Judgment :- Sreedharan. J Petitioner in O.P. 3206/1996 in the appellant. He sought appointment as Headmaster of A.U.P.S.,Thenur West, Thenur in Palakkad. His appointment was not agreed to by the educational officers. Hence he approached this Court inter alia praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders passed by the educational officers declining his appointment as Headmaster. Learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 26.2.1996, dismissed the original Petition. Hence this appeal. 2. One Sri.P.K. VelayudhanE/hulhassan was the owner and Manager of A.U.P.S. Thenur West, Thenur in Palakkad. On his death, the school and assets devolved on his legal heirs, including the appellant. For the management and conduct of the school, legal heirs of Jiulhassan entered into an agreement, marked in this case as Exhibit P3. That agreement asserts that all the legal heirs of E/huthassan, including the appellant, are entitled to the school and its assets and that they arc to nominate one from among them to act as Manager of the school. The person so chosen from among themselves, as per clause -5 of Exhibit. P3, is liable to he removed and a new person nominated in his place. From Exhibit P3, it is clear that the management of the school and its assets devolved on all the legal heirs in equal right and they form the managing body. Rule 8(J) of Chapter 111 of K.E.R. states that no person who is a Manager or member of other office hearer of the managing holy shall he eligible for any appointment in that school. This provision casts an embargo on a member of the managing body from holding any post in the staff of the' school. This provision has a proviso. It stales that Managers or members or other office bearers of the managing body working as teachers, including Headmasters, when these rules came into force may continue to do so. This proviso thus makers it clear that if any member of the managing body of the school was already working as teacher, including as Headmaster, when the rules came into force can continue to discharge the duties as such. The rule came into force on 15,8.1961. 3. Appellant was appointed as a teacher in the school on 27.6.1980, long after the provisions contained in Rule 8 of Chapter 111 was brought into force. The rule came into force on 15,8.1961. 3. Appellant was appointed as a teacher in the school on 27.6.1980, long after the provisions contained in Rule 8 of Chapter 111 was brought into force. But, at that time, the appointment was proper, because the school belonged solely to the appellant's father as his proprictory concern. At that time, petitioner was not a member or office bearer of any managing body of the school. But, on the death of his father on 10.2.1981, he became a member of the managing body of the school. Thereafter, he cannot get afresh appointment as Headmaster, because of the provision contained in the rules. 4. Appellant in this case was appointed as a teacher of the school in the year 1980 when (he school was under an individual educational agency. Appellant's father was the Manager. No provision of the Education Act or Rules prohibited his appointment by the then Manager. That appointment was duly approved by educational authorities. Subsequent to the demise of his father, the management of the school devolved on the legal heirs of the deceased. Appellant thus become a number of the managing body. As a member of the managing body, he cannot seek any appointment in the school. But since he was holding the post of teacher when the management developed on the managing body, according to us, he can continue in that post. No new appointment is required for his continuance as teacher. II he is to be appointed as Headmaster, a fresh order to that effect is necessary. Such an appointment cannot be effected on account of the prohibition contained in Rule 8 of Chapter III K.E.R. 5. Identical question came up before a learned Single Judge of this Court in Madlmvan v. Stale of Kerala, 1978 KLT 325. The learned judge took the view that under the cover of the proviso, a member of a managing body, who was working as a teacher in the school, cannot claim the post of Headmaster of the School, relying on the definition of "teacher" in Rule 2 of Chapter-I of K.E.R. We are in respectful agreement with this view. Chapter -1 Rule 2 K.E.R.,the definition clause, defines "teacher" as "including Headmaster". On the basis of this definition it is argued that appellant, a teacher, can hold the post of Headmaster as well, because Headmaster is also a teacher. Chapter -1 Rule 2 K.E.R.,the definition clause, defines "teacher" as "including Headmaster". On the basis of this definition it is argued that appellant, a teacher, can hold the post of Headmaster as well, because Headmaster is also a teacher. In (he proviso to Rule 8 (1) of Chapter III, the words used are "as teachers including Headmasters". If the word "teachers" alone was included in. the proviso, an argument could have been advanced by the appellant to that effect that "as he was a teacher and teacher includes Headmaster, he can continue as Headmaster of the school even after his becoming a member of the managing body. Such an interpretation cannot hold good, because, according to us, the proviso makes it abundantly clear that, a teacher can continue in the post of teacher only and Headmaster can continue as Headmaster of the school. When a teacher is appointed as Headmaster, it is a fresh appointment and approval of that appointment by educational authority's contemplated. In mis view, eventhough definition of teacher includes Headmaster, a teacher who is a member of the managing body of the school cannot claim posting or appointment as Headmaster of (he school. The post held by the appellant prior to his becoming a member of the managing body can be continued and cannot claim any other post under a fresh order of appointment, 6. The fact that appellant is a member of the managing body of the school is established beyond any shadow of doubt by Exhibit P3 document. Therefore, his claim to gel appointment as Headmaster of the school cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, though for reasons not stated by the learned single judge, appellant has to fail. We do not find any merit in mis appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.