JUDGMENT : 1. The Petitioner-Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, U.P. (hereinafter referred to as Parishad) seeks a writ of mandamus directing Respondent No. 2 and 3 to make an award u/s 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 (briefly, the Act) in respect of the land which is excluded in the award dated 31.3.1987 (Annexure 8' to the writ petition). 2. The facts as succinctly stated, are that the Petitioner directed the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kichha, district Nainital (for short, the Samiti) to select land for construction of a market yard. Then the Samiti selected land in respect of which a notification u/s 4 of the Act (Annexure 1' to the writ petition) was published. The notification pertains to the lands situate in Mauja Somera and Siraulikala. The dispute in this writ petition relates only to the plots of lane situate In Mauja Siraulikala. A notification u/s 6 of the Act was also made simultaneously, but that was quashed in a writ petition filed on behalf of Respondent No. 4 to 7 and then a fresh declaration u/s 6 was made on 25.2.1986. Looking to the urgency of the construction of the market yard, it is said that though no award was made, possession had been taken by the Samiti of all the plots of land as described in the notification and declaration, Issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively, on 23.4.1986. 3. An award dated 31.3.1987 was made in respect of the plots excepting the portions of the plots of land as staled in para 3 of the writ petition. 4. The case of the Petitioner is that the possession of the entire land as stated in the notification and the declaration, issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act having been taken on 23.4.1986 before the award was made, such land came to be vested absolutely in the State Government under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act and, therefore, the Collector could not have legally excluded any portion of the plots of land as stated in the notification, issued u/s 4 the Act. 5. 5. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Respondent No. 3 In his communication dated 7.2.1987 (Annexure 1' to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 8) sent to the Petitioner, stated that part area of plots of land as stated in para 3 of the writ petition aggregating to 9 bighas and 12 biswas was excluded from the award, because that was relinquished by the Samiti with the approval of the Petitioner as the tenure-holders offered lo withdraw their rases in which stay orders were obtained by them against the Respondent. 6. The Petitioner denied such averment made by Respondent No. 3 in his communication. 7. It is averred that the Collector and the land acquisition authorities connived with the tenure-holders and, therefore, part area of the plots of land as shown in para 3 of the writ petition was excluded from the award dated 31.3.1987. Contending that the possession of the part area of plots of land as shown in the notification issued u/s 4 of the Act had been taken u/s 17(1) of the Act and consequently such land stood vested in the State Government, the Petitioner prays that Respondent No. 2 and 3 be directed to make the award in respect of the lands shown in para 3 of the writ petition, which was illegally excluded from the award dated 31.3.1987. 8. Whereas Respondent No. 3 and Respondent No. 8 filed their separate counter-affidavit, Respondent No. 4 to 7 filed their counter-affidavit jointly. 9. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer, Respondent No. 3, it is stated that after the publication of the declaration u/s 6 and after the disbursement of eighty percent compensation, the possession of the plots of land was transferred on 23.4.1986 by the tenure-holders and that no interim order was filed before him. If is denied that any land was excluded from the award dated 31.3.1987 under the pressure of the tenure holders. Rather, it Is stated that the Samiti itself passed a resolution dated 5.2.1987, in view of the changed circumstances to relinquish part area of plots of land as shown in para 3 of the writ petition, which stood excluded in the award dated 31.3.1987. 10. Rather, it Is stated that the Samiti itself passed a resolution dated 5.2.1987, in view of the changed circumstances to relinquish part area of plots of land as shown in para 3 of the writ petition, which stood excluded in the award dated 31.3.1987. 10. In the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent No. 6 on his behalf and on behalf of Respondent No. 4, 5 and 7, it is denied that possession of the plots of land as stated in para 3 of the writ petition was ever taken from the tenure-holders by the acquisition authorities on 23.4.1986; that in the teeth of the stay order dated 4.4.1986 which according to the tenure-holders had been issued in respect of the entire land covered by the notification issued u/s 4 of the Act, the possession of the lands could not have been taken by the acquisition authorities and that if any possession was taken contrary to the stay order dated 4.4.86 that was merely a paper-possessior and wholly illegally; that the Samiti being a local authority entered into negotiations with the tenure-holders whereby the Samiti agreed to relinquish the part area of the plots as stated in para 3 of the writ petition and that was