Honble JAIN, J.–In this writ petition the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 13.6.1996(Annex-1) and the proceedings initiated thereunder. (2) The petitioner has alleged that he was elected as one of the three members of the Municipal Board, Taranagar District Churu, which consists of 20 members in all in the election held on 27.8.95. It is submitted that while exercising the power under Section 63(4) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (for short the Act), the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 13.3.96, (Annx 1) on the ground on 31.1.96,he misbehaved with one Ramakant, Executive Officer, in the proceedings of the meeting held on 31.1.96. (3) It is alleged that a report of this incident was lodged on 2.2.96 at P.S. Tara- nagar, District Churu. A cross report was also lodged which is also pending investigation by the CID (CB), Jaipur. (4) Shri C.K. Garg learned counsel for the Caveator filed reply and raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition is not maintainable. It is also submitted that on account of indecent behaviour and criminal assault on the Executive Offi- cer, for which a preliminary enquiry was held, and after considering the reply to show cause notice,an enquiry under Section(3) as contemplated, which is pending before the Joint Legal Rememberancer, as such the writ petition is pre-mature and the same is liable to be dismissed being pre-mature. He also submits that this writ petition involves disputed questions of fact regarding the alleged incident. He has also filed reply on merits and submits that if petitioner is left with any grievance after the enquiry is held by the Joint L.R., he has a remedy to approach this Court and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on merits also. (5) In this case, the main contention of Shri Dhankar learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of 74th Amendment and insertion of Part IX-A in the Cons- titution, the disqualification mentioned in Section 63(4) of the Act of 1959 cannot be invoked as it is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 243 ZF, and becomes repugnant in the absence of any rule framed to this effect,as period of one year has already elapsed. (6) On this basis, he submits that the impugned order dated 13.6.96 suspen- ding the petitioner is without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside. (6) On this basis, he submits that the impugned order dated 13.6.96 suspen- ding the petitioner is without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside. (7) Learned Advocate General was also issued notice and he also addressed to the Court on the points and submits that within a period of one year as provided under Article 243 ZF of the Constitution, the State Government by 2nd Amendment dated 29.4.94 has framed rules and necessary amendments were made, which are within the jurisdiction.He has also submitted that Section 63(4) of the Act could be invoked and, therefore, the impugned order is valid and the respondents are well within their jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. (8) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on the record and also carefully gone through the relevant provisions of law and the case law cited. (9) Admittedly, the incident, which has given rise to this writ petition, involves disputed questions of fact and cannot be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone as adjudication of such question needs investigation which cannot be made under Article 226 of the Constitution but since the petitioner has raised important legal questions, I deem it just and proper to examine the same in this writ petition. (10)The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no provision to remove a member in the Constitution and so-called amendment made by the respondents will not validate the same. According to him in the absence of any rule framed to this effect the respondents could not pass the impug- ned order dated 13.6.96, so the impugned order is without jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of Maharaja Umeg Singh Vs. State of Bombay, (1) and in the matter of In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957,(2).He has also placed reliance on the decision, in the matter of Automobile Transport Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan, (3) 114 and in the matter of M/s Adarsh Bhan- dar Vs. Sales Tax Officer(4). (11) Now the question which arises for determination in this case is as to whether the amendment so made empowers the respondents to pass the impugned order ? State of Rajasthan, (3) 114 and in the matter of M/s Adarsh Bhan- dar Vs. Sales Tax Officer(4). (11) Now the question which arises for determination in this case is as to whether the amendment so made empowers the respondents to pass the impugned order ? (12) There cannot be any dispute between the parties that for the purpose of election etc., there is no difference between the election of Member, Legislative Assembly and Member of Parliament but at the same time for the purpose of disqualification of members of Municipal Council and Gram Panchayat provisions applicable for the Member, Legislative Assembly and Member, Parliament, there is a separate Act and the rules are framed thereunder. Chapter 1 Part XI of the Cons- titution of India deals with Legislative Relations. Articles 245 and 246 empower the State Legislature to frame the rules. Further Entry 5 of List II (State List) empowers to enact laws regarding local bodies like Municipal Board and Panchayat etc. The legislature in its wisdom while enacting Article 243 ZF provided that for the period of one year any part inconsistent to the Constitution will remain in force and in between the period of one year the State Legislature was required to frame the rules. Rajasthan Municipality Act, 1959 has been enacted which has been allowed to continue