JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 3rd December, 1993, passed by the Sessions Judge, Ajmer in Sessions Case No. 102/1991, by which he has been pleased to uphold the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code levelled against the appellant, Ashok and. imposed the sentence of life imprisonment on him with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default of payment of fine to further undergo imprisonment for two years. 2. The case of the prosecution was initiated on the basis of the parcha-bayan' of the deceased Prerriata herself which was recorded by the police on 27.3.1991, on which two witnesses namely Kalicharan and Navratan affixed their signatures and a First Information Report was registered on its basis under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. It was stated in the `parcha bayan' that in the previous evening of 27.3.1991, Ashok son of Bhanwar Lal, who was residing in front of the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer came to the deceased where they had a chat and also teased each other and, in course of this, she demanded some ornaments from Ashoka. The appellant herein, Ashoka, promised to return the ornaments within 21/2 months, which had been pledged and also told her that in case she required it earlier then she ought to pay Rs. 1,000/- and he will also pay rupees one thousand in addition to that. The deceased stated that she is not having any money on which Ashoka promised to get back her ornaments after 21/2 months. It has further been stated therein that 21/2 months back, Ashoka had called her at his house to sleep and at that time, the ornaments had been given to her. At this, the deceased lamented and said that death was a better alternative than the life she was living. Ashoka retaliated by arguing that if she threatened him then he himself will give a befitting reply to her. Thereafter Ashoka is alleged to have poured kerosene oil on her from a container and lighted a match-stick and threw at her. Ashoka thereafter fled away and the deceased raised hue and cry. On hearing the cries, the landlord Gokul Bowai arrived there and put a blanket on her. Thereafter Ashoka is alleged to have poured kerosene oil on her from a container and lighted a match-stick and threw at her. Ashoka thereafter fled away and the deceased raised hue and cry. On hearing the cries, the landlord Gokul Bowai arrived there and put a blanket on her. She has further stated the time of the incident, which she mentioned as 11 or quarter past eleven, She then told her landlord to call her brother and mother who arrived. She was then brought to the hospital by her brother Nauratmal, where PW 16 ASI Ram Prasad recorded her `Parcha Bayan'. The police registered the First Information Report under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and started investigating into the case. 3. Thereafter her dying declaration, marked as Ex.P. 22, was recorded by the learned Magistrate Prasant Yadav (PW 18) and Dr. L.N. Singh (PW 10) examined her injuries and prepared the injury report marked as Ex.R 10. The dying declaration marked as Ex.R 22 had been recorded by the learned Magistrate, Prasant Yadav (PW 18) after Dr. D.N. Singh (PW 2) certified that she was in a fit mental state to give her statement. Her injury report was also prepared which is marked as Ex.P. 10. In the dying declaration, which is a short one and was recorded on 28.3.1991 at 10 p.m. after the Doctor, attending Praveen certified that she was in a fit mental state to give her dying declaration, stated that at about 11 or 11.30 Ashoka sprinkled kerosene on her and burnt her. She also stated that Askoka was her second husband with whom she had a quarrel on account of ornaments like ring and ear-ring. She further declared that they were alone in the house. On her dying declaration, her thumb-impression was also affixed, on which there is a note that on account of burns, the thumb impression could only partly be taken. The police at the time of investigation also seized a number of articles vide Ex.R 30, which includes clothes, match-boxes, quilt and broken bangles of the deceased Premlata from the site. The injury report of the deceased had been prepared, which disclosed that she had sustained 80% burn injuries. The accused Ashok also appears to have sustained some burn injuries vide Ex.R 14, but they were indicated superficial in nature. The injury report of the deceased had been prepared, which disclosed that she had sustained 80% burn injuries. The accused Ashok also appears to have sustained some burn injuries vide Ex.R 14, but they were indicated superficial in nature. The post-mortem was also conducted on the deceased, Premlata on 29.3.1991, the report of which is marked as Ex.R 15. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against the accused- appellant under Section 302, Indian Penal Code who denied the charges and claimed to be tried. The statement of the accused was also recorded under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code where he did not plead any specific defence, but denied the charge. 4. The prosecution in support of its case examined 19 witnesses, but the case of the prosecution rests entirely on the dying declaration of the deceased, as admittedly all the witnesses who have deposed were not present at the time of the actual occurrence, and had arrived only after the deceased had sustained burn injuries. The trial Court on scrutiny of evidence in support of the dying declaration was pleased to hold the appellant guilty of the charge under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and consequently awarded him the sentence of life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo imprisonment for two years. 