JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J. :---Rule, returnable forthwith. Mr. S.D. Thakur, Advocate waives service on behalf of the respondent No. 1. Mr. Suresh Chawda, A.G.P. waives service on behalf of the respondent No. 3. All the learned Counsel agree that the Industrial Court is a formal party and service of rule on the Industrial Court may be dispensed with. The learned Counsel further pray that the writ petition may be heard finally at this stage. 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 3. Mr. R.E. Moharir, the learned Counsel for petitioner submits that the dismissal of Reference by the Industrial Court, Nagpur by its award dated 17-2-1994 was not proper and the Industrial Court, Nagpur ought to have gone into the question of validity of the notice dated 13-8-1991 given by the elected representatives of the workmen for terminating the Settlement dated 13-9-1990 even if the workmen at whose instance the dispute was referred to the Industrial Court, Nagpur under section 73 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1956 (for short, the 'BIR Act') did not desire reference to be adjudicated. The learned Counsel for petitioner also sought to challenge the constitutionality of section 116 of the BIR Act by urging that the said provision gives unbriddled power to the union to terminate the registered Agreement of Settlement and therefore, section 116 of the BIR Act be declared ultra vires, of the Constitution of India. 4. The essential facts for appreciating the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for petitioner may be briefly narrated. Certain demands were raised by the respondent No. 1, elected representatives of M/s. Reptkos Brett and Company Limited (for short, the 'employees') before the Management of the petitioner M/s. Reptakos Brett and Company Limited (for short, the 'employer'). The said demands were not fulfilled by the employer. The conciliation proceedings were initiated to resolve the dispute and while these were pending before the Conciliation Officer, number of meetings were held between the employer and the elected representatives of the employees and ultimately and a memorandum of Settlement was arrived at between the employer and the elected representatives of the employees on 13-9-1990. Duration of the Settlement was three years from the date of signing of the Settlement and it was further stipulated that the elected representatives of the workmen shall withdraw the dispute which may be referred to in due course. Duration of the Settlement was three years from the date of signing of the Settlement and it was further stipulated that the elected representatives of the workmen shall withdraw the dispute which may be referred to in due course. The said Settlement was signed on 13-9-1990 but thereafter under section 73 of the BIR Act, the demands raised by the employees earlier, which ultimately culminated in settlement dated 13-9-1990 were also referred by way of industrial dispute for adjudication by the Industrial Court. In terms of the Settlement, as observed above the elected representatives of the employees were required to withdraw the said dispute and accordingly they filed pursis before the Industrial Court on 16-9-1991 that in view of the terms of Settlement, reference had become infructuous and be dismissed accordingly. In the mean-while before the pursis was filed on 16-9-1991, it appears that on 13-8-1991 the elected representatives of the employees served upon the employer a notice under section 116 of the BIR Act for premature termination of the Settlement on expiry of one year of the said Settlement though the life of Settlement was three years. The employer resisted the pursis filed by the elected representatives of the employees before the Industrial Court and stated that in view of termination of Settlement with effect from 13-9-1991, the validity and elegality of the said notice dated 13-8-1991 should be examined in the present reference and, therefore, the reference should be decided on merits and not dismissed as infructuous. 5. The aforesaid facts are not disputed and the contentions raised by Mr. Moharir need to be examined in the light of the aforesaid facts. There is no dispute that industrial dispute referred to the Industrial Court under section 73 of the BIR Act related to the dispute and demands which were settled by the mutual agreement/settlement dated 13-9-1990 between the employer and the elected representatives of the employees. There is also no dispute that under the terms of Settlement, the elected representatives of the employees were required to withdraw the reference as and when referred to the Industrial Court in due course. There is also no dispute that immediately on execution of the Settlement dated 13-9-1990 both the parties to the Settlement viz. the employer and the elected representatives of the employees acted upon the said Settlement and the said Settlement became fully operative and effective from 13-9-1990. There is also no dispute that immediately on execution of the Settlement dated 13-9-1990 both the parties to the Settlement viz. the employer and the elected representatives of the employees acted upon the said Settlement and the said Settlement became fully operative and effective from 13-9-1990. From the aforesaid admitted facts, it can not be said that the Industrial Court committed any error in dismissing the reference holding that the said reference had become infructuous since the elected representatives of employees, at whose instance the industrial dispute was referred were not desirous of pursuing the reference and they rather prayed for withdrawal of the said reference. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for petitioner that the Industrial Court ought not to have dismissed the reference as infructuous has no merit. 