State Bank Of India v. Swaran Singh — 1996 DIGILAW 1113 (ALL)

Judgment : N. L. Ganguly, J. 1. This civil revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was filed by the State Bank of India, defendant, against the judgment and decree dated 26-10-1993. 2. A suit for recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation, mesne profit, ejectment of the defendant from the premises in question etc. was filed. The said suit has been decreed and a decree for eviction of the revisionist was also passed. A caveat was filed through Sri Aditya Narain Advocate for the plaintiff-respondent. An application for vacating the interim order was filed on behalf of the plaintiff-landlord. An alternative prayer was also made in the said application to decide the revision itself finally at the earliest. Counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged and the parties have filed true and correct copies of all material record, namely, notice, plaint, written statement etc. The learned counsel for the par ties consented to decide the revision itself finally without summoning the record of the court below. 3. ON 5-9-1995 the revision was heard and it transpired that the parties were inclined to arrive at a compromise in respect of the disputed accommodation. ON 10-10-1995 the Court granted time to the parties to talk among themselves and settle the rate of rent per sq. ft. etc. as they may consider and file and compromise deed before the Court. It was specifically mentioned in the order dated 10-10-1995 that the Court has not pressurised or compelled the parties to come to a compromise. It was their own offer. Thereafter number of dates were fixed and adjournments were sought by the par ties specially the revisionist and no com promise deed was filed. Lastly the learned counsel for the revisionist Sri Sharad Malviya stated that the officers of the Bank were ready to compromise but none of the officers wanted to take the responsibility on his own shoulder to compromise unless the Head Office of the Bank specifically directed so. Sufficient time had been granted to the parties to arrive at a settlement and file a compromise as offered by them. Ultimately it was ordered on 9.8.1996 that in case no compromise is filed the revision shall be decided on merits. 6-9-1996 was the date fixed on which date also the parties failed to file any compromise. The revision was heard on merits. Ultimately it was ordered on 9.8.1996 that in case no compromise is filed the revision shall be decided on merits. 6-9-1996 was the date fixed on which date also the parties failed to file any compromise. The revision was heard on merits. Sri Sharad Malviya argued the revision for the revisionst at length. 4. THE facts of the case are not complicated. THE suit for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation for the accommodation, eviction of the defendant etc. was filed against the State Bank of India on the ground that the plaintiffs is the owner-landlord of the property in question. THE building in question was constructed in 1977 and was for the first time assessed by the Municipal Board in the year 1977-78. On 15-12-1979 the property in question was let out to the Bank at a monthly rent of Rs. 1700 for a fixed period of five years and that period expired on 14-12-1984. THE plaintiff pleaded that the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the said premises. It was a monthly lease. THE lease deed was not a registered deed and the plaintiff was a right to evict the defendant from the-suit property. Notice for arrears of rent and eviction dated 11-1-1985 as served on the defendant on 12-1-1985 by which the tenancy was terminated and the defendant-revisionist was called upon to vacate and handover the vacant possession of the said property to the landlord. THE tenancy of the defendant stood terminated on 11-12-1985. THE revisionist failed to comply with the notice. THE defendant was in arrears of rent from 15-12-1984 to 12-1-1985. THE plaintiff is also entitled to get mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 250 per day till the vacant possession is delivered to him. The revisionist-defendant by written statement denied the plaint case, pleaded that the notice of demand and ejectment was illegal and invalid. The defendant's tenancy could not be terminated by the notice in question and the defendant was not liable to ejectment. The defendant also pleaded the plea of misjoinder. 250 per day till the vacant possession is delivered to him. The revisionist-defendant by written statement denied the plaint case, pleaded that the notice of demand and ejectment was illegal and invalid. The defendant's tenancy could not be terminated by the notice in question and the defendant was not liable to ejectment. The defendant also pleaded the plea of misjoinder. It was also stated that the plaintiff himself approached the Bank for giving the accommodation on lease for five years with further option of renewal of the year each by the Bank on the same terms and conditions including the rate of rent and the lease would commence from the date when the possession was given to the Bank. It was pleaded that it was the plaintiff, who was to execute the registered lease deed in favour of the Bank to which the plaintiff had agreed. Initially the lease was for a period of five years with five further options of renewal of one year each. The defendant pleaded that they were ready to perform their part of the terms. It was the plaintiff who omitted to get the lease deed registered before the Sub-Registrar. The plaintiff himself was to be blamed and the defendant would not be liable for the lapses of the plaintiff. 5. THE Additional District Judge Sri Puran Singh, as a Court of Small Causes, framed the following issues: 1. Whether the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is not applicable upon the present case on account of new construction of the disputed property? 2. Whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit contained under Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972? 3. Whether the defendant is in arrears of rent from 15-12-1984? 4. Whether the tenancy was created for a fixed period of five years? 5. Whether the notice is illegal and unvalid? 6. Whether the suit is premature before 1989? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits @ Rs. 250 per month? 6. TO what relief, if any, is the plaintiff en titled? 8. 4. Whether the tenancy was created for a fixed period of five years? 5. Whether the notice is illegal and unvalid? 6. Whether the suit is premature before 1989? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits @ Rs. 250 per month? 6. TO what relief, if any, is the plaintiff en titled? 