5. Since the conviction of the appellant is based solely on the dying declaration of the deceased, it has obviously been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant contending that the dying declaration which is uncorroborated, is insufficient to convict and sentence a person. According to him, the deceased who had sustained 80% burn injuries was not in a fit state of mind to get her dying declaration recorded. Hence, no reliance should have been placed by the Court below on such dying declaration to base the conviction. It has also been urged that the Doctor who issued the fitness certificate has not been produced and examined by the prosecution, and in the absence of the testimony of the Doctor, it should not be believed that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to get her statement recorded. It has also been urged that the Doctor who issued the fitness certificate has not been produced and examined by the prosecution, and in the absence of the testimony of the Doctor, it should not be believed that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to get her statement recorded. Elaborating his argument on this question, it has been submitted that the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, admitted before the trial Court that the patients of burns are given morphine injection for reducing pain as a result of which patient goes in a cool sleep and such injection are continuously given for one week, It has further been submitted that whenever one went to see the deceased, she was found sleeping. In the aforesaid circumstances, there is nothing to suggest that the deceased was in a fit state of mind when her dying declaration was recorded by the learned Magistrate. A further objection has been taken that the dying declaration has not been recorded in question and answer form and, therefore, it is extremely doubtful whether the dying declaration is genuine. 6. Last of all, it has been submitted that the contents of the dying declaration were not put to the accused while recording her (sic) statement under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code and, he was deprived of sufficient opportunity to challenge the same. Thus, it has been urged that the conviction based on such dying declaration should not be upheld by this Court. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, has supported the prosecution case and submitted that the dying declaration is consistent and corroborated by the medical evidence and is worth placing reliance. It has also been submitted that the `Parcha-bayan' should be treated as the first dying declaration which has been treated as FIR and the contents therein in substance have been repeated in the dying declaration which was recorded by the Magistrate. A perusal of the parcha-bayan and the dying declaration clearly shows that there is no discrepancy between the contents of the two documents and, hence, there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration which stands corroborated with the Parcha Bayan. A perusal of the parcha-bayan and the dying declaration clearly shows that there is no discrepancy between the contents of the two documents and, hence, there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration which stands corroborated with the Parcha Bayan. In support of his submission he has relied upon a judgment of this Court reported in 1995 RCC 303, Rajendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan wherein the facts of the said case and the case at hand are similar in material particulars. Practically, all the contentions which have been urged herein were also the subject-matter of consideration in the said case. 8. But, in order to test the veracity of the prosecution case and to arrive at a finding whether the dying declaration is fit to be relied upon, or not, we have examined its correctness on the basis of the legal principles in this regard as to whether the deceased lady was in her fit state of mind to record the statement and whether the same was the result of any tutoring and prompting as also the fact whether she had clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. In this regard, we examined the evidence of PW 18 Prasant Yadav, Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration Ex.R 22. He has deposed that prior to recording of the statement of the deceased, he ascertained from the Duty Doctor, Dr. Pravesh, as to whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to get her statement recorded. In this regard, the doctor certified about the deceased by issuing a certificate vide Ex.R 21 stating that she was in a fit state of mind to give her statement and, thus, assured about the mental fitness of the deceased lady. The Judicial Magistrate, PW 18 also testified that the certificate Ex.P. 21 was signed at A to B by the said Doctor in his presence. Thus, the Judicial Magistrate PW 18 proved the certificate Ex.R 21 which certified that the deceased Premlata was fit to get her statement recorded, and we are of the opinion that the certificate Ex.P 21 is a genuine document worth placing reliance. Thus, the Judicial Magistrate PW 18 proved the certificate Ex.R 21 which certified that the deceased Premlata was fit to get her statement recorded, and we are of the opinion that the certificate Ex.P 21 is a genuine document worth placing reliance. We are, therefore, not inclined to doubt the correctness of this certificate merely on account of non-examination of the Doctor who had issued such certificate Ex.P 21, especially when the certificate was signed by the Doctor in presence of the Judicial Magistrate which is unambiguous and inspires confidence as a perusal of the certificate clearly establishes that the deceased Premlata was in a fit state of mind to get her dying declaration recorded. Besides this the Judicial Magistrate also has deposed that after obtaining the certificate of the Doctor, he himself did not notice any circumstance due to which he could infer that the deceased was not in a position to give out her dying declaration. He has, therefore, specifically denied about the fact in his cross-examination that Premlata was not fit enough to relate the incident. We find absolutely no reason to disbelieve the certificate of the Doctor, the authenticity of which is proved also by the deposition of the Judicial Magistrate in regard to the mental fitness of the deceased lady due to which the first ingredient about mental fitness for placing reliance on the dying declaration cannot be said to be lacking in this case so as to discard it as untrustworthy. 