in view of Article 243 ZF except the inconsistent part that too for a period of one year. Under the circumstances, the State Legislature amen- ded number of provisions vide Rajasthan Municipalities (Second Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994) including Sections 24 and 26 which are as follows :- ``Amendment of Section 24, Rajasthan Act No. 38 of 1959 in Section 24 of the Principal Act: (b) ..after clause (d) as so amended, the following shall be inserted namely :– (e) he has attained the age of 21 years, in either case whether the seat is reserved or not. ``Amendment of Section 26, Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959, in Section 26 of the Principal Act :- (a) after the words for being chosen as, expression,``or for being, shall be inserted, and. ``Amendment of Section 26, Rajasthan Act 38 of 1959, in Section 26 of the Principal Act :- (a) after the words for being chosen as, expression,``or for being, shall be inserted, and. (13) In view of the aforesaid amendment in Section 26 the general disqualifi- cations which were earlier applicable for the members for being chosen as a member of a Board, will now also be made applicable for the members who have been elected as a member of the Board, which means that the aforesaid disqualification will be applicable for both type of persons i.e.for the persons who are to be elected and for the persons who have been elected. In view of the aforesaid amendment, the inconsistent part to the provisions of Constitution has been removed. As already stated in view of Article 243 ZF existing law has been allowed to continue and will remain in force and valid unless challenged which is not the case of the petitioner. Therefore, the argument, that without any specific provision regarding removal no order invoking Section 63(4) can be passed, has no substan- ce. So also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that unless some amendment is made as per Article 243-V(1)(b), no member can be disqualified or removed, is of no avail. So under the circumstances the theory which the petitioner wants to get this court to adopt does not appear to be plausible particularly when the State Legislation has provided all possible probabilities in a manner and it can- not be said that the State is not conformed with the power as there are specific rules framed by the Legislation. (14) That apart counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show any inconsistency in the provisions of the Act and the Rules which even otherwise has no substance in view of above discussion. Moreover, the amendments made in Sec- tion 26`general disqualifications are for the persons who to be elected and for the persons who have been elected. In addition to this Section 63 of the aforesaid Act, provides for removal of members, the relevant Section reads as under :- ``63. Removal of members- (1) The State government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) & (3) remove a member of a Board on any of the following grounds, namely :- (a).... In addition to this Section 63 of the aforesaid Act, provides for removal of members, the relevant Section reads as under :- ``63. Removal of members- (1) The State government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) & (3) remove a member of a Board on any of the following grounds, namely :- (a).... Provided that the period during which such member was in jail as an under prisoner trial or as a detenue or as a political prisoner shall not be taken into account, (b) to (c) ... (d) that he has, (i) been guilty of misconduct in the discharges, or (ii) been guilty of any disgraceful conduct, or (iii) become incapable of performing his duties as a member, or (iv) otherwise flagrantly abused in any manner, his position as such member. (15) A bare perusal of the above Section as well as the other sections referred above, makes it clear that the State Government was well within its rights to pass the impugned order suspending the petitioners in the exercise of powers under Section 63(4)of the Act of 1959.Section 63 of the Act of 1959 deals with removal of members on certain contingencies on which a member can be removed in the exercise of this Section after following the procedure laid down in it. As stated above, if there is violation and a member is guilty and his case falls under the aforesaid provision, the same can be invoked. In view of this, when existing law on the subject is not inconsistent conferring ample powers on the respondents which can be invoked as per the provisions of law and once inconsistent part to the Constitution has been removed by the Second Amendment Act, dated 29.4.94 within a period of one year of the period of enactment of part IX A of the Constitution, in my opinion, the respondents are well within their jurisdiction to issue the impugned order. (16) So far as the case stated by the learned counsel for the parties, the prin- ciple enunciated has not been disputed by the other side, so not necessary to deal with but they are not applicable to the facts of the present case, as discussed and are not helpful to the petitioner. (17) It is pertinent to note that the enquiry is pending with the Joint L.R. and the same is likely to be completed. (17) It is pertinent to note that the enquiry is pending with the Joint L.R. and the same is likely to be completed. In case after conclusion of the enquiry any grie- vance remains, the petitioner will be free to avail the remedy available under the law. Under these circumstances, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 13.3.1996 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the concerned authority is directed to expedite the enquiry and conclude the same in accordance with law at the earliest. (18) No other point was pressed before me. (19) With the above observations, the writ petition is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. _