JUDGMENT 1. - The facts giving rise to this petition under section 482 read with section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) filed by Suresh Chand and Rajendra, sons of Kapoor Chand (hereinafter to be jointly referred as the petitioners and severely, as the petitioner No.1 and 2 respectively are as under: A challan was filed against the petitioners in the court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Deeg (Bharatpur) on 7-7-1994 with allegations that they had committed offences punishable under sections 341, 323 and 325 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. The learned trial court, after delivering the copies of the documents to the petitioners, adjourned the case to 14-12-1994 for hearing the arguments before framing of the charges, on which date, the learned counsel for the petitioners was not prepared and a request was made and, therefore, the case was adjourned for that purpose to 29-6-1995. On 29-6-1995, the petitioner No.2 did not appear in court and an application was moved by his learned counsel for his exemption from personal appearance on the ground that he had to go out station and the learned trial court allowed the application and adjourned the case to 27.9.1995, on which date also, similar application was made on behalf of the petitioner No.2 on the same ground and the application was allowed and the case was adjourned to 21.12.1995, on which date also, the petitioner No.2 did not appear and an application was made by his learned counsel for his exemption from personal appearance on the ground that he was lying sick. The learned trial court allowed his application and adjourned the case to 27.3.1996 and, on 27.3.1996 also, similar application for exemption from personal appearance of the petitioner No.2 was made on the same ground and the learned trial court adjourned the case to 15.6.1996, on which date again, an application for exemption from personal appearance was made on behalf of the petitioner No.2 on the ground that he had to go out station and, thereupon, the learned trial court adjourned the case to 1.8.1996 for hearing the arguments before framing of charges. When the case camp up before the learned trial court on 1.8.1996, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioners stating that they had been attending the court, but although, more than two years had elapsed since the date when the challan had been filed against them, the trial had not commenced and praying that the case against them be closed and they be discharged, in view of the directions of the Apex Court, in case, " Common Cause vs. Union of India & others, reported as 1996 (4) Supreme 37 . The learned trial court, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned PP, came to the conclusion that the charges could not be framed and trial could not commence either because the learned counsel for the petitioners wanted time for arguing the case or because the petitioner No.2 had been getting the case adjourned by moving applications one after another on one ground or the other and, as such, the case of the petitioners was not covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in Common Cause's case (supra) and, consequently, vide the impugned order dated 1.8.1996, the application filed by the petitioners was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this court by filing this petition. 2. I have heard Shri D.G. Chaturvedi, Advocate for the petitioners, Miss Sumitra Goyal, PP for the State and have also perused the impugned order. 3. It has been contended by Shri Chaturvedi that the offences under sections 341 and 323 Indian Penal Code are compoundable and the offence under section 325 Indian Penal Code is compoundable with the permission of the court and, in such a situation, if the trial has not commenced in the court for more than two years for any reason whatsoever, the court has to close the case by acquitting or discharging the accused and, as such, the learned trial court erred in passing the impugned order dismissing the application of the petitioners. 4. I have gone through the judgment of the Apex Court in Common Cause's case (supra), in which, while taking into consideration the right of life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it was held that it should be ensured that the criminal proceedings do not operate as engines of oppression and, as such, directions were issued for trial of cases. Para 2(b) of such directions of the judgment, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, reads as under: "2(b) Where the cases pending in criminal courts for more than two years under Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force are compoundable with the permission of the court and if in such cases trial have still not commenced, the criminal court shall, after hearing the public prosecutor and other parties represented before it or their advocates, discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases." 5. Bare reading of the abovesaid directions makes it clear that the court has to hear the public prosecutor and other parties before it or their advocates before any order of discharge or acquittal of the accused and closure of the case is passed. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, it would mean that if in a criminal case challan is filed against an accused with the allegations that he had committed offences compoundable with the permission of the court and the accused, who is on bail, appears before the court and is supplied the copies of police report and other documents mentioned in section 207 of the Code and the case is adjourned for hearing the arguments before the framing of charges and, on such adjourned date, the accused does not appear but absconds and is not traceable for a period of more than two years, the court will have no option but to close the case and discharge/acquit the accused. If such an interpretation is accepted it would amount to absurd result and it would not he possible to proceed with the criminal trials and no such intention can be imputed to the Apex Court while giving the directions in question and, in my view, the only interpretation is that the court must hear the parties and it is only when it is satisfied that the commencement of the trial has unnecessarily been delayed, for no fault of the accused, resulting into his oppression, that the order of closing the case and discharging/acquitting the accused can be passed. 6. In the present case, in my view, the learned trial court rightly dismissed the application of the petitioners and no case for interference is made out. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. 7. 6. In the present case, in my view, the learned trial court rightly dismissed the application of the petitioners and no case for interference is made out. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. 7. Copies of this order be sent to all subordinate courts in the State of Rajasthan.Petition dismissed. *******