8. The trial Judge (J. S. C. O.) after appraisal of the evidence of the parties arrived at a conclusion that the building in question was completed and assessed for the first time by the Municipal Board on 1-4-1976 and the present suit was filed on 22-3-1985 i.e. within ten years of completion of the building. Thus he recorded a finding that the building in question was not within the clutches of the provisions of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. He also found that the defendant cannot be permitted any benefit of Section 20 (1) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 since the Act itself was not applicable. The learned counsel for the revisionist Sri Sharad Malviya submitted that the defendant was the tenant for a fixed period of five years. Further the defendant ad option to get the lease renewed for one year each for a further period of five years. Sri Sharad Malviya submitted that after 14-12-1984 after the tenancy of five years period had come to an end in view of the terms and conditions of the agreement, the tenancy would be renewed automatically. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that it was the latches on the part of the plaintiff that he did not get the original agreement for lease registered. The legal position is not in controversy. The un registered lease deed shall not give any legal force to the submission of the learned counsel for the revisionist. If the lease deed was not registered it was not admissible in evidence. It has to be treated a tenancy for month to month. Sri Sharad Malviya submitted that the conditions mentioned in the agreement shall be treated as collateral conditions admissible in evidence without a document being registered. I fail to appreciate the submission. The document it self was not registered and not received as evidence being unregistered document. It has to be treated a tenancy for month to month. Sri Sharad Malviya submitted that the conditions mentioned in the agreement shall be treated as collateral conditions admissible in evidence without a document being registered. I fail to appreciate the submission. The document it self was not registered and not received as evidence being unregistered document. The Court below rightly arrived at a conclusion that the tenancy of the defendant, which was for a fixed period of five years came to an end and it never stood renewed. 7. SRI Sharad Malviya also addressed the Court about the correctness and legality of the notice dated 11-1-1985 under Section 106, T. P. Act. The notice was served on the defendant and was also replied. The notice was sent by the plaintiff to the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India whereby the plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant on the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. A copy of the notice was also sent to the Branch Manager and General Manager of the State Bank of India. According to SRI Sharad Malviya, the Branch Manager, General Manager and Regional Manager are not the juristic per sons but it is the State Bank of India which is the juristic person. Thus it was submitted that the notice should have been sent to the State Bank of India. The court below after appraisal of the notice under Section 106, T. P. Act held that the notice served on the Branch Manager, General Manager and Regional Manager, who are employees/officers of the Bank, shall be deemed to have been served properly on the Bank. Thus the above defect does not render the suit of the plaintiff bad in law and cannot be dismissed on this score. Thus the above defect does not render the suit of the plaintiff bad in law and cannot be dismissed on this score. The trial court referred to a decision reported in 1978 A. I. R. Calcutta 124, J. M. C. Gaffin and another v. Life Insurance Corporation of India in which it was held that "where a notice of determination of tenency, the purpose of which is to be the persons concerned aware of the purport of the contents of such notice is received by a person who is constituted attorney of the tenant in respect of the premises of the material time, such service on the attorney, though made in personal capacity would amount to a notice on the tenant also". The court below also relied on a decision reported in 1992 (II) A. R. C. 545, SRI Misrilal v. IX Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others wherein it has been held that "in the circumstances, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the notice referred to above, indicating that the accommodation was required by the landlord for their personal use for residential purpose and demanding the tenant to handover vacant possession thereof could be deemed to be sufficient compliance of the requirement as envisaged under the 1st Proviso to Sec. 21 (1) of the Act", the trial court found as a fact that the notice served on the defendant was in accordance with law and the suit could not be dismissed on this ground. 8. THE learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was not properly served on the correct defendant. THE trial court relying on the definition of 'railway administration' in Section 3 (6) of the Rail ways Act observed that it would mean the Manager of the Railways does not warrant the inference that a suit against the railway administration can be brought against the Manager of that railway. THE argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist does not help in any manner. The learned counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the suit was premature. The said argument is misconceived. 9. THE argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist does not help in any manner. The learned counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the suit was premature. The said argument is misconceived. 9. AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties it is abundantly clear that the suit property was assessed for the first time in the Municipal board on 1-4-1976 and the suit was filed within ten years of the date of completion of the building. Thus there is no doubt left that the building in question would not come within the clutches of the provisions of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. There is no such material evidence on record which may show that the judgment and decree of the J. S. C. C. in any manner suffers from any error of law or material irregularity. 10. NO other argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the revisionist. The revision is dismissed with costs. The order dated 22-4-1994 staying the eviction of the defendant from the premises in question in hereby vacated. Revision dismissed.