why the award dated 31.3.1987 was made excluding such portion of plots of land; that acting upon the resolution dated 5.2.1987, the tenure-holders got their Writ Petition No. 2061/86 filed before the Lucknow Bench of this Court, dismissed as not pressed on 11.8.1990 and therefore, the award was made only for the remaining land; that the Samiti being a local authority is entitled to file a suit and that the Parishad is not entitled to maintain any suit on behalf of the Samiti in respect of the lands which are said to have been acquired at the behest of the Samiti, that no award having been made within a period of two years as contemplated by Section 11A of the Act, the entire acquisition proceeding stood lapsed; that the tenure-holders are in possession of the lands in question falling in plots No. 11, 12 and 16 in Mauja Siraulikala and that on these facts and circumstances, no award could be made in respect of the portion of land falling in plots No. 11, 12 and 16. 11. 11. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenure-holders raised a preliminary objection that the Parishad is not entitled to maintain the writ petition. To elaborate this submission, he relies on Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (for short, the Adhiniyam) which states that for every Market Area there shall be a Committee to be called Mandi Samiti of that Market Area, which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and an official seal and subject to such restrictions or qualifications, if any, as may be imposed by this or any other enactment, may sue or be sued in its corporate name and acquire, hold and dispose of properly and enter into contracts. The submission of the counsel, therefore, is that the Samiti being a corporate body is entitled to sue or be sued. When the Samiti -a local authority is entitled to sue or to be sued, says Sri. Vinod Sinha, learned Counsel for the tenure-holders, the Parishad has no power to litigate on behalf of the Samiti. The submission is that when the Samiti Itself is empowered to protect its rights and to litigate with a view to achieve such objective the Parishad has no authority under the law to initiate litigation for and on behalf of the Samili. It is submitted that cause of action may arise only to the Samiti from the exclusion of portion of plots of land as stated in para 3 of Ihe writ petition and, therefore, the Samiti alone is the aggrieved party and that being entitled to sue, no writ petition can be filed by the Parishad on behalf of the Samiti. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Adhiniyam, the Samili shall be deemed to be a local authority for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act and for any other law for the time being in force. The submission is that cause of action having arisen only to the Samiti-a local authority the Parishad will not be a substitute of the Samiti for the purposes of filing the writ petition. 12. On the other hand the submission of Sri. The submission is that cause of action having arisen only to the Samiti-a local authority the Parishad will not be a substitute of the Samiti for the purposes of filing the writ petition. 12. On the other hand the submission of Sri. B.D. Madhyan, learned Counsel for the Parishad is that u/s 26L(1)(i) of the Adhiniyam, the Parishad shall have power of superintendence and control over the working of the Market Committees and other affairs thereof including programmes undertaken by such Committees for the construction of new Market Yards and development of existing Markets and Market areas. The power of superintendence and control over the working of the Market Committee, says Sri. Madhyan, will also include the power to approve proposals of new sites selected by the Committee for the development of the market to supervise and to guide the Committee in the preparation of the site plans and estimate's of construction programmes undertaken by the Committee under Clauses (i) and (ii) respectively of Sub-section (2) of Section 26L of the Adhiniyam. He submits that by virtue of the power of the superintendence, the Parishad has full authority to supervise the functions of the Samiti and it is implied in this power that the Parishad may ensure that a market yard is properly constructed over the entire land which was acquired for that purpose. If the Samiti falls to discharge its duty either by acquiescence or by connivance, urges Sri. Madhyan, then the Parishad can intervene to secure the interest of the Sarniti and if necessary, may sue the acquisition authorities and others if the acquisition made for the laudable object, that is construction of the market yard, is in Jeopardy. He submits that the plots of land as described in the notification issued u/s 4 and in the declaration made u/s 6 of the Act, stood vested in the State u/s 17(1) of the Act and that being so, no portion of plots of land as shown in para 3 of the writ petition could have been excluded from the award dated 31.3.1987. He urges that once the land stood vested under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, even the Slate Government had no power to relinquish the same and, therefore, relinquishment of part area of plots No. 11, 12 and 16 as shown in para 3 of the writ petition, is of no consequence. 