9. We also find no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the defence that as the deceased had sustained 80% burns, on her body and was given drug for sedating, hence, she was not in a fit state of mipd to get. her statement recorded. It is no doubt true that PW 10 Dr. L.N. Singh did depose that in case of 80% burns, injections are given to the patient for sedation in order to relieve the agony of pain to the patient. But PW 14, Dr. PK. Saraswat on his part has also deposed that the effect of such injection lasts only for four to six hours. Thus, the medical evidence as testified by PW 13 and PW 14, is that even if 80% burns are sustained by the patient he or she is in a fit state to give out the statement during the interval between the injection. Thus, the medical evidence as testified by PW 13 and PW 14, is that even if 80% burns are sustained by the patient he or she is in a fit state to give out the statement during the interval between the injection. Thus, merely because the deceased had been injected to sedate, the said cannot be held to be sufficient to disbelieve her statement on the ground that she was not in a sound state of to get her statement recorded when PW 18 Judicial Magistrate recorded it. Judicial pronouncements are not wanting dealing with similar circumstances when dying declaration of person sustaining 80% burn injuries have not been discarded merely on the ground of their mental state. In Surendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1987) 2 SCC 32 , the victim had sustained 100% burns and her dying declaration was recorded by the Doctor in the hospital and the victim had started going into coma, yet the learned Judges of the Apex Court accepted the dying declaration made by her to the Doctor and maintained the conviction based on such dying declaration. Similarly, in the case of Padmabed Shamabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (1991) Cr.LR (SC) 162 , there were 90% burns sustained by the victim and, the general condition of the victim was also poor, still the dying declaration of such a person was fully accepted and the conviction was sustained. To add another decision dealing with similar situation, the case of Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 2 SCC 684 , the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination noted extensive burns to the extent of 90% on the body of the deceased and opined that the deceased had died due to extensive burns all over the body and the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court still accepted the dying declaration made by the victim and, on that basis, recorded conviction of the accused. Yet another case which is the case of Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr.LJ 298 , the victim had sustained 97% burns all over the body, but such declaration too was relied upon and the conviction on the basis of such dying declaration was maintained by the Supreme Court. 10. Yet another case which is the case of Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr.LJ 298 , the victim had sustained 97% burns all over the body, but such declaration too was relied upon and the conviction on the basis of such dying declaration was maintained by the Supreme Court. 10. In the instant case, the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement had taken care to obtain the certificate of the Doctor about the mental fitness of the deceased and also categorically deposed that Smt. Premlata was in a fit condition to give her statement. Relying on the judgments referred to hereinabove and also in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, especially when nothing has come out either in the cross- examination, or any other material to doubt the veracity of such dying declaration. Thus, the submission urged by the defence counsel on this count is also fit to be rejected. 11. Now, the only question which requires consideration is whether the deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailant in order to place reliance on her `parcha-bayan' and dying declaration according to which it was the accused Ashok who was solely responsible for burning her, which ultimately resulted in her death. In this regard, the `parcha-bayan' which had been recorded soon after the occurrence itself has disclosed the circumstances that the accused was the second husband of the deceased lady, who were initially on cordial terms, but in course of their conversation, a quarrel took place as an out-come of the strained relationship which had subsequently developed between them. It is, therefore, clear that the deceased was not only known to the accused but was also on intimate terms with him and, therefore, she had no reason to depose falsely against the accused had the incident not taken place in the manner alleged in the `parcha-bayan' as also in the dying declaration. It is, therefore, clear that the deceased was not only known to the accused but was also on intimate terms with him and, therefore, she had no reason to depose falsely against the accused had the incident not taken place in the manner alleged in the `parcha-bayan' as also in the dying declaration. Thus, we find that although the prosecution case rests solely on the dying declaration, the factum, mode and manner of burning of the deceased by the accused gets fully corroborated not only by the evidence of the deceased lady but also by the evidence of the landlord who had reached immediately after the occurrence, and had although noticed the deceased in a burnt state, saw her in a sufficiently sound condition and on her request had called her father and brother by informing them about the occurrence. Therefore, the fact of burning cannot be said to be a concocted story and the only burden on the prosecution was to establish whether it was the appellant Ashok who can be clearly held responsible for burning the deceased lady. Since the accused Ashok was a paramour of the deceased and they were living as husband and wife, we cannot figure out any reason why the deceased lady would have falsely implicated the accused Ashok had the incident not taken place in the manner alleged. Thus, the `parcha-bayan' and the dying declaration, the authenticity and corroboration of which cannot be doubted for the reasons discussed hereinabove, we find that the prosecution has fully explained the circumstances under which the incident took place and since the same fully bears out the truth after it is tested on the anvil of legal principles regarding the dying declaration and the law regarding the evidentiary value of such dying declaration, we find absolutely no reason to discredit it by treating them as manufactured documents as we are fully convinced that the deceased got her `parcha-bayan' recorded in a fully conscious state of mind and in view of her imminent death, the dying declaration which was recorded by the judicial Magistrate does not suffer from any legal infirmity and fully inspires confidence about the genuineness and manner of the incident. 12. We, therefore, uphold the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, and maintain the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. 12. We, therefore, uphold the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, and maintain the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. The appellant shall surrender if he is on bail, to serve out the sentence of life imprisonment.Conviction upheld, appeal dismissed. *******