions I find no force in the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. As a result of the above discussions I find no force in the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition is devoid of merit and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. The petitioner is directed to immediately comply with the impugned award dated 12.7.1990 passed by the learned Tribunal and respondent No. 2 will be entitled to re-instatement with all consequential benefits as admissible to him in accordance with the rules and pursuant to the directions of learned Tribunal.Petition dismissed. *******