13. He urges that once the land stood vested under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act, even the Slate Government had no power to relinquish the same and, therefore, relinquishment of part area of plots No. 11, 12 and 16 as shown in para 3 of the writ petition, is of no consequence. 13. The question for consideration is whether power to sue within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Adhiniyam conferred on the Samiti can be exercised by the Parishad concurrently. Power to sue u/s 12(1) of the Adhiniyam is specifically conferred on the Samiti and that alone is competent to sue. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Samiti-a local authority for the purposes of land Acquisition Act and any other law for the time being in force may acquire any property following the procedure laid down under the land Acquisition Act. If the Samiti has power to acquire the land, then it follows that only the Samiti will have a right to sue in regard to the land either sought to be acquired or has been acquired. We see no warrant in the submission of Sri. Madhyan that the Parishad having superintendence and control over the working of the market committee and other affairs thereof including the programmes undertaken by such committees for the construction of new market yards and development of existing market and market areas within the meaning of Section 26L(1)(i) can exercise power to sue, conferred by Sub-section (f) of Section 12 on the Samiti, concurrently. The power of the Samiti u/s 12(1) and the powers of the Parishad u/s 26L are mutually exclusive. No doubt under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 26L of the Adhiniyam, the Parishad has the power of superintendence and control, over the working of the market committees under Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) and power to approve proposals of new sites selected by the Samiti for the development of markets under Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 26L, that cannot take within its ambit the power conferred on the Samiti under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Adhiniyam. The Samiti being a local authority for the purposes of Land Acquisition Act under Sub-section (2) of Section 12, is itself competent to sue and that being so, the Legislature would not have intended to confer the same power on the Parishad concurrently for such purposes. 14. Power to do superintendence and have control over the working of the market committees within the meaning of Sub-section (1), Clause (i) of Section 26L and power to approve proposal of the new sites selected by the committee for the development of markets under Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 26L do not imply the power to sue, specifically conferred on the Samiti under Sub-section (1) of Section 12. From the power of superintendence and control under Clause (i) of Section 26L(1), no inference can be drawn that the Samiti is fully subordinate to the Parishad and that what can be done by the Samiti that can necessarily be done by the Parishad as well. The scheme of the Act points out decentralisation of powers between the Samiti and the Parishad and the latter is not vested with a concurrent power to sue on behalf of the former. Power of superintendence and control over the working of the market committees imply the power of oversee the affairs of the Samiti by the Parishad but that certainly does not give any clue that the powers specifically conferred on the Samiti can also be exercised by the Parishad and that if the Samiti fails to exercise any power conferred upon it, then that can be exercised by the Parishad in default of the Samiti. 15. Powers of the Parishad qua the Samiti are specifically stated under tire Adhiniyam. u/s 28(1), the Parishad may remove a member. Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the committee, where it is of the opinion that he: (a) has been guilty of misconduct or gross negligence of duty as such member, Chairman or Vice-Chairman. (b) ceases to hold the qualifications necessary for his being a member, Chairman or Vice-Chairman. 16. Section 29 provides that where the Parishad is of the opinion that the Samiti has failed in the performance of its functions or discharge of its duties, or has exceeded or abused the powers conferred on it by or under this Act, it may by notification in the Gazette supersede the Samiti. 17. 16. Section 29 provides that where the Parishad is of the opinion that the Samiti has failed in the performance of its functions or discharge of its duties, or has exceeded or abused the powers conferred on it by or under this Act, it may by notification in the Gazette supersede the Samiti. 17. These provisions clearly indicate the power of removal of the Office bearers and of the super-session of the Samiti by the Parishad. 18. u/s 31, Sub-section (1), the Parishad may, of its own motion, or on report or complaint received, by order, prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution passed, or order made, by the Samiti or its Chairman or any of its officers or servants, if it is of the opinion that such resolution or order Is prejudicial to the public interest or is likely to hinder efficient running of the business in any market area or if that is against the provisions of the Act or rules or bye-laws made thereunder. So the Parishad has power to prohibit execution or further execution of any resolution passed by the Samiti. 