6. The grievance of the petitioner principally is that the elected representatives of the employees on 13-8-1991 served upon a notice under section 116 of the BIR Act for determination of the Settlement dated 13-9-1990 on expiry of two months therefrom before expiry of the said Settlement and in view of this act of elected representatives the Industrial Court ought to have examined the legality and correctness of the notice dated 13-8-1991 before dismissing the reference as infructuous. The Industrial Court observed that in the present reference proceedings, it had no jurisdiction to decide the legality of notice terminating the Settlement and that there is separate procedure provided under law for the said purpose. I do not find any fault in the reasoning of the Industrial Court. Obviously, the Industrial Court was called upon to adjudicate only the industrial dispute referred to it under section 73 of the BIR Act and could not have enlarged and amplified industrial dispute referred to it by examining the legality and correctness of the notice dated 13-8-1991 which had nothing to do with the industrial dispute referred to it. Rather, had the Industrial Court embarked upon the enquiry in examining the legality and correctness of the notice dated 13-8-1991 given by the elected representatives to the employer under section 116 of the BIR Act, it would have exceeded its jurisdiction and the said enquiry would have been absolutely without jurisdiction since the dispute about the legality and correctness of the notice dated 13-8-1991 was not referred to the Industrial Court for adjudication under section 73 of the BIR Act. Thus, there is no merit in the first contention raised by Mr. R.E. Moharir. 7. As regards the second contention raised by Mr. R.E. Moharir challenging the vires of section 116 of the BIR Act, firstly it may be observed that the constitutionality of section 116 of the BIR Act is directly not involved in the present writ petition since as observed above, the question of legality and correctness of notice dated 13-8-1991 issued by the elected representatives of employees to the employer was not subject-matter of the industrial dispute referred to the Industrial Court and the order of Industrial Court impugned in the present writ petition also does not deal with merits of the notice dated 13-8-1991. Secondly, even otherwise, there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner that section 116 of the BIR Act confers unbriddled power to the employees or its elected representatives or unions to terminate the agreement or settlement at its sweet will. The Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 was enacted to regulate the relations of the employers and the employees to notified industries under the Act and to make provisions for settlement of industrial disputes and for the other relevant purposes. The Act provides various protections to the workmen covered by the said Act. Sections 114 and 116 of the said Act reads as under :--- "114(1) A registered agreement, or a settlement submission or award shall be binding upon all persons who are parties thereto : Provided that --- (a) in the case of an employer, who is a party to such agreement, settlement, submission or award, his successors in interest, heirs or assigns in respect of the undertaking as regards which the agreement, settlements, submission or award is made, and (b) in the case of a registered union which is a party to such agreement, settlement, submission or award all employees in the industry in the local area whose representative, the said union is, shall be bound by such agreement, settlement, submission or award. (2) In cases in which a Representative Union is a party to registered agreement, or a settlement, submission or award, the State Government may, after giving the parties affected an opportunity of being heard, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that such agreement settlement, submission or award shall be binding upon such other employers and employees in such industry or occupation in that local area as may be specified in the notification : Provided that before giving a direction under this section the State Government may, in such cases as it deems fit, make a reference to the Industrial Court for its opinion. (3) A registered agreement entered into by the representatives of the majority of the employees affected or deemed to be affected under section 43 by a change shall bind all the employees so affected or deemed to be affected." "116(1) A registered agreement, or a settlement or award shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein or if no such date is specified therein, on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such agreement, settlement or award, as the case may be, is given in the prescribed manner by any of the parties thereto to the other party : Provided that no such notice shall be given till the expiry of three months after the agreement, settlement or award comes into operation. (2) Nothing in this section shall prevent the terms of a registered agreement or a settlement or an award in terms of an agreement being changed or modified by mutual consent of the parties effected thereby and the registered agreement, settlement or award shall be deemed to be changed or modified accordingly. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or (2), if a registered agreement, or a settlement or award provides that it shall remain in force for a period exceeding one year, it may after the expiry of one year from the date of its commencement be terminated by either party thereto giving two months' notice in the prescribed manner to the other party. (4) If a registered agreement, or a settlement or award is terminated under sub-section (1) or (3) or if the terms of a registered agreement or a settlement or an award are changed or modified by mutual consent, notice of such termination, change or modification shall be given by the parties concerned to the Registrar and the Labour Officer. The Registrar shall enter the notice of such termination, change or modification in a register kept for the purpose. Explanation---For the purposes of this section, parties who shall be competent to terminate a registered agreement, or a settlement or award, or to change or to modify the terms of a registered agreement or a settlement or an award and who shall give notice of such termination, change or modification under sub-section (5) shall be the employer who has signed the agreement or settlement or who is a party to the award or the heirs, successors or assigns of such employer in respect of the undertaking concerned and the representative of the employees affected by the agreement, settlement or award." 