19. u/s 32, the Parishad in exercise of its power may for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision of, or order passed by a Samiti, at any time call and examine the proceedings of the Samiti, and, where it is of the opinion that the decision or order of the Samiti should be modified, annulled or reversed, pass such orders whereon as it may deem fit. 20. When powers of the Parishad in relation to the matters of the Samiti are specifically stated and when there is no specific provision enabling the Parishad to sue for and on behalf of the Samiti or to exercise the power to sue conferred on the Samiti under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 concurrently, the submission of Sri. Madhyan that the power to sue is implied in the power of superintendence and control within the meaning of Clause (i) of Sub-section (1) and in the power to approve the proposal of the new sites selected by the Samiti for the development of the markets within the meaning of Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 26L of the Adhiniyam cannot be accepted. 21. 21. At best, it can be argued, though not argued, that the Parishad having power of superintendence and control over the working of the market committees and other affairs thereof including programmes undertaken by such Samiti for the construction of new market yard and development of existing market and market areas under Sub-section (1), Clause (i) and power to approve proposals of new sites selected by the Samiti under Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section 26L may imply the power to regulate and the power to enforce any direction given by the Parishad in relation to such matters. 22. It is bite that power to do a thing necessarily carries with it the power to regulate the manner in which the things may be done. It is an incident of the power itself and indeed without it, the power will frustrate rather than further the object of the power. Even if it is so that Parishad cannot use, the power to regulate or to implement the statutory power conferred upon it, unless the record indicates that the Samiti has fabled to sue the Respondent herein either because of connivance or acquiescence. There is no averment that the Samiti connived with the tenure-holders and it took up the proceedings to relinquish part area of the plots as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition, to favour them. It is averred in the writ petition that land acquisition authorities connived with the tenure-holders and, therefore, they illegally and arbitrarily excluded part area of plots No. 11,12 and 16 as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition to benefit the tenure-holders, from the award already. There is no averment whatsoever that the Samiti ever connived or was in league with the tenure-holders. Can the Parishad even if assumed possessed of the power to sue for and on behalf of the Samiti, can be permitted to sue in absence of such averments against the Samiti? The Parishad, at the most, can exercise such power, explicitly vested under the statute in the Samiti-only when the latter falls to exercise it with the connivance with the tenure-holders. Concurrent power to sue in one and the same matter cannot be inferred to have been vested with the Samiti and the Parishad, unless the statute specifically says so. The Parishad, at the most, can exercise such power, explicitly vested under the statute in the Samiti-only when the latter falls to exercise it with the connivance with the tenure-holders. Concurrent power to sue in one and the same matter cannot be inferred to have been vested with the Samiti and the Parishad, unless the statute specifically says so. No reason whatsoever has been given by the Parishad to exercise the power to sue, explicitly conferred upon the Samiti under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Adhiniyam and, therefore, the Parishad cannot be permitted to usurp such power of the Samiti. 23. Sri. Sinha then submits that when there is a dispute between an instrumentality of the State and the State, that should not be brought before the Court, unless there is a specific authority in that behalf from the State. This submission, he made relying on the case of 1992 (61) ELT 3 (SC). In para 3 of the said decision, the Supreme Court Lamentedly stated: This Court has on more than one occasion pointed out that Public Sector undertakings of Central Government and the Union of India should not fight their litigations In Court by spending money on fees of counsel, court fees, procedural expenses and wasting public time. Courts are maintained for appropriate litigations. Court's time is not to be consumed by litigations which are carried on either side at public expenses from the sources. Notwithstanding these observations repeated on a number of occasions, the present cases appear to be an Instance of total callousness.... That was the observation with regard to a dispute between the public sector undertakings of Central Government and Union of India. In the instant case, the dispute is between the Parishad and the land acquisition authorities/State. The principle enunciated in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) will squarely apply to the case In hand. Before coming to the Court, the Parishad should have obtained approval of the State Government to enter into litigation with the State/land acquisition authorities. The petition is not maintainable on this score as well. 24. In para 21 of the writ petition, it is averred that the matter was brought to the notice of the State Government but as it might take time; the Petitioner, advisedly approached this Court. The petition is not maintainable on this score as well. 24. In para 21 of the writ petition, it is averred that the matter was brought to the notice of the State Government but as it might take time; the Petitioner, advisedly approached this Court. When the matter was receiving attention of the State Government, the Petitioner should have awaited proper instructions in the matter from the Stale Government. Without persuading the State Government to expedite the decision, the Petitioner hastened to come to this Court and we deprecate such tendency. 25. The case of Parishad is that land stood vested in the Samiti as early as 23.4.86 when possession was taken of the entire land as stated in the notification and the declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, Yet a resolution dated 5.2.1987 (Annexure 1' to the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent No. 4 to 7) was passed relinquishing the area under acquisition of plots No. 11, 12 and 16. As per the case of the tenure-holders, relinquishment was made by the Samiti. We are dismayed that despite such averments of the tenure-holders, the Petitioner took no steps to implead the Samiti. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the Samiti was a necessary party and failure on the part of the Petitioner to implead the Samiti disentitled the Petitioner to maintain the petition. 26. The next question for consideration is whether the possession of part area of plots No. 11,12 and 16 as shown in para 3 of the writ petition was taken by Respondent No. 2 and 3 on 23.4.1986 vide Dakhalnama (Annexure 3' to the writ petition) and if so, whether the said plots to that extent stood vested in the State Government immediately upon the possession thereof having been taken by Respondent No. 2 and 3 alongwith the other lands as described in the notification and declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The case of the tenure-holders (Respondent No. 4 to 7) is that a Writ Petition No. 2061 of 1986 was filed before the Lucknow Bench of this Court by them for quashing the notification and the declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act and then a stay order was passed in that writ petition on 4.4.1986, which is annexed to the supplementary affidavit, filed on behalf of the Petitioner. This order states that the Petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the plots, mentioned In Schedule 'A' to the writ petition. Copy of the Writ Petition No. 2061 of 1986 was not filed by either party to the instant writ petition. Then we called upon the parties to the instant writ petition to file a copy of Writ Petition No. 2061 of 1986. Sri. B.D. Madhyan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner after conclusion of the arguments, made a copy of Writ Petition No. 2061/86 available to us, though without filing an affidavit, which forms part of the record. 27. From the description of the plots as given in the Schedule 'A' annexure to Writ Petition No. 2061/86, it appears that the stay order dated 4.4.86 did not relate to all the plots as stated in the notification issued u/s 4 but that related to some of the plots only including plots No. 11, 12 and 16, situate in Mauja Siraulikala. Plots No. 6, 7, 9 and 10 as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition do not find place in the Schedule 'A'. 28. In the award dated 31.3.1987 (Annexure 8' to the writ petition), it is stated that the possession was taken on 23.4.86. It is not the case of the tenure-holders (Respondent No. 4 to 7) that no possession was taken on 23.4 86 or that the possession was taken on that date only of the plots other than the plots as described in para 3 of the writ petition. So, the factum of taking possession on 23.4.86, as stated in the award itself, has not been denied altogether by the tenure-holders. It means that the possession had been taken on 23.4.86. But the question is whether on that date, the possession was also taken of the plots as stated in para 3 of the writ petition. Simple contention of the tenure-holders is that the Respondent having been restrained from taking possession by order dated 4.4.86 in writ petition No. 2061/86, the possession could not have been taken by the Respondent of the areas of the plots No. 11,12 and 16 as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition. The Dakhalnama (Annexure 3' to the writ petition) which is said to have been signed by Mahendra Singh, Respondent No. 4, clearly refers to the plots of land, as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition. The Dakhalnama (Annexure 3' to the writ petition) which is said to have been signed by Mahendra Singh, Respondent No. 4, clearly refers to the plots of land, as mentioned in para 3 of the writ petition. Respondent No. 4 has not filed any affidavit to state that the Dakhalnama was not signed by him on 23.4.1986. 