8. Section 114 of the BIR Act makes a provision that a registered agreement, or settlement submission or award shall be binding upon all persons who are parties thereto and it further provides that employer and registered union who are parties to such agreement, settlement, submission or award or their successors in interest, heirs or assigns as the case may be shall be bound by such agreement or settlement. Sub-section (2) of section 114 of the BIR Act, 1946 makes a further provision that the cases in which a representative union is a party to registered agreement, or a settlement, submission or award, the State Government may, after giving the parties affected an opportunity of being heard, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that such agreement, settlement, submission or award shall be binding upon such other employers and employees in such industry or occupation in that local area as may be specified in the notification and before giving such direction, the State Government, may in suitable cases, make reference to the Industrial Court for its opinion. Sub-section (3) of section 114 provides that a registered agreement entered into by the representatives of the majority of the employees affected or deemed to be affected under section 43 by a change shall bind all employees in the industry in the area whose representatives, the said union is. According to sub-section (1) of section 116 of the BIR Act, 1946, the registered agreement, settlement or award shall cease to have effect on expiry of the date specified therein and if no date is specified, then on the expiry of two months from the date on which notice in writing is given in the prescribed manner by any of the parties thereto to the other party, subject of course that no such notice shall be given before the expirty of three months from the date such agreement, settlement or award has come into operation. The learned Counsel for employer could not point out any vice in sub-section (1) of section 116 of the BIR Act, 1946 and apparently, there is no vice because it gives opportunity to both the parties to terminate registered agreement, settlement or award in case any of the parties so desire, if no such date is specified in a registered agreement, settlement or award by giving notice of duration mentioned in the said sub-section in the prescribed manner. The opportunity to terminate the agreement, settlement or award is not confined to the registered union alone but it is equally open to the employer to exercise such right. The terms of registered agreement or settlement or an award may be changed or modified by mutual consent of the parties affected thereby under section 116(2) and the registered agreement, settlement or award shall be deemed to be modified accordingly. Obviously, if a registered agreement or settlement has been arrived at mutually between the parties by their mutual consent, the terms of settlement or agreement can be modified or changed and there is nothing in sub-section (2) of the section 116 which may lead to conclude that the said provision is unconstitutional or suffers from any vice. There is absolutely no element of discrimination. There is absolutely no element of discrimination. Sub-section (3) of section 116 begins with non-obstante clause and says that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or (2) if a registered agreement or settlement or award provides that it shall remain in force for a period exceeding one year, it may after the expiry of one year from the date of its commencement be terminated by either party thereto giving two months' notice in the prescribed manner to the other party. Thus, sub-section (3) of section 116 is an exception to sub-sections (1) and (2) of the said section and if a duration of registered settlement or agreement exceeds more than one year, it is open to the either of parties to terminate the said settlement or agreement by giving two months' notice to the other party in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (3) clearly gives option to the either of the parties to determine the registered agreement or settlement after expiry of one year if the duration of the settlement or agreement exceeds one year. When the statute provides similar and equal opportunity to both the parties of registered agreement or settlement to determine such settlement or agreement, how can it be said that such provision is discriminatory. There is absolutely no vice and nothing unconstitutional in sub-section (3) of section 116 and it cannot be said to be hit by Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Sub-section (4) of section 116 makes a provision that the party giving notice under sub-section (1) or (3) shall send a copy thereof to the Registrar and the Labour Officer of the local area concerned. Under sub-section (5), if a registered agreement, settlement or award is terminated under sub-section (1) or (3) or if the terms thereof are changed or modified by mutual consent, notice of such termination, change or modification shall be given by the parties concerned to the Registrar and the Labour Officer and that the Registrar shall enter the notice of such termination, change or modification in a register kept for the purpose. The entire section 116 of the BIR Act, 1946, therefore, gives equal option and opportunity to either of the parties to determine the registered agreement or settlement and therefore, it cannot be said that if confers any unbriddled powers to the elected representatives of the employees or union. The entire section 116 of the BIR Act, 1946, therefore, gives equal option and opportunity to either of the parties to determine the registered agreement or settlement and therefore, it cannot be said that if confers any unbriddled powers to the elected representatives of the employees or union. Section 116 of the BIR Act, 1946, therefore, does not suffer from any vice or unconstitutionality and the contention of the learned Counsel for employer that section 116 of the BIR Act, 1946 is unconstitutional is devoid of any merit and is rejected accordingly. 9. No merit is found in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.