29. Admittedly, stay order dated 4.4.1986 continued till the Writ Petition No. 2061/86 was got dismissed as not pressed before the Lucknow Bench by the tenure-holders. The case of the Petitioner is that the copy of the stay order was not served upon the Samiti and that the possession of the entire land covered by the notification and the declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act was handed over to the Samiti by the tenure-holders ungrudgingly. Taking of the possession on 23.4.1986 of the plots as mentioned In para 3 of the writ petition cannot be said, nor is it said to have been taken in disregard of the stay order dated 4.4.86. There being no affidavit of Mahendra Singh, Respondent No. 4 to dispute or deny his signature on the Dakhalnama and there being no case of the tenure-holders that possession on 23.4.86 was delivered only of the plots other than the plots as stated in para 3 of the writ petition, it can be said that the possession of all the plots of kind, including those as stated in para 3 of the writ petition, was voluntarily delivered by the tenure-holder to the Samiti on 23.4.1986. There is no explanation from the side of Respondent-tenure holders as to how the Dakhalnama dated 23.4.1986 came to be signed by Mahendra Singh, Respondent No. 4. Ordinarily, Respondent No. 4 fortified by the stay order dated 4.4.1986 would not have delivered possession of plots No. 11, 12 and 16, inter-alia, on 23.4.1986, but the fact remains that the Dakhalnama dated 23.4.1986 which appears to have been signed by Respondent No. 4, has not been controverted in any way and that goes to show that the possession of the entire land as shown in the notification and the declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, had been delivered in one go by the tenure-holders, notwithstanding the stay order dated 4.4.86 having been obtained by the Respondent-tenure-holders, which admittedly, was not served on the Samiti. 30. 30. The question is: what is the effect of the possession having been delivered on 23.4.1986 Section 17(1) of the Act provides that in cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances (underlying by the Court). 31. The consequence of the finding that the possession had been delivered of all the lands covered by the notification and the declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, notwithstanding the stay order dated 4.4.1986 by the tenure-holders themselves to the Samiti, is that the subject-matter of the acquisition proceedings stood vested in the State Government with effect from 23.4.1986. 32. Once the land stood vested in the State Government, the plea of Respondent No. 4 to 7 that a resolution dated 5.2.1987 was passed by the Samiti relinquishing part area, that is, 5 bighas 3 biswas, of plots No. 11, 12 and 16, is of no avail as no portion of the lands having been vested in the State Government within the meaning of Section 17(1) of the Act, could have been released even by the State Government after 23.4.1986. 33. Though as many as seven plots as stated in para 3 of the writ petition were excluded from the award dated 31.3.1987, Respondent No. 4 to 7 restricted their case only to part area, that is, 5 bighas 3 biswas of plots No. 11, 12 and 16 and rightly so, because plots No. 6, 7, 9 and 10 as shown in para 3 of the writ petition, are not mentioned in the Schedule 'A' but they are shown in the Dakhalnama dated 23.4.1986. There being no stay order in respect of plots No. 6, 7, 9 and 10, the Samiti was free to take possession of them. The only inference that can be drawn on these facts is that the possession of the plots, as shown in para 3 of the writ petition had been voluntarily delivered by the tenure-holders to the Samiti on 23.4.1986 and therefore, such plots could not have been relinquished by the State Government after that date in favour of the tenure-holders. 34. The only inference that can be drawn on these facts is that the possession of the plots, as shown in para 3 of the writ petition had been voluntarily delivered by the tenure-holders to the Samiti on 23.4.1986 and therefore, such plots could not have been relinquished by the State Government after that date in favour of the tenure-holders. 34. It was also contended by the Respondent that the petition is barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Section 11A of the Act which states that the Collector shall make an award u/s 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. 35. The Explanation to the proviso to Section 11A provides that in computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. It has come on the record that the stay order dated 4.4.1986 came to an end only on 10.8.1990, when the Petition No. 2061/86 stood dismissed as not pressed. If the period of stay is excluded, then the writ petition will not be hit by the law of limitation. 36. Before parting with the case, we reiterate the legal position that the law of limitation simply bars the remedy, but not the statutory claim. To adjust the equity and to do complete justice between the parties, we direct the State Government and/or the Collector on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, not to raise the plea of limitation to defeat the statutory right of compensation of the tenure-holders, if they initiate proper proceedings for claiming the compensation in respect of the land in dispute having been vested in the State Government u/s 17(1) of the Act within one month from today. 37. In the result, the petition not being maintainable by the Petitioner, is dismissed.